



KANT, HERDER,
AND
THE BIRTH OF ANTHROPOLOGY



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
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For Katie




CONTENTS



	ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	ix
INTRODUCTION	The Emergence of the Personal Rivalry between Kant and Herder and the Disciplinary "Calving" of Anthropology from Philosophy	i
CHAPTER ONE	The <i>Aufklärung</i> of the 1760s: "Philosophy for the World" or <i>Bildung</i> as Emancipation	15
CHAPTER TWO	Kant and the Leibniz-Wolff School to 1762–1763	43
CHAPTER THREE	"An Altogether Different Kant": The "Gallant <i>Magister</i> " and <i>Popularphilosophie</i>	83
CHAPTER FOUR	A "Kantian of the Year 1765": Herder's Conception of the Project of Philosophy	137
CHAPTER FIVE	Kant's Crisis of Professional Identity: The Calling of Philosophy and the <i>Dreams of a Spirit-Seer</i>	179
CHAPTER SIX	Constituting the Discourse of Anthropology: The "Philosophical Physicians"	221
CHAPTER SEVEN	Kant's Critical Turn and Its Relation to His Anthropology Course	255
CHAPTER EIGHT	"Enough Speculating; Let's Get Our Facts Straight": Herder and the Agenda of German Anthropology in the 1770s	309
	CONCLUSION	347
	NOTES	353
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	495
	NAME INDEX	551
	SUBJECT INDEX	561

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Sometimes getting stuck in an airport can be a blessing. I was en route to the south of France to attend a conference, "The Pre-Critical Kant," in the delectable setting of the Centre Les Trois Hiboux near Albi. I had made it as far as the Amsterdam airport and was waiting for my connecting flight to Toulouse. Susan Shell walked up; it turned out she was on the same connecting flight to the same destination. We chatted briefly. Then came the announcement that our "equipment" for the connecting flight was out of commission and that we would be stuck in the airport for many hours. With nothing else to do, Susan and I began talking about the papers we had written for the conference, and as the hours stretched out, the conversation spun into one of the most illuminating discussions of the whole trajectory of Kant's intellectual life that I have ever experienced. That extended conversation galvanized the ideas which ultimately became this book. I thank Susan for that inspiration even as I exonerate her from any responsibility for the errors or excesses that my enthusiasm for the project may subsequently have interjected.

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discernment and above all for its generosity toward an upstart who dared on so many occasions to dispute him. Predrag gave me the opportunity to pursue the ideas that had been born in the conversation with Susan Shell and thus to do homage to his (and my) great teacher. I thank them both.

Hans Adler heard me give a talk on my new project at the American Society for Eighteenth Century Studies meetings and he invited me to submit it to *Monatshefte*, the distinguished journal of which he is an editor. I sent him a swollen compound of the two earlier drafts and he wisely urged me to prune it down to a proper journal article length and return it to him. Instead, the project mushroomed into this book. I thank Hans for the invitation, for the good humor with which he received the news of my deviance, and most of all for his discriminating and helpful comments on the book manuscript.

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
What fruitful new developments would not arise if only our whole philosophy would become anthropology.

—Herder, "Wie die Philosophie zum Besten des Volks
allgemeiner und nützlicher werden kann"

Suppose Kant had not been Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Königsberg. Suppose rather that, like his friend Berens, he had become a businessman; or like his pupil Herz a physician; or like his neighbor Hippel a civic administrator; or like his brother Johann Heinrich a pastor. Suppose, further—and this is easier to suppose—he had like the first three followed a literary avocation. We may presume that he would have had a reputation in his time as good as that of many men we have mentioned in this book, and would now be as forgotten as they.

—Lewis White Beck, *Early German Philosophy:*
Kant and His Predecessors

INTRODUCTION



The Emergence of the Personal Rivalry between Kant and Herder and the Disciplinary “Calving” of Anthropology from Philosophy

This is a study in contextual intellectual history. My goal is to assess how the thrust of *Aufklärung* in the 1760s impressed itself upon two of its most important and critical participants, Immanuel Kant and his greatest student and latter-day rival, Johann Gottfried Herder. It is striking that we must go back to the notes Herder took in Kant's classes between 1762 and 1764 to find a benchmark for the evolution of both men: this is the earliest testimony of their intellectual orientation on many of the issues that most interest us. Of course, Kant had been lecturing at the University of Königsberg for seven years and had published a number of papers when Herder came to him as a new student in 1762. But they shared in a remarkable moment of intellectual discovery and growth associated with the penetration into Germany of the thought of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and especially Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and in the endeavor to use these exciting new insights to revise the established philosophical view codified in the works of Christian Wolff and Alexander Baumgarten. One might well say that each of them set himself the challenge: How should an *Aufgeklärter* philosophize in the aftermath of Rousseau?

What does the shift in the meaning of *Aufklärung* occurring in Germany in the 1750s and 1760s, the contest between *Schulphilosophie* and *Popularphilosophie* as well as between indigenous and external (French and English) philosophical ideas, have to do with what Kant himself later

articulated as the mission of an "age of enlightenment"? Can the context of *Aufklärung* in the Germany of the 1760s, especially as it bore upon the sense of philosophy's mission, offer us a supplementary vantage for considering Kant's unhappy love affair with metaphysics, especially in his turbulent 1760s? Can it perhaps even open new perspectives for elucidating his still mysterious *Umwälzung* of 1769? To grasp these questions, Herder proves indispensable. As Kant's favorite student, Herder was closer to him than any other observer, modeling and projecting identities for his mentor as for himself in the broader campaign for enlightenment. I propose to draw on several moments in Herder's intellectual development over the 1760s, both for their expression of his views and for their juxtaposition with Kant's. Indeed, at times I will read them not so much for Herder's sake, but for the light they shed on Kant's shifting position. Recognizing Herder's experience of, and participation in, the wider intellectual discourse of the decade, one must constantly ask whether Kant could have been oblivious to it and, since that is preposterous, why he took so different a stance.

The rivalry of Kant and Herder became a matter of public record starting in the mid-1780s.¹ The closeness of their relationship at the outset, in the years when Herder was one of Kant's most prized students, is also widely recognized. There is even fairly wide consensus that Herder remained, as Rudolf Haym famously stated, a "Kantian of the year 1765" for the balance of his life.² There have been efforts to articulate the fundamental differences between the "critical" Kant and the mature Herder, notably Hans Dietrich Irmscher's essay concerning Kant and Herder on the crucial matter of history.³ After many years of dismissing Herder as a "philosophical dilettante," a series of works has finally emerged that try seriously to reconstruct Herder's philosophical efforts in their own right, and not simply as unworthy from a Kantian vantage; here the recent works of Ulrich Gaier, Hans Adler, and Marion Heinz stand as my immediate inspiration.⁴ What I propose is an effort, along the lines they have pioneered, to trace the *emergence* of the differences between Herder and Kant, articulating the rift as it widened gradually over the last years of the 1760s and the first years of the 1770s. Central to this study is recovering the image of Kant in the mind of the young Herder. What Herder made of Kant in the 1760s is vitally important evidence of Kant's undertakings. But I am concerned with Herder's "reception" of Kant as much as with Kant's "influence."⁵ That image of Kant's person and project best helps us understand the origins of Herder's own project and also his gradual disillusionment with Kant's actual philosophical course. At the same time, the incongruity of Herder's image with his own self-conception explains Kant's growing displeasure with his former student and its eventual

turn into public enmity. I suggest this mutual estrangement had dramatic consequences for their respective impacts on the times.

Contextual history is not causally unidirectional. The times were important in constructing the identities and projects of Kant and Herder, but these men were instrumental in shaping their times. The influences of Kant and Herder on the German *Aufklärung* can best be understood in terms of their divergent conceptions of philosophy and anthropology. Thus, the account of their relationship opens out into a narrative of the gradual crystallization of a new disciplinary consciousness in Germany, the rise of anthropology.⁶ The parting of ways between Kant and Herder came at exactly the moment when anthropology in Germany “calved” away from philosophy.⁷ I mean to show that was no coincidence. German anthropological discourse crystallized in three distinct manifestations around the year 1772: first, Ernst Platner’s publication of *Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise*; second, Kant’s inaugural course in anthropology at the University of Königsberg; and third, the publication of Herder’s prize-winning *Essay on the Origins of Language*.⁸ Herder was among the earliest and most radical advocates of supplanting philosophy with anthropology, and he devoted his life’s work to that endeavor, with all its promise and perils.⁹ Kant developed a view of anthropology that was unique—if not idiosyncratic—vis-à-vis the wider *Aufklärung*, and while his role in the constitution of that discipline was substantial, it was also partial in all the senses of that word. I will argue that while the precritical Kant exercised a seminal influence on the emergence of the new disciplinary discourse, the critical Kant systematically subordinated anthropology to metaphysics in a way that ran against the grain of anthropology’s disciplinary ambitions. Indeed, as the discipline struggled toward actualization, both in substance and in name, it was Herder who proved ultimately its most fertile proponent.¹⁰ That revisionist point will be the major historical harvest of the account to be developed here.

The terminus of this inquiry is the emergence of the new discipline of anthropology. Claude Blanckaert writes: “The birth of a new area of study or the way it gains its autonomy is a social and collective event rather than an individual fact, an event that occurs in the dimension of ‘*longue durée*’ and rarely stands out like a bright light punctuating the line of time.”¹¹ This essential historical admonition governs my approach in relating Kant and Herder to the emergence of the eighteenth-century “discipline” of anthropology. We must begin immediately with the proviso that its “discipline” is not ours, that it did not have the professional, institutional, or methodological parameters that are so essential to our notion of disciplinarity.¹² In this sense, Michel Foucault was right to challenge an unreflected sense

of present continuity with the "science of man" of the eighteenth century, wrong as he was to deny that it had one.¹³ The sense of discipline with which we will be working is that of a focus of questioning, "a new rubric in the space of knowledge," in the apt terms of Francisco Vidal.¹⁴ That is, by the second half of the eighteenth century a set of preoccupations galvanized and crystallized allegiances and projects, resulting in the gestation of what Imre Lakatos would call a "research programme," or Thomas Kuhn a "paradigm."¹⁵ Gradually over the nineteenth century, as Blanckaert has suggested, a discipline with institutional parameters in our sense emerged.¹⁶ In linking the origins of German anthropological discourse to the parting of ways between Kant and Herder in the late 1760s and early 1770s, I hardly pretend to an exhaustive account, but rather offer one important avenue to its historical reconstruction.

AN "ALTOGETHER DIFFERENT KANT":

KANT'S INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY, 1762-1773

There is a concurrent ambition in this study, which centers very much upon Kant and Kant's relation to the *Aufklärung* conceived in its widest sense. This study will accentuate what Karl Vorländer once called an "altogether different Kant."¹⁷ All Kant scholars know of the time when Kant was the "gallant *Magister*." For the most part this has been considered simply a marginally interesting sidelight on Kant's rigorous philosophical labors. Even Kant's biographers find themselves concerned only to counter the image of the dry-as-dust scholar who manacled his life to maxims and called that freedom.¹⁸ Still, recent publications suggest the direction for a new approach to Kant that smiles at Heinrich Heine's witticism that Kant had no life and therefore no biography or history, but more earnestly disputes the penchant of conventional Kant scholarship to look past any possible historical contextualization to address the "timeless" philosophical arguments of the Königsberg *Aufklärer*.¹⁹ Kant had a history and a biography; he lived in his time, embodying and contesting it in richly nuanced ways. My study is a contribution to this historical-biographical recontextualization of Immanuel Kant.²⁰

In the study of Kant, as Norbert Hinske observes, biographers "are not in an enviable situation."²¹ Hinske blames the "willful unobtrusiveness [*gewollte Unauffälligkeit*]" of Kant's conduct of life (18). Not for nothing did Kant choose Francis Bacon's motto, *de nobis ipsis silemus*, for the definitive version of his first *Critique*.²² Gerhard Lehmann formulates the same issue even more pointedly, writing of "the prejudice cultivated by Kant himself of

his so-called impersonality [*Unpersönlichkeit*]."²³ To take the "risk [*Wagnis*] of an *authentic* biography," Lehmann suggests, one would need to "seek out the turning points in Kant's life" (412–13). Hinske makes the same point. Setting out from the drastic segmentation that divides the two stereotypes with which tradition has configured Kant's biography—the "old Kant" of legendary regimen, and the "gallant *Magister*" that was added as corrective—Hinske argues that the transition calls for more consideration. "But what was it, so goes the key question of this life, that transformed the elegant *Magister* into that rigorous, virtually mechanical laborer [*Arbeitsmensch*] [of the later years]?"²⁴ Lehmann maintains that a full examination of how and why that transformation arose would require "a special investigation" that would work through all the materials of the 1760s and beyond. Though the crisis had a determinate point of inception, he writes, it had no similarly determinate moment of closure; instead, it was "essentially interminable [*wesentlich unabschließbar*]."²⁵ This study aims to contribute toward such a "special investigation."

I am interested in approximately one decade in Kant's history and biography, 1762–1773, a decade or so in which his compass wobbled wildly from the telos of the critical philosophy we have ever since enshrined. Relieved—and philosophically legitimated—by Kant's "critical turn," the disposition of all historians of philosophy has been to pass over this erratic decade as a mere episode after which Kant found his true path and went on, consistently over the subsequent thirty years, to create that monument of modern philosophical culture, the critical system. Even as historically sensitive a Kant scholar as Giorgio Tonelli may be taken as exemplary of all this: "The essayistic style became fashionable only at the time of the so-called 'popular philosophers' such as Mendelssohn, Meiners, Tetens, etc. Kant, in his precritical period, shared this view; but he was soon converted to a very new kind of systematic spirit, which would henceforth inform his critical philosophy."²⁶ Who could dispute that the Kant of critical philosophy is a figure of world-historical significance? What, on the other hand, of that Kant of the 1760s, of whom Lewis Beck once offered us such a charming, yet at the same time dismissive, conjectural portrait?²⁷ A Kant who never made the "critical turn," Beck assures us, would have been a thoroughly representative figure of German Enlightenment thought, worthy of perhaps a paragraph in the history of philosophy. But would he really have been as insignificant as Beck makes out? I would like to reconsider this ephemeral precritical Kant, to ask whether he does not deserve a larger stature in the history of the German *Aufklärung*, not simply as a representative but as a dissident and even a transformer.

I suspect that we have misplaced something hitherto in our conception of the critical turn. We have not been careful enough in determining what Kant was turning away *from*.²⁸ The traditional claim has been that it was Wolffian school metaphysics. But that turn had happened already by 1762–1763. Dieter Henrich has given us a very persuasive argument that in 1762–1763 Kant achieved the first systematic form of his philosophy.²⁹ But in a passage that is crucial for this study, he adds, “that Kant, the metaphysician, went silent before the end of 1763 and hid himself for the next seven years in elegant and popular occasional pieces, should be just as strong an indication that Kant’s system-conception of 1762 went into crisis” (11). I am interested in that crisis and in the seven years of a different Kant that ensued before Kant made the critical turn.

I propose what Kant turned away from around 1769–1770 was in fact the path of a *popular philosopher*. In the preceding seven years, deeply troubled about the direction of traditional German school metaphysics, as well as about the role of the *Gelehrtenstand* in the project of Enlightenment, it is not unreasonable to suspect that Kant considered an alternative identity, that of the popular philosopher—a project that in fact Herder would take up in his stead (and even, I am suggesting, in his image). A complete itinerary for this road not taken, this “altogether different Kant,” would begin in the thicket of Herder’s lecture notes, move through *Observations* and the *Remarks in the “Observations,”* climax in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* and Kant’s precious few letters of the later 1760s (to Johann Lambert, to Moses Mendelssohn, and to Herder), and close in Kant’s creation of his anthropology course, 1772–1773.

Virtually no one has taken sufficiently seriously the personality, desires, and struggles of the *teacher*, whose charismatic style—attested to by a generation of testimonials—may well have shaped the sensibility of the age in a manner not yet fully appreciated. Likewise we need to retrieve Kant the *writer* (*Schriftsteller*, in its precise German usage), striving to make a name for himself in and for the new public of the *Aufklärung*—a figure to be compared (if not entirely favorably) to Hume and Rousseau in terms of style and wit and urbanity: an essayist and a *Popularphilosoph*. This was not a Kant who persisted or prevailed; the Kant who emerged as a world-historical philosopher may well have purchased his immortality at the price of this ephemeral historicity. Yet the historical possibility of an alternative life will concern us here, for the Kant of that possibility was, perhaps despite his own ambivalence, one important inspiration for the anthropological culture of the *Aufklärung* he would quite explicitly seek to redirect.

Had Kant pursued this alternative path, I am convinced, it would not be nearly so easy to dismiss the whole idea of popular philosophy in Germany

as trivial. As Reinhard Brandt writes: "If Kant had published his lectures [on anthropology] as a book in the [17]70s already, the image of Kant today would be completely different: the popular philosophers could not have been able to turn against him, because in the Anthropology Kant was himself a popular philosopher."³⁰ Moreover, once we take this point seriously, the path that Kant's most important disciple of the 1760s *did* take, Herder's development of a new hermeneutic historicism, assumes more centrality in the overall history of the German *Aufklärung*. Indeed, it becomes possible to see Herder as fulfilling the promise of the path Kant abandoned, and that raises the prospect that the second half of the eighteenth century in Germany could be construed as the struggle between two philosophical possibilities inaugurated by Kant in the 1760s. Helmut Pfotenbauer writes of the "epistemological dichotomies" and "anthropological bridge-building efforts" of the late eighteenth century as follows: "Therewith two of the most important types of aesthetic theory construction in the last third of the century, i.e., after the departure of School philosophy, the anthropological and the transcendental-philosophical, mutually constrain one another and thus demonstrate their incompatibility."³¹

That puts a new spin on the old idea that the bitter rivalry that emerged between the two figures after 1784 was really the conflict between the critical and the precritical Kant.³² The traditional formulation, of course, privileges the critical position, structuring the whole encounter with a Kantian prejudice. That has long been the historical verdict. But recent work is strongly suggesting that this traditional view is not very illuminating, either for the immediate moment or for the longer term conception of the history of Western thought. Recently revisionism has been suggesting that the position taken up by Kant (and a fortiori the one taken up by the Idealists) was impossible to sustain and that in a longer term perspective at least elements of what Isaiah Berlin long ago called the German "Counter-Enlightenment"—Johann Hamann, F. H. Jacobi, and, in his view, Herder—proved stronger.³³ Frederick Beiser, for example, has argued that the line from Hume to Friedrich Nietzsche has proven far more influential for modernism and especially postmodernism than the Kantian enterprise of a transcendental grounding of reason.³⁴ Beiser traces this line from Berlin's "counter enlightenment" via the Jena Romantics, the later Friedrich Schelling and Søren Kierkegaard. That may render the history of modern thought in too starkly an anti-Enlightenment light. But there is an alternative tradition, one not so hostile to the Enlightenment, that would carry forward from Herder to Wilhelm von Humboldt and G. W. F. Hegel, to Friedrich Schleiermacher and Friedrich Wolf, to the left Hegelians, to Leopold von Ranke, Johann Droysen,

and Wilhelm Dilthey: the tradition of hermeneutics and historicism. I believe that tradition deserves to be regarded as part of the "unfinished project of the Enlightenment," not lumped among its adversaries.³⁵ But that would entail seeing the Enlightenment as more than just the Kantian critical philosophy, or at least it urges us to reconsider the eighteenth century without orthodox Kantian lenses.

To see *Popularphilosophie* as significant in this longer term trajectory becomes more plausible if we see not Johann Feder or even Christian Garve as the principal exponent of this stance, but rather Johann Gottfried Herder. Indeed, I contend that Herder entered upon his vision of "anthropology" in the phase of popular philosophy associated with the *Hochaufklärung* in the 1760s and developed it over the balance of his career. His polemical confrontation with Kant, starting in the mid-1780s, led to his isolation from the German Idealists (not without having deeply influenced them despite themselves), and his reputation suffered significantly as a result.³⁶ But recent scholarship suggests that Herder may have been a far more weighty force in the late eighteenth century than a traditional Kantian conception of that period allows. Particularly crucial for current scholarship is Herder's role in late-eighteenth-century "anthropology." Hans-Jürgen Schings notes "the unusually high interest nowadays in Herder, who as no other embodies the style of thought and the competence of an anthropologist."³⁷

TAKING "POPULAR PHILOSOPHY" SERIOUSLY

We must be careful, in assessing the rise of *Popularphilosophie*, that the latter not be underestimated, construed merely as *vulgar* philosophy—as philosophy conducted with insufficient intellectual rigor.³⁸ Notoriously, the image of popular philosophy has been colored by Kant's vehement rebuttal in the *Prolegomena* of the Garve-Feder review of his first *Critique*.³⁹ Lewis Beck's handling of the popular philosophers is a typical modern example: he can see them as little more than "lightweight opponents of Kant."⁴⁰ Their concerns, Beck condescends, "found suitable expression in pretty essays, diaries, private correspondence destined to be published and autobiographies" (320). Their "superficial conception of the role and scope of philosophy was destroyed by Kant," he asserts (323). But that is hardly a fair historical or philosophical treatment. We must rivet our attention on the idea of philosophy *for* the people, in other words, intellectual advocacy of the self-constitution of the people, that sense of Enlightenment that Kant was eventually to advocate as "emergence from self-inflicted immaturity."⁴¹ *Popularphilosophie* signified "philosophy for the world," a redefinition of

philosophy's mission away from the traditional preoccupation with logic and metaphysics, with theoretical knowledge and its certainty, to a new ethical and sociopolitical agency for change and progress. Those very terms, *change* and *progress*, rendered historical the standards of philosophy and set as the highest criterion precisely the "vocation of man [*Bestimmung des Menschen*]." What Kant would articulate much later in his writings on philosophy of history as the actualization of the "highest good" or the "kingdom of God on earth" found voice already in the *Aufklärung* of the 1760s under the rubric of *Popularphilosophie* and the new concern with "anthropology."

Periodization can provide a very useful structure here. We can distinguish three phases of popular philosophy in Germany over the eighteenth century. The notorious form of popular philosophy, protracted "guerilla resistance" against Kantianism led by Johann Feder and Christoph Meiners throughout the *Spätaufklärung*, has for too long been the only one scholars have considered, largely because of their own Kantian blinders. Historically, it should be seen as only its third (and least interesting) phase.

The first phase was associated with Christian Thomasius and the *Früh-aufklärung*. In his own words, Thomasius called for "an easy manner, comprehensible to all rational persons of whatever station or gender [*waserley Standes oder Geschlechts*]." ⁴² Thomasius advocated a radically pragmatic revision of reason: "the critical application of sound human understanding to historical circumstances." ⁴³ He wanted to create a general German culture, and to do so he felt compelled to break free from the stranglehold of theologically orthodox university culture. ⁴⁴ This was the same motive that led him, roughly simultaneously, to offer the first lecture in the German language at a German university, and to establish the first popular journal in German. ⁴⁵

For a span, Thomasius's eclectic program of Enlightenment worked in tandem at the University of Halle with a movement in Lutheran religion, Pietism, which resisted dogma in the name of concrete moral-religious life. ⁴⁶ But Pietism itself soon hardened into a sort of orthodoxy. ⁴⁷ The result was the famous quarrel between these Pietists and the systematic rationalist Christian Wolff that resulted in his dismissal from Halle in 1723. Ironically, this martyrdom helped make a hero of Wolff, and his ideal of *Gründlichkeit* swiftly became dominant in Germany. A new concern for theoreticity prevailed in the German universities, and Thomasius's idea of a practical, eclectic, engaged style of reason went into eclipse. "Science," in this new sense of disciplinary rigor, became the key to intellectual life. For a span of some thirty years, from 1720 through 1750, *Schulphilosophie* in the guise of *Gründlichkeit* prevailed. Wolff enforced this after his reinstatement at Halle

in 1740; Albrecht von Haller at Göttingen and Johann Gottsched at Leipzig played similar roles in these years.

Nevertheless, starting around midcentury a second phase of popular philosophy rose up against this triumphant Wolffian *Schulphilosophie*. This is the phase (*Hochaufklärung*, 1750–1780) to which this study is devoted. Three impulses conjoined to spawn an opposition to Wolff even before his death. First, there were the immanent philosophical objections to his system, especially to the idea of mathematical method in philosophy.⁴⁸ Second, there was the massive incursion of foreign thought, both French and British.⁴⁹ Third, there was the retrieval of Thomasius's idea of "eclecticism" precisely as a resource to bring the philosopher, the university scholar in general, "down to earth" or back into the "world."⁵⁰ Beyond the university, things were stirring. The impulses that Thomasius set in motion with his popular journal gathered into a huge tide of such journals, the "moral weeklies," between 1740 and 1770, creating the reading public that Thomasius could only envision.⁵¹ The moral weeklies had largely completed their work by midcentury when a new, more sophisticated style of periodical literature came to succeed them. Journals of a distinctly more critical cultural or literary orientation came to prominence as a full-fledged literary market took shape.⁵² Berlin became the prime center for the emergence of such journals of the "beautiful arts" and the "beautiful sciences." There Friedrich Nicolai, Gotthold Lessing, and Moses Mendelssohn—with their allies Johann Sulzer, Friedrich Resewitz, Thomas Abbt, and others—created an intellectual context for the German public's reception of ideas from all Europe. These figures were committed to the program of *Hochaufklärung*; that is, they had a definite agenda for progress, freedom of expression, and an informed public opinion (*Öffentlichkeit*).⁵³ It was under the influence of this program that Kant developed his decisive reading of Rousseau. It was also at this moment that Herder was studying with Kant, perceiving the European Enlightenment through his mentor's discerning eyes.

This second phase of *Popularphilosophie* was of course overthrown, in its turn, by Kant's new form of rigorous philosophy after 1783. The third phase of "guerilla resistance" then ensued. The total defeat of this popular philosophy has traditionally been associated with the triumph of German Idealism in the 1790s: yet another "school philosophy." There is no question that the critical philosophy and its Idealist heirs dominated the cultural scene in Germany after 1786 and that Herder and all the others who dissented from this dominant culture went into eclipse. Yet the new interest in the emergence of anthropology as an empirical "science of man" in Germany in the last third of the eighteenth century, and its connection with wider

shifts in the natural sciences toward which Kant had at best ambivalent attitudes, opens a space for a substantial reappraisal of Herder's stature in the late Enlightenment. To be sure, he was the "loser" in the head-to-head struggle with Kant. But he may well have proved both more visionary and more indefatigable than we have for so long believed.

"Interpretations of Herder's scientific methodology hitherto showed that his anthropology, despite astonishing knowledge of the empirical sciences, was heavily influenced by older ways of thinking derived from metaphysics or theology, which after the rise of the critical philosophy of Kant were swiftly driven out of the empirical sciences."⁵⁴ This observation by H. B. Nisbet about the historiography of Herder's anthropology is accurate for everything written until very recently, but it is precisely the view that my whole study aims to revise. There are good reasons, both in terms of eighteenth-century developments in the sciences and in terms of current theorizing about the nature and history of empirical science, to question whether the Kantian victory was so definitive.⁵⁵ It is, on the other hand, quite valid to claim that Herder's thinking derived from older metaphysical and theological conceptions. The historical point is that everyone's did, including, I must say, Kant's.⁵⁶ The theoretical point is that Kant's conception of empirical science and especially the positivist culture of science that canonized it have fallen from grace in the current culture, and for sound theoretical reasons.⁵⁷ To grasp the historical emergence of anthropology, it is necessary, then, to be more attuned to theoretical issues crucial to our current notions of science and its development, as well as to the complexities of the actual historical situation of the sciences in the late eighteenth century in Europe generally and in Germany quite specifically.⁵⁸ In that optic, simultaneously historicist and presentist, Herder does not appear quite so easily dismissed.

I wish to suggest that even *within* the Kantian tradition Herder and his hermeneutic historicism played a larger role than has been recognized: the philosophical anthropology of Humboldt or Hegel has a strong Herderian tenor. Moreover, in the non-Kantian currents of the early nineteenth century, whether in the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Wolf or in the historicism of Ranke and Droysen, Herder's stamp is even clearer. Finally, if we take seriously both the link between the eighteenth-century "science of man" and the emergence of modern social science and the link between eighteenth-century naturalism and the rise of modern naturalized or evolutionary epistemology, Herder and the popular philosophy of which he was the prime German exponent deserve a dramatically higher estimation than orthodox Kantianism has hitherto permitted.

DELIMITING THE CLAIMS

Let me sum up what I set out to accomplish with this book. I have two objectives. First, I aim to retrieve for historical-philosophical attention a substantial body of thought in late-eighteenth-century Germany identified with "popular philosophy" and the "science of man" (anthropology), a body of thought that has typically been lost from sight in the history of philosophy in the shadow of Kant's monumental critical philosophy. I set out to retrieve these historical endeavors not only with a *historicist* concern for the prominent actuality of these currents in their time but with a *presentist* awareness that some of these impulses have become resources for quite contemporary endeavors in hermeneutics. But I have found a *second* and, it seems to me, highly complementary angle, namely that the very Kant whose *critical* philosophy explicitly repudiated these discourses had in his *precritical* period actively cultivated them, had emerged indeed as a potential leader for this movement, and continued to influence those who carried on in that vein after his critical turn against it.

In short, I hope I may invoke the precritical Kant's attitudes and endeavors to elicit—even from Kantians—a more charitable historical consideration of Kant's rivals. I neither seek nor expect to convince Kantians that these rivals deserve to have prevailed, that Kant should never have made the critical turn, or even that Kant's criticisms of the popular anthropological discourse were not telling. Kant did seriously consider being a popular philosopher. But only up to 1770. There were merits to the pursuit of popular philosophy, nonetheless, and others, notably Herder, continued in that pursuit, often invoking the very merits Kant himself embraced prior to 1770. I do not believe that the philosophical claims of popular philosophy are stronger than those of the critical system, though I do believe they are not as trivial as Kant and Kantians have represented them to be.

This is not a book about the critical philosophy. It is a book about *what else* there was—in Kant and especially in his milieu. It would be disingenuous to say that I do not find attractive *some* of the impulses of the popular philosophical movement I retrieve historically from the shadow of Kant's critical opprobrium. But it would be an absurd historical judgment to prize the popular philosopher Kant *might have been* over the critical philosopher he *became*. To be sure, I wish to solicit in my readers a suspension of the *privilege* the critical system has enjoyed against all other late-eighteenth-century discourses. But that is only so that they can once again consider the plural historical possibilities of that moment in thought and take seriously the tradition from which Kant made his turn and that continued along


the lines he himself abandoned. *That* is the project of my book. It is not too much, I believe, to ask that we recognize something of intellectual richness and worth in these endeavors, something that we may well today find it fruitful to renew. I accept the burden of making more philosophically perspicuous the warrant the popular philosophers offered for their views and also of making explicit why contemporary philosophical and hermeneutic thought might find the reconstruction of that endeavor of interest.

This last point warrants elaboration. Contemporary interest in philosophical issues is a legitimate basis for reconstituting the history of philosophy. The history of philosophy is always a project of reconstituting prior discourse in philosophy to accommodate the concerns of the present.⁵⁹ Just for this reason, the standing poles in history of philosophy have long been historicism and presentism, with extremists of each persuasion arguing for the irrelevance and anachronism of their respective rivals.⁶⁰ My contention, however, is that these two motivations need not be at loggerheads, and in the best history of philosophy they are not. Certainly, this study is motivated by both historicist and presentist considerations and by the belief that they are mutually reinforcing.

I believe that there is widespread interest today in the problems that the popular philosophers and the anthropologists of the eighteenth century took up. Not only would I point to the extraordinary development of arguments concerning the "social construction of reality," but I would stress the development within the most austere reaches of philosophy of the idea of a naturalized or evolutionary epistemology that is both explicitly *post-Kantian* and historical-hermeneutical in senses that make the late-eighteenth-century discourse I have retrieved very interesting.⁶¹ My point is that today, after massive philosophical arguments *have* been made against the Kantian system—by such philosophers as Carnap, Quine, and Wittgenstein, to mention only those in the analytic tradition—we can go back to the eighteenth century with more generous attention to non-Kantian views. By the dawn of the twenty-first century, some skepticism has developed about what remains of Kant's transcendental ambitions.⁶² At the same time many of us seek to rediscover and redeploy the hermeneutic strategies of the path he abandoned and Herder took up.⁶³

In a sociable century, such as our own, am I not to be permitted to regard the stock which a multiplicity of entertaining, instructive, and easily understood knowledge offers for the maintenance of social intercourse as one of the benefits which it is not demeaning for science to have before its eyes?

—Kant, *Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen*
in dem Winterhalbenjahre von 1765-1766



The *Aufklärung* of the 1760s:
 “Philosophy for the World”
 or *Bildung* as Emancipation

The system of Christian Wolff has often served as a virtually opaque backdrop against which to set the drama of Kant’s philosophical career. We need to see *through* Wolff to a fuller context in which he was an important but often only a placeholding figure. The task of this chapter is to configure the multiple contexts through which Kant and Herder experienced the decade of *Aufklärung* roughly from the early 1760s to the early 1770s.¹ Here the idea is to link Kant’s well-known rebellion against orthodox Wolffianism to a larger current of thought in the *Aufklärung* that saw Wolffian *Schulphilosophie* not only—or even primarily—as a problem of metaphysics (technical philosophy) but also as an obstacle to cultural—and even political—emancipation.² In short, much of what in intellectual history has fallen under the rubric Enlightenment belongs equally to the social history of the “public sphere,” or to the political history of “bourgeois emancipation.” For a social group that would define itself and its progressive aspirations around education, philosophy and its constitutive role in the university and in the creation and propagation of culture could not be a matter of indifference. It is this idea which gives sharpness to the cultural assault upon *Schulphilosophie* at the middle of the eighteenth century. The German *Hochaufklärung* (1750–1780) maintained that philosophy was far too important to be left to (such) philosophers.

Disputes among philosophers regarding the character and practice of their discipline interfaced with a wider social transformation of culture.

In the terms of Hans Erich Bödeker, there was a contest between the new *gebildeten Stände* and the established *Gelehrtenstand*. Questions of the uses of philosophical knowledge played a significant role: "the 'gebildeten Stände' were not any longer identical at all with the traditional 'gelehrten Stand.' . . . Accordingly the traditional concept of the 'gelehrten Stände' was devalued and confined to the guild quality of the traditional scholarly estate."³ Similarly, Frank Kopitzsch notes that while "academic schools and universities were of substantial importance for the propagation of enlightenment ideas," over the course of the eighteenth century "the enlightenment expanded in all ways—in thematic terms as well as in recruitment—turning from a matter of 'scholars [*Gelehrten*]' to a concern of the 'educated [*Gebildeten*].'"⁴

What alternative model(s) of the intellectual (our anachronistic term) prevailed in the later eighteenth century? One model was French, and its nomenclature warrants reflection: these were *philosophes*, but what that signified had changed dramatically from the seventeenth century and earlier. That, indeed, is the core of the matter: redefining the meaning—in other words, the mission and practice—of philosophy. Another clue is to be found in the term *Bildung* and the model of education and subsequent life practice it came to represent over the course of the eighteenth century.⁵ To be *gebildet* was not simply to be *gelehrt*. Sometimes it was not even clear that they were compatible. The uncoupling of *Bildung* from traditional *Gelehrsamkeit* is central to the *Hochaufklärung*.⁶ Something about the acquisition and management of learning was centrally in dispute here. It was in dispute not only at the level of the individual person, but also at the social-historical level, and that was precisely the burden of the key term for the epoch, *Aufklärung*.⁷ Recently scholars have been carefully examining the intense discussions of the meaning of *Aufklärung* that took place in Germany in the 1780s. Attention then and now focuses on the two famous essays by Moses Mendelssohn and Immanuel Kant on the question, "What is Enlightenment?" which appeared in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*.⁸ What needs to be observed is that the issues that came to articulation through these two landmark essays already had a substantial intellectual and institutional history in eighteenth-century Germany, as the very term associated with these events, *Spätaufklärung*, would token. Indeed, it behooves us to go back some twenty years to appraise what many of these same figures, notably Mendelssohn and Kant, understood by *Aufklärung*.

There is considerable evidence that the course of *Aufklärung* took a decisive turn in Germany around the middle of the eighteenth century.⁹ It was a moment in which *Schulphilosophie*, especially in its orthodox

Wolffian form, seemed to have lost momentum and to be ceding leadership among the intellectual currents of the day to what came to be called *Popularphilosophie*.¹⁰ Connected with this, and supplying considerable energy for it, was the German assimilation of ideas from France and, above all, England. It was also a moment in which the legacy of the almost forgotten early *Aufklärung* figure, Christian Thomasius, came to be retrieved in Germany.¹¹ A way to put the central dispute over *Schulphilosophie* is to say that by midcentury its critics doubted that it could serve the grand purpose of *Aufklärung* any longer.

To grasp this social appropriation of philosophy, there are two loci of cultural transformation that need to be correlated, the university and the "public sphere" (*Öffentlichkeit*), both of which must always be understood in terms of the authority exercised over them by the territorial states. Within the university setting, the distillation of philosophy into a "special science" (*Fachwissenschaft*) and its pursuit of grander directorial aspirations for the entire academy (what Kant would later call the *Streit der Fakultäten*) were at issue. The meanings of "discipline" and "science," the place of philosophy as a "faculty" within the institutional hierarchy of the university—all these were drastically underdetermined in these decades, yet the moment proved seminal in a process that achieved substantial clarification only early in the next century in Wilhelm von Humboldt's University of Berlin.

Within the "public sphere," the issue has been called "bourgeois emancipation" but would perhaps more prudently be termed the emergence of elements of what in the nineteenth century could securely be termed a *Bildungsbürgertum*.¹² Only the cataclysmic events of the French Revolution decisively effectuated the shift from estate to class stratification so that, in the nineteenth century, *bourgeois* would become commonplace in social identification both subjectively for the historical actors and conceptually for the historian. The very idea of a "public sphere" is by no means uncontroversial, to say nothing of "bourgeois" or *Bildung*.¹³ Yet these terms are, at least, historically grounded: people used them; moreover, they proved vital to the people's self-understanding. By the 1790s, elements especially in Prussian society came to be identified as *gebildeten Stände*.¹⁴ This was a new phrase, to be distinguished in three directions: from the *höheren Stände* (the aristocracy and upper ministerial elite), from the traditional *Ständegesellschaft* (the corporate social order of birth and status inherited from the middle ages), and from the *Gelehrtenstand* (grasped narrowly as the university professoriat). Indeed, much of the cultural struggle of *Aufklärung* would be about discriminating this new social category, *gebildeten Stände*, from the very concept *Stand*, which persisted in its name but which was

in fact incompatible with its actuality. And it was precisely here that the *gebildeten Stände* made an issue of the nature and role of the "philosophy faculty" and of philosophy altogether: it should help them become *gebildet*. Failure at that could be laid at the door of the "lower faculty" far more plausibly than at the door of the higher professional faculties. The struggle for emancipation—or, perhaps more accurately, for self-definition and eventual public recognition—of the emergent *gebildeten Stände* found expression in a sharply negative attitude toward university scholarship and the model of enculturation it offered.

We have not yet resolved anything with these terms, but we now have a more recognizable constellation of questions. There are three levels of inquiry through which we can achieve the necessary clarification. The first level is that of philosophy as a specific disciplinary pursuit. The second level is that of philosophy as the name (and also the agenda) of the so-called lower faculty within the university system, in other words, the "arts faculty" as distinguished from the "higher" or professional faculties of theology, jurisprudence, and medicine. The third level is that of "philosophy for the world," or, in its more problematic and polemical formulation, *Popularphilosophie*. These are obviously circles of widening implication, with the last opening out onto the world.¹⁵

That idea of "world," it must be noted from the outset, meant only the bourgeois public sphere; it largely excluded participation by the lower classes, though *Volk* was by no means excluded from its rhetoric.¹⁶ It is a matter of some controversy whether it included even as a possibility participation by non-Europeans or by women, and a particular issue was the role permitted Jews. These were the unpleasant limits of the Enlightenment as an age, and they were certainly not unique to Germany. Moreover, there were occasionally remarkable exceptions to this exclusionary practice that help retrieve some historical authenticity for the Enlightenment's fervently avowed—if subjectively equivocal—universalism in theory. That in turn helps illuminate the irreversibility of the long-term reception of universalist Enlightenment ideals.

THE DISCIPLINE OF PHILOSOPHY: WOLFF'S IDEAL OF A RIGOROUS SCIENCE

Philosophy in the early modern period took as its disciplinary project self-liberation from the yoke of theology. This found literal expression in eighteenth-century Germany in the widespread (though brief) adoption of the term *Weltweisheit* for the discipline.¹⁷ The obvious thrust of the term was

toward secularization. The "world" meant physical nature, but even more it meant the human dimension, and philosophy took on the role of addressing the "essential interests of humanity," to use Kant's terms. Two issues latent in this turn to the world were, first, the problems of the adequacy of a "human measure"—not only cognitively but ethically—in the new physical world revealed by natural science, and, second, the problems of the "democratization" of philosophy: if it addressed universal human interests, should it not be accessible to everyone? But the initial conception of disciplinary philosophy was tightly bound up with resisting theology and its dogmatic interventions. The break with theology was no easy enterprise, and God and immortality would remain indispensable questions for metaphysics over the eighteenth century. Still, the point is that these questions—and all other questions of philosophy as a discipline distinct from theology—had to be answered, if possible, with only the resources available in the finite human mind.

The German situation, with its massive confessional investment in the institution of the university dating back to the Reformation, made the issue of this liberation of disciplinary philosophy from theology dangerous and protracted.¹⁸ In the eighteenth century, to practice philosophy in a German university—or even outside it—was always to work in the shadow of theology. This lingering subordination to dogma marked the German academic scene not only in the Catholic regions of the *Reich* but in the Protestant domains as well. Trends within Protestantism in Germany, both in practices and in doctrine, sharply affected the contours of philosophical discourse throughout the century. Salient episodes included the banishing of Wolff from Halle in 1723, the acrimony over the publication of the Reimarus fragments, the Spinoza controversy, and the Wöllner Edict of 1788.¹⁹

Nevertheless—and this was the signal achievement of Christian Wolff—a new disciplinary self-conception did crystallize for philosophy in early eighteenth-century Germany: the idea of philosophy as a "rigorous science."²⁰ Wolff's background was in mathematics and the natural sciences, and he brought with him into his philosophizing the ideal of the *esprit géométrique* so central to René Descartes and the seventeenth-century metaphysicians. Such rigorous science could only conceive itself as systematic. Above all it needed to be self-grounded or absolute. Systematicity, rigorous closure, was a hallmark of rationality for Wolff, requiring demonstrative proofs of all propositions. Grounding—*begründen*—was what distinguished philosophy, drawing it close to the lucidity of mathematics. The mode of knowledge in philosophy and natural science needed to approximate mathematics in its structure of argumentation and proof if it was to attain

true knowledge, or knowledge of truth. While it would be wrong to contend that Wolff simply identified mathematical and philosophical method, he saw more in common between them than would his eventual critics.²¹

By contrast, mere *cognitio historica* suffered two fatal deficiencies. Either it was literally derivative—secondhand or “book” knowledge—or it was all too unreflected, *nuda facti notitia*, immediate sense experience (*Sinnlichkeit* or *Erfahrung*).²² In both instances *cognitio historica* lacked the rigorous formulation of arguments or explanations according to principles. To enter the higher realm of truth, Wolff and his school maintained, one had to get beyond mere historical knowledge to the autonomous realm of the a priori, in other words, to *cognitio philosophica* and *cognitio mathematica*. Kant was entirely Wolffian in this regard; he celebrated Wolff just for this in the B-Preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason* as the figure who had secured the “spirit of rigor [*Geist der Gründlichkeit*]” in Germany.²³

Wolff’s agenda was not restricted to the narrow confines of philosophy as *Fachwissenschaft* along the lines hitherto set forth. The founder of “school philosophy” was an energetic advocate of university reform. His argument—and it was not simply about how to learn philosophy in the disciplinary sense—was that one had to discriminate between “historical” (casual-empirical) knowledge and “philosophical” (principled) knowledge across the board.²⁴ Wolff put a fundamental challenge to the traditional disciplinary ascendancy of theology, jurisprudence, and medicine by claiming they offered merely a historical knowledge of their fields, whereas “only philosophy could raise this knowledge to the theoretical level of a knowledge of principles [*Gründewissens*].”²⁵ Kant would raise all these issues himself at the end of the century in his *Streit der Fakultäten*.²⁶

Wolff had grand ambitions for his system of philosophy in this regard. He saw himself as correcting a serious loss of rigor in scholarship which had set in with Thomasius and his followers and their advocacy of “eclecticism” or “practicality.”²⁷ Wolff was not so much opposed to their goal as he was to the method of its achievement. “Eclecticism” for Wolff meant *lack* of method. Where Thomasius and his followers wanted to be immediately relevant, reaching outward to ordinary people and also upward to the seat of power, Wolff believed that university scholarship should follow a more circumspect avenue to influence: via scientific rigor, discovery, and the transformative potential of truth. He wanted philosophy as science to constitute the primary and dominant faculty of the entire university. He therefore proposed a new organization of the university into three faculties: the humanistic, in other words, the traditional *trivium* less logic; the mathematical (less music); and the philosophical, in other words, logic, natural science, and social science.²⁸

Wolff's proposals for a fundamental revision in the structure of the university and the principles of disciplinary inquiry failed to dislodge the entrenched structure of the traditional university organization of the eighteenth century.²⁹ Traditionalism was not the only reason he failed, however. Wolff's vision had an energetic, creative rival. One of Notker Hammerstein's most important discoveries about the German universities in the eighteenth century was their turn toward empiricism and especially toward "an increasingly historical orientation in all of the sciences [*einer vermehrt historischen Ausrichtung aller Wissenschaften*]."³⁰ This historicization was launched by Thomasius and his colleagues in jurisprudence at the newly founded University of Halle after 1694 but exemplified above all by the University of Göttingen after its inauguration in 1737.³¹ This turn brought to prominence within the university system the faculty of jurisprudence—especially at Göttingen, but widely throughout the *Reich*. According to Hammerstein, this exercised a decisive check to Wolff's ambitions for the philosophy faculty under the rubric of rigorous science. He observes, "To be sure, Wolff demanded that the disciplines taught there [i.e., in the philosophical faculty] should be counted among the most important and leading ones in the canon of the sciences, that the philosophical faculty should be number one. But that's where matters stayed. Nothing changed."³² The historical-empirical approach of the faculty of jurisprudence prevailed, above all at Göttingen, and Wolff's particular vision had little structural impact on the Protestant universities, though it did have a curricular impact even on the Catholic ones. Wolff's system, long since encoded in textbooks of his own making or by his immediate school, formed the basis for instruction in courses throughout the Holy Roman Empire. His style of thinking and his vision of rigorous science shaped university instruction in Germany for two generations. In Bödeker's words, "Actually it was originally thanks to Wolff that philosophy in Germany became a theme for the educated [*Gebildeten*], not just the scholars [*Gelehrten*]."³³

In the period after his triumphant reinstatement at Halle (1740), however, it appeared that Wolff had nothing new to offer.³⁴ His later tenure at Halle was most notable for a deterioration of the *studia humaniora* within the philosophy faculty induced by his preference for rigorous sciences.³⁵ Worse, his whole system came to seem too ingrown, too "systematic" in a foreclosed sense. While Wolff always aimed to be practical, many who were exposed to his system found it anything but open to the wider world. And that became the decisive motive for the abandonment of *Schulphilosophie* even if, within technical philosophy, there were substantive arguments as well against Wolff's particular claims.³⁶

The opposition to Wolffian *Schulphilosophie* was simultaneously and more essentially an opposition to university *Gelehrsamkeit* and to its representatives, the *Gelehrtenstand*: "a clearly articulated, public hostility toward the erudite scholarship of the universities."³⁷ At stake was the grander question of *Bildung* versus *Gelehrsamkeit*, but the specific philosophical position of Wolff and his disciples got caught in this crossfire. That was captured in a negative twist to the key phrase, *Schulphilosophie*. *Schulphilosophie* came to mean, first and foremost, enclosed thinking: closed conceptually and cloistered in social space. "School" clearly had these two senses from the medieval genesis of "scholasticism" throughout the German eighteenth century: it referred both to the esoteric nature of intellectual discourse and to the institutional framework of higher education in which it largely deployed itself.³⁸ Enclosed thinking—"closed minds"—came to be associated with closeting in the schoolroom and with guild restrictions in society. The intellectual godfather of this critique was Thomasius, who provided it with much of its preferred rhetoric of abuse.³⁹ Wolffian *Schulphilosophie* became identified with a far older and long-disparaged image of intellectual life, that of the *Schulfuchs* or traditional *Gelehrter*. Turner elaborates: "In the name of Aufklärung critics denounced the universities for their outmoded, medieval constitutions and their pedantic curriculum still mired in Wolffian philosophy, theological dogmatism, and the Latin *imitatis*."⁴⁰ In this context Wolff came, perhaps unfairly, to be identified with pedantry, with pompous and pointless knowledge.

That style of *Gelehrsamkeit* which marked the successful *Schulfuchs* came to be mocked in continuous satire throughout the eighteenth century: "Between 1750 and 1780 the very word *Gelehrsamkeit* was degraded to a term of satirical abuse."⁴¹ Lessing contributed to this vein with his early play, *Der junge Gelehrte* (1748). C. G. Salzmann's novel *Carl von Carlsberg oder über das menschliche Elend* (1784) was a prominent late instance of such satire. Herder, not surprisingly, proved eminently proficient in this vein, but what may surprise is how accomplished the early Kant proved in it. The point of this "general satire of the scholars" was "to take a stand against the [ideal of] scholarship created by study in the arts faculties [and identified concretely] with professors and masters."⁴² The *Schulfuchs* was by the mid-eighteenth century no longer deemed fit for the intellectual discourse of the wider context into which philosophy needed to insert itself. Thus, the whole "chastisement and contempt of the scholar" presupposed the vantage of the wider bourgeois order, which demanded a participatory role in learning (28–29). The core idea here was that culture must be "fundamentally available to all [*grundsätzlich allgemein zugänglich*]."⁴³ Both the

style of articulation and disputation and the institutional framework of the *Gelehrtenstand* came under such fierce attack over the second half of the eighteenth century in Germany that neither escaped drastic reformation.⁴⁴ In the words of Werner Schneiders, "School philosophy became conscious of its open flank to the world."⁴⁵ It needed to transform itself into the vanguard articulation of a new public's aspirations to practical success and happiness in the world. Philosophers were not to restrict themselves to discourse with other philosophers only, but rather address themselves to the wider public and thereby acknowledge a different identity, namely that of a *reflektierende Schriftsteller*.⁴⁶ The sphere of intellectual expression and disputation expanded forever beyond the walls of the university, and the style and organization of that expression altered dramatically to accommodate the wider public sphere into which it fit. It was to be a *Philosophie für die Welt* (where, to be sure, "world" meant the bourgeois reading public).⁴⁷

PHILOSOPHY AS A "FACULTY": THE CRISIS OF THE UNIVERSITY

Philosophy as a special discipline, as a rigorous science, was more an ideal that Wolff aspired to than an actuality either of practice or of institutionalization. When the question of "philosophy" arose in the context of German universities in the second half of the eighteenth century, it more likely involved the larger *faculty* notion than the narrower *disciplinary* one, and the consideration was probably the social utility of this "lower faculty" as a whole.⁴⁸ A key 1768 text from the prominent Göttingen philologist J. D. Michaelis represents one of the most important documents articulating this question of the university for public opinion in the mid-eighteenth century. It was by a university professor about university affairs but by no means only for professors. In his book he disputed the preponderance of the jurisprudence faculty at Göttingen on behalf of the "philosophy faculty" in general and the newly constituted specialty disciplines within the philosophy faculty, like his own discipline of philology, in particular.⁴⁹

The recognition that the German universities went into crisis in the eighteenth century has been clear in the literature since at least Friedrich Paulsen's epochal study.⁵⁰ Already at the outset of the eighteenth century, as Gunter Grimm observes, "there was a grating transformation within the academic estate," for most of its traditional privileges had vanished, especially in the aftermath of the Thirty Years War.⁵¹ The entire second half of the eighteenth century was a period of "declining prestige of the universities."⁵² It was paralleled by a dramatic decline in university attendance.⁵³ In the words

of Bodeker, there was "a massive critique of the universities that coursed through the entire eighteenth century . . . on account of their intellectual backwardness, their preoccupation with status, their guild restrictiveness as well as their poor execution of their function of general education."⁵⁴ Many universities of the Holy Roman Empire by the eighteenth century were "shrivelled into scholastic decay [*in scholastischer Erstarrung verharrend*]" (30). As George Iggers puts it, "The university became increasingly irrelevant, educationally and socially."⁵⁵

Prudently, Bodeker warns us against overstating this case. In the words of university historian Notker Hammerstein, the universities of Germany retained "late as early their central place even during this 'Age of Enlightenment.'" ⁵⁶ As Hammerstein states elsewhere, "the German *Aufklärung* found its locus to a substantial degree within the universities," in significant contrast to France or England.⁵⁷ Indeed, he cites Michaelis to that very effect.⁵⁸ Still, as Wolfgang Hardtwig notes, there was a "crisis of the university which above all drew to itself around the middle of the eighteenth century the attention of the public and of critical reflection."⁵⁹ R. Steven Turner has noted the increasingly drastic criticisms the university as an institution suffered after the mid-eighteenth century and especially from the 1760s, when talk of its abolition began.⁶⁰ By the close of the century, a respectable body of opinion advocated this abolition of the universities.⁶¹ Certainly a substantial debate emerged by midcentury over their organization and mission, especially in terms of the relation of the so-called lower or philosophy faculty to the three higher faculties: theology, jurisprudence, and medicine.

The lower faculty was indeed in dire straits by the mid-eighteenth century.⁶² Students in German universities were expected to undertake only as much coursework in the lower faculty as needed to advance to the mastery of their professional study.⁶³ This service function was reflected clearly in the hierarchical descriptors and in the realities of university life. The philosophy faculty earned salaries drastically inferior to those of the higher faculties.⁶⁴ Moreover, the higher faculties could supplement these salaries substantially by practicing their professions outside the university.⁶⁵ All the philosophy faculty could do of a parallel nature was teach in the lower schools, but these paid even more miserably than the university. The result was an economic and even status divide that was severe and widening through the mid-eighteenth century. In Hammerstein's words, "At the bottom of the ladder then as ever stood the arts faculty, and indeed so much so that some of its members barely earned enough to feed themselves."⁶⁶ They needed to string together a series of appointments to create a standard of living that was bearable. Thus, professors accumulated chairs and other sinecures to

make up for the inadequate economics of the universities. At Erfurt in 1778, for example, half the philosophy faculty also taught in secondary school and roughly the same percentage held more than one sinecure.⁶⁷ Only at Göttingen was this practice somewhat overcome.⁶⁸ The establishment of single-appointment careers could only follow upon the sounder economic establishment of the universities. That really only came to pass in the nineteenth century.

In the eighteenth century, debate centered on the ultimate mission of the university—teaching or research? Michaelis complained that most professors, in the context of declining enrollments, offered only “bread courses,” in other words, the basic introductory courses they were required to offer by the terms of their appointments, while advanced courses that could serve both to develop their students and also to stimulate their own thinking and research had to be put off.⁶⁹ Still, he believed teaching was of the essence; to be a renowned author was not essential for a professor.⁷⁰ Indeed, one of the remarkable features of the mid-eighteenth century was a virtually consensual conception of the division of labor that should prevail between the universities as instructional institutions and the new academies of learning as centers for research. The academies appeared to have seized the leading role in research by the mid-eighteenth century.⁷¹ Wolff found it plausible to distinguish the academies as sites for research and invention from the universities as sites for general education and teaching.⁷² These academies complemented the universities to the extent that the latter could not fulfill the research and scholarly needs of the era. Albrecht von Haller made this a central argument in his roles as professor at the University of Göttingen (1737–1753) and first president of the newly instituted academy in Göttingen (1751) (45). For him, these roles did not conflict. This was the prevailing wisdom of the middle of the century, when the academies were at their height. The Berlin Academy, reconstituted by Frederick II in 1744, became simply the most important intellectual venue in Germany in the middle of the eighteenth century, and its prize competitions galvanized intellectual controversy even as they focused inquiry throughout the Germanies.⁷³ As late as 1770, the Prussian ministry conveyed the impression to the Berlin Academy that its role in sponsoring and elaborating discovery and invention had to make up for the signal lack of these in the universities.⁷⁴ One of the unique features of the Berlin Academy was that it had a section for speculative philosophy.⁷⁵ Maupertuis, its first president, had found that somewhat suspect, but it fit with his patron Frederick II’s agenda, which was to use the academy to undermine the established *Schulphilosophie* by drawing in the wider—in other words, the French—Enlightenment.⁷⁶ This was one of

Frederick's motives for requiring the language of the academy to be French. (Another was his contempt for German as a literary language.) In any event, Maupertuis took up the agenda, and the academy's sessions and above all its prize competitions worked consistently to bring the established orthodoxies of German *Schulphilosophie* under scrutiny. Particularly central in this endeavor of the academy was the man in charge of the section for speculative philosophy for the 1760s, Johann Georg Sulzer (1720–1779), a Swiss by origin and one of the most important figures in the rise of popular philosophy.⁷⁷

While the preponderance of opinion—both governmental and popular—was that universities were primarily for teaching, there were conflicting “materialistic” and “idealistic” concerns even on this score. “Idealistic” critics sought some curriculum for the whole person, in other words, *Bildung*, while the “materialistic” measured curricular utility crudely by placement success. Many critics in the eighteenth century complained that the universities did not teach a curriculum rich enough to cultivate student character, and these critics demanded a substantial elaboration of general education. In 1778 the Prussian minister of culture, von Zedlitz, sent Kant a semiofficial request to use his influence “to hold back students at the university from the bread courses [*Brodt-Collegiis*] and to help them understand that the little bit of legal—indeed even theological and medical—learning [they pursued] would be vastly easier and more certain in application if the student had more philosophical knowledge.”⁷⁸ The question of proper general education, as distinct from professional training, was particularly the target of the new pedagogical theorists of the “Philanthropin” movement in the 1760s led by Johann Bernhard Basedow (1724–1790).⁷⁹ Ironically, by the close of the eighteenth century, even their concerns appeared too utilitarian and “materialistic” to German Idealists and Neohumanists, who accordingly launched their own reform program, culminating in Humboldt's creation of the University of Berlin.⁸⁰ But enrollments in the universities dropped steadily from the middle of the eighteenth century to the era of Napoleon, and the most plausible reason for this was that the course of university study was not securing for the students the career opportunities in the professions, and above all in state service, that they desired.⁸¹

As the university crisis intensified over the later eighteenth century, instruction came increasingly to be regulated by the state. It prescribed in great detail what texts should be used, what course sequences should be offered, and so forth. With the decline of the University of Halle after 1750, especially in comparison with the new University of Göttingen, the Prussian ministry made several interventions which it then tried to generalize to other Prussian universities, for example, Königsberg. In particular

the Prussian government in 1770 set forth a curriculum guide for students matriculating in any faculty, specifying what a typical three-year course of study should encompass.⁸² It stressed acquiring the basic knowledge offered by the lower faculty before going on to specialized work in one of the three higher faculties. The most important institutional trend in this regard over the course of the eighteenth century in Prussia was the introduction of an increasingly mandatory and increasingly rigorous examination system for professional and bureaucratic entry.⁸³

Still, this did not occasion any significant revival in the Prussian universities of the late eighteenth century. There is good reason to question whether this barrage of regulation was even effectively implemented. In many instances universities operated quite autonomously even when they were officially under the closest regulation. This appears to have been the case with Königsberg in East Prussia. In any event, increased regulation was not what had made Göttingen successful; instead, Hammerstein makes Göttingen's success sound almost like a textbook model of the efficiency of market forces. He writes of the "freedom to change positions, the spur of competition [*anstachelnde Konkurrenz*], the feeling of personal responsibility, financial advantages, and the intense exertion of the faculty [*bemühte Eifer der Professoren*]." He explicitly contrasts this with "government supervision, . . . rigid regulation and punishment." Above all, what Göttingen offered was the guarantee of academic and publishing freedom.⁸⁴

Göttingen stands out as a glowing exception to the general decay of German universities in the eighteenth century. At the very moment that the rest of the universities of Germany, even Halle, were suffering declining enrollments and plummeting prestige, Göttingen was at its peak, the "display model of an enlightened university."⁸⁵ Hammerstein identifies four outstanding features of the university: shortness of the course of study, clarity of curriculum, scientific standards, and efficiency in placement. Indeed, Göttingen students "were known everywhere as exemplary, industrious and knowledgeable." They had few problems gaining the best positions anywhere in the *Reich* (80). Notably, whereas publication from the other universities of Germany diminished continually over the eighteenth century, there was a dramatic burst of publication from Göttingen departments in the "philosophy faculty" starting in the 1760s. It was a foreshadowing of the enormous productivity of the later German research universities of the nineteenth century.⁸⁶ A new spirit informed the university, especially in the creation of more modern disciplinary structures as well as the pursuit of a more rigorously empirical research agenda.⁸⁷ In addition, there was a deliberate effort to create a style at Göttingen that would make it a

"university appropriate for cavaliers [*eine kavaliersmäßige Hochschule*]." Indeed, Göttingen had the highest proportion of aristocrats in its student body among the larger German universities of the eighteenth century.⁸⁸ With declining enrollments, the share of aristocrats in the overall student population of Germany increased generally, and this aristocratization of student life became notable.⁸⁹ Not only students, but even the faculty at Göttingen were encouraged to live according to that sense of style, to achieve an "elegance of manners [*elegante Manieren*]" that was "courtly."⁹⁰ That explained the higher salaries and their punctual disbursement that distinguished Göttingen. Thus, it came to set the "standard for modern education and scholarship" in Germany and, by the end of the eighteenth century, actually helped raise the status of the professoriate (317).

From the outset the new University of Göttingen was hostile to Wolfian *Schulphilosophie*.⁹¹ Its founder, Freiherr von Münchhausen, a product of Thomasius's training at the University of Halle, deliberately set about creating a university that would not tolerate *Schulphilosophie*.⁹² This reconstitution of disciplinary inquiry was most prominent in philology, in history, and in the natural sciences.⁹³ The University of Göttingen was also decidedly shaped by the Hannoverian dynastic connection with England, so that intellectual styles of research and of discourse took on a decidedly British tone of empiricism and antispeculative "common sense."⁹⁴ But the reception there of the scientific ideas of Buffon, for example, suggests the importance as well of French thought.⁹⁵ Insistence upon "down-to-earth" empirical-historical research characterized the scientific canon of Göttingen in its ascendancy in the mid-eighteenth century.⁹⁶ It is not surprising that it would become a center of opposition to *Schulphilosophie*. Göttingen became involved in *Popularphilosophie* via two crucial connections: the assimilation of British philosophical thought (the Scottish Enlightenment and the "common sense" school), and the appointment in 1768 of Johann Feder and Christoph Meiners to the philosophy faculty.

"PHILOSOPHY FOR THE WORLD":

A CULTURE FOR THE *GEBILDETEN STÄNDE*

Eighteenth-century controversy over the university expressed divergent interests that can be crudely segregated into those of the state and its ruling stratum, on the one side, and those of the emergent social order we have called here the *gebildeten Stände*, on the other. From the vantage of the state, the concern was with qualifications for the professional functions university graduates—in particular those of the higher faculties—would take up within

the bureaucracy and the wider political system of the state. But in addition to this administrative goal on the part of the ruling order, there was a political one as well, and that was to limit penetration into the higher echelons of state service by elements from the lower—in other words, the bourgeois—classes. Foreclosing access at the top of the administrative hierarchy, then gradually restricting entry into the lower bureaucratic levels and ultimately even into the preparatory educational institutions that enabled such entry, represented an important political strategy of the ruling elite of Prussia and other territorial states in Germany in the eighteenth century.⁹⁷ The tension between these two concerns is obvious, especially when we note that the number of state service positions was hardly declining over the eighteenth century.⁹⁸

The perplexities of this situation were vivid to the social groups most anxious to seize such opportunities for advancement, such "careers open to talent."⁹⁹ These were the groups we have designated by *gebildeten Stände*. Restrictions both of occupational possibilities and of educational access represented threats to the very possibility of their social existence. But it is also important to see that the idea of education to which they subscribed was not so narrowly channeled toward professional competence. For them, education was not simply a vehicle of social mobility; it was the talisman of social identity. They conceived *Bildung* not as a possession but as a way of life.¹⁰⁰ That way of life offered possibilities of self-definition and even self-assertion above all against the traditional *Stände*. This is the historically apt sense of the term *emancipation*.

The traditional *Bürgerstand* nestled in small towns, and its way of life was marked decisively by a localism of orientation and identity, a mentality Mack Walker caught aptly with the Americanism "hometown."¹⁰¹ *Stadtbürgerlichkeit* was a matter of the fusion of occupational (guild) roles, family and marriage patterns, and local political participation (citizenship). Its mentality found ideological expression in the notion of *das ganze Haus*.¹⁰² By the eighteenth century, however, a scattering of people born in such circumstances came to join the few who were native to larger urban agglomerations in the pursuit of lifestyles and occupations starkly different from their hometown origins. Their decisive character was a personal mobility unthinkable and undesirable in the frame of *Stadtbürgerlichkeit*. Long-distance trade and the territorial state created the economic basis for these new occupations, and their conjuncture created secondary occupations addressed to the new needs and opportunities of the first group: educating and entertaining them, servicing a nascent "consumer society."¹⁰³ Thus, groups with widely different occupations and equally disparate income lev-

els somehow formed a new commonality. Its novelty and heterogeneity were reflected in the difficulty it found in naming itself, a difficulty its historians have inherited. Hans Gerth long ago conceived of them as a "bourgeois intelligentsia [*bürgerliche Intelligenz*]." ¹⁰⁴ Walker has called these groups "movers and doers." ¹⁰⁵ Rudolf Vierhaus writes of a "new bourgeoisie." ¹⁰⁶ Others have projected the nineteenth-century term *Bildungsbürgertum* back upon its eighteenth-century progenitor. ¹⁰⁷ Bödeker has taken up the term that the historical actors finally began using for themselves at the end of the eighteenth century, *gebildeten Stände*, and I have adopted this term.

The essential point is that the second half of the eighteenth century can be characterized, in social-historical terms, as precisely the moment of the groping toward identity of this social congeries. One of its obviously essential features was that it was urban, that is, these new groups tended to be located in the larger cities. ¹⁰⁸ In Prussian governmental practice, a clear distinction was made in administrative appointments and professional licensing (two of the distinctive forms of career development for the new social groups) between such cities and small-town or rural districts. ¹⁰⁹ Perhaps of even greater importance was the idea that developed in Prussian law over the eighteenth century that the groups whose emergence and identity we are seeking to discern should be distinguished as "immediately subject to the state [*staatsunmittelbar*]," in other words, exempt from certain forms of local jurisdiction (124). Thus, they were considered *Staatsbürger*. Indeed, this came to even sharper codification in the Prussian *Allgemeines Landrecht* of 1794 (125). This *Eximierung*, this emancipation, was just what was going on inside the minds and characters of the emergent group members: they came to think of themselves as individuals, not members of a corporate body, as capable of establishing a life and standing for themselves that was not already confirmed and confined by birth. Thomas Nipperdey characterized this as a "process of individualization, decorporation and emancipation," and that terminology has persisted ever since in the German scholarship. ¹¹⁰ To use the essential categories by which Talcott Parsons long ago tried to define sociological modernity, this was the group that set achievement rather than ascription at the foundation of selfhood. ¹¹¹

One unity that tied all these congeries together was that education was indispensable for their practices, and not only in the economic or occupational sense. Rather, education was the personal distinction, the figuring of self, out of which individuality and career achievement could be wrought. Reading was essential to identity formation: that one read, how one read, what one read—all these marked one as *gebildet*. ¹¹² Reading was for self-discovery or self-formation (*Bildung* had that sense at its core), but it was also

for orientation to the world (*Weltkenntnis*, a term of decisive importance for Kant). Through these first two processes, reading was expected to lead to the achievement of urbanity, a self-confident sense of attunement to and participation in current affairs, in the "public sphere."¹¹³

Not only was this the period in which Germany experienced a dramatic expansion of literacy, it was also the time in which a literary market of modern institutional form took shape.¹¹⁴ This represented a decisive turn in the cultural history of Germany, the moment when a German literary language emerged that would soon achieve European significance.¹¹⁵ There were dramatic shifts as well in the structure of reading. Religious texts were displaced by cultural ones, Latin texts by German ones. Rolf Engelsing has plausibly argued for a shift from "intensive" to "extensive" reading, in other words, from the close and repeated reading of a few texts to the continuous assimilation of ephemeral reading material, above all in the form of periodical literature.¹¹⁶ It was in this era that the periodical press took shape in Germany.¹¹⁷ One of its most important manifestations in the early eighteenth century was the emergence of a vast number of "moral weeklies"—centered above all in the cities—which offered instruction in taste and style along with, as their title suggests, a great deal of moral instruction.¹¹⁸ The point was to cultivate—indeed to create—a new, independent bourgeois reading public, and to do so by weaning it from the religious confines of traditional culture on the one hand, and from acquiescence to representations of courtly and aristocratic preeminence on the other.

The ideal of sociability (*Geselligkeit*) was of immeasurable importance for the emergent *gebildeten Stände* in the *Hochaufklärung* (1750–1780).¹¹⁹ This style of *gutbürgerliche* identity could take satisfaction in industriousness, decency, and learning, but it could also appreciate novelty, sensibility, and art. What the "moral weeklies" advocated at a rather fundamental level, the higher forms of literary articulation repeated with greater sophistication: the new *Bürger* needed to achieve independence in judgment, *Selbstdenken*.¹²⁰ To be capable of thinking for oneself was to have achieved "maturity," *Mündigkeit*.¹²¹ To achieve *Selbstdenken*, to become *mündig*, was a matter of personal knowledge, the cultivation of individual judgment (*Urteilkraft*), which could only be successful by drawing upon all of one's own life experience, the physical and the emotional alongside the logical-cognitive. Here such terms as *Sinnlichkeit*, *Empfindsamkeit*, and above all *Erfahrung*, whose technical philosophical senses are central for Kant, found their decisive social place.

In all these the new mentality stressed the necessity for sharp observation (*Beobachtung*), for a keen notation of particular instances, and hence

for a process of learning that built upon empirical and historical accrual.¹²² Here *cognitio historica* was not inferior, it was indispensable. And the most important point of all was that this process of learning constituted character-formation (*Bildung*) in that distinctively pragmatic-moral sense that proved central to the specific undertakings of Kant. The end was to achieve fulfillment or happiness (*Glückseligkeit*) within a community that obviously posed competitive challenges and constraints even as it offered recognition and reward. The means were the cleverness (*Klugheit*) and the effectiveness (*Geschicklichkeit*) to cope and indeed prosper in this world, along with the (moral) wisdom (*Weisheit*) to do so with integrity. Here was the crux of the critique of *Gelehrsamkeit*. Philosophy needed to be reoriented, made "practical." Of course, "practical" is not identical with "pragmatic"—above all we must think of Kant here. The tension between virtue and success, the relation of character to prosperity, proved the central theme of empirical psychology, of anthropology, and of ethics for *Aufklärung*, and for Kant in particular, over the second half of the eighteenth century.

The problem was not primarily theoretical; it was existentially urgent and it was socially mediated. One could neither pursue nor achieve *Bildung* in isolation. Identity is always social. *Mündigkeit* could only be demonstrated in practice. The impetus of reading was outward from the subject into the social world. It is crucial, then, that the first and foremost instrumentality of this wider social practice was the formation of *Lesegesellschaften*, "reading societies."¹²³ German scholarship, starting with the pathbreaking sociological work of the young Jürgen Habermas, has recognized the essential contribution of association to the constitution of the new political culture of "bourgeois liberalism" in the eighteenth century.¹²⁴ The essential feature of association is that it is voluntary and individual: one chooses to participate or to withdraw.¹²⁵ No one is born, no one is compelled, to participate. Precisely by associating, however, individuals found their subjective identities affirmed by the collaboration of others. Moreover, the styles of discourse created in these voluntary associations, starting with the *Lesegesellschaften*, aspired to a new form of "democratic social practice," one in which everyone would be considered equally entitled to participate regardless of background.¹²⁶ Crucially, the reading process of periodical literature was collective: "what had been read was also discussed in a critical manner."¹²⁷ The training in listening and in both agreeing and disagreeing was a first approximation to participatory democratic political orientations.¹²⁸

These impulses were actualized further in other forms of voluntary association whose tendency was toward social practice and concrete politics. So-called patriotic societies sprang up especially in the 1760s with demands

for civic improvement, social welfare, and political reform.¹²⁹ They suggest stirrings toward politicization in the new elements of the German middle class.¹³⁰ These civic associations, in addition to the pursuit of individual prestige and local boosterism, also strove self-consciously for *Mitbestimmung*, for a participatory role in the governance of the local urban community. That aspiration could even extend to a wider ambition to participate in the territorial, indeed to constitute a national, political community.¹³¹

Moses Mendelssohn, invited to join the Patriotic Society of Bern, responded with some striking observations in Letter 138 of *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend* (1761):

Philosophy is at home in Germany. . . . Nor do we lack systems of political science. . . . It is just that our political philosophy still retains an element of timidity, which it will naturally only lay aside in a free state. Its true fatherland is there where it does not have to shrink from openly opposing arbitrary violence and hypocrisy. . . . We must admit, in all fairness, that several Swiss writers were among the first Germans to begin looking at people in the context of a wider political society from a truly philosophical viewpoint.¹³²

The key role of cities with longstanding traditions of civic republicanism—Hamburg and Bern—is important here, even if in both instances a strongly oligarchical cast shadowed this republicanism by the eighteenth century. Lessing's Hamburg affiliation is significant here, as is Iselin's participation in the Bern patriotic society. If one figures Rousseau's idealization of his native Geneva into this mixture, it becomes at once a major political context. One link was Henri Fuseli's important exposition of Rousseau's writing, undertaken while Fuseli was still in contact with the Bern patriotic society.¹³³ More central to this study is the announcement by the Bern patriotic society of a prize competition on the role of philosophy in promoting the good of the people. This prize competition proved very important to Mendelssohn and Herder.¹³⁴ Certainly such ideas and ideals were in considerable tension with the principles of territorial absolutism that otherwise prevailed in the Germanies.¹³⁵

A similar importance needs to be attached to yet a third crucial form of voluntary association, the so-called secret societies. Masonic lodges spread from England and Holland (via Hamburg) to Germany, particularly to Prussia after the accession to the throne of Frederick II.¹³⁶ Kopitzsch contends that the masonic lodges should not be counted among the secret societies, and he even questions whether they were really part of the Enlightenment, because

their "irrational and hierarchical tendencies contradicted the fundamental convictions of the enlightenment."¹³⁷ On both counts, I believe, he overstates the case.¹³⁸ The radical political potential of such secret societies was most famously illustrated by the case of the *Illuminaten* in Bavaria in the era of the French Revolution.¹³⁹ More generally, given what Margaret Jacob has suggested about the connections of freemasonry with both republican political mobilization and materialism (deist or pantheist in inspiration), the spread of freemasonry takes on salience for the context of the rise of political culture in the German *gebildeten Stände*.

There was, in short, at least an emergent political consciousness attached to the *gebildeten Stände* and their idea of *Öffentlichkeit*. Central to their political concern was that "public" affairs called for freedom of expression. Lessing's sour appraisal of freedom of expression in Prussia in his letter to Nicolai from Hamburg, August 25, 1769, stressed the palpable constraints:

Tell me no more about your Berlin freedom to think and write. It boils down pure and simple to the freedom to bring as many inanities against religion to market as one wishes. And an honest man must swiftly become too embarrassed to make use of such a freedom. Just try sometime in Berlin to write so freely about other things as Sonnenfels has done in Vienna; take on as an experiment telling that excellent mob at court the truth, as he told them [in Vienna]; let somebody stand up in Berlin for the rights of the subject, raise his voice against edicts and despotism, as is now taking place in France or Denmark: and you will soon know by experience which is to this very day the most slavish land in Europe.¹⁴⁰

These bitter and famous words notwithstanding, strides *were* made toward the articulation of political aspirations. In the 1770s, the nature of journalism shifted toward social-political commentary with a new assurance that the press now had a constitutive, monitory role in public affairs.¹⁴¹ Bödeker has noted that it was not until the 1770s that a truly political press appeared in Germany, but he is equally insistent that one did arise at that point.¹⁴² He points especially to A. L. Schlözer (1735–1809) and his *Briefwechsel* (1776–1782) and *StatsAnzeigen* (1783–1793), the most important political journals of their day. But he also notes that Christoph Martin Wieland's *Teutsche Merkur* (1773–1810) started such political commentary even before Schlözer. Another such journal, the *Deutsches Museum* (1776–1791), explicitly committed itself to "a more overtly political voice" whereby "Germans would be made more acquainted with themselves and aware of their own national

affairs."¹⁴³ This was the moment when "public" became public opinion, in other words, the meaning shifted from a receptive (passive) to a judgmental (active) emphasis.

Lewis White Beck notes this shift in meaning, but only under the negative rubric of the "unpolitical German": "Unlike the French *philosophes* to whom they are sometimes compared, the German popular philosophers' interests were focused on the problems of private sentiment and virtue, religion, education, and art. . . . [T]he concern was with the individual who needed, perhaps, a new kind of education but not a new kind of government."¹⁴⁴ Concentration on the private world, the world of human social engagement apart from political authority, has been the source of a long-standing interpretive controversy over the "unpolitical" German.¹⁴⁵ As a persuasive rejoinder we can invoke Rudolf Vierhaus:

The development of political consciousness is not something that takes place exclusively on the level of complete self-consciousness of the individual and can be followed in terms of distinctly formulated ideas, doctrines and commitments. Much more what is involved is a complicated process of reconstruction of experiences, of learning and carrying forward, of sensitization to things that earlier appeared self-evident or not even noticeable, of recognition of contradictions, of making opinions possible and utterable and of the formulation of goals. It takes place in a context of general intellectual changes and shifts in mentality, which are themselves inseparably embroiled in concrete socio-cultural and socio-economic change.¹⁴⁶

To be sure, there were substantial limitations to the breadth and depth of the politicization achieved in and by the *gebildeten Stände* in the German eighteenth century. To dwell only on the limitations, however, obscures the fact of real change. The cultural history of the *gebildeten Stände*, especially from the midpoint of the eighteenth century, can be conceived in terms of three key notions—publicity, patriotism, and popular philosophy—which, even as early as the 1760s, lend some credibility to the idea of "*Aufklärung* as politicization."

THE SCHÖNE WISSENSCHAFTEN:

RHETORICAL HUMANISM VERSUS SCHOLASTICISM

An event of 1754 has drawn historical attention both for its coincidence with the death of Wolff and for its explicit advocacy of "popular philoso-

phy." That event is the Rectoral Address of Johann August Ernesti (1707–1781) at the Thomas Schule in Leipzig, entitled *De Philosophia Populari* (Of Popular Philosophy).¹⁴⁷ Ernesti drew upon the call of the key French *philosophe*, Denis Diderot, in *Pensées sur l'interprétation de la Nature* (1753): "*Hâtons-nous de rendre la philosophie populaire* [Let us hasten to make philosophy popular]."¹⁴⁸ Ernesti, a major classical philologist at Leipzig, specializing in Cicero, picked up the Ciceronian rhetorical distinction between the *genus subtile et acutum* and the *genus popolare* to urge that esoteric metaphysics should be replaced by a more accessible and a more useful style, a humanism.¹⁴⁹ Roland Mortier notes that, for a classical philologist, Ernesti was radical in attaching no privilege to Latin over vernacular languages. Against esotericism, Ernesti insisted that "true philosophy" had to be "a [mode of] thought in close contact with society . . . necessarily open to non-specialists."¹⁵⁰ Thus, Ernesti took up the criticism of the "scholastic" university and fashioned a conception of philosophy that accorded far better with a *philosophe* of the style of Diderot than with the established German *Gelehrte* like Wolff (though Ernesti did not mention Wolff by name).

What Ernesti called for in 1754 in Leipzig had already been underway for a number of years in Berlin—a city, it should be noted, with no university but with the most important academy in the Germanies. That Academy and also the energetic periodicals edited and published by Friedrich Nicolai had already come to constitute a distinctively new approach to philosophy in Germany. Perhaps the most important figure was Moses Mendelssohn, barred from the academy by his Jewish background, but prominent nonetheless in the circle around Nicolai, together with his friend Lessing. In the 1750s these three figures, and above all Mendelssohn, established a new literary style of philosophy that was the highest achievement of popular philosophy. Lessing celebrated exactly this about his friend.¹⁵¹ Whether they discussed the nature of tragedy as a form, or the various kinds of gratification, or what the proper balance between philosophy and poetry or between a serious and a farcical grasp of Leibnizian cosmology signified (in their famous "Pope ein Metaphysiker!" [1755]), Mendelssohn and Lessing (with Nicolai) became the "philosophers on the Spree," the voice of popular philosophy in Germany for the 1750s.¹⁵²

One of the striking features of the emergence of popular philosophy, associated with the displacement of the "moral weeklies" by journals of a higher level aimed at eliciting a more discriminating public, was the vogue of the term *schöne Wissenschaften*—most often as an element in

the larger phrase, "*schönen Wissenschaften und freien Künste*." As the historian of this concept reports, "around the middle of the eighteenth century and up to its eighties, the expression '*schöne Wissenschaft*' came into extremely frequent use; it experienced a boom (*Hochkonjunktur*)."¹⁵³ That boom coincides precisely and necessarily with the *Hochaufklärung* for the *schöne Wissenschaften* featured in the identity and the agenda of popular philosophy. What did the term signify, and why did it assume so central a role? I propose a historical analogy, which I do not believe was far from the cultural consciousness of the popular philosophers, but which will remain viable even only heuristically: the invocation of *schönen Wissenschaften* in the mid-eighteenth century against *Schulphilosophie* deploys the same constellation of concerns that *rhetorical humanism* articulated in the Renaissance to dispute scholasticism.¹⁵⁴

Strube notes that the term originated in German usage in the late seventeenth century, prominently in Christian Thomasius. That is, it was a feature of popular philosophy over *all* its three phases, commencing with the first. Thomasius invoked it in his campaign against academic pedantry. He insisted that all *Wissenschaft* should be "*schöngeistig betrieben*"—carried out with elegance and eloquence. This demand paralleled Thomasius's demands for an "eclectic" and a "practical" mode of thought. He saw this opening toward spiritedness and gallantry as an adaptation into German circumstances of the culture of *honnêteté* of the grand century of France.¹⁵⁵ If scholarship could be conducted with *bel esprit*, Thomasius believed, it could be authentically "useful for mankind." The issue Thomasius did not fully resolve, however, was whether it was indeed *possible* to present or conduct all scholarship or science in this manner. It was precisely here that his view came to be challenged and overturned by Christian Wolff, with his claim for the need in science of a relentless rigor.

If Thomasius's demand for *schöngeistig betriebene Wissenschaft* lost luster under Wolff's assault, the term *schöne Wissenschaften* was not abandoned. Instead, it shifted from a normative standard for all disciplines to a classificatory designation for *some* disciplines.¹⁵⁶ In the important philosophical lexica of the early eighteenth century, *schöne Wissenschaft* came to be understood as the German rendition of the Latin *litterae humaniores* or the French *belles lettres*.¹⁵⁷ More specifically, within the university under the assault of Wolffian *Gründlichkeit*, these disciplines needed both codification and defense. In 1725 at Halle, Johann Friedrich Bertram published *Summarische Einleitung in die so genannte Schöne Wissenschaften Oder litteras humaniores*. The title tells a lot: the use of "so-called" re-

flects ambivalence about the phrase, and the equation of the German with the Latin reflects the essential thesis of the text. For Bertram, the *schöne Wissenschaften* were the German academic disciplines that corresponded with the traditional humanities, the *studia humanitatis* of the Renaissance. Under the pressure of Wolff's rigorous standard for science, however, Bertram sought to maintain that the humanities *were* sciences—*Wissenschaften* in the German sense—but he had to concede that they contrasted with the "higher" sciences in that they were merely "probable" in the rhetorical sense of attaining persuasiveness, never certainty, and in that they were merely "propaedeutic," in other words, they were lower or preliminary faculties, preparatory for pursuit of the higher sciences.¹⁵⁸ In Bertram's defense we can perceive a submission, one that characterized the hegemony of Wolffian standards in academic culture up till midcentury. The admission of inferiority parallels strikingly the quandary of the *Geisteswissenschaften* in the late nineteenth century in Germany, and perhaps in all late modernism.¹⁵⁹

But popular philosophy reasserted itself against Wolffianism at midcentury, and so the "boom" of the phrase *schöne Wissenschaft* ensued. The best index of this—and a clue to its character—is the proliferation of a series of high-culture journals bearing the phrase in their titles. The trend was set by the emergent arbiter of taste for Germany, Johann Gottsched. In 1745 he founded the journal *Neue Büchersaal der schönen Wissenschaften und freien Künste*. In the inaugurating preface he proclaimed it his mission to advance the taste of his countrymen by examining the "arts and disciplines which no wellbred and clever person can wholly neglect."¹⁶⁰ Gottsched was not particularly interested in the precision of his concept. He had in mind a *Sammelbegriff* (congeries) suitable for his broad, pragmatic ambition, with the one explicit idea being cultivation of aesthetic taste as a sign of social grace. This characterized as well the journals that emulated his. Friedrich Nicolai founded the *Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste* in 1757 in Leipzig, with the explicit program of "advancing the *schönen Wissenschaften* and good taste among Germans."¹⁶¹ Christian Felix Weisse took over that journal in 1759. In 1765 it was replaced by the *Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste*, which would be edited by one of the foremost popular philosophers of Germany, Christian Garve. A final instance of journals bearing the term is Christian Adolf Klotz's *Deutsche Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften*, established in 1767 by the man who would be Herder's archenemy of the late 1760s. A final instance of the connection of the term *schöne Wissenschaft* with the mission of improvement of taste is the designation of one of the sections of the Berlin Academy by that title.

In addition to the role the term played in the program of *Aufklärung* as the cultivation of taste, it played a role as the designation for the rigorous inquiry into the principles of taste, that is, the newly established "science of aesthetics." This was the moment for the systematization of the idea of the arts, as Kristeller long ago established, and the key figure was Alexander Baumgarten.¹⁶² What needs to be underscored is that Baumgarten was a Wolffian, that is, he proposed to develop a science on the Wolffian model. Indeed, Wolff had proclaimed that even the *studia humanitatis* could be pursued with scientific rigor.¹⁶³ Baumgarten dedicated himself to the realization of this ambition. He discriminated between an unphilosophical sense of aesthetics—the lore of the artistic craft—and a philosophical sense, which would be grounded in Wolffian principles, hence a *theory* of aesthetics. Baumgarten suggested that the phrase *schöne Wissenschaft* in common parlance was misguided, because it really signified only a "*Kunst schön zu denken*."¹⁶⁴ Baumgarten shared Wolff's contempt for mere *Schöndenker*; rigor was all. Indeed, he was part of a reaction against the propagation of the *schönen Wissenschaften* that gained momentum over the *Hochaufklärung* along just these lines, the charge that mere literariness lacked rigor and substance, that it was mere *Seichtigkeit*—superficiality—especially *French* superficiality.¹⁶⁵ That trend would culminate, of course, in the critical Kant.

Baumgarten pursued the idea that aesthetics could be theoretically grounded by making it the science of the lower faculties of cognition and discerning in the form of knowledge available there a unique "perfection," the perfection in *sensibility*.¹⁶⁶ His disciple Georg Friedrich Meier published a work along these lines even before his teacher did: *Anfangsgründen aller schönen Wissenschaften* (1748). Baumgarten's own *Aesthetica* appeared later. Together they launched a major new vein of inquiry with decisive implications for Mendelssohn and for Kant.¹⁶⁷ In 1757 Mendelssohn published a systematic work along these lines, *Hauptgrundsätzen der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften*, which exerted great influence on both Kant and Herder. In that work, Mendelssohn introduced, over against the school-philosophical approach of Baumgarten-Meier, a more psychological orientation derived from British aesthetics.¹⁶⁸ In it, as well, he began to discriminate the *schönen Wissenschaften* from the *schönen Künste* by distinguishing the media or semiotics of their articulation. That impulse was carried forward by Sulzer, who initially accepted the convention of Gottsched and those who followed him, which lumped together the arts and the humanities. By 1756 Sulzer was disposed to see the *schönen Wissenschaften* as exclusively literary, and in 1757 he drew a sharp divide


between the arts and the sciences. Poetry he categorized among the arts; the humanistic disciplines belonged among the sciences. But for *any* science the designation "*schön*" seemed misleading. In the second edition of his *Kurzer Begriff aller Wissenschaften* (1759), he deliberately suppressed the term *schönen Wissenschaften*, and in the balance of his writings he addressed only the *schönen Künste*. Still, the essential point for the whole movement was made by Johann Feder in 1767: "Nothing is more unjust than when one urges that philosophy have nothing to do with the *schönen Wissenschaften* and nothing is more foolish than when one imagines that philosophy can do without them."¹⁶⁹

What all these popular philosophers did was draw up a coherent agenda, articulating the desire for a new public sphere committed to social and political improvement and placing responsibility for its cultivation and advancement with philosophers. While there were "*literati*" (*freie Schriftsteller*) outside the university, we must never forget J. D. Michaelis's point that most of the writers and thinkers of Germany throughout the eighteenth century remained associated with the university: "The majority of our great scholars actually reside in the universities, and of the rest many either once were actually professors who taught in the university or in any event in their youth enjoyed the privilege of devoting themselves to the academic life."¹⁷⁰ Gerd Ueding makes the same decisive observation: "Most of the philosophical essayists were in fact at the same time school philosophers. They taught at universities."¹⁷¹ What mattered here was that they were calling upon themselves, even as they were being called upon by others, to think in a wider frame, with a new goal, in a new style. Sulzer's *Kurzer Begriff aller Wissenschaften* (first edition, 1745; second, revised edition, 1759) offered exemplary formulations of the new approach. Sulzer made clear what his agenda signified: "'Philosophy of the world' [gen. subject] is *worldly cleverness* [*Weltklugkeit*] or 'wisdom' which can only be learned by experience [*Erfahrung*] or 'socializing in the world [*Umgang mit der Welt*].'"¹⁷² Packed into that one-sentence definition is a horde of crucial connections, the whole configuration of ideas that distinguishes popular philosophy. That was the decisive sense of "philosophy for the world." For the newly emergent reading public, the popular philosophers proposed a new and apposite writing style. Against *subtilitas* ("all too much precision") they proposed *popularitas* ("general comprehensibility") and against *siccitas* (dryness) they proposed *suavitas* ("a certain charm").¹⁷³ Turner puts it very well: "The crisis of the *Gelehrtenstand* followed not from overt rivalry with groups that stood outside it, but from

the gradual adoption by its own members of new intellectual and cultural values that increasingly proved incompatible with its own traditional ones. The crisis of the *Gelehrtenstand* was an internal crisis, a crisis of self-image and self-justification."¹⁷⁴ This is the decisive point, directly relevant to Kant.

Man is to himself the most wonderful object in nature; for he cannot conceive what the body is, still less what the mind is, and least of all how a body should be united to a mind. This is the consummation of his difficulties, and yet it is his very being.

—Blaise Pascal, *Pensées/Provincial Letters*



Kant and the Leibniz-Wolff School to 1762–1763

"In my opinion, everything depends on our seeking out data for the problem, *how is the soul present in the world, both in material and in non-material things*. In other words, we need to investigate the nature of that power of external agency in a substance of this kind, and the nature of that *receptivity* or capacity of being affected, of which the union of a soul with a human body is only a special case."¹ With these words of his letter to Moses Mendelssohn in 1766, Immanuel Kant gave token not only of the trajectory of his metaphysical speculation for the prior twenty years but of a commitment to the future of this inquiry. If we are to establish what the "precritical" Kant considered his essential *métier*, there are few more apposite statements from his pen. We can cast back through his "Physical Monadology" to the *Nova dilucidatio* and even to his first major publication concerning the *vis viva* controversy, and we can look forward to the persistence of the problem into the emergent "critical" philosophy in Kant's *Inaugural Dissertation*.² Kant in all this was a creature of the philosophical culture of the mid-eighteenth century. His concerns in metaphysics arose from the Leibnizian conception of the problems of substance interaction, and his concerns in logic arose from the Leibnizian specification of the hierarchy of conceptual perfection, especially as this came to be articulated with and through a facultative psychology.³

THE METAPHYSICAL CONUNDRUM OF THE AGE: THE THREE HYPOTHESES

As the article "Immatérialisme et Spiritualité" of the *Encyclopédie* put it, contemporary thought had to come to terms with "the doctrine of those who admit two essentially different substances in nature: one, which they call *matter*, and the other which they call *mind*."⁴ The problem of the interaction of mind with world, or, more intimately, of each mind with its own body, haunted the age. Having made the strongest argument for the total separation of the substances of thought and extension, Descartes himself had tried to make his peace with the appearances of healthy common sense by imagining the pineal gland as the node of intersection and interaction between the two substances, incongruous as this remained with his whole system. His preference was to regard the human body as no different from the body of an animal, notoriously for him a mere mechanism. In that light, a human's rational nature could be viewed as little more than a *superimposed* soul. Indeed, its dissection from the body, in line with traditional notions of its immateriality and immortality, was one of the metaphysical elements of his system of which Descartes was most proud, precisely because it fit so well with Christian (and Platonic) tradition.

The thinkers who received his philosophy for the most part welcomed his dualism, especially for its traditional religious import, but they found his mechanism for explaining the appearance of causality implausible. To escape Descartes's dualist dilemma, which his expedient mystification of the pineal gland was hardly sufficient to mask, became the grand ambition of subsequent metaphysicians for at least a good century and a half, if not longer.⁵ Malebranche found the pious solution of restricting *every* causal action directly to God and relegating not only physical substance but finite spirit to metaphysical passivity. To be sure, one could wish to lift one's arm, but only God could make it happen.⁶

Eighteenth-century philosophical discourse, through at least the mid-century, turned upon the so-called Three Hypotheses, which formulated responses to the dualist problem.⁷ These were physical influx, the affirmation of intersubstantial causation (and presumably intrasubstantial causation), a position associated vaguely with Scholasticism and sometimes ascribed to Descartes; occasionalism, the denial of both intrasubstantial and intersubstantial causation and the ascription of all causality to God alone, associated primarily with Malebranche; and preestablished harmony, the denial of intersubstantial causation but the affirmation of intrasubstantial causation (monadic entelechy) preconfigured by God to result in cosmic harmony,

envisioned by Leibniz.⁸ Those who endorsed occasionalism and preestablished harmony no less than those who adopted physical influx accepted the *appearance* of interaction as the experience of ordinary life.⁹ "Common sense" seemed to endorse physical influx. There were two aspects of ordinary experience that stubbornly refused to make peace with the grand metaphysical hypotheses of separate substances: the passive experience of perception, in other words, the inescapable sensation of physical stimuli in the mind; and the voluntary experience of action, in other words, the willed intervention in the physical order by the mind.¹⁰ Philosophers from Descartes forward found the interaction of substances metaphysically naive.¹¹ Whatever common sense might believe, they simply denied that reality could conform to it. The new metaphysics had to explain away these "appearances" convincingly in terms of the preferred "reality." But none had the temerity to contest that the appearances spoke for "healthy common sense."

In removing the causal force of the world's animation from the world itself, dualist metaphysics made possible a more creative approach to the physical world. Descartes and Newton each invented a physics that was desperately in need of animation from without. There was a tacit complicity between the mechanical approach to physical science and the spiritualist doctrine of dualism. Both were quite content to regard matter as dead, "inert," and to leave scientifically mysterious (i.e., uncontested) the metaphysical nature of the "forces" that "animated" that matter.¹² Needing only to "save the phenomena," in other words, to account for physical effects, physical science could profess to "frame no hypotheses" about ultimate essence and therefore could merely describe the regularities of the effects in the world under the name of some "force" (e.g., "gravity")—whose essential but mysterious nature Leibniz somewhat unkindly called "occult." A more complacent term would be *providential*. The great debate between Leibniz and Samuel Clarke manifests clearly how the problem of action at a distance became the occasion for speculative deployment of voluntarist versus rationalist conceptions of divinity.¹³ Physics became an advertisement for physico-theology.

Leibniz was quite sensitive to the need to preserve the essential role of God in imparting all the original force to the system at the moment of its creation and in maintaining it in its proper harmony throughout. Rather than the naive world of interaction that appearance suggested, Leibniz conceived a reality of immaterial monads whose internal entelechy caused their change, each in utter independence from the rest but all in a "preestablished harmony" such that their "windowless" mutations seamlessly merged to instantiate a material world of "well-founded" phenomena. To buttress his

monadic immaterialism still further, Leibniz also made the problem of the continuum of space embarrassing for particle theory, for he demonstrated that space had to be infinitely divisible, but a fundamental particle could not be. The mathematical idea of a point did not belong within any such infinitely divisible continuum but represented an ideal limit. That was the closest the mathematics of space could come to the immaterial and spaceless reality of the monad.

While Newton considered inertial velocity an inherent property of bodies, he did not feel prepared to recognize any other forces, such as attraction or repulsion, as inherent. He granted the effects of these forces, and their vital importance to physical science, but he found it impossible to recognize them as immanent properties of particulate matter. Instead, he simply termed them "etherial" or "imponderable principles" of physical action. Obviously, the term *principle* is extremely vague as to the exact nature of these phenomena, in other words, as to their substantive reality and metaphysical implications. While Newton thus retained a good part of the Cartesian notion of inert matter, scientists of the eighteenth century pursued more speculative veins in Newton's *Opticks*. Studying attraction and repulsion in chemical and electrical phenomena, they began to redefine the properties of the physical world in such a way that inert matter and an exclusively impact model of mechanical cause came to seem entirely inadequate. They recognized the necessity of the physical postulation of such forces as real elements in the explanation of natural phenomena, especially in the nascent sciences of "electricity," chemistry, and biology.¹⁴ On that basis, Roger Boscovich conceived a theory of the fundamental building blocks of physical nature as point centers of force, not literally particles at all, etherializing still further the materiality of the physical world that Newtonian atomism had already rendered vastly porous.¹⁵

Eighteenth-century physicists believed in observational empiricism: the effects of forces, however mysterious, had to be tangible and measurable. And there was the further matter that elegance of reasoning—Occam's razor—demanded that the proliferation of physical effects be economically ordered under the least possible number of diverse causal "forces." The question was how one could identify and discriminate such forces since they were in principle immaterial. How could they be reduced to the most rational system, how to a systematic *unity*? Could human reasoning attain this? All forces were occult, John Locke maintained in defense of the new science, because human cognition had access only to "nominal essences." The "real essences" that metaphysically caused the appearances were beyond human access. Science could not explain them. Hence, metaphysics (or, in Locke's

case, theology) was at liberty to speculate about (believe in) what the "other world" might be.

It was a charming accommodation. Only it made a scandal of *empirical explanation*. Leibniz recognized no less than Locke that human conceptions were approximations, "nominal essences," and if he held out more hope that mankind might access "real essences" not merely conceptually but through advances in instrumentation, he nevertheless realized that there were contingent truths that analysis to all infinity would never allow humans to grasp. The issue he chose to consider was whether this made the reality itself a contingent one, in other words a matter of chance (*objective probability*). He denied that; the world, whether we could know it or not, was totally determinate from the divine vantage. The only place for probability in a Leibnizian scheme was in the human nominal approximations to that reality (*subjective probability*). While he scrupulously recognized the sphere of empirical inquiry, for Leibniz all the important issues thus became questions of logic and metaphysics.

Ironically enough, it was Christian Wolff who moved German philosophy somewhat back toward problems of empiricism. What is distinctive in Wolff's exposition of the relation of mind and body, the *commercium corporis et mentis*, is that he situated his analysis explicitly in terms of the Three Hypotheses of physical influx, occasionalism, and preestablished harmony, but he was not prepared to take a definitive stand on the validity of any.¹⁶ While he suggested that Leibniz's preestablished harmony seemed the most plausible, he explicitly warned his readers not to identify his own position with that of Leibniz.¹⁷ The problem of the commerce of mind and body was left in an open state. Wolff was prepared only to offer "a direct factual report of the commerce between soul and body" that tallied closely with ordinary experience.

Still, the "rationalist" cast of German philosophy in the aftermath of Leibniz is not to be denied. Leibniz's *Theodicy* was one of the most frequently cited books of the eighteenth century and not just in Germany.¹⁸ The Francophone discourse on Leibniz (who published much of his work in French) was intense over the course of the eighteenth century, and his importance in the development of French thought, in particular French "materialist" thought, is now becoming a matter of intense investigation.¹⁹ The Berlin Academy was a center of Francophone philosophical discourse in the eighteenth century, and one of its major ambitions was to dispute the philosophy of Leibniz. Thus, in 1747 it announced a competition to consider Leibniz's doctrine of the monad. And, of course, in 1755 it announced the famous competition on Alexander Pope and optimism as a vehicle for an

assault on Leibniz's theodicy. Similarly, as John Yolton has documented, Swiss writers, conversant with both the German and the French language materials, involved themselves intensively in the debate over the Three Hypotheses in the period 1735-1750.²⁰

In Germany, philosophers were even using the Leibnizian model against itself to create new possibilities for physical influx.²¹ Among the most important such philosophical proponents of a new theory of physical influx in Germany were Martin Knutzen, Kant's teacher, and Christian Crusius, the philosopher who most powerfully influenced Kant to break with the Wolffian school.²² The first advocate of a revived physical influx theory was Wolff's most important early exponent, Johann Christoph Gottsched. He took advantage precisely of Wolff's careful characterization of all three systems as "hypotheses," for as such, Wolff did not require his disciples to adopt any one of the three positions. The indeterminacy of the "solutions" allowed latitude in the question. In parallel to the argument Locke had made to insinuate the possibility of "thinking matter," Gottsched argued that the limitations of human knowledge made certainty about what was possible for soul or body unreachable, and hence "incomprehensibility" did not mean "impossibility," and one was entitled to seek a more "comprehensible" formulation. He then took advantage of another feature of the Leibniz tradition to make space for his view. Leibniz had objected that physical influx violated the law of the conservation of motion, but Leibniz himself had created a great deal of controversy over exactly how that law operated: did it have to do with the "dead" forces or the "living" ones? If Leibniz was right that conservation had to do with "living forces," then physical influx did not conflict with that principle.

Even more important for Kant were the other two figures who adopted *influxus physicus*: his teacher, Martin Knutzen, and the philosopher he appears to have esteemed most highly in his early period, Christian Crusius. While Gottsched sought to exploit ambiguities in order to adopt the physical influx view without breaking with Leibniz and Wolff, Knutzen made the bolder move of arguing that on Leibnizian principles themselves physical influx was the most plausible hypothesis.

Knutzen argued that Leibniz's very idea of intrasubstantial causation imputed to a substance the power to change place, but such a change of place implicated other substances, which would need to be moved to make place for the first. Intrasubstantial causation implied intersubstantial causation.²³ A second argument was that without the notion of physical influx the idea of impenetrability, which was essential to the theory of matter, became incoherent. Impenetrability entailed the resistance of one substance to another

(315). That this would have quite the impact upon a Leibnizian view that Knutzen wished follows only upon an identification of substance with *body*, which is not entirely clear in the Leibnizian view, though the confusion here seems to lie more with Leibniz than with Knutzen. A third claim of Knutzen is that intersubstantial causation cannot be contradictory since God did it at creation; indeed, the very fact that God did it makes physical influx a "perfection" (319). While that kind of argument only works in the context of an established set of theological premises, those premises were operative in the school-philosophical environment of the early eighteenth century in Germany. (They were not, however, in the West, which may help account for the substantially smaller resonance of Leibnizianism altogether in the West.) Finally, Knutzen appeals to what Eric Watkins calls "probability" but which might be rephrased as "elegance": it was the simplest explanation that fit all the facts (321). Watkins believes the combination of these four arguments by Knutzen in 1735 marked "the crucial turning point" in the contest between preestablished harmony and a revived theory of physical influx. "Crusius, Darjes, Ploucquet, and even Euler all accept Physical Influx in the 1740s," Watkins observes (327). The most important of these figures for the theory of physical influx proved to be Christian Crusius, for he developed "a detailed ontological foundation for Physical Influx" by articulating the idea of "real connection" as essential to any discourse concerning a coherent "world." And "real connection" could only be "causal connection" (334, 329). With the articulation of the notions of "real connection" and "world," we arrive at the philosophical vocabulary of the "precritical" Kant. Watkins takes a strong view of Kant's allegiance to the theory of physical influx: "Kant's *central* and *enduring* concern with causality is . . . to develop a novel version of what Leibniz calls *influxus physicus* or physical influx."²⁴

GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY

It is crucial to discern the mutual implication of theories of intersubstantial interaction with theories of human nature or of the relation of logic to psychology. John Yolton has drawn our attention to the fact that a novel approach to philosophical logic set in during the early eighteenth century, primarily through the work of Locke. "The newer logics . . . both on the continent and in Britain, concentrated more upon the nature and operation of the faculties than upon arguments and valid inference forms."²⁵ This innovation was all the more crucial since logic was the umbrella rubric under which the entire discipline of philosophy was taught in the eighteenth century. It developed the tools and the methods through which the sustained

inquiry into metaphysics and morals could then go forward. As several scholars have pointed out, most perspicaciously Norbert Hinske, there was no such thing yet as "epistemology." It was considered the task of logic to lay out these matters.²⁶

The new way of thinking about logic was a result of the mutual influence between the Lockian view and the French view formulated in the celebrated *Port Royal Logic* of Arnauld and Nicole.²⁷ Locke was the decisive influence. Given his general theory of "real essences," Locke could postulate a mental faculty as a force or power, but since as such it was immaterial, it could not be discriminable except in its implementation in particular acts of mind, and these, he insisted, were triggered only by sensations. By the same token, however, Locke held firmly to the view that, in addition to sensation, reflection, the self-conscious application of mind, was necessary in order to explain knowledge.²⁸

If Leibniz parted company with Locke, it was because he believed Locke had not supplied an adequate account of the nature and operation of reflection, on the one hand, and had, on the other, introduced difficulties in the relation between ideas and words, between real and nominal essence, which were unnecessary. While the full scope of Leibniz's disagreement with Locke did not come to public consideration until the publication of Leibniz's *New Essays* in 1765, there was sufficient understanding of his position within the Wolffian school to discern the greater emphasis, in Leibniz, on the spontaneous powers of mind. The elaboration of a "facultative logic" proved central for the Leibniz-Wolff school, but this school fused it with problems of cognitive legitimacy in the Cartesian tradition of "clarity and distinctness" of ideas. The Wolffian school, not only in Wolff's own work but in the elaborations by Gottsched, Bilfinger, and especially Baumgarten, articulated two distinct facultative hierarchies: one of man as a whole, distinguishing between cognition and desire (understanding and will), and the other within cognition alone, the "faculty of representation," segmented along a continuum from "higher" to "lower" faculties based upon clarity and distinctness. This whole domain of inquiry the Germans called the science of psychology, a new and important branch of philosophy.

The most important aspect of Wolff's psychology was the development of a facultative logic, an account of the process of knowledge formation in terms of a set of human cognitive aptitudes, as well as an account of human volition in terms of human appetitive aptitudes. For Wolff and for the early Kant, it was the former that occupied the bulk of attention. The main framework of Wolff's sequence had three levels: *attentio*, *reflexio*, and *collatio*. At the culmination of that sequence Wolff proposed that one

attained "distinct" knowledge. *Attentio* (*Aufmerksamkeit*) or "attention" was the beginning of knowledge in that it discriminated something from an obscure background, introducing what school-philosophical language called "clarity." This capacity to focus or attend was a skill that could be cultivated by application, exercise, and habit (*conatus, exercitum, usus*).²⁹ Once one had distinct ideas, or concepts, one could then undertake more rigorous elaborations, which involved the higher faculties of reason and especially the logic of syllogisms, which Wolff strongly advocated.

Even more central to our considerations in this entire study is Wolff's inaugural distinction between "rational" and "empirical" psychology.³⁰ Wolff's *empirical* psychology presented descriptively a set of mental functions that had the warrant of experiential acquaintance. He took both introspective observation and the examination of the behavior of others as the evidential basis for this body of thought.³¹ In his *rational* psychology, he set about trying to derive these results from his primordial philosophical principles, both of ontology and of logic, the so-called laws of contradiction and of sufficient reason.³² Both rational and empirical psychology were part of philosophy, Wolff asserted, and yet he wrote: "empirical psychology is really a *history* of the soul and it can be known without any other discipline."³³ This had a decisive pedagogical significance: one could begin instruction or exposition of philosophy with empirical psychology because it presumed only "what anyone can recognize who pays attention to himself" and could be ascertained from our "everyday experience."³⁴ That would seem to place it entirely in the sphere of historical knowledge, but Wolff suggested there was an intermediate sphere between historical and philosophical knowledge into which this consideration particularly inserted itself; it was "the closest level to philosophy and could be called its beginning."³⁵

Wolff was a leader in explicitly discriminating between *cognitio philosophica* and *cognitio historica*.³⁶ Yet there remains a deep ambiguity in the very distinction between philosophical and historical knowledge in Wolff.³⁷ Wolff's definition of *cognitio philosophica* entailed "rigorous demonstration and absolute certitude," but that was hard to reconcile with his claim that "the principles of philosophy must be derived from experience."³⁸ In his Latin *Psychologia empirica* (1732), Wolff distinguished between a pure and an impure reason: both operated a priori in making inferences, but the latter set out from empirical givens. Even more interestingly, Wolff used a very Baconian description for impure reason: "*connubium rationis et experientiae*."³⁹

Wolff had an important empirical side, which has not been recognized in the scholarly literature until recently. But the accentuation of his empirical

concern only intensifies the ambiguity of his vision of philosophical knowledge as rigorous science.⁴⁰ His solution in practice was an "experimental philosophy . . . derived from experience, observation and experiment" (24). But the problem is whether, on Wolff's notion of science, observation can suffice. It is not clear how one ascends from mere observation to the principles required for *cognitio philosophica*.⁴¹ This was an issue not only for Wolff but for Kant as well, for they both clung to a conception of science that wedded it to apodictic certainty, and this was clearly not only problematic for "mere" observation but even for that *connubium rationis et experientiae* that Wolff evoked. Empirical science is something both of these philosophers mention frequently and yet something that a rigorous interpretation of their theories of science makes quite problematic.⁴²

This whole constellation of ideas would be decisive for Kant and for empirical anthropology, though they would take diametrically opposed directions from it. Kant would insist (against Wolff as much as against the so-called empiricists) that metaphysics could contain nothing but the a priori. This insistence intensified with the critical turn, but it was latent even in Kant's precritical writings. While Kant followed Wolff in the pedagogical insertion of empirical psychology into his metaphysics course, he believed as a precritical philosopher that it, along with all other empirical considerations, had to be grounded in a priori principles—in this instance, rational (i.e., metaphysical) psychology. After the critical turn, the empirical still needed to be grounded in the a priori, but this was now a transcendental psychology. After his critical turn Kant would repudiate the whole endeavor of rational psychology as a paralogism. But Kant never questioned the appropriateness of the facultative approach to human experience in general or, more significantly, the specific structures that the Wolff school developed to depict and account for that experience. Kant not only used Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* as the text for his metaphysics course throughout his career, he retained a substantial part of *Metaphysica's* vocabulary and, again more significantly, conceptualization of mental structure.⁴³ What would differentiate Kant from the Wolffian school was his abandonment of the idea that all the mental faculties could be arrayed in a single *continuum* of cognitive clarity and distinctness for the idea that there was a categorial *disjunction* between sensibility and understanding. But that only came with the critical turn of 1769. Originally, Kant construed this conflict with the Wolffians in terms of the problem of objective knowledge, the contrast between nominal and real essences. Gradually, however, he came to see it as a problem of the constitution of the mind itself, thus radicalizing the facultative logic of cognition, which

the Wolffians had already developed, into his own fundamental "discursive" dualism.⁴⁴

In terms of the other facultative hierarchy, that concerning the human being as a whole, the major break with Wolff and with the Baumgarten of the *Metaphysica* (though not of the *Aesthetica*) was Kant's shift from two to three faculties in the conception of human experience in general (*Gemüt*): adding to cognition and volition a third dimension, affect or *aesthetic sensibility*. Baumgarten launched this expansion of investigation into the so-called lower faculties with his *Aesthetica*, which did have this tripartite division, but it was developed primarily by his successors, Georg Friedrich Meier, Johann Sulzer, and Moses Mendelssohn.⁴⁵ These investigations were ongoing as Kant took up his philosophical career, and Kant swiftly became involved in the discourse.

A BRIEF RETROSPECT: KANT'S CAREER TO 1762

Kant came from a modest background, and he attained his advanced education largely because of the intervention of a ubiquitous and powerful benefactor, F. A. Schulz. Schulz was a pastor, rector, and professor, and he was the leading Pietist pedagogical reformer in Königsberg over Kant's early years. He was close to Kant's parents through the parish church, and he appreciated their authentic Pietism. Schulz persuaded them to groom their son for the ministry; this was the impulse, besides Kant's native brightness, for his own sustained patronage. Schulz secured him a place in the best Gymnasium in Königsberg, the Collegium Friedericianum, of which Schulz was rector. From there Kant advanced to the Albertina University in Königsberg, where Schulz dominated the theology faculty and served as rector of the university from 1742 through 1758. It must have disappointed him that Kant proved indifferent to the study of theology, yet Schulz remained his patron even after he entered his university career, only requiring and receiving from Kant assurance of his religious sincerity.⁴⁶ Kant attended the Albertina for some six years but left in 1746 without completing his examinations.⁴⁷ For most of the next nine years he worked as a *Hofmeister*, a private tutor, in prominent households in the outlying districts of East Prussia, returning to Königsberg in the mid-1750s to attain his *Magister* degree, defend two dissertations, and receive the *venia legendi* at the Albertina, commencing in 1755.⁴⁸

To inaugurate his university teaching career, Kant gave a public address in Latin, as was required for the occasion. The topic of the address, Ludwig Borowski, one of Kant's first students and his chosen biographer, tells us, was "on easier and more profound instructions in philosophy."⁴⁹ Of course, this

could simply have been a ceremonial topic, as it was clearly an occasional piece. But the title also suggests that Kant was considering, as he began his university teaching career, the question of the style of philosophy he should pursue. Wolff had died the year before. Change, as we have seen, was already strongly in the wind. The terms “easier (*leichtern*)” and “more profound (*gründlicher*)” were the precise ones by which Thomasius and Wolff distinguished their respective approaches to philosophical presentation, with all the attendant implications. Certainly, as Tonelli has made us aware, the polarization of Thomasian (or Pietist) versus Wolffian sentiments was hardly dead at the University of Königsberg.⁵⁰ Kant’s whole education had been steeped in it. How he would conduct himself as a philosopher and as a teacher would have been something everyone in his audience was curious to know.⁵¹ (And, for what it’s worth, Borowski claims the audience was substantial.) In short, Kant, from the moment he assumed his role as *Magister*, if not before, had to be at work self-consciously constructing a public intellectual identity.

Kant was ambitious. He intended from his earliest writings to place himself among the most important discussants of the most important issues of the time. His earliest essay, composed while still a student of Martin Knutzen, sought to resolve the *vis viva* controversy involving issues of physics and mathematics that had set Leibniz at odds with Descartes and Newton (and which, unbeknownst to Kant, had in fact already been resolved by one of the century’s premier mathematicians, Jean D’Alembert).⁵² While the title page of this early essay indicates 1746, Kant’s revisions continued evidently through 1747, and the work actually appeared in print in 1749. Kant sent a letter promoting this first work to the prominent German mathematician and physicist Leonhard Euler.⁵³ For some time, the scholarship believed a second letter Kant composed on the same day was sent to Albrecht von Haller, the other most prominent natural philosopher in Germany at the time, but recently skepticism has prevailed on that point.⁵⁴ It still remains possible that Haller wrote the review of Kant’s book that appeared in the *Göttingischen Zeitung von Gelehrten Sachen*, since Haller edited the journal at the time.⁵⁵ What is certain is that neither of these giants of mid-eighteenth-century German science took any personal interest in Kant. Worse still, the only major figure in the German literary firmament who did take notice of Kant polished him off in a witty distich. In 1751, in *News from the World of Imagination*, Lessing wrote:

K. pursues a weighty course,
To teach the world a lesson.

He measures every living force,
—His own the lone exception.⁵⁶

To get caught on the barb of Germany's best critical wit was not an auspicious beginning.

Kant's most important early work, *Universal Natural History* (1755), a pioneering contribution to cosmogony but also a flight of literary imagination, needs to be viewed in the light of his ambitions.⁵⁷ Kant dedicated the work to King Frederick II of Prussia, with every hope that its contents, facilitated by this dedication, would receive the attention not merely of the king but of the Berlin Academy and the wider republic of scholars. Unfortunately, the entire edition of the text was impounded by the courts due to his publisher's financial difficulties, and it was never effectively brought to market. The book was scarcely reviewed (Borowski knew of only one review, in a Hamburg newspaper) and one wonders how many outside Königsberg even heard of the work.⁵⁸ Thus, Johann Lambert would compose and publish a similar theory in Berlin in 1761, blithely unaware of Kant's work. Moreover, that work was acclaimed as a new discovery, a point that irked Kant in no small measure. In a footnote in the preface of his *The One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God* (1763), Kant tried to make the public aware of his precedence, taking note of Lambert's publication and offering a compressed summary of his own earlier argument.⁵⁹ Though Kant had written a lot, some of it quite innovative, and though he had actively sought to make a name for himself, in the 1750s he remained largely an unknown outside his native city.

In 1756 Kant applied for the associate chair (*Extraordinarius*) in philosophy at Königsberg University, a position formerly held by his teacher Knutzen (d. 1751). Kant was not chosen. Instead, the Prussian ministry used the outbreak of the Seven Years War as a rationale to cancel the position. The simple fact was that Kant was not known in Berlin, that his works had made virtually no impact on the learned world. But, in addition, he was—and would become increasingly—estranged from the social community of the local university professoriate. Wolfgang Ritzel goes so far as to question the prudence of Kant's conduct: "academic advancement of such a[n] untenured professor] then as much as now depended, however, upon the good will of the ordinary professors. Was Kant at least in this measure embroiled in his own fifteen year dalliance as *Privatdozent*—in the final analysis because he knew there was something better than admission into the academic guild and advancement within it, though he determined nonetheless to pursue that course for the material security it offered?"⁶⁰ Even Vorländer's

biography registers Kant's negativity toward the academic guild; he writes of "numerous expressions in Kant's own writings concerning the [lack of] imagination and pedantry of scholars [which] can only be explained in terms of personal experience."⁶¹ He makes the important point that Kant avoided socializing with faculty, and instead preferred businessmen and military officers in Königsberg society.

Kant knew the system, of that we can be sure. Can it be that he was not earnest about securing his advancement? Surely his ambition and his efforts to secure a professorship speak against that. Yet Kant was not behaving quite the way an aspiring academic was supposed to. Every beginning professor knows what is required: publish, publish, publish—and not "popular" but professional, "rigorous" scholarship. And yet, Ernst Cassirer notes, Kant's "literary production from 1756 to 1763 comprises only a few pages."⁶² One can go farther; I think Ritzel gets right to the heart of the matter:

Now it must be striking that the majority of what Kant wrote and published in the middle and late 1750s was conceived for the learned without profession [*Gelehrten ohne Profession*—we might say the *gebildeten Stände*!] Did it charm him more [*Reizte ihn mehr*—an interesting phrase for Kantians] to work as a "philosopher for the world" for an enlightened public or at least a public which had committed itself to strive toward enlightenment instead of as a school philosopher strictly inside the learned guild?⁶³

Was Kant of one mind here? Dare we suspect that he was psychologically conflicted over his situation? There is a letter to his friend Johann Lindner, from 1759, which gives us as much insight as the circumspect Kant ever willingly allowed into his own state of mind.⁶⁴

I sit daily at the anvil of my lectern and keep the heavy hammer of repetitious lectures going in some sort of rhythm. Now and then an impulse of a nobler sort, from out of nowhere, tempts me to break out of this cramping sphere, but ever-present need leaps on me with its blustering voice and perpetually drives me back forthwith to hard labor by its threats—*intentat angues atque intonat ore* [he beholds the serpent and his mouth thunders forth].⁶⁵

That his sphere was "cramping," that he found lecture writing "repetitious"—that much is clear. That "need" compelled him to stick with this "hard labor" is also clear.

What we wish we could have more information about is that "impulse of a nobler sort" and where—surely *not* "nowhere"—it came from. Willi Goetschel has offered an extended study of Kant's earliest writings, including those Ritzel here characterizes as "conceived for the learned without profession." Goetschel's interpretation of Kant the author suggests that he did from the outset seek a much more general audience than academic publishing would imply. "A close look at his early writing career," Goetschel argues, "shows the degree to which Kant self-consciously perceives himself as a writer entering the *république des lettres*."⁶⁶ He elaborates, "The role models Kant chose are decisive: Rousseau and Hume, but also Voltaire, Swift, Mendelssohn and Aristotle" (9).

But even more than Kant as writer, Kant as reader proves decisive here. Herman Schmalenbach offers us crucial insight: "The yearning to travel that [Kant] carried inside himself and that could not be realized directly because of other, even more hidden internal resistances, was transformed and given an outlet in reading great quantities of travelogues. But this act of transference could be made possible only if descriptions of travel could accomplish what Kant would have been able to expect from traveling himself."⁶⁷ Thus, travel literature allowed Kant to *project* a cosmopolitanism, to imagine safely from his provincial study a tumultuous world of difference. Though the travelogues typically had little detail of actual life, Kant brought to bear "an extraordinary fantasy, an uncommonly intricate sensual imagination."⁶⁸ A nineteenth-century American biographer of Kant perceptively observed that Kant read travel literature, that quintessential Enlightenment genre, as his most favored form of relaxation.⁶⁹ It was part of breaking out of his cramping sphere, that self-projection into a wider, more fascinating world than Kant's everyday station provided. His mind quested manifestly to the edge of the galaxy, but we should be content to affirm his ambition to be a citizen of the world, to achieve that "good European" ideal of cosmopolitanism [*Weltbürgertum*].⁷⁰

THE IMPORTANCE OF PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY

Kant was not quite so untraveled as legend would have it, but it remains that he was physically fixed in the remote province of East Prussia. To be sure, Kant was emphatic, almost hyperbolic, about the cosmopolitan possibilities of Königsberg: "a city such as Königsberg on the river Pregel, even, can be taken as an effective place for the elaboration not only of a knowledge of man but also of a knowledge of the world, [a place] where, even without traveling, these can be acquired."⁷¹ There has been some probably deserved sniping at

this, but, read with psychological sympathy, both what it claims and what it represses tell us much about the dreams of our gallant *Magister*.⁷² Not for the last time, we must turn to pedagogy for some of our most important evidence. In this instance, it was Kant's pioneering project of introducing into the curriculum of the Albertina a course in physical geography.⁷³

Two issues need to concern us. First, we must take seriously Kant's interest in earth science, in the emergent disciplines of geology and geography as *natural sciences*.⁷⁴ To leap too swiftly past that point would be to miss something essential about the early Kant and his self-conception as a natural philosopher, in other words, a(n armchair) scientist. But, having taken this first point seriously, it will be necessary to take up again a contested matter, namely the relation of Kant's physical geography to *Weltkenntnis*, with all the inevitable *anthropological* implications that this term, which will be of decisive importance for this entire study, entails.⁷⁵

From the outset, I submit, Kant saw the course in physical geography as different from his other courses—with different goals and a different audience. The opening line of his course advertisement is revealing: "The rational taste of our enlightened times has ostensibly become so general that one may presume that only few might be found to whom it would be a matter of indifference to know those marvels of nature which the earth possesses in other places which are beyond their immediate horizon."⁷⁶ This pedagogical project was Kant's earliest innovative step in fostering *Aufklärung* in Germany. Kant as a natural scientist and Kant as a cultivator of pragmatic cosmopolitanism among the *gebildeten Stände*—here we have modes in which Kant projected a self-conception beyond the narrows of his academic post and his academic colleagues.

In that context Kant became increasingly interested in the prize competitions proposed especially by the section on speculative philosophy of the Berlin Academy. Giorgio Tonelli has argued that Kant in these days was far more attuned to—and directed by—the line of the Berlin Academy than many interpreters have realized. In particular, Tonelli insists that the president of the Berlin Academy from 1746 to 1759, Maupertuis, needs to be seen as one of the two most important guiding lights (*Gewährsmänner*) of Kant's early years (the other being Crusius).⁷⁷ Tonelli developed a point that recent scholarship has confirmed, namely that Maupertuis and his academy were seen as directly connected to the cultural and political agenda of King Frederick II. Kant's identification with the king's program has long been recognized.⁷⁸ Kant studied the initiatives of the Berlin Academy assiduously, both for his intellectual orientation and for his pragmatic career choices. He studied, it must be added, not simply the prize topics in the class of

speculative philosophy, with which so far most scholarly treatment has preoccupied itself, but also those in the class of natural science.

The Berlin Academy pursued something of a zigzag course after its revitalization in the early 1740s. In particular, after an initial pro-Wolffian moment in which Frederick II actively sought Wolff's move to Berlin and membership in the academy, the installation of Maupertuis as president signified a sharp anti-Wolffian shift. This shift prevailed even after the death of Maupertuis in 1759, under the active administrative leadership of Leonhard Euler and the tacit but equally anti-Wolffian direction of Jean D'Alembert.⁷⁹ Most important, the Berlin Academy brought the grand issues of the European Enlightenment, conducted for the most part in Francophone texts, directly into the center of German cultural discourse. Figures like d'Argens, Mérian, Formey, and Sulzer, to say nothing of Maupertuis and La Mettrie—and briefly Voltaire himself—took up residence in Berlin. They presided over an infusion of Western Enlightenment ideas into German thought through the portal of Berlin that was of extraordinary importance.

While Kant was already writing on topics drawn from the academy's prize competitions by 1754, Kant was first drawn to *enter* the competition announced by the philosophical section of the Academy for 1755.⁸⁰ Eventually he thought better of participating, suspecting, correctly, that his own view would not meet with favor among the academicians.⁸¹ The issue was profoundly politicized. It took up the question of Pope's optimism as a surrogate for Leibniz's theodicy, with the intention of debunking both.⁸² The competition provoked an internal squabble between the Wolffian and anti-Wolffian camps in the academy, leading to harsh words between Sulzer and Formey. It also took place in the context of the most divisive and embarrassing controversy in this period of the academy, the so-called Maupertuis-König dispute, which again turned on the question of Leibniz.⁸³ Most important, it provoked an external and brilliant satirical commentary in the form of Lessing and Mendelssohn's pamphlet, "Pope a Metaphysician!"⁸⁴ That text was important both for its elaboration of a distinction between poetry and philosophy and for its insistence upon discriminating the vulgar from a rigorous understanding of Leibnizian metaphysics. It also signaled the presence of an extra-academic philosophical culture.

The urgency of the question of what Leibniz could have meant by his notion of the "best of all possible worlds" was heightened dramatically by the Lisbon earthquake of 1755.⁸⁵ I would add to this natural disaster the man-made catastrophe of the Seven Years War, which commenced in 1756.⁸⁶ Voltaire, present in Berlin for much of this time, offered his immortal commentary in *Candide* (1759).⁸⁷ More prosaically, but with notable vigor,

Kant too responded to the popular demand for guidance on the question of the natural calamity, since it spoke both to his "scientific" expertise in earth science and to his calling to bring *Weltkenntnis* to the *gebildeten Stände*.⁸⁸ It also allowed him to feel he was entering into the European contest opened out between the titans, Voltaire and Rousseau, on the moral significance of natural, as contrasted to human, horrors.⁸⁹

In the same year Voltaire published *Candide*, Kant composed an essay, "On Optimism," inspired by the academy competition four years earlier and disputing the position of the prize-winner.⁹⁰ Kant circulated his little essay in Königsberg as an advertisement for his courses (particularly the course in physical geography). That announcement became embroiled with a dissertation on the same topic presented by a new *Magister* at the university who, thinking Kant had aimed his piece at him, took umbrage and dashed off a rejoinder.⁹¹ The whole affair won Kant considerable local notoriety. He reported this in his letter to his friend Lindner (in Riga) alluded to earlier, in which Kant also disclosed his sentiments about his career and his dreams. Much later, Kant surprised his secretary/biographer Borowski with the "really solemn earnestness [*wirklich feierlichen Ernste*]" of his request that "On Optimism" be suppressed.⁹² Recently Franz Nauen has helped make clear why: by the 1790s this early text had become an embarrassment for Kant's high-profile opposition to Spinozism, since it showed how close he himself had come to that posture in the late 1750s.⁹³ One wonders whether even in 1759 this might not have appeared politically risky. Anything smacking of Spinozism was still dangerous in Germany, and Königsberg already had a bad record on that score.⁹⁴ But circumstances were a bit strange in Königsberg at that moment: Berlin was not nearly so prominent. St. Petersburg had become the presiding metropole.

The Russians occupied Königsberg for the better part of the Seven Years War, and during that time governance of the University of Königsberg passed to the Russian tsarina Elizabeth II. Administrative matters went on much as before in Königsberg with the change in regimes. The Russians had no interest in restructuring local administration. As it happened, a philosophy chair opened up again at the university while the Russians were in charge. In 1758 Kypke, the Ordinarius for philosophy, died, leaving his chair open. Kant's mentor, Schulz, wanted Kant to have the chair and Kant actively solicited it from the tsarina, but the position went to someone else.⁹⁵ Kant was simply not known well enough in the general academic community to receive the preference. Moreover, in light of Arsenji Gulyga's presentation of the Russian sources, it would appear that Kant's criticism of Crusius ran him afoul of the Russian official in Königsberg responsible for determining

the appointment.⁹⁶ That the name of David Weymann (a disciple of Crusius) first appears in this context may help explain why Kant might have become embroiled even briefly in a dispute over optimism the following year with a person he considered a mere "cyclops."⁹⁷

The Seven Years War was for Königsberg, if neither for Prussia nor for Europe as a whole, just another "cabinet" war.⁹⁸ Nothing in local government seems to have been affected, and the Russian military brought a good deal of money and even more social liveliness to the scene. To be sure, Frederick II never forgave East Prussia for surrendering, and he refused to visit the province for the balance of his reign (not a great sacrifice for him personally, since the one time he did visit it, in his youth at his father's command, he had hated it); his grace toward Königsberg and its university may have diminished as a consequence.⁹⁹ Moreover, the aftermath of the war brought on a severe economic crisis in Prussia and Germany generally, which triggered a long-term decline in Königsberg's wealth.¹⁰⁰ Ironically, spared in war, the city gradually came to suffer in the ensuing peace, but these longer term consequences are less important for our concerns than the more immediate effects of the Russian presence. One such consequence of the Russian occupation proved relevant to Kant. He found himself attended by a number of young Russian military officers (many of them German or German-speaking) interested in cultivating themselves while at their new post.¹⁰¹ He gave them private lessons, mainly in (applied) mathematics, and there is good reason to believe this dramatically improved his financial condition.¹⁰² He also spent a lot of time in their social company, developing a lifelong taste for association with the higher military. When the war ended, Kant switched to the company of the returning Prussian officer corps.

KANT'S SYSTEM OF 1762-1763

Around the year 1762-1763 Kant had a "surprisingly productive" spate of writing: "The False Precision of the Four Syllogistic Figures" (1762), the "Investigation of the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals" (commonly referred to as "The Prize Essay") (completed December 1762; published April 1764), *The One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God* (published December 1762), and the "Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitude into Philosophy" (completed summer 1763; published Easter 1764). It is striking that Kant should have published so much in so short a time, in light of the rather spare publications of the preceding six years. One prime stimulus was the prize competition announced by the Berlin Academy in 1761. The section for speculative

philosophy proposed a most topical and fruitful theme, for which Johann Sulzer deserves full credit. The question, posed in its exact terms, is as follows: "One seeks to know: whether metaphysical truths generally, and in particular the first principles of natural theology and of morals, are capable of the same distinct proofs achieved by geometric truths, and, if they are not capable of such proof, what the actual nature of their certainty is, what level of purported certainty can be attained, and whether it is sufficient for complete conviction."¹⁰³ This question was published in the *Berlinische Nachrichten von Staats- und Gelehrten Sachen*, June 23, 1761. The deadline for submissions was given as January 1, 1763, and a decision was promised by May 21, 1763.

We know that Kant got his text in at the very last minute, on December 31, 1762. We know as well that he was finishing the copy for his lengthy monograph on the *One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God* over the same period, and that it appeared late in December. Thus, it is likely that these texts were composed with some overlap, and their argumentation shows considerable affinity. Kant composed the earlier false-precision essay as an advertisement for his logic course in the winter term of 1762–1763, so it was published in late summer or early autumn of 1762. The essay on negative magnitude belongs so closely in this configuration that we have every reason to believe that Kant turned to this composition immediately upon submitting the Prize Essay, even though it was not published until 1764.

Dieter Henrich has persuaded us that Kant's burst of writing of 1762–1763 represented his first systematic philosophical position.¹⁰⁴ By 1762, Henrich argues, Kant "believed he was in possession of the fundamentals of a new concept of metaphysics" (11). Indeed, "already before the publication of the Prize Essay, it seemed that Kant was of the opinion that he had succeeded in achieving insight into the true method of metaphysics" (13). This accounted for Kant's remarkable burst of productivity, in Henrich's view. Certainly Kant's decision to enter the prize competition signaled a new resolve, and the text itself represented Kant's declaration of independence not only from Wolff, as has long been noted, but also from Crusius. Henrich argues that Kant's Prize Essay arose out of his longstanding engagement with the problems of a natural theology posed by Leibniz's *Theodicy*.¹⁰⁵ The beginnings of this undertaking lay in Kant's interest in the challenge posed by the Berlin Academy in 1755 to question the whole monadology of Leibniz, especially in the form presented in the *Theodicy*.

Kant's constellation of publications correlates directly with the lectures on logic and metaphysics that Johann Gottfried Herder attended from 1762

to 1764 and from which his notes have been preserved. These are also largely the works that Moses Mendelssohn reviewed in *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend* in 1764 and 1765, and for which his own prize essay served as the most appropriate foil. (Situating Kant's works between Mendelssohn and Herder will prove an ongoing methodological thematic of my study.) After briefly culling contextual hints from the published texts themselves, I will take up in turn Herder's notes, Mendelssohn's reviews, and finally Henrich's synthetic interpretation. The goal here is twofold: first to survey Kant's concerns and to situate them in the intellectual context, and second to create a benchmark from which to trace Kant's "crisis" and seven years of "alternative" philosophizing.

KANT'S TEXTS

If we take the Prussian Ministry's 1770 Rescript seriously, logic had rather a tall order to fill in a student's education: "In [this course] will be examined philosophically not only human knowledge, its flaws, limits and perfections, but also a [general] instruction in scholarly thought and how to study; if a student learns this logic at the very beginning of his studies, then he will be best prepared to learn any other science to which he applies it."¹⁰⁶ We know that though Kant in 1766 conceived of a sophisticated logic as a capstone course in the study of philosophy, his elementary logic course was what students typically took first from Kant once he became professor in 1770. Enrollments were relatively high, which suggests that at least some students took the Prussian ministry's advice seriously. We have more student notebooks from Kant's logic course than from any other, which suggests that the business in transcripts of this particular series of lectures was lively. The question is whether there would have been such interest a decade earlier, when Kant was not the professor, and when students would have had to subscribe and pay to hear such lectures.

One of the ways to drum up student interest was to advertise, in the form of a short publication, and this was the origin of Kant's essay "The False Precision of the Four Syllogistic Figures." One can speculate that this was in all likelihood the first piece of Kant's writing that the young Herder, matriculating that very term, might have read.¹⁰⁷ The work shows Kant not only comfortably in command of the logical terminology but also willing to make some innovative claims about its proper organization and even more provocative claims about its appropriate use. "It is, however, the purpose of logic not to complicate but to resolve, not to present itself circumspectly but perspicuously. . . . Logic has as its most characteristic purpose to bring

everything into the simplest form of knowledge."¹⁰⁸ More the pity that human nature is disposed either to split hairs or build castles in the air, Kant continued, and worst of all—at least “not very much to the advantage of truth”—is the “scholarly gymnastics” of word games through which to catch out the unwary (57). This sharp reprimand to academic misemployment of logic suggests an appealing freshness of viewpoint that would, one suspects, attract beginning students wary precisely of academic one-upmanship. But Kant adds a grander dose of intellectual pessimism, drawn in all likelihood from the anti-intellectual genius of the day, Rousseau: “Things worth knowing pile up in our times. Soon our capacity will be too weak and our lifetimes too short to be able even to cull out what is useful. There is laid before us such an excess of wealth that in order to extract [that wealth] it is necessary for us to throw back a lot of useless plunder. It would have been better never even to have attempted it” (57). Stylishly unorthodox, this was an invitation to those who could discern the author behind the author. By contrast, only someone already knowledgeable in philosophy would grasp the other points in the essay that link up with Kant’s larger philosophical endeavor, such as the mention of “unprovable judgments” with which the text draws to a close, or the final two sentences, which declare war, without naming them, first upon Wolff and then upon Crusius (61).

When we turn to the *One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God*, we come to a much more extended work, and one, moreover, with strong connections to Kant’s philosophical corpus of the 1750s, especially the *Universal Natural History*, the *Nova Dilucidatio*, and the “Physical Monadology.” We are in the thicket of “school philosophy.” Because it was brought to completion coterminously with the Prize Essay, and because the latter is so much clearer about Kant’s rebellion against Wolff and Crusius and about his projected alternative metaphysics, let us turn first to that essay, and then incorporate the *One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God* into the structure of issues that the briefer and more polemical text articulates.

Kant begins the Prize Essay by implicitly contrasting the failure of philosophy to have achieved a universally accepted system with the success of Newton’s physical science. This anticipates a line of historical argumentation about the maturation of sciences that gets developed in the “Transcendental Dialectic” of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.¹⁰⁹ The major argument of the Prize Essay is set forth in the “First Reflection,” which, taking its lead from the prize question, juxtaposes the mathematical with the philosophical method. But instead of seeking to assimilate the latter to the former, Kant insists that they are profoundly disparate. Mathematics

proceeds always synthetically, from stipulated definitions. Philosophy, by contrast, starts from the situation in which "the concept of a thing is already given, but it is confused or insufficiently determined; I have to analyse it."¹¹⁰ That is, "it is the business of philosophy to analyse concepts which are given confusedly, to explain them in detail and to make them determinate" (278; tr. 8).

But here a further difference intervenes. Mathematics, because of its stipulative definitions has few "unanalysable concepts and unprovable propositions; but in philosophy they are innumerable" (279; tr. 10). The struggle of philosophy to make confused concepts determinate will always end in "unanalysable concepts . . . unanalysable either in and for themselves or relatively to us" (280; tr. 10). Kant suggests that there are many concepts in philosophy that will not be very amenable to analysis: "other concepts can only be partially analysed, as the concepts of *space*, *time*, of the various *feelings* of the human soul, of the feelings of the *sublime*, of the *beautiful*, of the *disgusting*, etc."¹¹¹ Kant makes it the business of the "higher philosophy" to find out those "characteristics, which the understanding initially and immediately perceives in [the object]" as "the foundation from which definitions can be drawn up" (281; tr. 12). If that is its project, "metaphysics is without doubt the most difficult of all human enquiries." Indeed, Kant continues, a metaphysics in this sense "has never yet been written" (283; tr. 14). That, we must pause to observe, is a provocation to the guild of the first order.

Kant proposes an approach to certainty that is intuitive, rather than demonstrative: "I can be immediately certain about various different predicates of any particular thing, in spite of the fact that I do not know enough about that thing to give a detailed and determinate *concept of the thing*, that is a definition" (284; tr. 15). One should start there, "looking carefully for what is immediately certain in the object." To this he adds a second rule: "one ought particularly to distinguish the immediate judgments about the object, from that which one meets first of all in it with certainty." Kant claims that this "true method of metaphysics is basically the same as that introduced by *Newton* into natural science" (285; tr. 17). What he means is that philosophy, like natural science, can dispense with full knowledge of the origins of things and work from what is incontestably given in experience. Giorgio Tonelli has done us the extraordinary service of situating these Kantian ideas in a rich context of other opinions from the early eighteenth century. What Tonelli demonstrates is the degree to which Kant's stance here, especially the approximation of metaphysics to natural science rather than mathematics, falls

within larger propensities of the era.¹¹² Kant's example, the distinction between body and space, demonstrates fully the immersion of Kant in the discourse of the time. However, it also demonstrates the lingering confusion of his position.

Kant explicitly invokes Crusius in the Prize Essay, in particular the latter's notion of "material principles" as the "foundation and firmness of human reason." He concurs with Crusius, that is, in rejecting the view that formal principles, especially the famous "Law of Contradiction"—or as Kant would have it, the *twin* laws of identity and of contradiction—could prove everything. But Kant rejects Crusius's proposal for an alternative basis for certainty, insisting upon a universality that Crusius's principle of "*what I cannot think of as other than true, is true*" (italics in original) cannot attain.¹¹³

Finally, Kant turns to the question of morals. He argues that "the fundamental principles of ethics are not yet capable of all the distinctness required" (298; tr. 31). He demonstrates this via an ambiguity in the concept of obligation, whereby one can construe the notion of "ought" as mediate or immediate, as a means or as an end. Kant would more felicitously characterize these in his *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) as hypothetical and categorical imperatives, respectively.¹¹⁴ Further, Kant maintains that "an immediate, ultimate rule of all obligation must be absolutely unprovable."¹¹⁵ The best he can offer is a principle attained "after much reflection"—"do the most perfect possible by you"—but he admits this is purely formal and adds that, as in metaphysics, material principles are required (299; tr. 32–33). That leads him to one of the most famous lines in the Prize Essay: "Only in our times has it begun to be realized that the faculty of representing what is *true* is *knowledge*; whereas the faculty of perceiving what is *good*, is *feeling*; and that these two may not be confused with each other" (299; tr. 33). Kant speculates that there must be "an unanalysable feeling of the good," and that this analogy to the unanalysable intuitions of the certain implies "an unprovable material principle of obligation" which is "indeed subordinate to the supreme formal and affirmative rule of obligation, but immediately subordinate" (299–300; tr. 33). Kant admits this is all provisional and that "the supreme, fundamental concepts of obligation must first of all be more surely determined." On this line, he notes, "*Hutcheson* and others have provided, under the name of moral feeling, a beginning to fine observations" (300; tr. 34).

The significant novelty of the Prize Essay in moral theory is the evocation of Francis Hutcheson.¹¹⁶ Kant identified Hutcheson as the philoso-

pher who had carried furthest the crucial inquiry for moral philosophy, namely the search for a grounding principle. It was Hutcheson's recognition of the "original inwardness of the ethical [*ursprüngliche Innerlichkeit des Sittlichen*]" that Kant admired, for Kant was convinced that "every ethical demand must have immediate certainty" (64). Henrich notes that Hutcheson was more swiftly and more fully translated into German than Hume or any other philosophical writer from Britain, and that a substantial body of his work was available in German translation by 1760 (51 n). Hutcheson was as important at the mid-eighteenth century as he was neglected in more recent times. Clearly, Kant was very involved in this reception, using Hutcheson as the basis for some of his course lectures on ethics. While his references to Hutcheson in published works are few and most of them, especially the later ones, were critical, Kant's lectures on ethics and his unpublished reflections demonstrate a more extensive engagement with Hutcheson's ideas. Hutcheson was convinced of the immediate spontaneity of the ethical, but that meant for him that reason could not possibly be its source. Of course, the reason he had in mind was the Lockian version, a mere logical capacity to link ideas. What Hutcheson sought under the rubric of moral sense was another sort of principle, the idea of will, which he traced back to Aristotelian ideas. Kant would take up but transmute this connection, deriving his notion of will from the idea of practical reason. This idea of universal legitimacy, of binding obligation, had become the touchstone of Kant's thought about moral philosophy already by the time of the Prize Essay.¹¹⁷ Trying to address himself to these concerns, Hutcheson, like Crusius, sought to ground the ethical experience in a divine intervention, but this would not satisfy Kant.¹¹⁸ Kant was convinced that the ground of the ethical experience lay in an "underivable originality of the consciousness of the good [*unableitbare Ursprünglichkeit des Bewußtseins vom Guten*]."¹¹⁹ The resonance of this language with his metaphysical considerations in the Prize Essay is inescapable.

Clearly, Kant has not achieved closure in his thinking with this essay. Cassirer goes so far as to suggest that Kant's real "problem did not seize him in the reply to the question he sent to the Academy but only really took hold of him after he had finished that answer."¹²⁰ Be that as it may, Cassirer is certainly apt in the following observation: "The analyst of inner experience, who tries to mold himself on the model of the Newtonian method, and the speculative philosopher who clings to the central element of rational metaphysics, the ontological proof of God's existence, though

in an altered form, here have not yet been clearly and sharply separated" (76). Even that does not get at all the complexities and possibilities of Kant's position in 1762. It does not take seriously enough how troubling Kant found the imprecision in ethics, or the direction in which he would immediately turn to achieve a more viable position. It does not recognize that even the "Newtonian" Kant still carried a lot of metaphysical baggage. He was caught up in the great wrangle of the so-called Three Hypotheses concerning the interaction of substances and the possibility of a unified world. That intrudes in the Prize Essay only in the example of body and space in section II, but it weighs heavily in Kant's writings on natural theology and in his lectures on metaphysics. What Cassirer does in mentioning the ontological proof, however, is bring us back to Kant's *One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God* and to the fourth piece of writing, Kant's essay on negative magnitudes, both of which contribute essential principles of Kant's philosophy, namely that existence is not a predicate and that real negation is distinct from contradiction.

The One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God contains clear statements of Kant's methodological positions of the Prize Essay. Thus, he explicitly contrasts metaphysics to mathematics and expresses commitment to an analytic method in philosophy.¹²¹ Similarly, Kant claims that analysis will inevitably result in "unanalyzable concepts" (59). The most important claim of the text is that existence is not a predicate of the conventional sort: "The term 'existence' is used as a predicate and this can be done safely and without troublesome errors so long as it is not proposed to deduce being from merely possible concepts as one is wont to do in proving absolutely necessary existence" (57). Kant maintains that existence "is the absolute position of the thing," and thus "on the whole identical with the concept of being in general" (59). That is, "something more is posited through an existent thing than through a merely possible one, because this concerns the absolute position of the thing itself" (63). Kant formulates an argument that actual existence must precede possibility, and thus "if all existence is denied, all possibility is also abolished" (71). Thus, Kant both stands the traditional ontological argument on its head and proceeds to suggest that in the inverse form a possible basis for the proof of God's existence can nonetheless be found. "[I]f I annul all existence in general and if through that the final real ground of all thought is abolished, then likewise all possibility disappears and there is nothing left to be thought" (77). Kant infers from this, "the existence of one or more things lies at the base of possibility itself, and . . . this existence is in itself necessary" (79). Having to his satisfaction established the necessity of such an existence,

Kant swiftly ascribes to it simplicity and spirituality (thought and will), and proclaims it God.¹²²

Kant sets out in the second part of his text to develop a more sophisticated idea of physical theology, one which sees in the complex harmonies of mechanical cause a sufficient warrant for divinity, without requiring miraculous interventions as the sign of divine providence.¹²³ Kant believes that physicotheology went off on the wrong track in seeking to identify miraculous interventions with divine providence. Rather, the natural function of the universe according to simple mechanical laws seems to Kant the essential basis for a viable physicotheology. "The method is excellent: first because the conclusion is thoroughly empirical and thus lively and engaging, and accordingly easy and intelligible to the most common intellect. Second, because it is more natural than any other proof" (147). Kant invokes in particular the theory of "least action" proposed by Maupertuis as a sterling instance of this divine economy (109–11). But his ultimate illustration is his reference to his own development of what we know as the nebular hypothesis.

For Kant, the problem of organic life occasions the question about the metaphysical basis of explanation, leading him to consider the rival theories of generation.

Because it would be incoherent to regard the initial generation of plants or animals as a mechanical by-product of universal law, a double question remains which is unresolved on the basis cited above—namely, whether each individual is immediately made by God and therefore of supernatural origin so that only perpetuation, that is the transition from one time to another in evolution, is entrusted to natural law; or whether there are some individuals of the plant and animal kingdoms which, despite their immediate divine origin, have the capacity, which we do not understand, of actually generating their own kind according to an ordinary natural law and not merely [the capacity] of evolving. (141)

What is noteworthy is the introduction of preformationist and epigenetic theories of generation into the discussion of the ideas of occasionalism and preestablished harmony, on the one hand, and physical influx on the other. Kant in this text clearly finds all the theories problematic, but he devotes attention specifically to the problems faced by Buffon and Maupertuis in developing an alternative to the dominant preformationist account (143). Kant's main point is to note that even an epigenetic account of generation

requires divine creation at the origin and hence is a supernatural, not a strictly materialist account of organic life.¹²⁴

The final text in Kant's burst of systematic philosophy of 1762 and 1763 was the essay on negative magnitudes. It was important for three things. First, it articulated a powerful argument for the discernment of a difference between the nominal and the real through differences in the respective theories of negation that attached to them. Second, it posed a fundamental challenge to metaphysicians to come up with a better account of causality. And finally, it gave vent to some of Kant's sharpest castigations of academic philosophy, and can indeed be taken as a statement of rebellion against the guild. For Kant, one of the strongest bases for the distinction of real from logical truth lay in the difference in the character of negativity each entailed. For Kant, logical negativity involved both contradiction and impossibility, which he termed *negation*, whereas real negativity needed to be understood in terms not of contradiction but of opposition, and this meant that both opposites were not only possible but actual; their interaction resulted in privation. Privation simply could not be reduced to a formal-logical notion.¹²⁵ For Kant, this argument about forms of negation, especially in their clarification of the action of forces of attraction and repulsion in nature and in their clarification of psychological and moral motives in the soul, gave substance to his argument for the centrality of the idea of real grounds. He explicitly distinguished his idea from that of Crusius, for he maintained that Crusius confused the ground of existence [*ratio essendi*] with the ground of cognition [*ratio cognoscendi*]; Kant himself held these distinct. Above all, this deeper analysis of the idea of real ground led Kant to throw down a challenge to the metaphysical community: "my question presents itself in the following simple form: How am I to understand *the fact that, because something is, something else is?*" (202).

Most interesting from our vantage are the passages in which Kant distances himself sharply from the academic community of philosophy. He observes: "The self-styled 'thorough' philosophers increase daily in number. They look so deeply into everything that nothing remains hidden from them which they cannot explain or understand" (201). Kant claimed, by contrast, to "make no secret of the frailty of my understanding. This frailty is the explanation of my understanding least what everybody else seems to understand with ease" (201). The irony could be lost on no one, and just in case, Kant is more explicit elsewhere: "the learned rabble [*gelehrten Pöbel*] . . . knows nothing and understands nothing, but it talks about everything; and what it says—on that it stubbornly insists" (200). Kant has no patience for

the dogmatic tone of academic metaphysics: "It seems to me, however, that, in a branch of knowledge as difficult to handle as metaphysics, it is much more appropriate that one's thought should first of all be presented to public examination in the guise of tentative experiments than that they should be announced from the beginning with all the adornments of pretended thoroughness and complete conviction" (189). His exasperation with the school tradition and his inclination to "experimental" philosophizing could not have been stated more clearly.

HERDER'S NOTES OF KANT'S METAPHYSICS LECTURES

Herder attended all the courses Kant offered in the years 1762 through 1764, and several of them more than once.¹²⁶ The volume of material we have from him on metaphysics and practical philosophy is substantial.¹²⁷ The concern here will be to identify what the major themes developed in Kant's courses appear to have been, as filtered through Herder's note taking and summarizing. (In another context we will take up questions about the reliability of Herder as a witness.)

Herder's opening notes from the lectures on metaphysics, not surprisingly, contain passages that represented Kant's introduction to the study of philosophy. This introduction is significant in two regards. First, Kant made an effort to represent the study of metaphysics as capable of beauty, not just profundity, though he admitted that this was not commonly achieved.¹²⁸ The question of an aesthetic dimension to the presentation of philosophy is no trivial issue. It was central to the dispute between *Schulphilosophie* and *Popularphilosophie*, and it continued as a major source of contention between Kant and the commentators on his "critical philosophy."¹²⁹ It also lies, in my view, at the ground of Kant's resentment of Herder in the 1780s.¹³⁰ Hence, it is important to note Kant's openness to accessible and, indeed, beautiful philosophizing at the moment Herder came to learn about the discipline from him. (Kant's subsequent aspersions on *schöne Wissenschaft* thus need to be taken symptomatically, not magisterially, as has been the penchant of Kant scholarship hitherto.)

Second, Kant enunciated clearly the keynote of his pedagogy in philosophy, his intention to teach his students not a set of doctrines but rather the practice of philosophizing. Two key principles opened the path to this pursuit: thinking for oneself (*Selbstdenken*), accepting nothing on authority; and seeing things from the vantage of the other, especially conceiving how this other could have found strange and problematic ideas plausible.¹³¹ Through such empathetic projection one could widen the scope

of one's own thinking. Even if this led ultimately to the conclusion that the other was in error, that too was highly instructive. In other courses, especially in his lectures on logic, Kant would supplement these two maxims with a third, perhaps already implicit in what he professed here—namely to proceed methodically step by step, avoiding speculative or imaginative leaps.¹³² These principles remained so important for Kant that they appeared as late as 1790 in his *Critique of Judgment* as core principles of "enlightenment."¹³³

Thus, Kant was emphasizing *Selbstdenken* at least by 1762. It was a dominant idea for Kant in this moment, and perhaps always. Borowski emphasized this above all in characterizing Kant's teaching: "To think for oneself—to inquire on one's own—to stand on one's own two feet—were expressions that were always being presented."¹³⁴ Herder, in his famous characterization of Kant as a teacher, of which I will be making much use over the course of this study, similarly stresses the emphasis on *Selbstdenken*.¹³⁵ Kant himself, in the important *Announcement of His Winter Courses for 1765–66*, makes that idea the linchpin of his whole teaching agenda: "[the student] should not learn *ideas* [*Gedanken*] but *thinking* [*denken*]. . . . The method of reflecting and concluding *for oneself* is the skill the student is really seeking."¹³⁶ This was an ideal that Kant clung to for a lifetime. He made it the talisman of enlightenment itself in his 1786 essay "What Does Orientation in Thinking Mean?"—"To think for oneself means to look within oneself (i.e., in one's own reason) for the supreme touchstone of truth; the maxim of thinking for oneself at all times is *enlightenment*."¹³⁷ It was then taken up expressly in Herder's writing from that time. Together, their practices represent persuasive evidence of the importance of this norm of the *Hochaufklärung* by the 1760s.¹³⁸

Kant situated his exposition in terms of contending philosophical vantages: the (logical) egoist (solipsist), the idealist, the materialist, and presumably his own position as distinct from all these. This manner of presenting philosophy, one might note, resembles the way David Hume set up his own inquiries.¹³⁹ Hume's "method" was underscored in the manner in which his essays were translated and published on the continent.¹⁴⁰ Hume seemed to offer an alternative project for philosophy that at least some Germans in the 1750s and 1760s took very seriously.¹⁴¹ The question of Kant's relation to Hume, in 1762 and thereafter, will concern us at another juncture.¹⁴² In light of later disputes, Kant appeared remarkably respectful of Berkeley's idealism, insisting "*logically* he cannot be refuted, but rather by the assent of other human beings and one's own conviction."¹⁴³ More important for Kant is the challenge of materialism, and he insists that

body cannot move itself. Matter is in that essential sense inert, and the sources of the forces that move it are external to it, in immaterial substances (2:899).

Kant taught metaphysics not only by offering a running commentary on the state-mandated textbook, Baumgarten's *Metaphysica*, but also by situating his comments in the larger controversy between Wolff and Crusius. Kant made it clear from the outset that he found fault with each of these figures, and with Baumgarten as well. Explicating but also critically supplementing Baumgarten, Kant, more by implication than by self-proclamation, sketched out his own position. The presentation in the lectures correlates directly with Kant's published writings of the time. They expound what Henrich has called Kant's system of 1762–1763.

Perhaps the most important thrust of the metaphysics lectures was Kant's development of the idea of a *Realgrund* and the whole distinction of logical versus real, formal versus material. That pervades the lectures and points forward to essential issues of the full-fledged "critical philosophy." Kant supported Crusius against the Wolffian attempt to derive the principle of sufficient reason from the principle of identity/contradiction, in other words, to subsume the material/real under the formal/logical. But Crusius, in Kant's view, had proceeded too recklessly to affirm an alternative basis for certainty in an indiscriminate sense of self-evidence. Kant emphasized the difficulty of the notions of the real and the *Realgrund* even as he insisted upon their centrality. How to conceive *what* and *how* a "real ground" might be thus became urgent, not only ontologically but epistemologically, for the future of metaphysics.

A further element of Kant's dissent from the Wolffians was his distinction of the philosophical from the mathematical method, especially over the essential issue of definition. This was, of course, the central concern of his Prize Essay of 1762, and it is not surprising that it would find expression as well in his lectures of the time. More important, however, is the emphasis throughout the lectures on the idea of "unanalyzable concepts and unprovable judgments." Kant argued that philosophy's project was to take the complex concepts given in discourse and submit them to rigorous analysis (*Zergliederung*), but he insisted that this analytic reduction would end with certain foundational concepts and judgments beyond which it would not be possible to go. He left open whether these would be immediately obvious and valid, upon reaching them, or simply ineluctable data. Moreover, by insisting on the core distinction between logical and real, he suggested that this analysis had to proceed along two lines: not simply the logical analysis of the predicates contained in the subject (which he would

eventually term "analytic judgments"), but the real analysis that asked after the "absolute positing" or existence-claim associated with a substance, since, as his *One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God* elaborated, existence was not a (logical) predicate. "The concept of reality is the concept of that which is posited."¹⁴⁴ And Kant developed in the lectures as well the core argument from the essay on negative magnitudes: "Those things set into real opposition do not constitute a negation [logical contradiction]" (1:19).

To explain his idea of a *Realgrund*, Kant argued that it could not be thought of in terms of a judgment but only in terms of a concept. He wished to avoid the Leibnizian penchant of regarding all judgments as expositions, according to the law of identity, of the truths contained in the subject. Thus, Kant adduced a key example: "The will of God is the real ground of the existence of the world [but] the world is not identical with God" (1:24). Instead of seeing the *Realgrund* as expressed in a conventional logical proposition or judgment, Kant insisted that it be grasped as a "simple concept," the concept of force (*Kraft*). Its explication generates a form that "appears to be the same as a logical proposition, but is not; instead, the predicate here is precisely the *respectus* of the real ground" (1:24).

There were two important corollaries. First, Kant insisted that we could know *Realgründe* "only through experience" (1:24). We cannot reach the real ground in substance. At best we can measure the magnitude of the force by the magnitude of the effect (2:845). "In every *commercium* the cause is therefore inexplicable." That is, "we cannot know the cause of the *nexus* with real grounds, for which the consequent is something other than mere experience. Since I can never grasp the relation between real grounds and consequences, because they are in themselves diverse, [I] rather conceive the term force as the ultimate concept" (2:886). The question remains: "How is it that substances stand in commerce at all?" (2:888). Kant expresses dissatisfaction with all the various vantages and ascribes the adjudication of the matter to psychology instead of philosophy. "I cannot explain the *commercium* by any real ground . . . a real spirit without body is totally inconceivable" (1:144). He elaborates: "The concepts of cause and effect one only receives through experience, because the *nexus* of the real ground and consequence is no judgment of the understanding, but rather the understanding simply brings it under more general principles" (1:39). On the other hand, Kant is clear, as this second clause indicates, that while we are presented with *Realgründe* only by experience, we must proceed to analyze them *rationally*. Accordingly, Kant argued that each such real ground needed to be logically subordinated

under more general categories, ideally unified under a universal fundamental force. "This is the philosopher's task: to presume as few real grounds as possible" (1:25).

Kant maintained that the world had to be understood as a "real whole," in other words, that "all things in it stand in real connection" (1:39). That is, community requires not only existence but reciprocal interaction (1:51). This put him square in the middle of the great metaphysical dispute of the day, the contest of the Three Hypotheses. But Kant was arguing that the world as a "real whole" entailed the "real connection" of its parts. That was a metaphysical, not simply an experiential, claim.

Eric Watkins discerns clearly the salience of the principle of "physical influx" in Kant's pronouncements of the world as a "real whole" in the Herder metaphysics lecture notes.¹⁴⁵ The core of Kant's argument parallels that of Crusius, namely, that a world implies real connections, which implies causation. Yet Kant developed his argument in a curious manner, namely, that the real connection was not a function of the mere specific existence of particular substances; their community ("reciprocal influence") had to be grounded in the embracing presence of God.¹⁴⁶ That is, the center of Kant's view of physical influx is not the mind-body problem but general issues in cosmology and in the "general conception of substance."¹⁴⁷

Kant complicated the issue further by distinguishing between space and bodies in space. While he offered a strictly relational, Leibnizian account of space in the lectures, he nonetheless insisted upon the vital distinction that space could not be reduced to simplest parts, but bodies could. Those simplest parts of bodies, he went on to argue, had no extension. These were (physical) monads. The adoption of the term *monad* for the basic elements of this real world made this violation of Leibniz's distinction all the more blatant. That raised enormous problems about the metaphysical account of the interactions of these monads and, of course, about the bearing of the whole argument on the vexed question of the soul and its materiality or immateriality.¹⁴⁸ It is also along these lines that the mathematical antinomies would present themselves.

MENDELSSOHN'S REVIEWS

In April 1764, after a significant delay, the two acclaimed texts of the Berlin Academy prize competition of 1763 appeared in print. Starting in that same month, Moses Mendelssohn published a lengthy review of *The One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God* in the key organ of the Berlin intellectual world, *Briefe, die neueste Literatur*

betreffend [Letters 280–281, April 26, May 3, May 10, 1764]. As Kant himself later observed, this review “first introduced him to the public.”¹⁴⁹ It was an extended review, and notwithstanding Cassirer’s claim that Mendelssohn “was not wholly just to the essay’s idiosyncratic ideas and method of proof,” it grasped Kant’s aims and also Kant’s equivocations with remarkable clarity and sympathy (77).

Mendelssohn committed himself “to the best of my ability, to attempt to disclose from the somewhat obscure presentation of this difficult material the sense of the author.”¹⁵⁰ He started off by recognizing the provocation in Kant’s title, which claimed to provide the only possible basis of a philosophical commitment whose ancestry was epochal and to which the greatest minds of all times had made contributions. Mendelssohn recognized Kant’s decisive starting point: the argument that existence is not just another (logical) predicate but rather “the absolute positing of a thing,” and thus different in kind from any other predicate. He found it nonetheless difficult to discern how, precisely, the “absolute positing” of a thing differed from what is involved in any affirmative logical proposition. Mendelssohn argued that the author had not yet made fully clear how this absolute is unique.

It seems, to be sure, that in these highlighted characteristics [*angezeigten Merkmalen*] which clarify existence there is a glimmer of truth, but it is so weak and wrapped in such darkness, that it is hard to discern it correctly. Existence is assuredly no predicate of the [propositional] issue [*von der Sache*], but rather something that has to do with the whole of a thing. What that actually is, however, we may not be able to say more definitively until we have more experience of how a thing may receive [*erhalte*] its existence. (605)

Mendelssohn grasped the thrust of Kant’s grounding, however: “The author appears accordingly to have concluded from the limited manner in which we humans can attain to knowledge of what is inwardly possible to the character of inner possibility in general” (607). If Mendelssohn could not see the ultimate implications of such an epistemological revisionism, it is not for us with two hundred years of hindsight to be too critical of him. At that juncture Kant was not clear about the implications himself.

In the conclusion of his first letter, Mendelssohn focused on Kant’s idea of a real ground. He indicated his acquaintance with Kant’s essay on negative magnitudes and held out the possibility of addressing that in a

subsequent letter. At the end of the review, Mendelssohn rounded back to a summary judgment which, despite the "obscurities and difficulties," saw, in the "glimmer of truth that shines forth from various of his theses," grounds for the cognoscenti to hope "that the author will himself gather his construction materials together and actually complete his structure" (616).

Almost exactly a year later, in April 1765, Mendelssohn published a second review of Kant's works, considering Kant's essays, "On the False Precision of the Four Syllogistic Figures" and "Attempt to Introduce Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy." With reference to the first essay, again Mendelssohn began his review by stressing Kant's affront to orthodox philosophers.

How dreary would it not be, at some academic disputations, were it no longer permitted to confuse one's opponent through artificial, often fallacious inferences according to the second, third and fourth syllogistic figures? Our German academies have been threatened with just such a terrifying revolution by a philosopher [*Weltweiser*] whom you already know, who is bold [*verwegen*] enough to reckon the syllogistic arts merely to the "gymnastics of scholars by which one seeks to outdo the incautious in a scholarly tussle of words. . . ." This bold man is Mr. Kant. (657)

Mendelssohn went on to cite Kant on the decadence of scholarship in their times and especially the observation that it would have been better had the endeavor never even commenced. One can be sure, though Mendelssohn refrains from mentioning it, that he recognized the echo of Rousseau's *First Discourse*.¹⁵¹ Mendelssohn found Kant's project of debunking academic rhetoric quite salutary, though tongue-in-cheek he lamented that without all this sound and fury, there might be nothing left of much "apparent learnedness" (*scheinbaren Gelehrsamkeit*).¹⁵² More soberly, Mendelssohn believed that Kant's discrimination between a judgment of understanding and a rational inference as paralleling the movement from distinctness to completeness represented a major advance in the formulation of logical theory. "The author is well on the way to simplifying in a correct and natural manner the theory of human understanding," which would not only improve the appraisal of truth claims but also "open the way to a deeper and more certain penetration into the nature of the soul" (661).

In the second part of his review, Mendelssohn fulfilled his earlier promise to write on Kant's essay on negative magnitudes. He clearly recognized

the utility of Kant's distinction between negation and privation, logical versus real negativity, and the aptness of Kant's illustrations from natural science and from psychology. Again, he praised Kant for discovering "a shorter path to the invention and application of criteria in the philosophical sciences," and he found it "even more interesting and fruitful" for practical philosophy (665). Most importantly, Mendelssohn fastened upon the challenge with which Kant ended the essay: how are we to understand cause and effect? The question was not simply about formal logic, Mendelssohn averred; it was rather a matter of real grounds. And he went on: "whoever is capable of answering the question correctly will be the creator of a new and more complete metaphysics than anything we now have" (668). He noted that Kant himself suggested that he had an answer to his own question and that he might be ready to lay it before the world. Mendelssohn expressed amazement (*Verwunderung*) at Kant's hint that this might not lie in a theory of judgment but could be expressed merely by a concept (669).

Clearly the upshot of these two extended reviews of Kant's lesser writings, combined with the simultaneous appearance of Kant's Prize Essay alongside his own winning entry, was that Mendelssohn promoted Kant to the foremost ranks of philosophers working in Germany. This was also the moment in which not only Mendelssohn but also Johann Lambert entered into personal correspondence with Kant. Success in the prize competition of 1763 brought the names of Kant and Mendelssohn publicly into juxtaposition just as it brought the two philosophers into personal correspondence.¹⁵³ Their respective contributions to the competition have ever since served as the benchmark of German philosophy and concomitantly of *Aufklärung* at the outset of the 1760s. Mendelssohn's represented the most elegant exposition of an updated Wolffian approach, while Kant's reflected his emerging restiveness against this orthodoxy.¹⁵⁴

HENRICH'S FORMULATION OF KANT'S "SYSTEM" OF 1762–1763

Henrich devotes the bulk of his essay to articulating the coherent system latent in Kant's writings of 1762–1763. He situates Kant's system in critical dialogue with the two dominant philosophers of the moment, Wolff and Crusius, both of whom Kant would term "builders of cloud castles [*Luftbaumeister*]," in the belligerent language of his later *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*.¹⁵⁵ In the Prize Essay, Kant claimed that their failure lay in neglect of the "real conditions of a philosophical knowledge-claim [*realen Beding-*

ungen einer philosophischen Erkenntnis]" (14). Every knowledge-claim had at its foundation "irreducible concepts and indemonstrable propositions [*unauflösliche Begriffe und unerweisliche Sätze*]" (14). Henrich endeavors to elucidate the meaning of these claims. Kant, he suggests, was *not* proposing a synthetic construction from simple givens to composite or complex wholes. The irreducibles and indemonstrables were, to be sure, logically prior, but they were not already in hand; Kant insisted they were what had to be sought out [*aufzusuchen*]: "The most important business of the higher philosophy consists exclusively in the search for these indemonstrable foundational truths [*unerweislichen Grundwahrheiten*]." ¹⁵⁶ Henrich glosses that to mean "what one immediately and with certainty encounters in the object [*was man zuerst und mit Gewißheit im Gegenstand antrifft*]." ¹⁵⁷ Kant consistently imputed to these indemonstrable propositions that they indicated what was "first and immediate" in the recognition of an object.

Notions of indemonstrability, which for Kant aimed toward ontology, had a place in orthodox school philosophy, but only in the domain of logic. Thus, Wolff and Meier deployed the notion of the indemonstrable to deal with definitional identities (tautologies) that were indemonstrable precisely because they were empty. Thus, they had no attunement to Kant's concern for "real foundations for knowledge [*reale Fundamente der Erkenntnis*]" (21). Crusius was closer to Kant, yet while Crusius recognized immediacy and primacy as criteria of the indemonstrable, Henrich contends, he did so in two distinct and unrelated arguments, leaving it to Kant to bring these together. And bringing them together changed them: "Crusius had understood correctly that indemonstrable propositions are the essential and ultimate foundation of all real knowledge. Kant, too, held firm to this understanding. It is presumed throughout the Prize Essay. But he was convinced that Crusius had not developed any procedure through which philosophy could, by a method unique to it, secure itself from error and attain the level of a science" (25–26). To find this criterion or procedure, Kant drew upon the Wolffian category of identity but construed it in a real, not a formal, sense. That is, Kant proposed that certain predicates attached to a certain subject in a distinctive (i.e., foundational) manner. That distinctiveness could not be a formal one, for in that sense every predicate is of equal standing in a definition of the subject. Rather, Kant was after what it meant for the subject to be "given [*gegeben*]," that is, present or actual to consciousness. This, again, is close to Crusius, but the latter drew this all the way back to elementary sensations (in a Lockian-empiricist sense), and this Kant was not prepared to do.

Henrich proposes that we must advance from a negative characterization of Kant's position (vis-à-vis Wolff and Crusius) to a positive one. "The authentic sense of the presentation of 'first and immediate' marks can only be clarified further by an interpretation of the act of denotation [*Bezeichnung*]" (29). Kant appeared to be after the original constitution of the object as available to knowledge, the necessary conditions of its very possibility of presence before any of its determinate properties could be read off. Henrich elaborates: "In contrast to Wolff, Kant saw that at the outset of the analysis of the given there must stand an achievement of knowing [*eine Leistung des Erkennens*] with a structure of its own" (30). For Henrich, this insight expresses itself in the notion of a "real ground [*Realgrund*]." For Kant in 1762, this required the distinction of a concept from a judgment. The relation of cause to effect could not be reduced to that of ground to consequence; the real and the formal were not identical: "The relation of a logical ground to its consequent is a judgment. The relation of a real ground is a concept. [There are] various primitive concepts of real ground."¹⁵⁸ That required that Kant make distinctions among propositions, all of which, as judgments, fell under the principle of identity (noncontradiction). Thus, Henrich concludes, Kant began to formulate his crucial distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments: "Kant introduced the distinction of analytic from synthetic propositions a short time after the Prize Essay."¹⁵⁹

Yet Henrich acknowledges that it did not appear in either the *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* of 1766 or the *Inaugural Dissertation* of 1770. That raises the question of the "crisis" of Kant's system of 1762–1763, which Henrich acknowledged at the beginning of his essay. Henrich lists a few of the issues that were still unresolved. First, the relation of concept to judgment obviously remained insufficiently elaborated; Kant collocated his notion of real ground entirely to the concept, but the latter could only be expressed in a judgment, and so Kant would need to develop the notion of synthetic judgment more fully to accommodate this. Moreover, since he wished to attach primordially to this aspect of judgment, the notion of the *apriority* of such synthetic judgment does not appear conceptually—if still it remained temporally—remote. To reformulate the distinctiveness of the concept of the real ground in the discourse of judgment, a new principle had to be articulated to differentiate such judgments from those that were merely analytic. This, Henrich notes, led to the Kantian principle of philosophical synthesis. While these questions arose out of the system of 1762–1763, they did not fit in its structure and impelled Kant to design a new

system. That came, however, only after a seven-year hiatus that Henrich really does not choose to investigate or explain. He offers only one hint about this seven-year excursus, namely that an "empirical reformulation [*empirische Umdeutung*] of parts of this system [of 1762-1763] . . . took place in 1764."¹⁶⁰

Everything rushes past us in a stream and the changing taste and the varying figures of mankind make the whole game uncertain and deceptive. Where shall I find a fixed point of nature that man can never corrupt and which can give him the defining marks of the riverbank where he should cling fast?


—Kant, *Bemerkungen in den "Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen"*

Indulge your passion for science, says she, but let your science be human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and society. Abstruse thought and profound researches I prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive melancholy which they introduce, by the endless uncertainty in which they involve you, and by the cold reception which your pretended discoveries shall meet with, when communicated. Be a philosopher, but amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.

—David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*

There is still always something about him [Kant] that reminds one, as with Luther, of a monk who to be sure has broken out of his cell, but who could not entirely expunge its traces.

—Friedrich von Schiller to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, December 22, 1798



‘An Altogether Different Kant’:
The “Gallant *Magister*” and
Popularphilosophie

Kant was finally achieving a wider plateau of recognition by coming in second to Mendelssohn in the prize competition of 1763 and having his essay published, with Mendelssohn's, by the Berlin Academy (though that was delayed till 1764). It would seem that Kant's technical-philosophical writings were finally earning him the dividends he had long sought. He might well in this moment have rededicated himself to solving the metaphysical quandaries these writings had exposed. Upon receiving notice of the acceptance of his essay by the Berlin Academy, Kant wrote to its secretary, Formey, requesting permission to revise it for publication.¹ That permission was granted.² Yet Kant did not undertake to alter a line in the text. Instead, Kant used the summer recess of 1763 to withdraw to a friend's house in the woods to sit down and write *Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime*. Nothing in his earlier writings gave token of such a work. It represented, in Karl Vorländer's words, an “altogether different Kant.”³ Again, Henrich's lines about Kant's change of course bear citing: “that Kant, the metaphysician, went silent before the end of 1763 and hid himself for the next seven years in elegant and popular occasional pieces, should be . . . an indication that Kant's system-conception of 1762 went into crisis.”⁴

Ernst Cassirer portrays it virtually as a calamity: “The phase that Kant's evolution as thinker and author entered after the writings of 1763 dashed the hopes of the world and of his friends most strikingly.”⁵ Emil Arnoldt found

it necessary to expound a general theory about Kant's nature to make sense of this turn.

From the beginning of his independent development into his old age he never did what in his situation a conventional person would have done. Accordingly, when one examines his life closely, it does not "go forward in perfect regularity," but rather it pursues its goals in a quite irregular manner. It always went contrary to the common opinion of people and disappointed those who surrounded and observed him. For what one believed oneself entitled to expect him to undertake, that he would not undertake, or he would do so after all had surrendered any hope of it, and then in such a grandiose and complete manner that his achievement occasioned astonishment and thus yet again belied all expectations.⁶

This is an interesting characterization, but it mystifies rather than clarifies Kant's development. The psychological dialectic we are trying to recuperate here demands a more detailed and intricate negotiation with the evidence. I propose to work back and forth from context to textual expression across a range of issues to establish both Kant's experimentation with new forms of identity and his ultimate disappointment with them.

Kant's growing restiveness in the 1760s has typically been interpreted only in terms of his epistemology and the line of argumentative innovation he was pursuing vis-à-vis school philosophy, but there is a wider biographical and contextual dimension that deserves higher profile. The literature is unequivocal that Kant's 1760s were turbulent years, and there is almost equal agreement that something began shifting dramatically for Kant around 1762. This restiveness in Kant goes beyond a quarrel with Wolff's argumentation. Vorländer says it, without really trying to explain it: "Around the year 1762 a change in Kant's inner life set in."⁷ And Arsenji Gulyga makes the same point: "1762 was a crucial year in Kant's life. . . . [It brought on] a revolution of all his life's objectives."⁸ Summarizing the biographical literature dealing with the 1760s, Rolf George notes, "this is a period of liberation for Kant, which left its imprint on his intellectual make-up."⁹ Richard Velkley and Frederick Beiser argue that the impact of Rousseau in just these years profoundly and permanently refigured Kant's conception of his philosophical mission.¹⁰ This chapter aims to investigate the nature and course of the turbulence in Kant's life in the 1760s.

Three aspects of Kant's biographical context deserve more consideration. First, we must ask after Kant's sense of his intellectual career. How

was he doing? What were his expectations and his frustrations in this vein, not only in regard to income but in regard to status in the profession? What about Kant's identity as a writer, in other words, what name, what fame was he making for himself in circles beyond Königsberg, indeed, beyond the professional scholarly community? How are we to interpret the nomination of Kant for a professorship of rhetoric in the mid-1760s? We know he declined the chair; what we need to ask is how he could have been considered for it in the first place, and what that tells us about Kant's image. Along this same line, what was it that so excited the faculty and students at the University of Erlangen in 1769 at the prospect of Kant's acceptance of the invitation to assume its chair in philosophy? It was not *Schulphilosophie*. Only one book by Kant went through eight printings in his own lifetime, and it was not *Schulphilosophie*, either.¹¹

Kant turned forty in 1764. We must consider this in light of Kant's prolonged wait for a professorial chair. He may well have been the "gallant *Magister*," but he was not yet a fully established member of the guild. In our own day, forty years of age often represents an important psychological turning point, a point of self-reckoning and even of anxiety. Is there any evidence that something like our "midlife crisis" might have emerged in Kant in these years? Did his fortieth birthday pass tranquilly, or might we detect signs that all was not entirely well?¹² As it happens, Kant devoted a great deal of consideration to the psychology of this turning point, much of it, one can plausibly infer, derived from introspection.¹³

Second, what about Kant as a reader? That is, how did reading figure in Kant's self-construction as a *gesitteter Mensch*? There is a considerable volume of work on the role of reading in identity formation among the *gebildeten Stände* in eighteenth-century Germany that deserves to be brought to bear upon its cultural producers, not just its cultural consumers. In particular, the role of novels in self-examination and self-conception has proven illuminating, and this will prove the case for Kant as well.¹⁴ But far and away the most important reading Kant ever did, if we consider its impact upon his identity and project, came at this moment in his life: his dramatic encounter with the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. To this we must add Kant's important but more elusive encounters with David Hume and with a Leibniz far more complex and rich than the school philosophy had made him out to be.¹⁵

Finally, and not at all unrelated to the first two considerations, Kant's socializing (*Umgang*) dramatically intensified in these years. "He was much in demand, and he never refused an invitation. As a clever and lively conversationalist Kant was the life of the party. He was natural, easygoing, quick-

witted."¹⁶ Kant's interest in gaming, in table talk, in hobnobbing with the rich and powerful is one thing. But it is quite another that at least briefly he seriously considered marrying. How did Kant's relations with women figure in his self-conception? Was this merely a matter of "distraction" or were there more intimate and passionate dimensions to the life of the "gallant *Magister*"? There is, one is entitled to surmise, a certain self-image that goes with taking oneself seriously as a potential lover or marital partner. Kant clearly identified with melancholy in the 1760s. A delight in melancholy often goes together with the contemplation of romance.¹⁷ Melancholy is altogether different from the phlegmatic temperament to which Kant switched allegiance only a little later in life.¹⁸ Can we date this shift of personal identification more precisely and attach to it a determinate biographical significance?¹⁹

The scholar who offered a first stab at interpreting Kant's life crisis of the 1760s was Josef Heller. He started from the famous image of the "old" Kant "whose external life, as is well known, was regulated down to the most meaningless little detail."²⁰ What Heller proposed was that "this punctiliousness was not simply a matter of pedantry but had deeper psychic roots of a hardly intellectual sort [*keineswegs verstandesmäßiger Art*]."²¹ By nature, Kant was a melancholy, sensitive person.²² He had to school himself relentlessly against his sensitivity to the outside world as well as against his own inclinations, for "every resistance to the course set out by his own will he found extremely painful."²³ For Heller, Kant's regimen arose out of the "necessity to accommodate to his external life circumstances . . . a forced transformation of some drives and inclinations."²⁴ The force that produced the later Kant was his "striving after complete independence." "Kant's inner candor and his 'ethical objectivism' occasioned a certain modesty and chaste withdrawal," as Heller would have it (26–27). The "old" Kant prized regimen and reticence the way Jean Starobinski has argued Rousseau prized transparency.²⁵

Heller argues that by the mid-1760s "one can already observe traces of a certain disappointment" in Kant.²⁶ His observation is initially occasioned by Kant's estimation of women, but he quickly suggests that it was a wider disaffection: "the deepest roots of Kant's soul were stirred with these doubts" (58). His decision for bachelorhood was part of a general renunciation. Kant explained years later to Marcus Herz that "he had to give up what he had [during those early years] in Königsberg, that 'nourishment of the soul' which comes of 'continual and intimate socializing.'"²⁷ Thus, at least retrospectively, Kant affirmed both a moment of rupture and its resolution, which entailed renouncing something he valued. What made

him "have to give [it] up"? That formulation implies as much compulsion as it does resolution.

In his own writings, Kant made the point that spiritual rebirth comes all at once, not gradually, and usually not until after a person has entered his thirties.²⁸ Kant's conversion moment came in the 1760s, as he faced what Heller termed a "complete collapse of all his youthful hopes [*völligen Zusammenbruchs aller seiner Jugendhoffnungen*]." ²⁹ To endure and to overcome this, Kant resolved to withdraw within himself and consecrate himself to his labor and to a stern notion of virtuous life in which the prospect of happiness or even momentary pleasures could count for little. "He had to see to it that life would interfere as little as possible in the process of his mental labor; he had to achieve a complete internal independence from all external circumstances." Heller adds, "a certain *phlegma* appeared to him the best means to achieve the sought-after peace" (64). The change was not only in his external regimen; it expressed itself dramatically in the change in his writing style: "In place of the earlier elegance and lightness there now appeared dry precision; the influence of English and French writers ended, and one noted the return to influence of the methods of scholastic, academic presentation" (68). Thus, Heller suggests that the "critical turn" of 1769 needs to be seen "not as a matter of some particular theoretical issue but of his entire world view" (58). This "change in philosophical thinking was preceded by a far deeper and more fundamental shift in his entire psychology and internal life" (57). The result was that famous "mechanization process in Kant's external life for the sake of his inner life" (65). For Heller, all this could not but have a tragic aspect. While neither Hinske nor Lehmann is satisfied with Heller's account, they agree that he identified the decisive "life crisis" in Kant.³⁰ Lehmann suggests that the unique documentation now accessible in Kant's *Remarks in the "Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime"* confirms Heller's view that the year 1764 was pivotal. We will consider all of this in detail.

KANT'S CAREER AND ECONOMIC CONDITION

Kant's success in the Berlin Academy prize competition of 1763 did not go unnoticed by the Prussian ministry of culture in Berlin, or perhaps even by King Frederick II himself, though of this one has more reason for skepticism.³¹ Kant's text appeared, under the academy's auspices, in April 1764. Several months earlier, *Observations*, Kant's most successful book, came to market. It received no fewer than fifteen reviews in the German periodical

press and would go into a second printing in 1766.³² Thus, when in July 1764 the professor of rhetoric and rector of Königsberg University, Johann Georg Bock, died, the Prussian ministry in Berlin sent a directive to the local administration in Königsberg that made it clear that Kant was someone in whom it was interested: "We have become acquainted with a certain Magister Immanuel Kant through a few of his writings [*durch einige seiner Schriften*], from which shines forth a very profound learning."³³ The ministry was seeking someone who would not only be able to dash off a few ceremonial poems in German, but who could strengthen the entire philosophy faculty and especially help ground students in classical—Latin and Greek—literature (23). It instructed its local officials to establish whether Kant was qualified for such a position and whether he would be interested. The official on the scene, Braxein, contacted Kant personally and reported back to the ministry on October 19, 1764, that Kant was highly regarded in Königsberg: "Magister Kant teaches with great effectiveness to general acclaim."³⁴ Unfortunately, he went on, it did not appear that Kant was suited for—and he definitely indicated he was not interested in—the position.³⁵ Nonetheless, Braxein proposed that Kant should be considered for the next position as professor of logic and metaphysics, which he believed would soon come available.³⁶ The ministry, in the king's name, appointed Kant's friend, Johann Lindner, to the position, and instructed the local administration "for the good and enhancement of your university in whatever other circumstance that might arise to find a place for Magister Immanuel Kant."³⁷ A few days later, a second directive followed, taking note of Braxein's report: "the very competent—and according to your previous report—also highly acclaimed teacher at your university, Magister Kant, should be advanced at the very first opportunity."³⁸ On November 14, 1764, Kant was provided written confirmation of this future preferment.³⁹ His reputation began to spread even beyond Prussia. In 1765 the University of Jena included Kant in its list of candidates for a chair in philosophy.⁴⁰ Yet one cannot help reflecting that while all this was happening, Kant was writing *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, his most negative statement about professional philosophy and the academic community. Do we have here a case of too little too late? After all, Kant actually got no job offer, only the promise of "preferment" in the future.

Kant's economic circumstances figure significantly in his estrangement from the academic community, especially since Kant believed economic independence was indispensable to personal dignity.⁴¹ In *Observations*, composed in the summer of 1763, Kant wrote, "What increases the evil of poverty is contempt, which cannot be completely overcome even

by merit, at least not before common eyes."⁴² There is a famous incident from Kant's later years in which he became offended when a French *homme des lettres* included in his "literary history of Prussia under Frederick II" an account of Kant's ostensible penury in his years as *magister legens*.⁴³ Particularly galling was the suggestion that Kant was invited to dine with the merchant Green as a kind of charity case. Kant responded angrily that these were the most pleasant years of his life and that he had no real economic difficulties.

Please greet the Abbé Dénina for me and let him know that I was very put off in his history of scholars to come upon such a pitiful description of my economic circumstances at the university [*meiner häuslichen Verfassung auf der Universität*] before achieving my professorial salary. He has certainly reported things quite falsely. For, since from the very beginning of my academic career (in the year 1755) on without interruption I have had many students in attendance [*ein zahlreiches Auditorium*] and never gave individual lessons [*nie Privatinformation gegeben habe*] (one must understand that one gave one's private courses in an auditorium one had to procure for oneself, and that generally required good remuneration), I have always had an ample income [*immer mein reichliches Auskommen gehabt*], so that it sufficed not only for the rent on my two rooms and a very good table—without having to depend on anybody, not even my friend, the now-deceased Englishman, without needing a special invitation for each meal, as if I were being invited out of charity [*als zu einem Freitische zu gehen*]⁴⁴—but also enough to keep a servant of my own. Just those years were the most pleasant of my life.⁴⁴

Despite—or perhaps in light of so much—protest on his part, there is reason to suspect Kant's pride in later years may well have clouded his recollection of the reality of his circumstances in these earlier years.

When Kant took up his position as *magister legens* in 1755, Heller argues, "he could permit himself no illusions regarding his material situation even for the future."⁴⁵ Just attaining his initial university position proved expensive. "Considerable expense was connected with his promotion, such as the payment of fees, and the printing of the dissertations; in meeting this he was aided by his uncle Richter."⁴⁶ As *magister legens* Kant received no salary from the university; faculty of his rank depended entirely upon student subscriptions to their courses for income. These courses were not even listed in the university catalogue at the time Kant was serving in this rank. Instead, instructors had to print up their own course advertisements,

obviously at their own expense. Jachmann notes: "In the first years of his private-docenture at the university the earnings from his lectures were very small and he had to take such abstemious care of himself that not infrequently he became embarrassed over his living conditions."⁴⁷

To make enough money, Kant undertook an unbearable teaching load. Gulyga writes: "While a *magister* he had to teach four to six subjects a semester. Each week he taught at least sixteen hours. . . . In the second half of the 1750s he writes hardly anything: lectures exhaust his time and his strength."⁴⁸ Jachmann reports that Kant had managed to set aside twenty gold pieces as his emergency fund, which he would not touch. But everything else had to go, including a nice library he had built up in his years as a private tutor.⁴⁹ Ritzel questions the plausibility of this report, doubting that Kant could have earned enough as *Hauslehrer* to have accumulated a library, and doubting further whether selling it off could have been enough to cover Kant's expenses.⁵⁰ But that only deepens the mystery of Kant's early livelihood. Arnoldt offers the suggestion that in these years Kant had a pensioner, a student who lived with him while attending university to help defray his costs.⁵¹ There is the prospect, too, that Kant privately tutored students at the university. But the fact is, we only know that Kant's means were very strained.

Still, by the end of the 1750s, Kant "no longer has financial worries. The *Privatdozent* can afford a servant: he takes a retired soldier, Martin Lampe."⁵² Kant took on Lampe by the early 1760s: a letter from Kant to Borowski from 1761 confirms that he did have a servant by that point.⁵³ What changed Kant's financial circumstances? Most likely, it was the patronage of the Russian military. Moreover, once Kant had established this connection, it proved easy to maintain even after the Russians left East Prussia; Kant then switched to the Prussian military and to the higher aristocracy.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, these private sessions were unpredictable and they also represented an additional burden on top of all the other work Kant had to undertake. There was simply no secure source of income. Even if student enrollments in his privately offered courses grew over the 1760s, Arnoldt, who studied Kant's teaching at the University of Königsberg more closely than anyone, observed that Kant's enrollments were never substantial, even after he was *Ordinarius*. Thus, we have reason to question whether Kant was being honest in claiming that he was richly compensated by his student fees in the 1760s.

Kant's own (self-interested) claim from these very years that his situation was strained provides the best evidence. We have that claim in the letters Kant addressed to King Frederick II and to Freiherr von Furst und Kupferberg in 1765, in connection with his application for an appointment as

assistant librarian at the state library in Königsberg.⁵⁵ Kant wrote to the king requesting "a gracious contribution to the lightening of my very wanting subsistence at the university here."⁵⁶ To Freiherr von Furst und Kupferberg Kant wrote of "my very uncertain academic subsistence."⁵⁷ Granting that Kant needed to plead his case, one should consider the lengths that he went to for a mere sixty-two thalers per year.⁵⁸ When he declined the Prussian Ministry's offer of a chair in rhetoric in 1764, Kant had to contemplate a future of protracted economic limitations. He took on the unpleasant job of assistant librarian for only this reason; all his biographers attest that Kant disliked the position. He dropped it as soon as his income permitted.

Even after his appointment to the professorship Kant was hardly prosperous. Kant's salary in 1770 was four hundred thalers per year.⁵⁹ He supplemented that with the student subscriptions to his private lectures, and for the first two years he retained his library position as well. From what we have seen of academic salaries in Germany at that period, this was not a particularly lavish income. Indeed, the offer from Erlangen (1769) would have brought Kant substantially more. Kant's salary should be compared with the salaries for professors in the higher faculties in Germany, and with the salaries for the philosophy faculty in other universities. In light of that data, it hardly appears that Kant was as "richly compensated" as he would have liked to pretend.

In sum, we have every reason to believe Kant was growing discontent with his career, perhaps even with his calling. Reading Rousseau proved catalytic for precipitating this discontent.

KANT AND ROUSSEAU I: THE DISCONTENTS OF SCIENCE

It should be no surprise that more than a trace of anti-intellectualism characterized the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.⁶⁰ Conversely, it has been said that Kant never had an anti-intellectual moment (364). I think that is quite wrong. He did have at least one. Rousseau did not elicit it, but he did offer decisive confirmation for it. One of the central features not only of Kant's *Remarks in the "Observations"* but of his university lectures at least through the 1760s was his vehement questioning of the place of "science" (*Wissenschaft*—with the wider sense in German of "scholarship") among human concerns. More specifically, he questioned the costs of a personal "scientific" commitment. What calls for examination is the individual form in which Kant articulated his disaffection from the scientific vocation, his personal experience of intellectual *acedia*. Certainly, the impact of Rousseau in this aspect of Kant's identity is not to be denied. In a famous passage from

his *Remarks in the "Observations,"* Kant observed that he was "by disposition a researcher," but that this had inspired in him an unjustified elitism, a contempt for the "masses without learning." Explicitly he acknowledged Rousseau's influence in "setting him right."⁶¹ It is clear that Kant had Rousseau in mind in his remarks on science even in his Herder lectures, since Kant mentioned Rousseau by name: "Were [man] to be concerned with life he would never need science. Woe to him! (Rousseau) He finds [only] phantasms [*Hirngespinnste*]."⁶² Yet we have amassed a considerable body of evidence to suggest that there were already a variety of impulses in Kant's own life experience carrying him toward that conversion moment. To be sure, Rousseau was the decisive catalyst. To grasp this dialectical interweaving of theoretical and personal dimensions, we must link Kant's own critique of the "scientific vocation" with his assimilation of Rousseau. The psychological premise that I follow here is that one only receives what is already latent in one's own consciousness. (This is an idea, incidentally, that Kant himself affirmed in the very text, *Remarks in the "Observations,"* that will be central to our investigation.)⁶³

Rousseau's *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences* (1748; published in 1750) had a tremendous impact in Germany, occasioning a wave of response to his provocative denial that advancements in science and the arts brought with them moral improvement in mankind.⁶⁴ This challenge to so bedrock a conviction of the entire *Aufklärung* could hardly go without rebuttal. Instead, German tomes ponderously full of piety for progress lumbered onto the field of discourse to denounce—or at least to correct—the wayward Genevan. Gottsched in Leipzig played a major role in orchestrating this scholarly outrage. But even literati such as Wieland found Rousseau's posture outrageous. They also found it insincere. No one thought he really meant it; it seemed merely a clever rhetorical gambit.⁶⁵ Not even the *Discourse on Inequality* (1755) persuaded anyone that Rousseau might honestly be as hostile to "civilization" as he professed. Hence the reverberation of Voltaire's famous quip upon receipt of Rousseau's text, "it makes one want to walk on all fours!"⁶⁶ On the other hand, Rousseau's *Letter to D'Alembert Concerning Spectacles* (1759) won appreciation for its earnestness in defense of Protestant virtue—at least among the Germans, for whom he suddenly seemed appreciably more "Swiss" than "French."⁶⁷

But the first *Discourse* must retain our attention for the moment. It made its impact in Germany first through a review by Lessing in 1751, upon which a translation speedily followed (1752), widening access to the "paradoxical" text.⁶⁸ Kant seems hardly likely to have missed the hoopla.⁶⁹ The literature on Kant's reception of Rousseau has concentrated, appro-

propriately enough, on the mid 1760s, but there remains little reason to believe that Kant would have been unaware of him earlier.⁷⁰ Indeed, there is evidence—for example, the casual mention of Rousseau's work by Hamann in a letter to Kant from 1759—that points the other way.⁷¹ I have already suggested in an earlier chapter that Kant was in all likelihood aware of the exchange between Rousseau and Voltaire over the question of the Lisbon earthquake, where, indeed, Rousseau's view tallied far more closely with his own than did Voltaire's. The remarks on the hypertrophy of knowledge in modernity that played such a striking role in Kant's *Spitzfindigkeit* essay of 1762 seem unquestionably linked to the Rousseau of the first *Discourse*.⁷² What we must ask is whether Rousseau's works might have helped fuel the mounting wave of discontent that would impel Kant from a primarily natural-scientific identity in the 1750s to preponderantly practical pursuits in the 1760s.

Certainly we must believe that Kant was already *enthusiastically* embroiled with Rousseau when Herder first joined Kant's classes in August 1762, for Herder completely reconstructed his regimen around Rousseau explicitly under Kantian inspiration.⁷³ By then, Kant had certainly digested the two *Discourses*, together, in all likelihood, with the *Letter to D'Alembert*.⁷⁴ He had also read Rousseau's novel *Julie, ou La Nouvelle Héloïse* (1761).⁷⁵ In fact, just before Herder began attending Kant's classes, in late summer of 1762, Kant obtained his copy of Rousseau's *Emile* and plunged into his legendary absorption with that work.⁷⁶

Significantly, Kant's reception of Rousseau was far closer to the general public's enthusiasm than to the scholarly community's hostility.⁷⁷ Indeed, we have every reason to believe that Kant was never so enthusiastic in his reading of any other thinker. This does not mean that Kant would not become a critical and discerning reader of Rousseau, or that he assimilated the latter's ideas indiscriminately. It does mean, however, that we do not find in Kant, as we do in so many of his contemporaries—especially in Germany—a scandalized concern over Rousseau's impieties, sacred and profane. As Raymond Trousson observes, "From 1762 to 1766 the German press was indeed very occupied with Rousseau but, it is essential to recall, in a manner entirely negative."⁷⁸ Kant, in fact, represented one of the most important positive avenues of Rousseau reception in Germany, and his role in inciting the Rousseau cult of the *Sturm und Drang* needs to be reconsidered in this light, especially since Kant despised the cult.⁷⁹ Kant's reception of Rousseau had to pass gradually from an initial stylistic bedazzlement to a cool, critical appraisal.⁸⁰ What he seems to have transmitted to Herder (and to others who would become prominent in *Sturm und Drang*, such

as Lenz) was primarily that initial enthusiasm. Lessing, especially in his first review, praised Rousseau, but no other German could have written, in that epoch, what Kant wrote in his *Remarks in the "Observations"* around 1764:

The first impression of the writings of Mr. J. J. Rousseau received by a knowledgeable reader, who is reading for something more than vanity or to kill time, is that he is encountering a lucidity of mind, a noble impulse of genius and a sensitive soul [*eine Scharfsinnigkeit des Geistes einen edlen Schwung des Genies und eine gefühlvolle Seele*] of such a high level that perhaps never an author of whatever epoch or of whatever people has been able to possess in combination.⁸¹

Yet that very same passage continued with criticism of Rousseau that took account of what troubled so many of Kant's contemporaries.

The impression that immediately follows is bewilderment [*Befremdung*] over the strange and contradictory opinions, which [so] oppose those which are in general circulation that one can easily come to the suspicion that the author, by virtue of his extraordinary talent, wishes to show off only the force of his bewitching wit and through the magic of rhetoric make himself something apart [*den Sonderling*] who through captivating novelties stands out among all rivals at wit.⁸²

The climax of Kant's crucial *Auseinandersetzung* with Rousseau came in the years 1764 and 1765, in other words, just as Herder was departing Königsberg for his new career in Riga.⁸³ That will have its implications when we turn to Kant's relationship with Herder, but for now it is Kant's relationship with Rousseau—with the texts, but also with the figure—that concerns me. I wish to suggest the possibility that Rousseau—the gadfly, the *critic* of Enlightenment—seemed to offer Kant the model of an alternative intellectual identity.⁸⁴

The impact of Rousseau on Kant was so enormous—Josef Schmucker calls it a "revolution" and describes it as "overwhelming" Kant, and Henrich agrees—that we must try to grasp it in segments.⁸⁵ Here, as a first pass, what is important is the way in which Rousseau reinforced Kant's disaffection from the learned estate by offering a theory of history and culture in which scientific pursuits are denuded of a great deal of their conventional glory. Kant was, of course, quite proud of his scholarly achievements. He saw them as a mark of his "natural superiority" and at the same time as the

fruit of his disciplined application (thus, implicitly the legitimation for his upward social mobility). "Use of the understanding is a skill [*Fertigkeit*] not just a capacity [*Fähigkeit*]. . . . The one who does not have this skill is naturally inferior (to be distinguished from inferior socially: many who are socially inferior can be naturally superior and conversely)."⁸⁶ Kant had parlayed learning into social importance: *Bildung* made him a *Bürger*. Nevertheless, the scholarly estate had its demerits. *Gelehrsamkeit*, the entire *Hochaufklärung* contended, was not the same as *Bildung*, and sometimes it got in the way, both for the individual and for his community.⁸⁷

The Herder lectures formulate the issue in terms of the difference between "distraction" and "abstraction." The former is a widely shared human trait, and one that was, Kant averred in a variety of contexts, healthy. Abstraction, by contrast, is a trait that can be attained only by assiduous effort. "If I really think deeply, then I think little; I abstract with great effort, in order to make something clear."⁸⁸ At the outset of his metaphysics lectures, as Kant introduced students to the field, he noted: "Nothing makes one more weary than the effort to understand correctly. The more removed [thought] gets from the sensual and the more preoccupied it is with [the abstract], the more difficult become its considerations" (1:6). Kant insisted that "a great vehemence (in studies, in intellectual activities) cannot be sustained: [only] a certain measure keeps up ones energies [*eine gewisse Mäßigkeit unterhält die Kräfte*]" (2:881). Interludes of relief prove indispensable. "One relaxes oneself not by not thinking but by thinking a lot: . . . Distraction is pleasant and necessary: thus high society distracts (when I am among thousands then I am really alone. Addison) then one is freer, more solitary, than in isolation" (2:871). Kant seemed to be affirming distraction, and *Umgang* as a vehicle for it, as the necessary anodyne to scholarship. "The drive for action: are all the pleasures that it brings just to still the one drive toward science?" (2:893).

Science, Kant asserted unequivocally, was an unnatural pursuit. In the *Praktische Philosophie Herder*, he observed: "In general that is unnatural which is against the drives of nature. Re: the drive to science: it is not just something opposed to the self-preservation drive, but in particular [it is] against the sexual drive."⁸⁹ He elaborated in *Remarks in the "Observations"*: "When something is not in keeping with the length of a [human] lifetime, nor with its epochs, nor with the larger part of mankind, but is ultimately a matter very much of chance and only possible with the greatest difficulty, it does not belong to the happiness and perfection of the human race. How many centuries went by before the first real sciences appeared and how many nations are there in the world which will never

possess them."⁹⁰ From this global perspective, Kant turned to the level of the individual to continue his critique: "The poor accommodation of science with mankind is primarily to be seen in this: that the vast majority of those who wish to ornament themselves [with learning] achieve not a whit of improvement of the understanding but rather a perversion of the same, not to mention that for the majority science serves only as a mechanism for vanity" (35).

In *Remarks in the "Observations"* Kant operated throughout with the Rousseauian distinction of natural man from the man of civilization. In that light, he argued that natural man had no need for science. "In natural circumstances one can be good without virtue and rational without science" (14). But man was no longer merely natural. Though "[t]he drive to know does not lie in Nature; it has become indispensable for us now, . . . through long exercise."⁹¹ Science—and, more generally, civilization—had become the human norm, however artificially established.

Animals [have] only capacities for life: instinctual organs, capacities in which there is nothing superfluous, but rather everything already in use in the present. . . . But the human spirit [has] a strong curiosity and passion which when developed make all the things of life trivial [*läppisch*]. Many more noble, great [useless] questions captivate him which have no use in this world. In these capacities the Creator seems to have handled even the wisest man with the greatest contempt [*mit dem größten Weissen das größte Gespött getrieben*].⁹²

The question is whether the pursuit of abstraction was not just strenuous but pathological. It is surprising how vehement Kant's tone got on this matter:

Scholars . . . have developed too many drives [*Triebe*] which could never be satisfied and become disturbed, become suicidal. . . . The scholar, gaunt, hypochondriac about useless things. . . . [M]ore and more useless drives are being awakened—what unhappiness faced with such a life! What a disproportion between the length of life and sciences. (894)

Desire for things that we can never reach makes us crazy in this life. . . . No science in itself can make up for its own discontents; they become more and more harmful to themselves—useless to the public. . . . [S]cience terrifies [*quält*], tears us away from pleasures, and the only satisfaction it offers is a means of prediction [*Vorhersehung*]. Life is too short for this: there is just no proportion between them. Beaver do not build for the

centuries. Man is insatiable in the pursuit of science and [then] he dies. His successor takes up the matter eagerly and he dies; everything gets interrupted. Newton died in the middle . . . [breaks off]. (892)

Newton instead of being a human became an ape or an angel—lost enjoyment/peace—never satisfied himself—became childish—got laughed at, then died. (894)

When we consider the reverence that Kant felt for Newton, these are stunning passages.

Kant argued that whatever did not answer to the actual purposes of nature destroyed its harmony, and he continued: "In the manner that one holds the arts and the sciences in such high regard, one makes contemptible those who are not in possession of them and [this] carries us into an injustice."⁹³ Thus, "scholars think everything is made for their sake" (34). This injustice that science incites was very much on Kant's conscience. "It seems to us nowadays that the human race has virtually no worth apart from the great artists and scientists it boasts, and thus country folk and peasants appear to be worth nothing and of value only as a means to support the former. The injustice of this judgment is enough to prove its falsity" (23–24). This was the insight for which Kant expressed his gratitude to Rousseau, for Kant had himself been guilty of this injustice. With Rousseau having "set him right," Kant "learned to honor mankind and I would find myself more useless than the common laborer if I did not believe that my reflections could provide the rest [of mankind] with value, by formulating the rights of mankind" (38).

The danger was that scholarship could interfere with moral capacities. "Speculations weaken the moral feeling."⁹⁴ That is, "One of the greatest harms caused by science is that it takes so much time that young people's morals get neglected."⁹⁵ That made the concern for balance and moderation even more important. "Sciences . . . in all too vast a measure and development are harmful: hence what we need is an antidote: the human soul will live—according to the order of nature."⁹⁶ Kant argued that one should not simply wish to revert to the natural condition. "Therefore, [pursue] science, etc., not as a blind thirst [consequently not to escape boredom, not to become unsociable [*ungesellig*], not to be contemptuous of the unlearned, but judging them generously [*nicht verachtend den Ungelehrten, sondern glücklich schätzend*]], but with distance [*äußerlich*], as a purpose" (895).

A great deal of the language of this denunciation of science is clearly derived from Rousseau, but it would be unwise to presume that this was

Kant's only source. Indeed, the whole array of moralists to whom Kant had turned his attention over the last years of the 1750s and the early 1760s, from Montaigne and Bacon through Shaftesbury and Hutcheson to Rousseau and Hume, to say nothing of the German tradition from Thomasius to Crusius, all provided him with insights on this score.⁹⁷ I would particularly wish to highlight the importance of Hume in this. Kant scholars have striven single-mindedly to locate that famous but elusive moment when Hume awakened Kant from his "dogmatic slumbers" on the question of necessary causality. As a result, they have neglected unduly Hume's prominence as a cultural critic of scholarship in general and of academic philosophy in particular.⁹⁸ Hume's impact on Kant the "popular philosopher" was as seminal as Hume's later impact on Kant the "transcendental philosopher."⁹⁹ This is unequivocal in the case of Kant's concern with "national character."¹⁰⁰ But what I wish to suggest is that Kant was not insensitive to the fierce command Hume put into the mouth of Nature: "Indulge your passion for science, says she, but let your science be human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and society. Abstruse thought and profound researches I prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive melancholy which they introduce, by the endless uncertainty in which they involve you, and by the cold reception which your pretended discoveries shall meet with, when communicated. Be a philosopher, but amidst all your philosophy, be still a man."¹⁰¹ Indeed, one may suspect that Kant was in closer sympathy on this matter with Hume than with Rousseau, for the latter's posture seemed to hold out no place for science, whereas Hume at least considered a proper sort of science beneficial.¹⁰² This, it turns out, was Kant's view as well. He stressed repeatedly the idea that while sciences did contribute to the corruption of civilized man, the advanced cultivation of these same sciences conduced to remedying their own evils.¹⁰³ He suggested that science could, along with the sense of looming death and of consolation in the next life, serve as an antidote to decadent inclinations (18). If "effeminacy in mores, idleness and vanity produce the sciences[,] the latter give to the whole a new decor [*Zierde*], keep away much that is bad and when they have achieved a certain level they ameliorate the evil they have themselves occasioned."¹⁰⁴ What Kant had in mind in this last context comes clearer in another note: "Contestations in philosophy have the utility of fostering the freedom of the understanding and of arousing distrust of the very dogmatic edifice one proposed to build upon the ruins of another" (112). Kant goes on—together in the spirit of Hume—to adopt a (moderate) skepticism in method: "the doubt of delaying. Zetetics. . . . The method of doubt is useful in so far as it preserves the mind in acting not according to speculation

but according to sound understanding and *sentiment*" (130). Thus, Kant redefines the project of philosophy: "one could say that metaphysics is the science of the limits of human reason" (134). Hume saw his task in precisely that manner.¹⁰⁵

Kant, in what Richard Velkley has claimed is the decisive reorientation to the "primacy of practical reason," develops an argument in the *Remarks in the "Observations"* that science must always be appraised in terms of its human moral value.¹⁰⁶ "Every purpose of science is either *erudition* (Memory) or *speculation* (Reason). Both must lead to the result that man becomes more understanding (cleverer, wiser) in the world appropriate to human nature in general and thus more satisfied."¹⁰⁷ That is, "if there is any science which man needs it is the one which teaches him how to take up appropriately the role in creation to which he has been assigned and through which he can learn what he must be in order to be a man" (39). Elsewhere Kant notes: "the taste which is moral requires that a science which does not improve [mankind] be held in low esteem" (11).

Thus, we see in Kant all the impulses of the critique of *Gelehrsamkeit* and the turn to the practical matter of "educating mankind" that are the hallmarks of *Popularphilosophie* and the *Hochaufklärung*. This is only reinforced when we turn to his dramatic change in lifestyle.

KANT'S SOCIALIZING IN KÖNIGSBERG IN THE 1760S

The Russian occupation of Königsberg, which commenced in January 1758 and thus spanned most of the Seven Years War, permanently altered some essential features of the city's social whirl.¹⁰⁸ Above all it transformed the relations among the elites of Königsberg society. Kurt Stavenhagen has written most vividly of this:

With the occupation the whole openness and lack of prejudice of the eastern life style [*die ganze Breite und Vorurteilslosigkeit des östlichen Lebensstils*] entered the staid old city. . . .

Above all, these officers found totally incomprehensible the restrictions which kept the aristocracy and higher bureaucracy separated from the university faculty, and these in their turn from the commercial circles, and they did not feel the need to adapt to the prevailing etiquette of estates and cliques. . . .

But not just estates and cliques got jumbled together—the pedantic prudery of the pietistic life style was shattered and gave way to a freer tone of propriety [*einem freieren Anstandston*]. Quite properly one spoke

of an emancipation of the women of the city from their hitherto narrowly cloistered world. . . .

Thus arose for the first time that society which brought together all intellectual energies and soared beyond the lingering circles of estate life. . . . This aristocratic society which could keep intellectual pace with its epoch is the Königsberg to which Kant, the elegant *Magister* with the sure presence of a man of the world, applied himself.¹⁰⁹

Königsberg did become a significant “center of the *Aufklärung*” over the balance of the eighteenth century, not least but also not only because of Kant.¹¹⁰ The transformation that Stavenhagen portrays represented the social breakthrough of Enlightenment, the creation of that eclectic social mix, the *gebildeten Stände*, out of which it emerged. The Russian occupation played a major role in cracking the frozen social relations of early modern life and opening up crucial interactions. Another vital contribution of these Russians was a revitalization of the *Dreikronenloge*, the most important masonic lodge in Königsberg, making the city the center of a rich web of masonic interaction across the entire Baltic region and deep into Imperial Russia.¹¹¹ While Kant held himself aloof from freemasonry, virtually everyone else in the Königsberg *Aufklärung* took part in it, including many of his intimate friends.¹¹² It was also during the Russian occupation that the erratic but intrepid publisher and book dealer Johann Kanter began to establish himself in Königsberg. He set about courting favor with the Prussian state in order, after the war, to secure a royal patent to found his own newspaper in Königsberg.¹¹³ That newspaper, too, belongs in the institutional matrix of *Hochaufklärung*, and it proves an important context for Kant, Herder, and the developments this study proposes to trace.¹¹⁴

These were the years that Kant dramatically increased his socializing. Indeed, immediately after the Prussians resumed control over Königsberg, as Vorländer reports, Kant for the first time “entered the most distinguished homes of the city, including especially the upper military.”¹¹⁵ Hamann wrote Lindner an interesting letter in February 1764 about the Kant of that moment:

[Kant] is currently conducting a lecture course for General Meyer and his officers, which is bringing him great honor and profit [*Nutzen*], since almost every day he eats [with the General] and [is brought] there in a coach to give his lectures on mathematics and physical geography. Carried away in a whirl of social distractions [*Durch eine Strudel gesellschaftl. Zerstreungen fortgerissen*], he has a number of projects in his head,

Morals [*Sittlichkeit*], Attempt at a New Metaphysics, an excerpt from his Physical Geography, and a number of small ideas from which I hope myself to profit. . . . If any of this comes to pass, which is still in doubt.¹¹⁶

All morning Kant devoted to his teaching, but the rest of the day was his: "After his lectures *Magister* Kant spent his time over a cup of coffee or a glass of wine; he played billiards and in the evening, cards. Often he made his way home after midnight, once—on his own admission—so drunk that he could not find his way to the street where he lived."¹¹⁷ This Kant is quite a far remove from the one we have typically envisioned, far enough that even Hamann worried for his future productivity. It is important that we take this intense social life seriously as a symptom of personal psychological restiveness. Kant needed to hobnob with the elite of the city. He needed to party with the military officers. He needed to seek out the society of ladies of high fashion. What was this need about?

"Socializing is the true root of life," Kant wrote, "and it makes a worthy man useful."¹¹⁸ But *Umgang* was a trait Kant found particularly lacking among scholars. Wolfgang Ritzel paraphrases:

Many scholars are incapable of socializing [*Umgang*] and "not conversational"; and yet just they ought to be "able to converse with all stations [of society]" because they are "beyond all their [particular] spheres . . . not so lowly before the grand, not too lofty for the commoner." The true scholar is "an academically trained [*excolierter*] person and thus best suited for conversation." The unsociable nature of many scholars follows from a lack of "worldly knowledge [*Weltkenntnis*]" and from a false estimation of science. "Scholars think everything is arranged for their own pleasure [*um ihretwillen*]."¹¹⁹

Vorländer observes much the same thing.¹²⁰ Both register Kant's sharp contempt for academics: that Kant, in Ritzel's words, "had something better in mind [*sich etwas Besseres wüßte*] than the career of a school philosopher and scholar by occupation [*Schulphilosophen und Gelehrten von Gewerbe*] is certainly connected with his attitude towards the whole scholarly guild. . . . One does not have to search long to find further evidence of Kant's penchant for contempt, even malice [*Spottlust, selbst . . . Bosheit*]" (51). Stavenhagen makes the same point: "in his circle of friends and acquaintances of the Sixties there was not one single scholar; instead every one was a representative of the *bios praktikos*."¹²¹ Norbert Weis corroborates the way Kant

belittled "this estate of professional know-it-alls" he called the "scholar-mob [*Gelehrtenpöbel*]": "'it knows nothing, it understands nothing, but it talks about everything, and whatever it talks about it brags about.'" ¹²² Vorländer writes: "[Kant] hated the pedantry of scholars just as much as he despised the cliquishness that so easily develops in closed occupational circles. He never joined over the course of his entire life any of the official scholarly associations, of which there were several in Königsberg, or the secret societies like the freemasons, although a number of his closest acquaintances belonged to them. He associated more with educated men and youths from different social backgrounds." ¹²³

One of the most important such "youths from different social backgrounds" was a new student matriculated in the Albertina University in August 1762—Johann Gottfried Herder—whom Kant "noticed immediately." ¹²⁴ Their relationship will deserve its own chapter, but one comment on their relationship needs to be cited at once. Kant was explicit in conveying to his favorite student that there was a necessary balance between study and society:

Just before Herder left Königsberg, Kant spoke with the nineteen-year-old and advised him that he should not pore so much over books, but rather far better follow his own example. He was very sociable [*gesellig*] and it was only in the world that one could cultivate himself [*sich bilden*]. (In fact at that time Magister Kant was the most gallant man of the world, wore fancy clothes [*bordierte Kleider*], a *postillon d'amour*, and visited all the coteries.) ¹²⁵

This is the passage that seems to have been the origin of the characterization of Kant as the "gallant *Magister*." Otto Schöndörffer, having scoured the documentation from the 1760s for this phrase and found nothing, has suggested the alternative phrase "elegant *Magister*." ¹²⁶ Hamann, and it would appear also students at the Albertina, called Kant the "little *Magister*," in token of his diminutive size, and perhaps also of his endearing youthfulness of personality. ¹²⁷ On the other hand, this last formulation had an unfortunate linguistic connotation, for the phrase came very close to *petit maitre*, and this was a term Kant particularly despised and would have resented profoundly if ascribed to himself. ¹²⁸ Even "gallant *Magister*" would have been problematic for him, for though he acknowledged and cultivated gallantry, he recognized it, as well, as a form of French rococo manners that he identified as a feature of modern decadence (100).

Kant did become a favorite with the Prussian military officers of Königsberg over the balance of the 1760s. He was acquainted with several generals besides the General Meyer to whom Hamann referred above. Over the autumn vacation of 1765 Kant accepted the invitation of General von Lossow to spend his time on the latter's estate on the East Prussian border with Russia.¹²⁹ His association with General von Knobloch will concern us presently. It is striking that Kant got on so well with the higher military and aristocracy. Stavenhagen observes on that score: "Kant commanded the chivalrous forms of the cavalier [*ritterlichen Formen des Cavaliers*] of his time with mastery, because they fit so closely the chivalry of his own nature."¹³⁰ Hagiography, true, but there is something to this. Kant set himself self-consciously to cultivate aristocratic manners; it was, in fact, part of the ambition of his class and even the avant-garde of his profession (think of Göttingen!). And those dreary years of service as *Hofmeister* had not gone totally to waste. It was "during his time as a private tutor [that he] gradually picked up the fine social graces."¹³¹ In the 1760s Kant clearly possessed "worldly elegance and refined urbanity [*weltgewandter Eleganz und feiner Urbanität*]" (78). Without them, the world of the officers and the aristocrats, the world of General von Lossow and Countess von Keyserling, would have been foreclosed to him.

But Kant was just as interested in the commercial elite of Königsberg. Most important in this connection was Kant's meeting, at least by 1766, with the man who became his best friend, Joseph Green, a Scottish merchant settled in Königsberg. Green was Kant's paradigm of British national character, his informant on things British—and perhaps even on the tempestuous relations in those very years between Rousseau and Hume, two figures of ceaseless interest for Kant.¹³² Green was a man more methodical than Kant, and punctual enough to fulfill all the myths that have been saddled upon Kant himself. Indeed, Theodor von Hippel recognized him for an excellent subject and modeled his play *A Man by the Clock* after him.¹³³ Kant spent a great deal of time with Green, dining with him regularly. They talked about everything—even, Kant would have it, the details of composition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.¹³⁴ There is little reason to suspect Green of metaphysical acumen, but there is every reason to see in him that *Weltkenntnis* that Kant prized perhaps more highly. Green's death in the mid-1780s left Kant genuinely bereft. Green was a bachelor, like Kant, but Green left Kant some consolation. He had brought to Königsberg a young assistant and eventual partner, Robert Mothersby, who had the good sense to marry into one of the prominent commercial families of Königsberg. His family

became a central part of Kant's later life, with the children of that household among his most cherished companions. Green and Mothersby were British. Johann Hamann, Theodor von Hippel, and Johann Gottfried Herder were avid students of British thought and letters. In a word, Kant in Königsberg was steeped in an Anglophile cultural milieu, and the affirmative image of British national character that fills his anthropology is not just something he derived from books.¹³⁵

Probably Kant's most important point of intellectual *Umgang* was in Kanter's bookstore, especially after 1766 when Kant took an apartment just upstairs. Here all the intellectually lively people in Königsberg gathered to check out the latest publications, read what they would not buy (Kant was prominent among those who did this), and talk about everything. It was a *Lesegesellschaft* without official organization. Hippel called it the "stock exchange of the scholarly world of the city."¹³⁶ Vorländer describes the reading room: "On a large table were laid out for all those interested to examine the newest releases from the book market. These, together with new political newspapers, stood ready for all visitors to read without charge, even for students twice a week. University professors and other scholars . . . met at this literary gathering place, in part to get informed, in part just to take a moment to enjoy the exciting entertainment."¹³⁷ Kanter had the painter Becker do portraits of the local literary lions as well as those from all over Prussia, for example, Mendelssohn and Ramler, and these were hung on the various walls of the shop. Becker's portrait of Kant (1768) for this collection has been preserved, and it will come under more detailed consideration in another context. Since Kant lived just upstairs for eight of the years the bookshop played this role, 1766–1774, he was one of its key attractions.

What our contextual analysis has brought into consideration, I propose, makes Kant's turn to a new style of expression and his pursuit of a new audience far more comprehensible. Kant set himself to be the *reflektierende Schriftsteller*, the *Beobachter*, called for by *Popularphilosophie*. The result was *Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime*.

KANT'S EXCURSION INTO BELLES LETTRES:
OBSERVATIONS ON THE FEELINGS OF
THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE SUBLIME

Kant used the summer recess of 1763 to withdraw to "the country, a few miles from town in the forest house at Moditten," home of Kant's friend, the forester Wobser, to write *Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime*.¹³⁸ It behooves us to ask not only after the obvious

questions of intellectual influence, but also after the contextual questions of Kant's motivations and strategies in connection with this text. Kant here presented himself as a philosophical essayist, in Gulyga's words: "The philosopher approaches a new genre—the essay. The elevated pathos of early works is gone, humor and irony have appeared, the style is elegant and aphoristic."¹³⁹ Kant became what Ernst Cassirer described as "a stylist and a psychological essayist [who] established a new standard for the German philosophical literature of the eighteenth century. His *Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime* display a precision of observation and a lucidity and facility of presentation Kant never again attained in any later work."¹⁴⁰ For Cassirer it was clear that Rousseau provided Kant the decisive model.

Vorländer recognizes that the style said as much as the content. This text showed a new side of Kant "even in its outward form. He wrote here in short, easily understood sentences, gracefully, wittily, imaginatively, indeed poetically."¹⁴¹ It was, writes Stuckenberg, the "only one of his books which can be placed in the department of belles-lettres. . . . It is neither profound nor remarkable for new thoughts; but . . . [it] reveals those qualities which made him so great a favorite in society."¹⁴² It epitomized "the popular Kant" (221). This text, like Kant's lectures, thronged with a wide range of literary allusions, both classical and contemporary. Indeed, Vorländer makes an important connection between this new literary style and Kant's style as a lecturer, already something of a local legend.¹⁴³ What led Kant to seek to project this energy and style into his writing? What audience did he seek? What identity was he projecting? Why then?

One of Willi Goetschel's most important contributions is to register the centrality of the genre of the essay (*Versuch*) in the German Enlightenment. The German word figured in a series of Kant's titles in the precritical period. Goetschel explains: "the 'form' of the essay . . . [i]n the Enlightenment . . . is associated not only with literary agility and elegance, but also with wit, *Witz*, *esprit*. The essay designates that free discursive space in which thoughts are allowed to develop without constraint." It becomes a "locus of experimentation."¹⁴⁴ Clearly Kant was emulating a style of writing, the reflective essay or *moraliste* aphorism, derived from foreign sources—British (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume) and French (Montaigne, Montesquieu, Rousseau). Goetschel notes: "'Moraliste' is what essayists were called who carried on the tradition of social criticism from Montaigne to Bacon" (82). But this also put Kant exactly in line with the impulse of *Popularphilosophie* and *Hochaufklärung*. Goetschel even argues that Kant represented a major turning point in the history of the literary genre of the essay: "If Montaigne

is considered to have given the essay its tone of privacy and individual subjectivity, and if Bacon introduced factual objectivity, then it is Kant who brought the essay a new, even deeper dimension . . . transcendental reflection" (11). He sees this especially prominent in *Observations*: "the subjective spin of the term *Observations* denotes an especially free, open form of essay. . . . [T]he *Observations*, as a literary undertaking, are assigned an epistemological-critical intention from the beginning. But the text can realize this intention only as a genuine literary *Versuch*" (59).

But Kant was also adopting a style of reflecting or judging (*beurteilen*) grounded in close, particular observation (*beobachten*) associated with *cognitio historica*, not *cognitio philosophica*, and thus squarely taking sides in the debate between *Schulphilosophie* (the tradition of Wolff) and *Popularphilosophie* (the tradition of Thomasius).¹⁴⁵ The need for a synthesis of these concerns had already been articulated by Moses Mendelssohn in the context of his review of a work by Isaac Iselin:

I think that until now philosophical moral theory has been neglected in France and historical moral theory in Germany. Hence the profound system of one such as Wolff lacks pragmatic application to history, and the subtle observations of one such as Montesquieu lack general systematic principles. A work that would combine the profound depth of Wolff with the shrewdly observant mind of Montesquieu would, in my opinion, be the most perfect masterpiece of human reason; maybe that is an ideal that transcends human capacities, but the greatest minds of our time should try to approximate it, as much as possible.¹⁴⁶

This text points back to the crucial observations Mendelssohn made about Edmund Burke's *Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Idea of the Sublime and Beautiful*, a crucial source for Kant's text, and points forward to some crucial comparisons that Herder would make in the one letter he wrote to Immanuel Kant.¹⁴⁷

Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime became Kant's "best-read" and most successful piece of writing. It thrust Kant to the forefront of "popular philosophy" at the time, made him an exemplary *reflektierende Schriftsteller*. Kant, in short, was being fitted for a new hat, and it might seem that he had intended just this to happen. What can be determined about all this? Borowski wrote:

In the learned journals people preferred these *Observations* to the similar efforts of Crousaz, Hutchinson [sic], Andre and others, and praised beyond

the common utility of the contents the wit and the gay caprice with which these pages had been written. In the *Lindauschen Nachrichten* the author was called the La Bruyère of Germany. This text by Kant should not be missed—either in the studies of the scholars or on the dressing tables of the ladies—several reviewers observed.¹⁴⁸

As the managing editor of Kanter's new Königsberg newspaper, Johann Hamann was concerned to give Kant an important, substantial review, but he did have his reservations about Kant's book. His review "experienced a long gestation period and was only published in the twenty-sixth issue, on April 30, 1764, after a touch-up job by Lindner."¹⁴⁹ Hamann expressed the wish that Kant had stayed true to his promise made at the outset to work more from the vantage of an observer than a philosopher.¹⁵⁰ Very significant in this review was Hamann's thorough juxtaposition of Kant's approach with that of Edmund Burke.

Herder considered *Observations* his favorite book by Kant, and he complained in his Fourth *Kritischen Wäldchen* that *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend* had not reviewed it.¹⁵¹ In Berlin, Nicolai later sought to remedy this omission by inserting a brief review of a subsequent printing of Kant's book in his *Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek*. The review was very positive: "In its few pages there are so many insightful observations, written in such an entertaining tone, that one reads it from beginning to end with pleasure." Kant's observations were held to be "profound and useful."¹⁵² As late as 1772, in a review of the best of popular philosophy for the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Goethe singled Kant's *Observations* out as one of the landmarks of that genre.¹⁵³

While it has been my object to stress the more contextual and intimate concerns of Kant at that moment, linking him with *Hochaufklärung* and *Popularphilosophie*, we must also recognize the intense development of Kant's *practical* philosophy in the aftermath of the Prize Essay of 1762 as a legitimate philosophical segue from the positions achieved in the system of 1762–1763. Two questions arise immediately: How can the shift from theoretical to practical considerations be related to the shift in style from scholastic to popular philosophy? And are the impulses preponderantly immanent in Kant's thought or do they reflect the impact of outside thinkers or contextual developments? Kant's composition of *Observations* needs to be seen as much in the direct aftermath of his Prize Essay as his essay on negative magnitudes, which he composed between them.¹⁵⁴ While the latter essay addressed itself primarily to the metaphysical issues of the Prize Essay, however, the *Observations* took up the parlous state of ethical philosophy

exposed in the Prize Essay. We must go back to the famous lines in the section on ethics: "Only in our times has it begun to be realized that the faculty of representing what is *true* is *knowledge*; whereas the faculty of perceiving what is *good* is *feeling*; and that these two may not be confused with each other."¹⁵⁵ To find out more precisely what the fundamental principle of ethics must be, this domain of feeling—specifically "moral feeling"—needed exploration. It was for this, of course, that Kant had singled out Hutcheson in the Prize Essay as having "provided . . . a beginning to fine observations" (300; tr. 34).

Kant believed that empirical inquiry represented the essential preliminary for further progress in discerning the originary principle of ethics. He made this point in the lectures on metaphysics (1762–1763) that Herder attended.

Practical philosophy, which treats of this *moraliter possibile* [morally possible], could be divided into a subjective and an objective [treatment]. All the books deal with the objective; the subjective is harder (without it the other has little use) but little researched [*excolirt*]: how persons recognize what is at issue [*die Sachen*], how they choose, etc. That would be the natural science of the will [*Naturlehre des Wollens*], it would explain the phenomena that occur, or should occur. E.g., how a miser is possible. And this one learns from great observers. An example of such an observer: Shaftesbury. But this is all new (and in these [observers] it is scattered about) and it would require as a preliminary a grand analysis of feeling [*eine große Zergliederung des Gefühls*]. Hutcheson and Hume make three examples.¹⁵⁶

Kant's *Observations* represented a contribution to this "grand analysis of feeling." The role of observation (*beobachten*) is central here. This was the crucial term for *anthropological* inquiry in the mid-eighteenth century in Germany.¹⁵⁷ Kant's theoretical metaphysics, specifically the segment on "empirical psychology," and Kant's practical philosophy converged precisely here. Out of this convergence, and with this sense of an empirical, observational science, would emerge Kant's conception of a disciplinary anthropology.¹⁵⁸

What is important in the immediate context, however, is that in the early 1760s Kant viewed this as the indispensable research program for the discovery of the fundamental principle of ethics, in other words, for the grounding of practical philosophy. *Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime* was a preliminary report of Kant's data-gathering on

that score. Gathering anthropological evidence toward an ultimate grounding of practical philosophy remained central to his research agenda and to his pedagogy at least through the important *Announcement of Course-Offerings for the Winter Semester, 1765–66*. In the ethics lectures Herder attended probably in 1763–1764, Kant observed: "An ethic for man, *determined* in his nature, by his knowledge, powers, and capacities, has yet to be written. . . . We have here to investigate his limitations, and to become acquainted with the *natural man*."¹⁵⁹ The notion of the natural man clearly suggests the influence of Rousseau, whose contrast of the man of nature and the civilized man became a central structure for Kant's anthropological reflections in the 1760s and thereafter.

Kant argued in all the sources of the 1760s for the indispensability of such a historical-anthropological inquiry. In *Remarks in the "Observations"* he wrote: "in the metaphysical foundations of aesthetics it is necessary to note the variety in nonmoral feeling [and], in the foundations of moral philosophy [*Sittlichen Weltweisheit*] the variety in moral feeling of mankind according to differences of sex, of age, of education, and [of] regimes of race and climate."¹⁶⁰ For Kant, this orientation was the decisive innovation of modern practical philosophy, carrying it beyond what the ancients had achieved. He credited Rousseau explicitly for this innovation: he "served to improve upon the Ancients" (12). In his *Announcement of Course-Offerings*, Kant also explicitly identified Rousseau as the master of this method, which already the British moral philosophers had commenced. It was essential, Kant wrote there, to establish what men were actually like before going forward to a consideration of what they should be.¹⁶¹ This research program remained crucial to Kant over the entire period of the 1760s as he contemplated composing a "work on ethics."¹⁶² Thus, Hamann wrote to Herder as late as 1767 that Kant contemplated writing a work on what morals *are* before taking on what they *should be*.¹⁶³

It is this sense for *beobachten* that must inform our reading of the crucial account Kant offers of his procedure at the very outset of *Observations*: "The field of observation of these peculiarities of human nature extends very wide, and still conceals a rich source for discoveries that are just as pleasurable as they are instructive. For the present I shall cast my gaze upon only a few places that seem particularly exceptional in this area, and even upon these more with the eye of an observer than of a philosopher."¹⁶⁴ Kant set out not only from the principle of empirical observation but also from the principle, derived from Hutcheson and articulated in the Prize Essay, that the key area for inquiry was *feeling*. Precisely the innovation of modern ethical inquiry was to recognize its difference from reasoning. Picking up directly upon the

concluding insight of the Prize Essay, Kant in the *Observations* notes: "We do an injustice to another who does not perceive the worth or the beauty of what moves or delights us, if we rejoin that *he does not understand* it. Here it does not matter so much what the *understanding* comprehends, but what the *feeling senses*" (72). The premise of Kant's inquiry is that feeling reveals the underlying nature of the subject. The more refined the feelings, the more this is true. Hence Kant moved beyond the cruder sensations of the merely agreeable to the finer feelings, though he also delimited an upper register—intellectual pleasure—as beyond his scope.¹⁶⁵ The finer feelings he proposed to investigate for their data on human moral nature were the beautiful and the sublime. These juxtaposed terms had come into their own in recent aesthetics and psychology, particularly in Britain, and Kant was well aware of this discussion.¹⁶⁶ Moses Mendelssohn had presented an extended summary of Edmund Burke's key contribution to this field in a review essay with which we must suppose Kant familiar.¹⁶⁷ What is important is the way in which Kant refashioned the aesthetic inquiry to suit his moral-anthropological objectives.

There is some controversy about whether the *Observations* should be viewed as at all a contribution to Kant's ethical philosophy.¹⁶⁸ Schmucker, for one, has argued energetically that it should be seen as preponderantly a study in aesthetics.¹⁶⁹ This will only do if one takes aesthetics in a very anthropological sense, as the study of human response, and not as an inquiry into principles of beauty (or the sublime) along the lines of the later *Critique of Judgment*.¹⁷⁰ But once we have made such a generous interpretation of what "aesthetic" offers, there seems little left to Schmucker's discrimination: Kant clearly considered anthropological inquiry a propaedeutic to fundamental moral philosophical inquiry. While it would be amiss to register the *Observations* as a treatise on ethics, it is equally wrong to miss the contribution that his anthropological inquiry into feelings made to the development of Kant's practical philosophy. Schmucker himself concedes this, insisting only that such an investigation does not preempt the fundamental inquiry but rather serves as a "preliminary, preparatory study of the nature of man."¹⁷¹ Kant did not, as Paul Schilpp would have it, endorse here an empirical, heteronomous ethic that he would later repudiate in favor of his critical one.¹⁷² The entire inquiry was rather into the subjective dimension of ethics, its application in the concrete context of human nature.¹⁷³ Schmucker makes the very important argument that Kant deliberately restricted his language in the *Observations* to the term *virtue* (*Tugend*), which involved subjective maxims for the actualization of the moral law. "Here we must above all discriminate between the principles of virtuous disposition and

the objective rules of duty or the laws of duty."¹⁷⁴ "Principles of virtuous disposition [are] not identical with the ethical imperatives or the moral laws" (122). They were simply subjective maxims of actualization. That left completely undetermined the "foundational practical discipline, namely the universal practical philosophy, i.e., the doctrine of principle in moral philosophy" (153).

What Kant is after in the *Observations* is a distinction between behavior according to principle, which alone seems to him worthy of the appellation "genuine virtue," and behavior, however benign, which arises naturally, on impulse as it were. Kant believes that beneath the contrast of the beautiful and the sublime he can discern a deeper stratum of anthropological character, distinguishing the "good-hearted" from the truly "righteous."¹⁷⁵ The question is how a feeling—any feeling—can constitute a principle. Kant writes: "true virtue can be grafted only upon principles such that the more general they are, the more sublime and noble it becomes."¹⁷⁶ That is, Kant sees a link between the universality of a feeling and its status as a principle suitable for virtue. "As soon as this feeling [of universal affection] has arisen to its proper universality, it has become sublime."¹⁷⁷ And "among moral attributes true virtue alone is sublime" (57). Thus, Kant makes his most important proposition: "These principles are not speculative rules, but the consciousness of a feeling that lives in every human heart . . . the *feeling of the beauty and the dignity of human nature*. . . . The first is the ground of universal affection, the second of universal esteem" (60). Affection or love is a characteristic of the beautiful, Kant avers, while esteem belongs with the sublime. In this passage, he would have it that they are in unison, but they need not be, and indeed earlier Kant made the interesting observation that "there is many a person whom one esteems much too highly to be able to love him" (51). One should overlay upon this another of Kant's most important distinctions: "The sublime moves [*rührt*], the beautiful charms [*reizt*]" (46).

Even more important is the elaboration of yet another stratum of association, this one having to do with the traditional idea of the temperaments.¹⁷⁸ The linkage of true virtue with the sublime and with esteem now gets extended to the *melancholy* temperament. "Genuine virtue based on principles has something about it which seems to harmonize most with the *melancholy* frame of mind" (63). As many scholars have recognized, there is a profound measure of autobiographical projection involved in Kant's discussion of the melancholy temperament (and hence all its concomitants).¹⁷⁹ Kant held that "in the moderated understanding" melancholy is "A gentle and noble feeling . . . grounded upon the awe that a hard-pressed

soul feels when, full of some great purpose, he sees the danger he will have to overcome, and has before his eyes the difficult but great victory of self-conquest."¹⁸⁰ Alerted to this self-identification with melancholy, other bits of the text take on salience. Thus, Kant wrote earlier that "subduing one's passions through principle is sublime" (57). By the chain of elective affinities, this falls into the field of the melancholy. Explicitly, Kant writes: "Melancholy separation from the bustle of the world due to a legitimate weariness is noble" (56). In characterizing the melancholy (and sublime) personality, Kant writes later: "He is a strict judge of himself and others, and not seldom is weary of himself as of the world." And "in the deterioration of this character, earnestness inclines toward dejection" (66). But without such deterioration, Kant expects the melancholy personality to be "resolute. On that account he orders his sensations under principles" (64). Over the balance of the 1760s, Kant's conception of the melancholy temperament may have become less affirmative, however. One possible source for this revision may be George Cheyne's widely influential text, *The English Malady* (1733), a reconceptualization that located the problem of the melancholic not in the traditional vein of introversion but rather precisely the reverse, "the malady's specific sociocultural etiology . . . the notion of diseases of civilization," as Roy Porter summarizes.¹⁸¹ That is, socializing, extroversion, led to excess and illness. This was a line of thought that may well have preyed upon the mind of Kant in the crisis of the late 1760s.

Kant associates the beautiful with a sanguine temperament, and assigns it that gracious affection that forms the opposite number to each of the terms in his melancholy/sublime type. He writes: "graciousness is the beauty of virtue."¹⁸² For anyone steeped in Kant's later critical practical philosophy, the blurring of categories in that one sentence is mind-boggling. The sanguine personality's "moral feeling is beautiful, but without principle" (67). (All of this will have enormous consequence when gender, yet another stratum of this dichotomous archaeology, comes to the fore.) Kant proceeds swiftly with the remaining two temperaments. The choleric temperament is connected with the sense of honor (*Ehrenbegierde*); it is characterized at its most benign by the desire to be agreeable to others (complaisance), but Kant is swift to point out that far from being virtuous, "depravities can spring from it" (59). The essential feature is always to estimate self by the esteem shown by others. Behind Kant's conception of the choleric sense of honor, we can recognize Rousseau's devastating analysis of *amour propre*, the psychological continuity between his first and second *Discourses*.¹⁸³

Finally, and of relevance to later arguments, Kant was brutally curt regarding the phlegmatic temperament. It represented "a deficiency of the

moral feeling," that is, "a comparative apathy occurs in the character of the *phlegmatic*," and "in the phlegmatic mixture no ingredients of the sublime or beautiful usually enter."¹⁸⁴ For Kant in 1763, the phlegmatic personality was entirely and crudely utilitarian, concerned only with material satisfactions. He assigned this temperament to the Dutch, holding them to be concerned with nothing but mercenary gain (105). What is absent is any indication that he associated the phlegmatic temperament at that time with the "dryness and coldness" of rational inquiry, of *Gründlichkeit*. And what is clear is that Kant in 1763 despised the phlegmatic.

While much in the treatment of the temperaments had a blatantly self-referential character, it was also an enterprise in general human anthropology and, more so, a project in discerning the relation between feeling and moral order. Hence, we must wonder at the startlingly cynical ("worldly-wise") conclusion to which this whole discussion led Kant. He maintained that there were precious few humans who behaved according to principle, but far from lamenting this, he proclaimed it "good," for too many of the principles humans might adopt were faulty. He went on to claim that there were more who acted from goodheartedness, which was "excellent." But most people operated simply according to self-interest. Flaunting the tenor of his entire preceding discussion, Kant proclaimed: "Nothing can be more advantageous." Such people were "diligent, orderly, and prudent . . . without intending to do so they serve the common good" (74). Here Kant took up one of the major motifs of ethical thought in the period, which Albert Hirschman has brilliantly analyzed in *The Passions and the Interests*, namely the despair of the efficacy of virtue and the acceptance of instrumental regulation as an adequate surrogate.¹⁸⁵ Such thinking, expressed early in the eighteenth century by Bernard Mandeville and Montesquieu, found its culminating formulation in Adam Smith's famous metaphor of the "Invisible Hand" for the capitalist market mechanism.¹⁸⁶ What should occasion wonderment is that the great enemy of this whole deeply pessimistic line of thinking about human nature was Jean-Jacques Rousseau—whom Kant was just then recognizing as the "Newton of the moral sciences."¹⁸⁷

KANT AND ROUSSEAU II: THE GROUND OF ETHICS AND KANT'S *REMARKS IN* *THE "OBSERVATIONS"*

The position in ethics elaborated in the *Observations* was a transitory one, swiftly superseded by a view more heavily influenced by Rousseau.¹⁸⁸ The most important impact of Rousseau on Kant was unquestionably in shaping

these orientations in practical philosophy.¹⁸⁹ That makes Kant's relation to Rousseau in the *Observations* all the more interesting. Without question, Kant suppressed mention of Rousseau's name in that work. It appeared only once (the earliest mention of Rousseau in Kant's published works) in a footnote to part 4, in which Kant explicitly (and somewhat disingenuously) distanced himself from Rousseau's views.¹⁹⁰ But early interpreters, notably Menzer and Schilpp, were not deceived. They insisted upon a substantial debt to Rousseau in the text.¹⁹¹ Schmucker himself had to make some rather substantial concessions on that score and admit, along with the footnote in part 4, other evidence that Kant had already read *Emile* by the time he composed the *Observations*. Schmucker conceded that one could discern not only that Kant had abandoned scholarly elitism in *Observations*, but also that Kant already accepted Rousseau's call for philosophers to become the "educators of mankind," just as Schilpp had argued early on.¹⁹² Of course, one might object that the whole movement of popular philosophy would have militated for these outcomes. But Schmucker argues more specifically that part 3, on gender distinctions, owed a great deal to Rousseau's *Emile*, even if it nevertheless operated with different categories (beautiful/sublime rather than weak/strong).¹⁹³ Still, the failure to adopt Rousseau's categories, along with the absence of the decisive Rousseauian idea of *freedom* in any of the discussions in the *Observations*, persuades Schmucker that Kant was at this point only "superficially" engaged with Rousseau; the "fundamental confrontation [*grundsätzliche Auseinandersetzung*]" had not yet taken place (129, 139). Rather, Schmucker argues, Hutcheson remained the preponderant influence (at least with regard to the crucial issue of practical philosophy) (128, 140).

Schmucker cannot believe that Kant was already deeply engaged in the study of Rousseau, because in Schmucker's view this encounter had so enormous an impact on Kant that it literally overran his thinking for a time. In *Remarks in the "Observations,"* Schmucker saw evidence that "the ideas of Rousseau washed over and penetrated Kant's thought with elemental force, and caused him to revise his [prior] interpretations which had diverged from those of Rousseau to align with the latter" (141). Thus, Schmucker places Kant's decisive confrontation with Rousseau's major texts, above all *Emile*, between the fall of 1763, when Kant submitted his *Observations* to the censors, and February 1764, when he published his essay on mental illness (142). The difficulty here is that Kant himself suggested that it was the initial experience of Rousseau, the power of his rhetoric, which he needed to overcome.¹⁹⁴ How are we to grasp that it was only upon deeper study that Kant came totally under his spell? It could well be that Kant deliberately

suppressed the impact of Rousseau during the composition of *Observations*, but that the explosion of his response could not be contained any longer. Therefore, in the blank pages and margins of that very text Kant had to allow the return of the repressed.¹⁹⁵ That would suggest that the period of Kant's "enthusiasm" over Rousseau would extend roughly from 1762 through 1765, not just a few months at the close of 1763 and beginning of 1764. This tallies far better with Herder's experience of Kant's preoccupation with Rousseau, both in his actual lecture notes and personal regimen as well as in his subsequent correspondence.¹⁹⁶ It is not unreasonable to believe that working through Rousseau would be a protracted matter for Kant, and that we would see all phases of it reflected in the *Remarks in the "Observations,"* from the initial awe to the dispassionate final appraisal.

Kant's *Remarks in the "Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime,"* annotations penned in 1764 and 1765 in the margins and on blank pages inserted and bound into his personal copy of *Observations*, represents a unique text in the Kantian opus, a text never meant for other eyes, Kant's most intimate and personal writing.¹⁹⁷ Schmucker notes that there are four major themes in *Remarks in the "Observations"*—two of them continuations from the *Observations* and two of them new. They are (1) the question of aesthetic feelings, temperament, and national character, which proves of relatively minor importance; (2) the question of gender, and especially the nature of women, which expands vastly beyond what Kant made of this in *Observations*; (3) the question of the basis for moral philosophy; and (4) the contrast of natural versus civilized man as the basis for an assessment of human nature.¹⁹⁸ Rousseau had a massive impact on all but the first. The two new themes in particular must concern us initially. Kant's incorporation of Rousseau's conceptual distinction of natural versus civilized man allowed him precisely to use his anthropological insights to break through to a more compelling fundamental theory of ethics.¹⁹⁹ In light of Rousseau's distinction, Kant discerned immediately that the kind of universal *feeling* of love or esteem for humankind that he still considered as a possible *subjective* principle of virtue in the *Observations* could not suffice in the case of civilized man.²⁰⁰ It became, instead, an illusion, a complacent moral fantasy that gave vent to moral sentiment without having to take actual moral responsibility, or more precisely, without having the strength to actualize any moral responsibility.

Rousseau postulated "natural man" as a metaphysical ideal—perhaps, as Pierre Burgelin would have it, a full "idea of reason" in the critical Kantian sense.²⁰¹ From this Rousseau then inferred what was wrong with civilized man. Kant called this a "synthetic procedure," and he opted instead for an

"analytic" one, in other words, one that began with civilized man.²⁰² This undertaking had two sides. What Kant wished to do was to derive from the contradictions of the civilized order what must have been natural (in the actual anthropological-historical sense of *original*) and what should be natural (in the prescriptive moral sense of *essential*). Whereas Rousseau frankly gave up hope of ever knowing anything about the former, Kant believed that the investigation could produce important information. But both thinkers were concerned above all with the second problem. The difference was that Kant believed that, in his "analytic" assessment of human nature, he avoided a certain measure of projection that Rousseau could not in his.²⁰³ He employed rigorous methodological criteria for his analytic discrimination of authentic human nature: given a rich anthropological-historical inquiry, only that which proved *unchanging* and *universal* qualified as natural to humans (32). Still, it would be uncritical to take him at his word, for Kant could not approach his problem without preconceptions any more than Rousseau could. Kant brought to the inquiry his entire earlier study of ethics in the school-philosophical tradition, and more, he brought to it a residual but crucial sense of "original sin" from Pietism that would never let him grasp the condition of natural man in quite so benign a manner as Rousseau.²⁰⁴ Kant granted relative goodness, but imputed to natural man features that Rousseau wished to believe had only come from society and its corruptions.²⁰⁵ Crucial here was the role of reason in conjunction with imagination, and with these, the role of sexual attraction as an original social element in man.²⁰⁶ While Kant seemed prepared to adopt Rousseau's theories of primitive economic individualism, his view of man in other lights was inveterately communal. Hence, there could never be any question for Kant of a primitivist reception of Rousseau. The dynamic of social development was programmed into natural man, for Kant. It was no accident, though it had its fatality, especially at the level of the individual. Since humans were always already communal, if only at the level of the "family," the dynamic toward civil society was inevitable, and with it the individual's need for help and goodwill from others. The problem was that this same dependency occasioned, in Rousseau's terms, the shift from *amour de soi* to *amour propre*, and in Kant's terms, the prominence of honor, or the appraisal of one's worth in relation to others.²⁰⁷ With honor and its competition, which Kant would famously characterize later as "asocial sociability," came the proliferation of needs and satisfactions, the condition Kant labeled simply "luxury."²⁰⁸ The problem, put with equal simplicity, was that luxury stimulated new desires far faster than it could provide for their satisfaction or morality could provide for their containment. The result was,

much as Rousseau diagnosed it, decadence of the elite and immiseration of the masses.

That led Kant to what Schmucker called the "decisive question: by what path was man, in the civilized state, to achieve ethical perfection and happiness [*Glückseligkeit*] or, in other words, what did these consist in?"²⁰⁹ What Kant faced was the Rousseauian dilemma that virtue was both more necessary and less possible in our civilized condition.²¹⁰ Like Rousseau's Savoyard Vicar, and Hutcheson before him, Kant found himself drawn to believe that the solution to the problem was beyond human means.²¹¹ Humans appeared to require divine grace to make it through.²¹² The danger of heteronomy in such a position is obvious, but Kant believed he avoided it by the expedient that grace was a free and mysterious gift; in other words, it could not enter into the actual moral resolve of the individual human being, but might serve as a hidden supplement.²¹³ Kant was not willing to go along with Hutcheson and with Rousseau in postulating an afterlife and divine recompense as a motive for virtue, even if he accepted the idea that it was a necessary psychological hope, a "rational faith," that somehow, in the aftermath of ethical action, a balance between merit and reward would be achieved (227-33).

If Schmucker is of the view that this much of the later "critical" ethics was already worked out in the *Remarks in the "Observations,"* he is on even stronger grounds in claiming that Kant had worked out in that text the essential features of his fundamental principle of ethics, the categorical imperative.²¹⁴ And here, too, he sees a decisive contribution from Rousseau. Kant's solution of his problem of a fundamental principle in ethics followed the structural solution that Rousseau found for the problem of the just political community. That is, Kant *transposed* "the political philosophical conception of Rousseau into the inner world of the freely willing spiritual being" (254). Autonomy, submission to a law one has imposed upon oneself, became the essential Kantian conception of moral obligation. But there is more to it than this. What Rousseau helped Kant to see, what made Rousseau in Kant's view the "Newton of the moral sciences," was that ethics could only be possible on the presumption of a *metaphysical* intervention.²¹⁵ The command of the moral law had its seat in an immaterial principle. Man experienced this, felt it palpably, as obligation, but its source remained mysterious because transcendent.²¹⁶ Freedom of the will, Rousseau had argued decisively, was not and could never be reducible to the material world.²¹⁷ It was this freedom that ultimately differentiated humans from animals.

What Kant recognized was a crucial structural analogy between his metaphysical idea of a "real ground" that could be recognized only a posteri-

ori even if it had to be ontologically prior, and this new, equally metaphysical idea of a principle of freedom that could be recognized only by the experience of obligation, but which had to be logically prior to (and autonomous from) the senses. Schmucker elaborates this well: "A secret power compels us to orient our intention as well to the good of others or according to alien wills." Recognition of this is what Kant identified in the period after 1762 with the "ethical feeling [*sittlichen Gefühl*]." It could be defined as "the impression [*Empfindung*] of compulsion of our will to agree with the universal will," that is, "the impression or the consciousness of dependency or compulsion and judgment by the law of the universal will."²¹⁸ This was an *inevitable* subjective experience that betokened the ethical in human life, though its source was as mysterious as the principle of gravitation seemed in Newtonian physics: an analogy that Kant felt fully entitled to employ (167). Schmucker draws attention to a key line from Kant's *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* in which Kant elaborated his notion: man felt the force of "the strong law of obligation and the weaker one of generosity."²¹⁹ This notion of moral feeling "now apparently takes over all the functions that in the *Observations* were ascribed to the generalized moral feeling for the beauty and dignity of human nature."²²⁰ This idea would animate Kant's thought for the next several years, with important implications for the critical philosophy.

But if this reflected a breakthrough in the metaphysical problem of ethics, it did not solve the practical one. In other words, if this established an "objective" principle, it did not resolve the question of its "subjective" actualization. Kant established the ground and the force of the moral law in free will, but he had not yet established how this could be efficacious in a program of active virtue. Under the influence of Rousseau, this was a far bleaker prospect for Kant than ever his rationalist tradition in ethics had surmised. Certainly, "holiness" was out of the question; perfection was beyond human reach. But how much virtue was possible?²²¹ Could one be moral in a corrupt, civilized world? Kant's answer was blunt: "man is perfect in the measure that he can do without [*entbehren*]" (109). There could be no prospect of matching one's capacities or deserts to one's desires, and so the only path to virtue that remained was the deliberate extirpation [*ausrotten*] of unnecessary desires, a program of intense *askesis* (24). The goal was to achieve "wise simplicity" in place of "natural simplicity."²²² Needs could be overcome; better yet, they could be prevented from arising.²²³ The latter was the goal of education.²²⁴ The former was the task that the educator had no alternative but to impose upon himself.²²⁵

To achieve a "wise satisfaction" through renunciation became for Kant the essence of "philosophy as a way of life."²²⁶ Kant associated it with "one who needs little because he can do without a lot. *Socrates*."²²⁷ For

this, one needed "manly strength" to "bear the yoke of necessity"—phrases whose antique resonance can escape no one (49). As Kant saw it, "virtue is a violent estate," for it called for sacrifices and renunciations, an "art of doing without," refusing to allow "inclinations to well up inside one."²²⁸ The outcome, Kant promised, would be a "soul in peace," indeed, a "sensitive [gefühlsvolle] soul in peace."²²⁹ What brought peace to this embattled soul was the sense of its own moral freedom, the joy of this freedom. Not only was the moral law immediate and categorical, but obeying it was at the same time the exclusive source of the unconditional good.²³⁰ Like Rousseau, Kant believed that, having stilled the passions, a person could clearly hear the voice of conscience, unequivocal and peremptory, announcing not only law but freedom, and not only freedom but the ultimate good. Still, Kant worried about the practical efficacy of human virtue. In this effort to become a "civilized man of nature" (which Rousseau, with strong grounds, took to be impossible, as evidenced in the failure of Emile as husband, father, and citizen), one had to wonder whether human resources sufficed.²³¹ Kant insisted that while perfection was beyond hope, and reward was not to be expected in this life, it was nonetheless within human power to exert moral authority over oneself, and this grim struggle was at least real, unlike the false rapture of the "beautiful soul." Thus, Kant insisted that the task of philosophy was to bring man back "down to earth."²³²

Importantly, Kant differed little from Rousseau in his assessment of the decadence and the force of the "civilized estate." Corruption was pervasive and augmenting. Education, science, and art were contributing to this accelerating decadence. "The delicacy of the times is an effectiveness in deception and our *academies* are churning out a horde of deceivers."²³³ But its most powerful expression was in the sphere of personal relations, especially between the sexes. Like many in the epoch, Rousseau prominent among them, Kant believed European modernity clearly reflected a dramatic expansion of the influence of women in the social sphere. The "sweetness" (*Süßigkeit*) in male behavior toward women was a general sign of the decadence of true male strength and worthiness, an effeminacy that Kant, with Rousseau, perceived at the core of the high society of his age.²³⁴ This new modishness found expression above all in French manners and in their spread across Europe. *Galanterie*, of which he was such a master, represented an important aspect of it. The trajectory toward excess was frightful. Kant used the term *etourderie* to describe it. In women, the result was the *coquette*; in men, the *petit maitre*. It is not a coincidence that all these terms are French.

Kant's ambivalence toward modernity was more theoretically self-conscious than Rousseau's. He was also more scrupulous to force his life into alignment with his principles in a manner Rousseau could not manage.

But the diagnosis of the society they inhabited remained preponderantly identical. Both men saw the sexual relation as the key to the entry into and the eventual corruption of human society. "Luxury," the civilized estate, "occasions the practice of making a big discrimination between one woman and another."²³⁵ In the natural order, such invidious distinctions did not arise. Having arisen, however, society had then to *pretend* they were not present, and this was precisely the function of *galanterie*: to treat all women as delectable without any real feeling of desire. The condescension of such a misrepresentation (rightly noted by feminists) is complemented by the danger of believing one's own lie, for women are swift to turn illusion, especially beautiful illusion (*schöne Schein*) into a real social force. "Ours is the age of beautiful trivialities, *bagatelles*, or sublime chimeras" (56). Illusion displaces truth; desire proliferates beyond fulfillment; everyone judges everyone else by the presumed estimation of still others, and only on that basis forms an estimate of oneself.

Adopting a historiographical vantage that was becoming pervasive, Kant proclaimed that the "ancients were closer to nature but we have introduced between ourselves and nature much trifling or luxurious or servile corruption" (56). The influence of Rousseau is blatant here, for Kant lifts one of the great lines of the first *Discourse* into his own text: "Then [in the time of the Greeks and Romans] one spoke of virtue and patriotism, now there is only an empty materialism into whose place of course a false *devotion* can step" (21). Men had constituted their own society, apart from women, back then; now there could be no taste, no grace without the presence of women. "We have become soft and womanly [*weichlich und weibisch*] and must now be among women" (21). Kant found the German eighteenth-century term for women, *Frauenzimmer*, fascinating for its suggestion of their physical sequestration (55). He felt that this was a sign of social strength once possessed by the Germanic peoples, and he admired what he took to be a residuum of such practice among the English (55). "The greatest hindrance for the male sex to return to happy simplicity is the female sex" (82). What all this suggests is that *gender* had become a pervasive metaphor for cultural anxiety in eighteenth-century discourse, and that gender relations became an acutely critical scene of social self-construction.

KANT'S RELATION WITH WOMEN

Kant's socializing (*Umgang*) was not just with men.²³⁶ This was the time, if ever there was a time, when Kant felt the attraction of the opposite sex. The question of Kant's relation with women is not one that has—or appears

to deserve—much place in his intellectual biography.²³⁷ Vorländer insists: "women played no determining—indeed no significant—role in the life of our thinker, to say nothing of the idea that they should have inspired his work [*geschweige denn, daß sie sein Schaffen befruchtet hätten*]." ²³⁸ More interesting is Kant's *estimation* of women, especially in light of the rise of modern feminism. Yet I would argue that it is hard to understand Kant's estimation of women without taking up his relation with them. Moreover, the question has a place precisely in assessing the restiveness of the 1760s, which is the central concern of this study.

Late in life, Kant made a rather crude but revealing statement: "When I needed a woman, I couldn't feed one; when I could feed one, I didn't need one any more."²³⁹ Thus, Kant admitted needing a woman at one time. How he stopped needing a woman will bear consideration below. We must remind ourselves, Vorländer notwithstanding, that Kant seriously contemplated *marriage* in the 1760s.²⁴⁰ Josef Heller has suggested that Kant just did not have the money or the social connections to secure a suitable match.²⁴¹ The economic considerations have some bearing. There is less plausibility to Heller's claim that Kant's social connections were lacking.²⁴² Biographers have unearthed three possible marriage partners: a widow visiting in Königsberg, a traveling companion for an aristocratic lady visiting from Westphalia, and a local woman who proved unworthy.²⁴³ Even the cynical Hippel was quite convinced that Kant was going to marry someone. As late as 1770 he observed: "Langhans is dead, and Magister Kant will take his place as *Ordinarius* for Mathematics. . . . I am not sure from one moment to the next whether he is going to come tell me he is betrothed, for it is said that he is not at all disinclined to dare this unphilosophical step."²⁴⁴ But all these marriage plans came to nothing.

There are two women for whom *marriage* is not the issue, but personal intimacy quite definitely is. Kant eagerly spent time with each of these women, and their fondness for him is documented. The first is Countess Karoline Charlotte Amalie von Keyserling. The other is the woman whose scandalous personal life and one flirtatious letter to Kant have always occasioned the most speculation, Frau Maria Charlotte Jacobi. Both of them were married women when Kant came to know them, but women married very young to men much older. Might they have had time enough to rue this, perhaps, and to seek consolation?

Countess von Keyserling was five years younger than Kant. In 1744, at age fifteen, the Countess, née Reichsgräfin von Truchseß-Waldburg, became the third wife of Count Johann Gebhard von Keyserling, thirty years her senior.²⁴⁵ She was beautiful, intellectually agile, and artistically creative. Of

her husband we know less. They had two sons, born in 1745 and 1747. They lived on their country estate, Rautenburg, which the Count had purchased from his wife's brothers.²⁴⁶ There is some mystery about when Kant first came into contact with this Keyserling household, in other words, whether it was in the years of his private tutoring or in his first years as *Magister*.²⁴⁷ It is said that Kant "instructed" (*föhrte*) the Countess's son. Probably this instruction came after Kant was already a *Magister*. Still, Kant must have known the Countess—and rather well—during the 1750s. She drew the earliest portrait we have of Kant, and the conventional dating of the portrait to 1758 suggests a moment when he was thirty-four and she twenty-nine (see fig. 1).²⁴⁸ The question of an erotic dimension to this important relationship is one that has been for the most part unwelcome among Kant scholars.²⁴⁹ There is one exception. "The young beauty was passionately interested in philosophy," Arsenji Gulyga aptly enough observes. Then he goes on: "rumour had it that she was no less passionately interested in the visiting philosopher. It was alleged that the feeling was returned."²⁵⁰ Gulyga does not share with us his sources for either rumor. Worse yet, apart from the word *young*, he gives us no sense of when this passionate interest might have arisen. One can only contemplate the portrait. It is quite effective. The Countess was an artist accomplished enough to be elected, in 1786, to the Prussian Academy. Certainly Kant would never again appear so dashing, so fresh, so charming. How much did this have to do with the eye of



Figure 1. Portrait of Kant by Countess von Keyserling (1755)

the beholder? One can be permitted the impression of a certain fondness in the depiction. Whatever stronger feelings there might have been, the abyss between the high aristocracy and this son of an artisan and still struggling university teacher was such that nothing "passionate" could have been admitted.²⁵¹

In any event, their relationship was interrupted. The Countess lost her first husband in 1761 and married his nephew, Count Heinrich von Keyserling, in 1763. Heinrich was a career diplomat who served various governments in various capacities (and locations) until 1772, when he brought the family back to Königsberg and expanded their residence into a formidable palace.²⁵² Thereafter, they began lavishly entertaining and Kant became a regular and highly honored guest, always seated next to the Countess unless some very important out-of-town dignitary happened to be visiting. This social relationship was one of Kant's most highly prized, and his presence was equally important for that household.²⁵³

Biographers have made the most of Kant's association with Maria Charlotte Jacobi, fifteen years his junior. Born Maria Charlotte Schwink, she was married to the banker Conrad Jacobi, a good friend of Kant. The marriage was unfortunate in terms of the difference in their ages: she was married to Jacobi, twenty-two years her senior, at age thirteen in order to cement a business connection to her family. By the close of the Russian occupation, Frau Jacobi had become the most beautiful and socially prominent *bourgeoise* of the city. She was, according to Vorländer, "the queen of balls and parties in Königsberg."²⁵⁴ That by the mid-1760s she was interested in men other than her husband is clear.²⁵⁵ She seems to have settled upon two candidates: Kant and the mint superintendent, Göschen, another of Kant's friends. Both of them escorted her to the theater. Both of them attended her social gatherings. We know that Kant spent a great deal of time with her, especially in her box at the theater. The question is whether there was more. A letter she wrote to him in 1762 has been the occasion of elaborate speculation.²⁵⁶ It certainly has a tone of flirtatiousness, though hardly anything more.²⁵⁷ That we have a love letter here seems, despite Gulyga and Ritzel, a bit of a stretch. The effort to read one of its phrases as a play upon *Tristram Shandy*, with innuendos of sexual encounter, has been definitively quashed.²⁵⁸ Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Frau Jacobi could presume enough upon Kant's friendship to chastise him for failing to come to Berlin in the dead of winter, January 1766, to escort her home after her eye surgery.²⁵⁹ Kant never left East Prussia in his life. For Frau Jacobi even to contemplate that he would do this for her suggests a strong attachment. But Kant did not accommodate her—then, or later. In the end, Göschen, unlike Kant, was willing to weather

scandal to have her. In 1768 she divorced her husband and shortly thereafter married Göschen. It was Königsberg society's grandest scandal of the decade. Hippel loved it. Kant did not attend the wedding and avoided their company thereafter, pointedly keeping up his friendship with the ex-husband until the latter's death.²⁶⁰

The last young woman with whom Kant's contact in this period has been documented is Fräulein Charlotte Amalie von Knobloch (1740–1804), to whom he sent the famous letter about Swedenborg.²⁶¹ The misdating of this letter created a lively controversy over Kant's Swedenborg reception.²⁶² The bizarre thing about this dating problem is that the person who came into possession of the letter and first published it in 1804 as an appendix to his Kant biography, Ludwig Borowski, should have misdated it. Borowski was personally connected with the young lady's household in the period (1758) to which he presumably falsely assigned the letter.²⁶³ In fact, he served as *Hofmeister* at Schulkeim, the estate of General von Knobloch, roughly from 1758 through 1762, upon the recommendation of Immanuel Kant.²⁶⁴ This raises more questions, such as how and when Kant came to know this family. Rudolf Malter comments: "Kant probably was acquainted with the von Knobloch family already around the mid-[17]50s" (45 n). That seems quite early for Kant to be traveling in such circles. There are several letters between Kant and Borowski during the latter's tenure as *Hofmeister*. In a letter to Borowski dated June 6, 1760, Kant wrote: "If the fair ladies of the Schulkeim home, which I respect to the utmost, should find [the text accompanying] this letter worth reading, it would make it vastly more important for me. Please assure this entire great house of my most deferential respect."²⁶⁵ From his letter to Borowski and from his role in securing the latter his position there, Kant must have been a visitor at Schulkeim, and more than once. This would suggest that Kant's gallant phrase about his esteem for *all* the ladies at Schulkeim could have harbored a more particular esteem for *one*.

Kant's 1763 letter to Charlotte von Knobloch is certainly gracious, but without any hint of intimacy. Vorländer is quite firm that there was nothing romantic at all about this relation.²⁶⁶ Heller registers the tone of Kant's letter as gallant and worldly, but admits that "it is hard to determine what this letter allows us to conclude about a real inner sympathy and about deep feeling on Kant's part."²⁶⁷ I think it allows us to conclude nothing. It reflects only Kant's style of address to the ladies of high society, especially those with whom he was frequently in company. Kant used the phrase "ornament of her sex" in addressing Fräulein Charlotte, which takes some of the patina off his use of the same phrase in the *Anthropology* in reference to Countess von

Keyserling.²⁶⁸ It would appear nothing more than a stock phrase in Kant's "gallantry."²⁶⁹ The interesting question remains why the Fräulein should have asked Kant about Swedenborg. The conventional view is that Borowski suggested it to her.²⁷⁰ But Kant's letter implies—and I believe her request presumes—an established *personal* acquaintance between them.

The evidence, ephemeral as it appears, suggests Kant had personal experience, not simply book learning, with women.²⁷¹ What matters is how it changed him—that is, how it changed his thinking and his self-conception. And for that we can bring fully to bear Kant's estimation of women, not only for what it says about the *object* of that estimation, but for what it says about its *subject*. Particularly salient is the change in attitude toward women that has been detected from the *Observations*, composed in summer 1763, to the *Remarks in the "Observations,"* composed in 1764–1765. Ritzel writes: "What the *Remarks* contributes to [his] characterization of women and to the judgment of love and marriage demonstrates experience, more precisely, passionate experiences."²⁷² He draws a blunt conclusion: "Even more frequently than in the *Observations*, the *Remarks* treat of the female sex—more frequently and far less gallantly" (113). Lehmann terms it "a sharply more realistic, critical and pessimistic standpoint," and he notes that Benno Erdmann already observed that "Kant's judgment of women had become more 'sour.'" Lehmann draws the same inference as Ritzel: "it cannot be doubted," Lehmann writes, "that Kant had some experiences in that period which entitled him to this 'sour' tone."²⁷³

KANT AND ROUSSEAU III: THE QUESTION OF WOMAN

Observations and *Remarks in the "Observations"* involve such a substantial and problematic investment in the question of sexual relations and, more specifically, in the characterization of the female sex that this fact alone calls for a more substantial explanation than it has hitherto received. For some scholars, Kant's preoccupation is to be ascribed simply to Rousseau's influence.²⁷⁴ For contemporary feminist theory, it is a consequence of the "virulence of the issue" in that historical moment for civil society.²⁷⁵ The Kant biographers have given us some ground to consider it in the context of changes in Königsberg society and his personal wrestling with the question of marriage (or sexual intimacy generally). The question is how to appraise the merits of each of these hypotheses.

The thesis of contemporary feminism is that the end of the eighteenth century, and more specifically the French Revolution, marked a decisive moment in the history of gender relations, the entrenchment of a new—a

modern—patriarchy, in which male participatory politics was established upon the foundation of the disenfranchisement of women and their sequestration to the domestic sphere.²⁷⁶ Thus, the liberation of men for public self-assertion required the denial of this possibility to women, defining manhood and citizenship precisely through this disempowerment of women. According to this feminist interpretation, “The conception of a reduced feminine reason is the necessary preliminary for the construction of a universal male reason.”²⁷⁷ The key theorist of modern patriarchy was Jean-Jacques Rousseau, but in the German sphere he was seconded fully by Immanuel Kant.²⁷⁸ Kant’s preoccupation with the question of women in *Observations and Remarks in the “Observations,”* long neglected by (male) Kant scholarship, seems perfectly transparent for feminists in the cultural-political context of his bourgeois self-construction. His reception of Rousseau on the question of women was largely uncritical. In both instances, these bourgeois patriarchal thinkers violated the presumed universalism of their advocacy of human rights. Moreover, women’s human rights had already become a matter of public debate, and Rousseau and Kant cannot be excused on the grounds of anachronism.²⁷⁹ For some feminists, this has suggested that the whole rhetoric of human rights and of Enlightenment is hopelessly corrupted by patriarchal prejudices and thus a viable conception of gender and culture can only be fashioned *against* this heritage.²⁸⁰ Indeed, reason itself appears to some as an irreparably sexist conception.²⁸¹ Others seek to retrieve the ideal from its clearly compromised uses in the eighteenth century (and subsequently) as part of a constructive reformulation of social justice.²⁸² In any event, this theoretical framework sets the relation of Rousseau and Kant on the question of women’s character into the sharpest profile.

The question remains, however, why Kant would have come at just this moment to take on the question, and with such vehemence, only to have it fade into unchanging reassertion over the balance of his career.²⁸³ One answer, of course, is just his reception of Rousseau’s texts, the historical coincidence that *La Nouvelle Héloïse* appeared in 1761, and that Kant read it shortly thereafter.²⁸⁴ That cannot be passed over too swiftly, for just what must be at issue here is the degree to which Kant’s reading of Rousseau’s novel(s)—for when it comes to Sophie, *Emile* fully assumes that genre—represented the essential basis for his judgment of questions of gender. Was Kant’s assessment of women derivative, shaped by another imagination and simply aped by his own? Was that other imagination Rousseau’s exclusively, or were others (Richardson, perhaps) equally determining? Did Kant ever “think for himself” on the question of women?

What other sources did Kant draw upon in his judgment, and how self-consciously did Kant bring all his sources into juxtaposition? Why *would* Kant read *La Nouvelle Héloïse*? What was Kant doing reading novels? Conventional Kant scholarship has never felt compelled to consider such questions seriously, and certainly Kant's ongoing disparagement of novels encouraged this neglect. We are now sensitized methodologically to see interest in novels as deeply embroiled in the psychology of bourgeois self-construction in the eighteenth century, and there is no reason to exclude Kant from this general pattern.²⁸⁵ Indeed, including him allows us to advance a more complex and adequate hypothesis about this matter, namely that Kant's interest in Rousseau, particularly Rousseau's novels of gender, was reinforced by personal imbrication in questions of gender and identity. More concretely, we should consider the possibility that Kant, above all in the *Remarks in the "Observations,"* might have been struggling not only to overcome Rousseau's fascination, to establish a measure of critical distance, but also to get free of his own fascination with women. Thus, what the Kant scholars have termed a "souring" of Kant's attitude toward women was really a "chilling," part of that general therapy of renunciation (*entbehren*—doing without) that Kant, reflecting on Rousseau, saw as the only vehicle for virtue in the civilized estate, not just for the collectivity but above all for himself. To achieve philosophical *askesis*, Kant had to shake off the enthusiasm inspired by Rousseau, as well as the charm (*Reiz*) of women's sexual attraction. "It is said that the desire for honor is the ultimate weakness of the wise. I believe that as long as wisdom is not simply a matter of onset of old age, love for women is the ultimate weakness."²⁸⁶ While knowledge empowered man to overcome the bulk of his inclinations, the significant exception was sexual desire (74). Kant loved to repeat the observation he attributed in one version to David Hume: "The correct understanding of the organization of the universe by Newton is perhaps the most beautiful product of inquiring human reason, but nevertheless Hume has observed that the philosopher in the midst of this rapturous contemplation can easily enough be disturbed by a little brown maiden" (91). Kant considered sexual desire (*wollüstige Liebe*) something it was necessary to suppress (*niederzudrücken*), even if this represented a great challenge (11). As with every other such inclination, indulgence and familiarity only increased its power. It was best not to begin, and if otherwise, to stop swiftly.

There is sufficient evidence to maintain that Kant found the sexual act not only disgusting but dangerous.²⁸⁷ Isabel Hull has commented aptly, "It is striking how much he distrusts pleasure, how impossible he finds it to imagine that one might give and take pleasure simultaneously."²⁸⁸

Kant prescribed for marriage a strict equality in the sexual sphere just because he considered it so relentlessly dehumanizing (310). And he prescribed to husbands renunciation of all other women as the vehicle through which to keep this animal component in their nature under the tightest restriction.²⁸⁹ Kant paralleled that other ascetic theorist of sexual relations, the Apostle Paul, in that he was prepared to concede that it is better to marry than to burn, but he still considered celibacy a far superior estate. Foreclosure of the sensual, even more for himself than for mankind: this was Kant's "philosophical" therapy.²⁹⁰ This "triumph of the will," this achievement of "character," was the essential project of Kant's self-construction in the balance of the 1760s, if not indeed, the balance of his life. Not to "need" a woman, not to "need" at all: such was Kant's sense of (manly) virtue. And one of the ways to make such a triumph of the will possible, alas, was to conceive of women as *in principle* "unworthy of his attentions."

KANT'S ESTIMATION OF WOMEN

The *Observations* contain statements by Kant that have deservedly aroused great ire among contemporary feminists. This goes beyond the gratuitous disparagement of "blue-stocking" intellectuals like Mme. de Châtelet in which Kant simply parrots the pettiness of his age.²⁹¹ More alarming, what Kant seems to be saying is that women have no true moral personhood, that they are perpetual minors, *unmündig* by nature. Kant almost always ascribes the character of women in his society entirely to natural endowments; there is scarcely a consideration that this character might be socially conditioned.²⁹² One has the right to raise this consideration since in the eighteenth century the *querelle des femmes* had already raised it, and Kant had as one of his most frequent associates in Königsberg a man who put the case in strikingly advanced terms, Theodor von Hippel.²⁹³ If Kant thought himself "gallant" toward women, it is surely only by the standards of his long departed age. *Galanterie* should thus be taken, as feminists have argued, as a euphemistic description of male patronizing, a subtle and perhaps even unexamined contempt.²⁹⁴

In the elaborate typology of the *Observations*, women were consigned to the beautiful, the sanguine, the charming, tenderheartedness, and impulse, while men preempted the sublime, the noble, the profound, principle, and hence virtue. To women was assigned "easy" or beautiful understanding, as contrasted with "strenuous" and deep understanding, reserved to men. "Her philosophy is not to reason, but to sense." Moreover, "the content

of woman's great science . . . is humankind, and among humanity, men."²⁹⁵ But Kant is insinuating that this is only a concern for the particular, and hence no science as he understands it at all. His characterization of how women might be taught physical geography confirms this. Worst of all, however, are the moral implications of Kant's view. "Women will avoid the wicked not because it isn't right, but because it is ugly. . . . Nothing of duty, nothing of compulsion, nothing of obligation. . . . I hardly believe that the fair sex is capable of principles" (81). Kant excuses himself from offense by adding that, after all, few men act upon principle either. In a footnote, he writes, "I would certainly not have wanted to say what Rousseau so boldly asserts, that a woman never becomes anything more than a grown-up child" (102 n). But the fact of the matter is that he *does* assert it, by implication here, and explicitly in his *Reflexionen*. In *Remarks in the "Observations"* Kant writes: "in matters of understanding women are pretty much children."²⁹⁶ Brutally, Kant observes: "women . . . have little character at all. When one knows one, one knows them all."²⁹⁷ He restates the point elsewhere: "the feminine sex has more good humor and heart than character."²⁹⁸ In women, "even if they have understanding, sense dominates."²⁹⁹ Indeed, Kant observes, one must always ask "of women, whether they be perpetual minors [*immer unmündig*]."³⁰⁰ He claims "whatever once has entered their heads one can never change their minds about. They are forever grown children."³⁰¹

When Kant scholars detect a "souring" of Kant's view of women from *this*, we need to ask in what sense. That sense revolves concretely around the sexual allure of women for men, a far narrower and more self-interested consideration. Kant is sensitive to this latter pitfall: "the author always appears to depict his own inclinations."³⁰² Indeed, Kant hardly escapes that trap. Already in *Observations* Kant maintains that woman's sexual charms are ultimately always at the basis of gender relations. He writes of "the impression that the form and features of the fair sex make on the masculine" that this "complete fascination is really overlaid upon the sex instinct," and "sexual inclination still ultimately underlies all her remaining charms" (85-86). He does distinguish between the merely physically attractive woman, who is just "pretty [*hübsch*]" and a "beautiful [*schön*]" one, who has some spiritual appeal. The former "charms [*reizt*]," the latter "moves [*rührt*]" (87-88). He does not distinguish, however, when he observes that "a single sly glance sets [men] into greater confusion than the most difficult problem of science" (79). Indeed, he argues that coarser men have a better handle on women's sexual appeal, since they are not distracted by idealizations of their spiritual potential. By contrast, one who is more refined "usually misses the great goal of

nature" because he "demands or expects more than nature usually offers. . . . Thence arises the postponement and finally the full abandonment of the marital bond; or what is perhaps just as bad, a peevish regret after making a choice that does not fulfill the great expectations one had made oneself" (91). Once again, Kant appears to have slipped into inadvertent autobiography. Kant's text strikes a sharply ascetic note at this juncture: "one must make no very high claims upon the raptures of life and the perfection of men; for he who always expects only something ordinary has the advantage that the result seldom refutes his hopes, but sometimes he is surprised by quite unexpected perfections" (92). Here we have a melancholy temperament in its degenerating phase, or perhaps even the incipient trace of the ascendancy of the phlegmatic. The general tone of resignation and cynicism that begins here deepens drastically in the *Remarks in the "Observations."*

In the *Anthropology* Kant writes: "when gallantry has become fashionable and jealousy ridiculous (as happens when a certain degree of luxury is reached), the feminine character reveals itself," that is "the wife may openly admit to having lovers other than her husband" and woman in general "lays claim to freedom and simultaneously to the conquest of the entire male species . . . under the name of coquetry."³⁰³ In a footnote, Kant carries the analysis one step further: "when the married woman practices obvious gallantry and her husband pays no attention to it, but rather compensates himself with drinking parties, card games, or with gallantry of his own, then not merely contempt but also hate overcomes the feminine partner, because the wife recognizes by this that he does not value her any longer, and that he leaves her indifferently to others, who also want to gnaw at the same bone" (304 n; tr. 218 n). That Kant believed his *times* had reached this dread pass is obvious. The question we might ask is whether what he reflects here has to do with his own personal experience. Frau Jacobi could fit this characterization altogether well. "I would rather be the happy St. Preux than the man in love with his own wife."³⁰⁴ And that might well be the point from which to consider the burst of harshness that characterizes Kant's observations in the *Remarks in the "Observations."* His theme there is: "A coquette is a wonderful mistress, but not much of a wife—except maybe for Frenchmen" (57).

"Sexual intercourse [*wollüstige Liebe*] is the basis of the attraction between the sexes. Accordingly, all talk of the beautiful or the sublime which does not take this into account is just a figment of the imagination [*Hirngespinnst*]" (59). Men are more fascinated with "tender love," Kant asserts, but women care more for the carnal (59). In matters of sex, women have a robust taste, men a delicate one (56). Of course there is a "moral taste" in which

everyone wishes to appear delicate or even pure, but this is just "beautiful appearance" (41). Kant observes that men should beware of that "tender and respectful love" for women, for it can swiftly turn into an outbreak of lust (59). By contrast, women artfully employ the "beautiful appearance" of delicacy and purity in order to make their conquests. But love between the sexes "always presumes carnal love, either in [present] sensation or in memory" (8). Kant believes marriage makes the erotic humdrum, if not repugnant.³⁰⁵ "If one wants to keep the fantastic element of love going in marriage, one will have to have jealousy and adventures; if one wants to keep the erotic [*Buhlerische*] going, the wife will have to be a coquette" (61). Twice Kant uses the line, "with marriage the fairy tale ends and history takes over" (97, 99). His advice is, once again, renunciatory: "if you restrict your own lustfulness, your wife will be sufficient for you" (64). Of course, old age in women is "horrible," and men care for older women only "in memory of their youth" (66). The most cutting satires of marriage are those that consider infidelity a trifle, and women are far more willing to have their sex satirized than the institution of marriage, for that is no laughing matter to them (71-72). "A man is such a puppy [*Laffe*] in marriage," managed by his wife, his heart is reined in: "generally when a man marries he is lost to his friends" (75).

What is the upshot of all this analysis of sex and marriage? "Idolatry of the beautiful sex is followed by contempt" (82). Kant creates this harsh image of women the better to renounce them—sexually and, thus, in marriage. He retains "gallant socializing," however, because women have become the "whetstone of virtue," and "perhaps this is a hidden reason why we always cling to them whether we wish to or not" (83).

REPRESSION AS THE PRICE OF "PEACE": KANT'S "CONVERSION" AND "CHARACTER"

In the text version of his *Anthropology* Kant writes that "what nature makes of man belongs to temperament . . . and only what man makes of himself reveals whether he has character."³⁰⁶

The person who is conscious of the character in his mode of thinking does not have that character by nature, but must always have acquired it. One may also take it for granted that the establishment of character is, similar to a kind of rebirth, a certain solemn resolution which the person himself makes. This resolution and the moment at which the transformation took place remain unforgettable for him, like the beginning of a new epoch.

This stability and persistence in principles can generally not be effected by education, examples, and instruction by degrees, but it can only be done by an explosion which suddenly occurs as a consequence of our disgust at the unsteady condition of instinct. Perhaps there will only be a few who have attempted this revolution before their thirtieth year, and fewer still who have firmly established it before their fortieth year. (294; tr. 206)

This statement, I submit, needs to be read autobiographically. As such, it represents the most important suggestion we have from Kant that there was a decisive rupture ("an explosion which suddenly occurs as a consequence of our disgust at the unsteady condition of instinct") that took place in his life around the mid-1760s. By an act of will, he wrenched himself out of a condition that disgusted him into a self-possession that he would never relinquish. In this personal register, Kant believed that even if he was saddled with a melancholy temperament, he could overcome it, and, indeed, it was essential to his moral self-respect to do so. This was the essential labor of self-determination.

Kant in 1763 relished his melancholia. He considered it robust, not degenerate. Likewise in 1763 Kant had nothing positive to say about the phlegmatic temperament. By the late 1760s he had shifted dramatically. Melancholy had become "the agony of the self-tormentor" and phlegm betokened "the peaceful serenity of the self-sufficient mind" (291; tr. 202). These phrases are taken from the published *Anthropology*, but we can retrieve virtually identical characterizations from Kant's *Reflexionen* of the late 1760s and early 1770s. Both considerations are important: Kant simultaneously found fault with the melancholic temperament and redeeming features in the phlegmatic. In *Remarks in the "Observations"* Kant wrote: "The melancholy man loves more strongly and is less loved by women, for women are capricious."³⁰⁷ One wonders whether this observation bespoke a personal disappointment.

In 1763 he would never have considered "phlegm as a strength," much less made the decisive connection between "cold-bloodedness" and philosophy, but just this characterizes his view in the *Anthropology*: "His fortunate temperament takes the place of wisdom, and even in ordinary life people often call him the philosopher." This was because such a person would "proceed from principles and not from instinct."³⁰⁸ Of course, we must note that the phlegmatic person is *not* a philosopher, *not* a man of character, *not* a man of principle. Rather, his natural endowment of temperament *approximates*, and hence its name *symbolizes*, the traits which

a true philosopher, a true man of character or principle, *achieves by self-exertion*. Nevertheless, the elective affinity is palpable, and Kant will ever after use the descriptors of the phlegmatic temperament as the symbols of a philosophical method.

It was his view that character was a function of judgment and could only be an accrual of maturity. Good judgment, *Klugheit*, was not to be expected short of forty years of age.³⁰⁹ As such, character was entirely a function of mind or spirit, not at all a natural endowment or a matter of temperament. It entailed the imposition of a "generally governing principle regarding a person's employment of talents and traits." That is, "to character belongs firmness and unity of principle."³¹⁰ Crucially, Kant defines character as the "faculty of freedom to make use of everything in accordance with a rule."³¹¹ What constitutes character is a "way of thinking [*Denkungsart*]."³¹²

In a word, "by character we can get the upper hand over bad nature."³¹³ "Virtue consists not at all in a person overcoming in particular circumstances his accumulated inclinations but rather in the effort to get free from them and thus to learn to do well without them [*gerne entbehren lernen*]."³¹⁴ That is what Kant came to believe and then set about to achieve in the second half of the 1760s, after his own fortieth year and in the context of disappointments that induced "disgust at the unsteady condition of instinct." What exactly might these disappointments occasioning disgust have been? We can formulate them in three echelons of increasing intimacy. First, he was disgusted at the decadence of society. Second, he was disgusted at the decadence of scholarship, in particular academic philosophy. But finally, and perhaps most pointedly, he was disgusted at his own susceptibility to the sexual allure of women. His resolve was to have none of the last, little of the first, and to purify the second into the most "rigorous" and impersonal inquiry possible.

Kant's theory of character seems to have emerged in just these years of the late 1760s, and it clearly represented the gleanings of a painful and personal learning, *pathei mathos*. That entailed a *therapy*. "One improves one's temperament by employing its opposite."³¹⁵ "Indifference, apathy, is the opposite of soft-heartedness [*Weichmüthigkeit*]."³¹⁶ As Josef Heller observed, "a moderate phlegma in the sense in which Kant described it in his *Anthropology* seemed to him at that point as the best means for the attainment of the sought-after tranquility."³¹⁷ One has to rein in one's *hopes*. "A person who does not attach much to hopes is not small minded. . . . To feed oneself on hope is unmanly, it is childish."³¹⁸ The task of character-building is methodical and sequential. "First one has to establish character in general, then one can go on to build a good character. The first occurs through

exercising according to a fixed plan, in adopting certain maxims established by reflection."³¹⁹ Kant elaborates: "Character requires first that one sets oneself maxims and then rules. But rules which are not delimited in maxims are pedantic when they constrain the self and disturbing and unsociable when they constrain others. They are the tethers of the immature. Maxims establish for judgment the case that falls under the rule."³²⁰ In novels, Kant complains, so much is made of goodheartedness, but that makes novels bad for character-building. "On the other hand, the most exacting precision in the distinction of that which belongs to the rights of man, and the highest dedication in the observation of the same builds character, makes a person not soft but upright [*wacker*], and leads to action."³²¹ "There is no virtue except in an upright heart, and no upright heart without the power of principles."³²²

This was a self-conscious therapy in the face of personal weakness and Kant made this known in his letter renouncing the offered chair at Erlangen. He wrote of his "weak physical constitution" whose "peace" he could only secure, even in "difficult circumstances," by remaining in Königsberg, among familiar places and persons.³²³ Kant gave similar expression to his fear of change in a letter to Marcus Herz from a decade later: "All alteration troubles me, even if it gives the highest promise of an improvement in my circumstances, and I believe I must pay attention to this instinct of my nature."³²⁴ That this therapy involved suffering and loss can be inferred from Kant's comments later in life about his longstanding struggle to overcome a hankering for death. It had its physiological origins in his narrow chest but its spiritual ones in his hypochondria and melancholy, and only his moral resolve, not any pleasure in life, overcame it.


Such a conversion experience or "rebirth," he avowed, was "unforgettable." Its cardinal property was renunciation (*entbehren*). Its great goal was peace (*Ruhe*). It withered the gallant *Magister* into the inexhaustible philosophical machine that generated the critical system. All it cost was joy.³²⁵ More fairly, what it cost was letting joy matter. His goal was to overcome melancholy, to "practice virtue with good humor. The more a person behaves with anxiety and gravity the more he proves that it [virtue] is not in keeping with his inclinations and that it is all a matter of coercion with him."³²⁶ We have all had occasion to admire the moral grandeur of Kant's vision. It seems that at least for once we must reckon what it cost him.

The conversion experience had taken place by the time Kant wrote his letter to Herder in May 1768, for he described in that letter the way of life he had chosen and invited Herder to emulate him in it.³²⁷ Stylistically, as Heller noted, the effect was marked. One must read the *Inaugural Dissertation*

(1770) in juxtaposition to the *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* (1766) not merely with the eyes of an epistemologist but with those of a psychologist.³²⁸ The abyss that yawns between them psychologically is wrenching. To see continuity between them is of course an interpretive prerogative that can always be adopted: no two texts by the same author—perhaps no two texts *at all*—are without continuity. But *difference* insists upon a hearing here—it makes all the difference in Kant's life.

Playfulness, wit, and humor were at his command. His lectures were the most entertaining talks. His mind, which examined Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, Crusius, and Hume, and investigated the laws of nature of Newton, Kepler, and the physicists, comprehended equally the newest works of Rousseau . . . and the latest discoveries of science. He weighed them all, and always came back to the unbiased knowledge of nature and to the moral worth of man. The history of men and people, natural history and science, mathematics and observation, were the sources from which he enlivened his lectures and conversations. He was indifferent to nothing worth knowing. No cabal, no sect, no prejudice, no desire for fame, could ever tempt him in the slightest from broadening and illuminating the truth. He incited and gently forced others to think for themselves; despotism was foreign to his nature.

—Herder, *Briefe zu Beförderung der Humanität*



A "Kantian of the Year 1765":
Herder's Conception of
the Project of Philosophy

Herder began with Kant; how much he stayed with him is the question.¹ It is not just a question of Herder's relation to Hamann, though that is a matter that has certainly not been settled.² Herder's studies in the English language with Hamann also entailed his absorption of British historical and literary thought. Kant's juxtaposition of Henry Home, Lord Kames, with Alexander Baumgarten on the philosophical possibilities of aesthetics was certainly from early on central to Herder's *Bildung*.³ More crucial, and decidedly under the auspices of Kant, were the two figures Rousseau and Hume.⁴ Beyond that there is the question of that triad the later Herder often invoked as his inspiration: Shaftesbury, Leibniz, and Spinoza.⁵ And, though they have not received the same attention, Bacon and Diderot will assume, by the close of this study, an important place in reconstructing Herder's project.

But Herder began with Kant, just when Kant was reading Rousseau's *Emile* for the first time, when Kant was plunging into the Königsberg social whirl, and when Kant was reaching out from the narrows of his provincial university to the nexus of intellectual energy in Germany, the Berlin Academy, by participating in its prize competition. There have been important efforts to sketch out these early years and their meaning for Herder; I revisit these matters with a vivid sense of my indebtedness to Rudolf Haym, to Bernhard Suphan, and to Wilhelm Dobbek, yet I believe that some revisionism is in order, especially in light of a substantial body of

misinformation that partisans of the two figures have propagated over the last two hundred years, largely obscuring their original relationship with the overlay of later and bitter conflicts.⁶

HERDER IN KÖNIGSBERG

Johann Gottfried Herder arrived in Königsberg in May 1762, a seventeen-year-old small-town boy, sensitive and reticent, for whom the city initially appeared overwhelming. If we have been disposed to look askance upon Kant's praise for Königsberg's cosmopolitanism, we need to remember that it was addressed to his students, most of them young men from the hinterlands of Königsberg, for whom this was in all likelihood the *best* and for some the *only* vantage on the wider world they could expect. For Herder, the first impression lingered for a lifetime, and he communicated it vividly enough to his fiancée a decade or more later that her reminiscences carry still the tone of his initial amazement.⁷

Born in Mohrungen, East Prussia, Herder came from a poor family that had managed to find him service with the rather pompous and overbearing Diakonus Trescho. At least this service also placed at Herder's disposal Trescho's library, which the young reader "devoured."⁸ Trescho was something of a writer, publishing with Kanter in Königsberg, and Herder managed to smuggle into correspondence from Trescho to Kanter one of his own poems, "Gesang an den Cyrus," which Kanter liked well enough to publish.⁹ Hamann took note of the poem, ascribing it to some "Hermes in Mohrungen" in a letter to Lindner.¹⁰ That literary connection proved fortuitous for Herder.

This learned, shy, oppressed young man had come to the attention of the Russian army surgeon assigned to Mohrungen during the occupation of the province, and it was this surgeon who took him under his wing, decided to get him a medical education, and brought him to Königsberg in the spring of 1762. Unfortunately, the first time Herder entered a surgical theater as an observer, he fainted. Medicine was out, for him. He had always been inclined to theology anyway.¹¹ That was unacceptable to his patron, who left him to his own devices.¹² The situation was grim, but Herder made use of his few connections. He turned to Kanter and to a school friend, Emmerich, who resided in Königsberg.¹³ Kanter welcomed him to his bookshop, though in all likelihood not as a formal employee, as some sources claim, since he already had the able Hartknoch as his assistant.¹⁴ Rather, this was a place where Herder could meet people, get his bearings, and do what he loved best: read. Again, we hear of his "devouring" books. Kanter intervened

with his friend, Kant, whose "False Precision" he was then publishing, to get Herder into the Albertina.¹⁵ There was some question of his academic suitability. Kant took the view that the admission policy required Herder to sit for an examination. Herder's friend Emmerich helped him arrange to be tested. Though Herder's personal appearance—both clothing and bearing—led the dean of the philosophy faculty to think the prospect hopeless, Herder surprised him with his learning, and so his way was opened to matriculate into the Albertina.¹⁶ The only problem was how to fund his studies. Here, again, the connections Herder was developing served him well. The very day after his matriculation he was hired at the Collegium Friedericianum (Kant's old school) as an *Inzipient*. He got free room and board and sixteen thalers per year (it eventually went up to fifty). The assignment of an *Inzipient* at the gymnasium was "to lead the students in their charge, and with whom they resided, in their religious devotions, to supervise their morning and evening study hours, and in general to keep order the rest of the time and on religious days."¹⁷ In addition, Herder applied for and received a scholarship from a foundation set up by Count Dohna for underprivileged students from Mohrunen. It also helped Herder's financial situation that Kant allowed him to attend his private lectures without charge.

Kant obviously recognized Herder early as a special student. Dobbek has suggested that Kant identified with Herder, a young man from an impoverished background, bright but naive, both academically and socially.¹⁸ Kant may well have identified with Herder's situation. In any event, the relation swiftly advanced from patronage to genuine friendship. Because so much misinformation got propagated later by the protagonists themselves and especially by their respective partisans, it is important to insist upon the special relationship that Kant allowed Herder. Equally, we need to underscore the idolization of his teacher that characterized at least the initial response of Herder. Too much effort has been expended to construe them adversarially from the start. They did become adversaries, without question. That can only be grasped properly, however, if we set it firmly in the context of the original, extraordinary sympathy between them. And that calls for a careful elaboration of the precise nature and limitations of that sympathy—from both sides.

It was August 21, 1762, that Herder first heard Kant lecture. He wrote that date down, as well as the topic of the lecture, "Pneumatology." From that day forward, Herder attended every course Kant offered, several of them more than once.¹⁹ He wrote of "daily" attending Kant's lectures, and if that is an exaggeration, it is not much of one, given the extent of Kant's teaching load and the enthusiasm of the student to attend. We have had

occasion to employ Herder's lecture notes to document Kant's thinking in the early 1760s. They are, of course, equally relevant for Herder's. What is important is the intensity of Herder's application to Kant's presentations. His college friend Karl Gottlieb Bock wrote how Herder "took note with excited attentiveness of every idea, every word of the great philosopher, then at home would rewrite his notes to order the ideas in a more adequate style."²⁰ What most fascinated Herder, who was himself beginning to teach, was Kant's pedagogical-rhetorical style. Haym, as with so much else, gets this exactly right:

What captivated him always and above all else was the style of delivery, the method of Kant, which to be sure could become particularly exciting in the more empirically oriented disciplines. Kant was the only professor in the whole university who was not for him a "pedant." What drew him above all in [Kant's] lectures was the liberty, the worldliness, the imaginativeness, the linkage of abstraction with the rich matter of the concrete. He saw and admired in Kant more the outstanding teacher of philosophy than the philosopher.²¹

So enthusiastic was Herder that he even tried to set Kant's lectures to verse, especially into that didactic poetical form that Albrecht von Haller and Alexander Pope had made central to the early eighteenth century, and for which Kant in those same lectures expressed his great admiration, most notably through recurrent citation. Herder once gave Kant a copy of the versified form into which he had rendered one particularly inspiring lecture, and Kant found this so outstanding that he read it aloud to the class.²² Years later, in the one letter Kant ever wrote to Herder, Kant reminded him of that poem and urged him to consider this form as the most appropriate for his own vocation.²³ By then, as we will see, Herder had a quite different sense both for poetry and for his own vocation. Nonetheless, this poetic exchange between student and teacher signaled an increasing intimacy.

Herder was explicit, at a time when he could well have suppressed the word, or regretted it, that Kant was not just his teacher but his *friend*.²⁴ Haym, again: "The teacher became the friend. Exegeses like 'On Being' in which Kant found his own ideas independently elaborated and spun out in new directions earned the student the right to talk through the content of the teacher's lectures personally, one to one. Often the conversations between them revolved around the favorite ideas of the latter."²⁵ Dobbek writes, "Herder became Kant's favorite student."²⁶ That special relationship that a professor has with a gifted student, which ripens into friendship as

mutuality increasingly displaces hierarchy, is especially potent when the professor sees the student as a likely heir to his ideals and projects. It is clear that Kant felt that way about Herder in those years. Dobbek elaborates: "Kant showed him great good will personally, indeed, treated him like a 'friend.' We hear of visits to his home, of going for walks together. He heard all of Kant's 'favorite opinions' many a time and talked about them with him; also his teacher would every once in a while share his ideas about his own lectures, indeed even give him manuscripts to read and ask for advice about them."²⁷ And it is equally important that Herder recognized and in a significant measure welcomed that transference. Kant was Herder's model—as a teacher and as a person: "the young Herder quickly took on as his model as well 'the elegant Magister.'"²⁸ That is the point of the Böttiger passage cited in chapter 3.²⁹ Herder himself wrote proudly to Lavater, in his opening letter to their correspondence in 1772, of his close personal affiliation with Kant.³⁰ Writing to Hamann on the eve of his departure from Riga, Herder called Kant his "best teacher."³¹

In this light let us peruse closely the two versions of Herder's famous description of Kant from *Briefe zu Beförderung der Humanität* (1795) for the concrete details of this bonding between student and teacher. I propose to comment primarily on the more extended version because it obviously has more to offer, but the nuances of phrasings in the published version will not be neglected. Herder begins: "From the years of my youth I remember with gratitude and pleasure the acquaintance and instruction of a philosopher who was for me a true *teacher of humanity*."³² It is crucial to stress this *humanism*, the idea of the *human measure*, as central to the experience of Herder in Kant's courses. Herder's idea of humanity goes back to the central concerns in Kant's moral-philosophical and anthropological ideas of the 1760s. As Dobbek puts it, "the turn which his teacher himself once made toward the *humanioribus* became for him a call for ceaseless 'human cultivation [*Menschenbildung*]' which from that point forward constituted the foundation and the impetus of his entire effort and work."³³ Haym too recognizes that Herder's commitment to the *Bestimmung des Menschen* was not something developed after or against Kant, but out of Kant's own work and with his encouragement.³⁴ Dobbek writes: "Kant's thought was aimed entirely at man, his place in the cosmos, his relation to his environment, his being and his obligation [*Sein und Sollen*]. Herder took all that up."³⁵ Later they *would* become estranged. Herder would read back even into these days the later systematic, transcendental Kant he disliked so thoroughly, and project a resistance on his own side, a flight to poetry or to Rousseau to escape the dreariness and oppressiveness of the metaphysical lectures.³⁶ But

we have no reason to take that seriously. What must be taken seriously is the mutual sense of betrayal of the later years. Margot Westlinning puts it well: Herder "saw himself, in any event, misled [*getäuscht*] in his expectation of a 'humanistic philosophy' by Kant, who would never forgive him this estrangement and later claimed that Herder owed everything to his own lectures."³⁷ Kant was not a systematic philosopher in the years 1762 to 1764—certainly not in the sense of Herder's *Kalligone*, and not even in Henrich's sense, for even the latter, as we have seen, described how Kant's system came swiftly to pieces.³⁸ Haym goes too far in his claim: "Led astray from Wolffian metaphysics by English empiricism [*die englische Erfahrungsphilosophie*], [Kant] found himself precisely at the time that Herder was his student, at the point of his maximal approach to skepticism." That goes too far, but only in the word *astray*. Haym is thoroughly correct in claiming, "The suspicion against dogmatic philosophizing was livelier in no one than in Kant."³⁹ This *moderate* skepticism, which Kant liked to term "zetetic," was taken significantly from Hume: or, at least, that was how Herder understood it, as is evident from his characterization of his former teacher's "Humean manner of philosophizing."

Liveliness was yet another aspect of the Kant Herder knew. We see the person of Kant, his bearing and his style, vividly recalled in Herder's evocation: "In the bloom of his life he was full of youthful ardour, and I believe that it will not desert him in venerable old age. His open visage, made for thought, was the seat of serenity."⁴⁰ This serenity that Herder perceived in Kant has been the object of some critical disputation. It is held that Herder misunderstood Kant, who was not serene by nature, but had to achieve this serenity by relentless self-discipline.⁴¹ I think this projects too much of the later Kant onto the earlier one, though there is an important truth there, which we have begun to explore and will take up still further. Kant appeared to Herder and to his other students and acquaintances of this time to be gracious, pleased both with himself and with the world around him. There was a "youthful ardor" about Kant then, though a different serenity, imposed by relentless self-discipline, was coming increasingly to displace it. The point is to see that Herder encountered and was shaped by the *first* of these phases. In 1768 Kant would invite Herder to join him in the second, and Herder would show no inclination to do so.⁴² But I do not believe it was at all Kant's design to project such an asceticism earlier. "[F]rom his eloquent mouth flowed pleasant speech, rich in thought. A joke, a witty remark, humour, he used them always to good effect and at the right moment, remaining serious amid the general hilarity."⁴³ That is, Kant in the classroom was the Kant of high society, the "gallant *Magister*." This is a point made

frequently, that Kant was in class and in conversation vastly more lively and entertaining than in his writings.⁴⁴ "His lectures were fascinating discourses; he would speak of an author and one could see his mind at work, probing further and further, and yet, in the three years I attended his lectures daily I never noticed in him the smallest sign of arrogance."⁴⁵ Herder was not alone. Already in 1762, Kant was known as the best teacher at the university. But he was not without critics and rivals. "He had an opponent, bent on proving him wrong, and he never paid him attention" (325). From the background we have of this period, this can only have been David Weymann. Hamann writes that Weymann dashed off a critique of Kant's *One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God*.⁴⁶ By academic rank, they were peers at the time. Kant knew himself to be vastly superior intellectually, however, and dismissed Weymann as a "cyclops."⁴⁷ In the guild context, Kant later had a chance to pay Weymann back where it really counted. An official query was directed to the Königsberg faculty concerning whether Weymann, who had been dismissed according to Frederick II's prohibition of the teaching of Crusius in Prussian universities, should be permitted to resume teaching (as *Magister*) at the University. Kant, an established Ordinarius, was among the majority who nixed the idea.

Probably the most famous lines in Herder's account had to do with the figures Kant discussed in his lectures.

I heard his evaluations of Leibniz, Newton, Wolff, Crusius, Baumgarten, Helvétius, Hume, Rousseau, some of them then very new names; it is remarkable that when he dealt with them his sole aim was a noble search for truth, a beautiful enthusiasm for everything that was best in man, a ceaseless, dispassionate desire to imitate what was best and greatest.⁴⁸

Here it is useful to juxtapose the revised version that actually appeared in *Briefe zu Beförderung der Humanität*.

His mind, which examined Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, Crusius and Hume, and investigated the laws of nature of Newton, Kepler, and the physicists, comprehended equally the newest works of Rousseau . . . and the latest discoveries of science. He weighed them all, and always came back to the unbiased knowledge of nature and to the moral worth of man.⁴⁹

In the first passage, the names are strewn together in a line, and what is stressed is the novelty of some (i.e., Rousseau and Hume). The revised

version articulates the list in two very interesting ways: first, a juxtaposition of philosophy with natural science, and second, a somewhat implicit discrimination between the *belles lettres* of a Rousseau and work in natural science. Hume is lumped with the German philosophers; the usage Kant had made of Crusius and Hume to critique the Leibniz-Wolff school draws no mention.

Even more important are the two characterizations of Kant's own pedagogical purpose with these figures. In the first version, Herder writes of Kant's "beautiful enthusiasm for everything that was best in man, a ceaseless, dispassionate desire to imitate what was best and greatest." That is, he stressed Kant's pedagogical modeling of *emulatio*. The thrust of such a style is to induce the student to take up and carry forward the endeavor: inspiration and enlistment. Herder was himself a magnificent instance of the success of this pedagogy. But the second version stresses instead *judgment*. "He weighed them all, and always came back to the unbiased knowledge of nature and to the moral worth of man." Herder here highlighted the key criteria upon which Kant built his entire course of instruction.

Equally decisive was Kant's pedagogy of *Selbstdenken*. In the first version, Herder wrote, "His philosophy provoked independent thought," and in the final version he wrote, "He incited and gently forced others to think for themselves; despotism was foreign to his nature."⁵⁰ Herder elaborated in the original version:

He did not know what intrigue was, sectarianism and prejudice were alien to him, he did not try to enlist followers nor did he strain to have his name on the lips of the young. His philosophy provoked independent thought, and I can think of no more efficient agency to this end than his lectures, his thought was borne before your eyes and then you had to develop it further: he had no patience with dictation, doling out information or dogmatic pronouncements.⁵¹

As one commentator put it, Kant was like a university in himself, in terms of all the fields he taught and incorporated into his thought. "Natural history and physics, the history of man and peoples, mathematics and experience were to him sources of human wisdom, from them he drew life-giving succor. To them he referred his listeners" (325). In the words of the final version, "He was indifferent to nothing worth knowing."⁵² Moreover, these fields "were the sources from which he enlivened [not only] his lectures [but also his] conversations." The Kant of the classroom segued naturally into the Kant of social intercourse: "his soul lived in society, and I can

still recall the friendly words of advice he gave me on that score when I was leaving."⁵³

Kant inspired Herder's reading, above all in Rousseau and Hume.⁵⁴ Indeed, so captivated did Herder become with Rousseau that he set a daily schedule for himself that commenced and ended with readings from the *Genevan*.⁵⁵ Rousseau inspired one of Herder's didactic poems in the style of Pope that he gave to Kant. Asked about this poem later by Scheffner, Herder dismissed it as the regurgitation of a belly too full of Rousseau, and he asked Scheffner to secure the poetic draft from Kant and return it to him if at all possible.⁵⁶ It would appear that he did so, for the text is in Herder's *Nachlaß*.

The critical issue is to ascertain what exactly Rousseau and Hume stood for in the minds of Kant and Herder in those days. And it is certainly unwise to presume that these images should have been unambiguous or unchanging. Herder began with an enthusiasm for Rousseau that was at least as strong as Kant's, but by 1767 he strove systematically to overcome it.⁵⁷ Rousseau and Hume were not the entire cast, however. Kant made Herder aware especially of the British moralists and literary critics, of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson and Home (Lord Kames). Indeed, so many of the authors that Kant recommended were British that the problem of translation became a pressing one. Kant could not read English. Herder did not want to suffer that disadvantage. In the spring of 1764 he began studying English with Johann Hamann.

Herder's relationship with Hamann proved at least as important personally as the one he had with Kant. The contested issue, with tremendous consequences for the reconstruction of the cultural history of the German eighteenth century, has long been whether Hamann "seduced" Herder into the "irrationalism" of *Sturm und Drang* (or, slanted the other way, "rescued" Herder from the "aridity and superficiality" of the *Aufklärung*). Haym set us on this unfortunate course (he liked the first slant).⁵⁸ Unger carried it forward (he liked the second slant).⁵⁹ The renaissance of Herder scholarship since the Second World War has been dedicated to getting rid of the slants. Emil Adler made a major effort in this line.⁶⁰ So have the many volumes sponsored by the Herder Society.⁶¹ It is now fairly well established that Herder was a true son of the Enlightenment.⁶² Herder strove for a naturalism that would free thought from the grip of religious inhibitions: "Ignorance, fear, and superstition, three sisters who have governed so many ages and peoples, once concealed by means of a sacred cloud many natural matters, the cause of which we are now able to explain without magic or miracles."⁶³ Now there is the risk of an excess of rectification, such that the *Sturm und Drang* threatens to vanish as a force in German cultural history, or at least

in Herder.⁶⁴ That is misguided. Herder helped create *Sturm und Drang*; it expressed his sentiments at a critical turning point.⁶⁵ Kant despised it, and Herder for spawning it. But all that happened a decade after the point we are trying to understand, a decade of enormous change in each of them, which is what this whole book is about.

What deserves to be stressed about the immediate impact of Kant and Hamann upon the Herder of the early 1760s is their striking compatibility. Ironically enough, Haym said it himself:

they linked up and collaborated in part in a remarkable way. Here as there the disciple was turned away from admiration of empty abstraction and scholastic precision onto the path of experience, of observation, of facts, and possessed by the impression of an unrelentingly rigorous honesty. Here as there he had recommended to him Bacon, Hume, Rousseau, Montaigne and Shaftesbury. The natural science and free command of ideas of the one was complemented by the literary sophistication and immediate intuition of the other.⁶⁶

While Kant did not share all of Hamann's literary tastes, both were formidable consumers of British novels. Richardson, Fielding, and Sterne were important for the Königsberg milieu of the 1760s, perhaps Sterne and *Tristram Shandy* above all.⁶⁷ Herder immersed himself in all this.

At the same time, Herder was an aspiring poet profoundly influenced by Klopstock, a theology student headed for the pulpit, and in constant contact with the unorthodox but intense born-again Christian, Hamann. The result was all-too-impassioned devotional poetry. One of Herder's college classmates recalls that Kant found the stuff pretty hard to take: "Back then [Herder] would submit to the Königsberg newspaper poems which for the most part contained something enthusiastic [*schwärmerisch*]. I recall that Kant once observed in connection with a Good Friday poem, 'Once the blustery genius gets pruned, he will, with his great talents, make a useful man of himself.'"⁶⁸ But if the poet Herder of this time was self-indulgent and uninspired, the critic Herder proved controlled and incisive from the opening installment. From his first published review forward, Herder showed this to be his real *métier*. Like Lessing, Herder was an "unpoetic poet" (*unpoetischer Dichter*).⁶⁹ Indeed, Lessing's name is apposite, here, because Herder was assiduously studying the great Berlin critical journals, *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend* and its predecessor, and they shaped his sense of the genre of criticism and its issues. His public literary career began, indeed, as the great commentator on these critics. His own realization about the

historicity of language and literature led him to recognize that his had to be an age dominated by prose, not poetry, and his own writing conformed to that historical "law."⁷⁰

Herder as *writer* will call for detailed attention. First, however, we must recall Herder as *teacher*. We need to consider Herder's own pedagogy—in practice and in theory. As it happens, Herder was an extraordinarily gifted teacher. Dobbek reports his phenomenal career at the Collegium Friedericianum: "With unusual speed he rose from *Inzipient* to teacher. First, in the winter term, 1762–63, he was given charge of instructing arithmetic in the 'German school,' but already the next spring he was entrusted with the third level Greek, French, Hebrew, and mathematics classes in the higher 'Latin school.' Thereupon in the next fall came Latin and Poetics in the second, as well as History and Philosophy in the first level."⁷¹ Herder dedicated himself not only to mastering his material and helping his pupils, but also to grasping the principles of education and finding ways to reform the clearly moribund curriculum of schools like the Collegium Friedericianum (90). This impulse for educational reform in Germany, in which the "Philanthropin" movement—led by Basedow and Campe—figured prominently, derived part of its theoretical inspiration from Rousseau, and that was certainly the case with Herder. The point not to be passed over too quickly is that it was Kant who stressed and inculcated just this aspect of Rousseau in the time Herder spent with him.⁷²

Kant wanted to create not epigoni but independent minds. In Herder he did just that. But he also equipped Herder with a whole mental arsenal. In Haym's words, "basically everything that he had of philosophy more or less carried the Kantian stamp."⁷³ That might be true in some sense, but not the way Haym proposes to interpret it: "thus Herder over the course of his entire life never got past that immature style of philosophizing that vacillated between two opposing streams [of thought]. A philosophical dilettante, he remained the empirical skeptic with idealistic needs that he had become under Kant's influence. . . . He was and remained, preponderantly, if to be sure with shifts in accentuation, a Kantian of the year 1765" (55). It remains to be seen whether Herder was a "philosophical dilettante," but in any event, we cannot allow the thinking of the 1760s to be written off as an "immature style of philosophizing."⁷⁴ That privileges the critical philosophy, as the NeoKantian Haym might be expected to do. Historically, privileging critical philosophy begs the question, and on two levels: that of the original moment and that of the history of reception. Haym's NeoKantianism is as dated for us as the "philosophizing that vacillated between opposing streams" of the 1760s seemed to him. To be true to our own philosophical

and hermeneutic theoretical requirements as much as to be true to the historical sources, we must "bracket" the claims to authority of the Kantian system itself. I wish earnestly to affirm Haym's famous claim that Herder was a "Kantian of the year 1765," but I dispute with equal adamance the presumption that this makes the position Herder embraced in the 1760s philosophically "immature."

Already in his student years Herder began to "think for himself"—as anyone who was at all attentive to Kant's teachings would. He thought for himself not only in the vein of literary criticism and "aesthetics," but also in what Kant was teaching him of philosophy. In that sense, if only in that sense, Haym was apt in claiming that all Herder had of philosophy bore a Kantian stamp. That was because it was Kant who taught Herder not philosophy but *philosophizing*. Herder did not just take notes; he challenged his teacher on the basis of what he understood to be Kant's most important insights.

HERDER AS INTERPRETER OF KANT'S PHILOSOPHY

From the beginning of the employment of Herder's notes from Kant's lectures—first as a vehicle for understanding Herder, and more recently as a vehicle for understanding Kant—commentators have stressed the "idiosyncrasy" of Herder's *intervention*.⁷⁵ Because Herder became a powerful, independent mind, there is a temptation to read that independence back into his student lecture notes, to consider him far more autonomous than the other names that have become affixed to lecture notes from Kant's courses.⁷⁶ I believe there are grounds for more historical-philological reserve on this question. Herder was still only a student in his late teens; moreover, he was awed by Kant. We need to take seriously the primacy of the receptive-mimetic moment and hold open the possibility that only gradually would he become critical-independent. When we juxtapose Herder's notes with Kant's corpus, as is the methodological requisite with all the other lecture notes, *are* there serious idiosyncratic distortions in Herder's notes when we compare them with Kant's contemporary publications, or with Kant's contemporary *Reflexionen*?⁷⁷ In chapter 2 I have demonstrated the substantial coherence of Herder's lecture notes with all the other Kant materials. This is not to deny a subjective coloration, but it does suggest that we should back away from our presumption that Herder's notes entail a substantial "revision" of Kant's own presentation. That allows us two important harvests. First, we discern the substantial role of Kant's own revisionism in the way Herder conceived the problems with contemporary German school philosophy. Second, we

can be far more precise about Herder's *real* departures from Kant's stance in his subsequent texts.

The crucial locus for consideration is Herder's early essay, "*Versuch über das Sein*," which he wrote while still Kant's student, in all likelihood in late 1763 or early 1764. Herder scholars have made this their point of departure for taking Herder seriously as an independent philosopher. Certainly Herder was striving to assert a voice of his own. But how independent should we really take him to be?⁷⁸ That is, does the language or argumentation of his essay depart significantly from those of the lecture notes?⁷⁹ There *were* real departures, but far more important is the massive *continuity* from Kant's "system" of 1762–1763 to Herder's essay. Biographically, I submit, it is hard to conceive how that would not be the case. It hardly compromises Herder's originality, and it gives us an important purchase on the impetus Kant's thinking of the time could impart to a brilliant and sympathetic student. What Herder carried forward, perhaps with the reckless enthusiasm of youth, needs to be retrieved as an impulse at least *latent* in the Kantian enterprise of the early 1760s. The Herder of 1762 to 1765 was not so much interested in *departing* from Kant as in *anticipating* and *participating* in his revisionist course. That included some constructive criticism, to be sure, and also some independent elaboration. As the young Herder saw it, the domain of investigation thrown open by the Kantian revision of philosophy was vast enough to leave plenty of material for each of them. Even Herder's signal departure from Kant proves illuminating, for it demonstrates that the path was thrown open by Kant's own insights, even if he ended up unwilling to pursue it.

The possibility exists Herder submitted his "Essay on Being" to Kant.⁸⁰ Certainly its opening "Envoi" (*Zuschrift*) gives rhetorical evidence of such a direct address.⁸¹ More importantly, it suggests a relation of deference that we should not pass by too swiftly. Calling himself "Epimetheus" meant ascribing to Kant the priority of the role of "Prometheus," in other words, Herder explicitly avowed that "the premises [of this essay] lie in your terms" (9). It is a bold student who submits to his teacher a critique of the latter's work, but a smart one who also claims that he is doing it in the teacher's own spirit and indeed on the basis of the best of the teacher's own ideas! If Herder did submit it to Kant, the reception appears not to have been favorable: "Kant seems to have become quite withdrawn [*ganz retiré*] towards me," Herder wrote to Hamann.⁸²

The essay was undeniably critical, for it implied that Kant was betraying his own most important insights in trying to formulate his *One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God*.⁸³ The thrust of the "Essay

on Being" was to intensify the critique of the central Wolffian position that formal-logical determinations can suffice for real determinations.⁸⁴ Kant had made this the core of his critique of Wolff-Baumgarten, and Herder pressed the argument relentlessly against his own teacher, who, in his view, was backsliding in trying to retrieve a proof of the existence of God by blurring the distinction between the certainty that arises out of the real ground of existence (*Überzeugungskraft*) and that which arises from a logical demonstration (*Beweiskraft*).

Certain rhetorical and contextual features of the text need to be highlighted. First, Herder often introduces the most important claims he wishes to make in the form of questions. That is a rhetorical vehicle to mitigate the reader's resistance that is particularly apt when the goal of the text is to coax the reader to revise views in which he or she is already deeply invested. This, once again, suggests the directness of the address to Kant. But the larger rhetorical ploy of combining sarcasm versus the philosophical guild with defense of common sense and ordinary knowledge was also a strategy of identification with Kant. Herder had heard Kant consistently disparage school philosophy not simply as theoretically erroneous but as practically arrogant and perverse. Herder charges that philosophy's reach badly exceeds its grasp, and we recognize in just this posture a crucial common bond between teacher and student: the reception of Hume's *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*.⁸⁵ Kant was the one who got Herder interested in Hume (though Hamann certainly nursed that interest later for his own ends), but the decisive question appears to be whether Kant shared Herder's unequivocal enthusiasm for Hume's position.⁸⁶ Hume's *naturalism* should give us pause. Kant was no naturalist—not as a precritical philosopher any more than as a critical one.⁸⁷ And yet, *at this moment* there was no one in German philosophy who was more skeptical than Kant, and what we need to retrieve as a historical fact is that at no moment was Kant closer to naturalism, or at least to an irreducible empiricism.⁸⁸ In short, Herder's text makes us ask more acute questions about how Kant taught Hume already in the period 1762 to 1764, and hence what Kant *thought* of Hume at that time.⁸⁹

Not only was Herder taking an adversarial stance toward Baumgarten and Wolff, but he was also walking very closely in the footsteps of Crusius and Kant (and Hume) in doing so.⁹⁰ Herder studied Baumgarten's *Metaphysics* starting in 1762–1763 as construed to the last detail by Kant, and that was hardly a transparent intervention! Kant was revising with a vengeance, and revising precisely in the direction of the unprovable givenness of the real, as we have seen. Only in the measure that we recognize Herder's reliance on

these philosophical mentors (*Gewährsmänner*) can we realistically assess what is his own philosophical achievement.

Herder situates his essay in the widest metaphysical frame—the question of knowledge of things in themselves, whose “effects” on sensibility form the starting point of Locke’s empiricism. With Hume (and Berkeley and the entire German philosophical tradition), Herder takes the Lockian theory of perception to lead inevitably to the view that epistemologically a “realist” empiricism cannot withstand skeptical critique.⁹¹ By contrast, idealism is philosophically irrefutable. (It should be noted that Kant made just this claim in the lectures Herder attended.)⁹² It cannot be proven that what is present to consciousness could not be itself the product of that consciousness.

But that raises the fundamental question: what *is* this consciousness, then? For Herder (as for Crusius), consciousness is inner sense, in other words, *self*-consciousness: the recognition of the contents of consciousness as *mine*, or what the Leibnizian tradition would term “apperception.”⁹³ It was just this that differentiated humans from animals, Herder claimed.⁹⁴ The issue between idealism and objective empiricism settled into the question of whether this *active awareness*, if I may use this locution, generated all its contents or not. Here Herder had recourse, as did all the philosophers of the rationalist tradition, to the conjectural notion of a divine intellect, which would literally be the sole and self-sufficient source of all its thoughts. Solipsism was a perfectly logical position—for God.⁹⁵ Thus, Herder observed, ultimately Being could only be God or the thoughts of God.⁹⁶ This was the Wolffian reformulation of Spinozist monism, expressed most accessibly in Moses Mendelssohn’s *Philosophical Conversations* of 1755.⁹⁷ Herder’s essay gives strong indication not only of his awareness of this text but of his conscious employment of its formulation.⁹⁸ He used that whole theological line of thought for its epistemological payoff in *juxtaposition* to human, finite experience. Herder, rather than dwelling upon the Spinozist monism that would become a central feature of his metaphysics after 1769, is concerned here to use it primarily as a foil through which to establish with greater precision the nature of human understanding. And the point is that humans cannot generate everything in their consciousness. In Kantian language, God might well have an intuitive intellect, but humans certainly do not. They are ineluctably presented with givens. That was the point upon which Crusius and after him Kant broke with the Wolffian school, and which Herder self-consciously adopted.

The essential point is, as Heinz argues, “Herder takes up the teaching of Kant and Crusius that we are compelled to think of existing things as bound

together in space and time and in interaction through force."⁹⁹ That is, for Herder the decisive point is that human finitude embroils us in matters of *existence* "behind which we cannot reach" (*nicht hintergebar*), as the Germans put it. Here Herder is working with the ideas associated with Kant's notion of *Realgründe* or Crusius's notion of material principles. His innovation comes in superimposing this decisive critique of the Wolffian system upon one of its most important presumptions, namely the continuum from obscure to distinct (indeed, adequate and intuitive) concepts.¹⁰⁰ For Herder, what Kant and Crusius identify as indemonstrable and unanalyzable notions must be taken to be *obscure*. But Baumgarten located the obscure in the sensual. Consequently, Herder reached a decisive inference: "Sensible and unanalyzable are therefore synonyms." Herder felt entitled to pronounce: "all my representations are sensible—are obscure—sensible and obscure having long since been taken as identical expressions." Human finitude, for Herder, expressed itself in just this immersion in sensibility. What he then pursued was the question of how to construe the *unity* in and through which the experience of the givenness of sensibility (inner and outer) presented itself: "the unity . . . under which the unanalyzable concepts and the material principles could be gathered and ordered."¹⁰¹ Herder asked his crucial rhetorical question: "is there *one* concept that is the most sensible of all [*einen allersinnlichsten Begriff*]?" (12). His answer is affirmative; it is the concept of *Being*. For Herder the claim that being is unanalyzable is identical with the claim that being is the most sensible concept of all (13).

There is a difference in the Herder essay, and a problematic one at that.¹⁰² The problem here is with too easy a slide from the *givenness of the real*, as Kant developed it in the lectures, to Herder's *certainty of being*, in other words, the determinate ontological notion of a simple, unitary reality (*being*), not the problematic question about the reality of a congeries of givens.¹⁰³ Kant, as a philosopher, aimed to problematize the relation between ontology and cognition (what we call epistemology); he resisted *both* the assimilation of the real into logic *and* any determinate pronouncement about the nature of the real. Here was the essence of that "zetetic" strategy Kant pursued: he delayed, because the matter was still treacherously complex from an epistemological vantage.¹⁰⁴ But Herder was nineteen. He saw the point Kant was making: philosophers thought they could produce reality with syllogisms, but reality was always already present. He plunged into its embrace. He called it "Being, most sensual of all," and affirmed its intimate presence as a "bodily truth" (*leibhafte Wahrheit*)—certain (*gewiß*) as a matter of acquaintance (*kennen*, not *wissen*).¹⁰⁵ There are two problems

with that: first, it is not clear that what Herder found present warranted his naming it "being."¹⁰⁶ Second, it is not clear that this presence is indeed *sensual*—much less "most sensual of all"—in other words, it is not clear that being as he conceived it was "bodily truth," nor is it clear what "bodily truth" is.¹⁰⁷

However, I propose it is less important to dwell upon these philosophical reservations than to emphasize the substantial impetus Kant's general philosophical revisionism gave to Herder's plunge, on the one hand, and on the other, perhaps even more critically, to recognize the extraordinary *methodological* fruitfulness for *empirical inquiry* that resulted from Herder's "sensualistic idealism."¹⁰⁸ Kant in both the metaphysical and the practical lectures emphasized the need to get back to empirical inquiry. The enormous metaphysical problems of the *Realgründe* only underscored the importance of registering the empirical "effects" upon which alone any reflections about their hidden causes could take place.¹⁰⁹ If ultimately Kant would be concerned with such metaphysical reflections, it is not unreasonable from his argument to assign an urgency and importance for the empirical study as well, especially when this was a question of knowledge of the subject of experience, humans, not just external nature. And behind Kant, there is no doubt that *Hume* was making just this summons.

At the core of "Versuch über das Sein" was a distinction that Kant had caused Herder to find fundamental—the difference between the force of proof (*Beweiskraft*) and the force of conviction (*Überzeugungskraft*).¹¹⁰ While he followed Kant in reckoning "objectivity" to the former and mere "subjectivity" to the latter, a privileging of the formal-rational that the whole thrust of his (and Hume's and Kant's) critique undermined, Herder nonetheless affirmed the validity of the certainty involved in the second form. "Being, as we have conceived it, no one has ever denied: the idea of doubting it came to over-sophisticated philosophers, and they then set about proving it," but this was arrogance and folly. "This certainty is native to us, Nature saved the trouble of philosophers proving it by giving us this conviction."¹¹¹ Baumgarten's efforts to derive being from nothing, and Wolff's efforts to derive being from possibility, were vain, and Kant had been (with Crusius) a foremost debunker of such enterprises (14–19). Herder felt that Kant should not have tried to achieve a similar derivation in his *One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God*.

Philosophers have questioned whether Kant was guilty of the same theoretical errors as Wolff and Baumgarten, as Herder charged.¹¹² That is, for my purposes, less important than the path Herder chose to break on the justified presumption that all logical derivation of existence was forever

foreclosed. Not only was it the case that "no one tries to prove a concept of experience a priori," but Herder took the more drastic position that all concepts—clear and obscure alike—*originated irreducibly* in sensibility, in other words, *all* concepts were empirical in origin. That was the crucial sense of Herder's claim that being was the "most sensible of all" concepts. It deserved this characterization because it was the *obscure* original *out of which* every other representation arose. "It is the first, sensible concept, upon whose certainty everything depends."¹¹³ The affirmation of being as sensibility compelled Herder to read the emergence of consciousness into lucidity (clarity and distinctness) as a *genetic* account grounded in and emergent from the obscure totality of being.¹¹⁴ Being deploys itself in the immediately subsequent material principles of space, time, and force. Herder calls these unanalyzable concepts, an interpretation that he gets directly from Kant, who in turn developed it out of Crusius. Herder reads them further as correlates of Hume's principles of association—contiguity, resemblance, and cause/effect.¹¹⁵ Most creatively, Herder seeks to ground them in the form of the senses themselves, in sight, hearing, and touch.

In the final analysis it is the drastic repudiation of the scientific status and disciplinary autonomy of philosophy that is so striking in Herder's essay. His assertion of an abyss between the existential and the formal-logical might appear an anticipation of the issue of Kant's transcendental logic of the critical period, but for Herder it preempts the very endeavor. Acknowledging the vanity of the claims of logic to prescribe existence, philosophy loses its strongest foundation as an independent science.¹¹⁶ Consequently, philosophy forfeits hegemonic authority and deserves to be merely the "handmaid of anthropology," since it is the latter that orients itself around "the natural certainty of existence via the senses" (867).

The question we must ask is, in what measure could Herder have believed that Kant would concur in this, or at least *should* concur in this? Could he so thoroughly have misunderstood or lost respect for his teacher that he would submit so scathing a dismissal for his consideration? Or could Herder have believed that Kant was *equally disillusioned* with philosophy as a discipline? When Herder made ironic gestures toward the whole guild of philosophy, were these strictly a matter of his own presumption or were they sallies modeled after what he had learned at the feet of his master? In the 1760s, how disillusioned was Kant not only with the possibility of metaphysics but with the academic discipline of philosophy? That question will occupy us further. But first we should survey briefly Herder's "thinking for himself" as he deployed it in his own early writings.

HERDER'S EARLY WRITINGS:
AESTHETICS AS THE BASIS FOR ANTHROPOLOGY

Herder believed literary criticism "should aspire to be what it was for the ancients, the voice of patriotic wisdom and the reformer of the people."¹¹⁷ As a "patriot," Herder was vitally concerned with the creation of a German national culture.¹¹⁸ The backwardness his generation felt in relation to Western Europe represented a burning motivation for his work. "Why have the sciences and arts not yet attained more, and what could provide their spirit with freedom and inspiration to raise it?"¹¹⁹ The situation, as he perceived it, was dire: "We are laboring in Germany as in the days of the confusion of Babel; divided by sects of taste, partisan in poetic art, schools of philosophy contesting one another: no capital and no common interest, no great and universal reformer and lawgiving genius" (95). While Herder never quite put himself forward as this reformer and genius, he did see himself as "a writer who can depend upon himself. I wish to produce for the other thoughts, have images appear in him, create ideas in him, provoke in him sensations—not however merely tell him *my* thoughts, stuff my images into him, parade my sensitivities before him. I want to awaken *geniuses*."¹²⁰ And he did.

In his *Fragments on Recent German Literature* (1766–1768), Herder developed two themes: "the investigation of language as the basis of all literary and cultural life, and the relationship between German and other national literatures."¹²¹ Germany and its language, though at the beginnings of national-cultural creativity, belonged to a civilization in which already prose and philosophy had established preponderance over poetry, and hence it was to the former spheres that the talent of Germany should devote itself: to *aesthetics*—a form of *philosophy*—not poetry, or at the most, to a didactic poetry.¹²²

Herder originally envisioned his *Fragmente* in four parts, surveying the "four provinces of literature": "language, *aesthetics*, history, and philosophy are the four provinces of literature, which reinforce each other mutually, and which are all but inseparable."¹²³ Our question is how Herder came to envision his domain of investigation so widely, and how he proposed to carry it through.¹²⁴ In "On Diligence in the Study of Several Learned Languages" (1764), Herder gave expression to his vaunting humanist ambition: "I seek to join the thorough English temperament, the wit of the French, and the resplendence of Italy with German diligence. I encompass the spirit of each people in my soul!—Rewards sufficient, I think, to rouse our diligence in the study of many languages."¹²⁵ For Herder there is a direct correspondence

between language and the mentality of a people {33}. "The *genius* of its language therefore is also the genius of a nation's literature. . . . Without its language, therefore, you cannot attain a view of a people's literature."¹²⁶ Herder self-consciously situated his notion here in the context of Johann Michaelis's prize-winning essay for the Berlin Academy, *Beantwortung der Frage von dem Einfluß der Meinungen in die Sprache und der Sprache in die Meinungen* (1760), and Mendelssohn's review of that work.¹²⁷ This connection opened out into the wider European concern with the problem of the origin of language and its implications for anthropology.

Herder's conception of language was not just formal but genetic-historical: "These four classes of poetry are the four ages of humankind: the first feels, the second thinks mechanically, the third invents, and the fourth thinks through freedom. . . . First live, then feel, then act, and finally think and die! That is the ladder of humankind and of its subjective poetic gift."¹²⁸ In the historical reconstruction of cultures, this principle held: "Thus the first genius is guided entirely by feeling in composing and judging, the middle genius is guided by taste, and the third genius by higher learning" (49).

When Herder left Kant's tutelage in November 1764, he came away with the idea of an ideal inquirer, "a three-headed 'genius,' equally at home in history, philosophy, and poetry."¹²⁹ For Herder, the need for the three-headed genius, the "triceps," arises from the nature of interpretation: "the *poetic philologist* must also be a *philosopher*, so that he may master the spirit of the nations around him, and find within these shells of particular instances the core that nourishes" (50). As he writes in another essay, "when philosophy is guided by history, and history is inspired by philosophy, it becomes twice as entertaining and useful."¹³⁰ That is, "Since we read everything with *participating concern*, the history of humankind is for us humans the most appropriate, the most important, and the most pleasing subject."¹³¹

Having established to his own satisfaction the irreducibility of sensibility to logic from his study of the German school-philosophical tradition with Kant, Herder proposed to approach that domain under a new conception of empirical psychology.¹³² For Herder, "aesthetics," that "new science" that Baumgarten had named and set the frame for, constituted the essential project. "We do not yet have a complete *aesthetics* of poetic art, and even less a whole metaphysics of the *fine arts*. The great *Baumgarten*, the real *Aristotle* of our time, unfortunately has not provided it, and except for him I know only minor contributions."¹³³ From 1765 his plans to develop this "science" were firmly in place.¹³⁴ The essential impulse was to advance beyond what in Baumgarten was still preponderantly a *poetics* to a full-fledged *aesthetics*, in other words, to encompass all the fine arts. Baumgarten's

immediate successors—G. F. Meier and especially Johann Sulzer and Moses Mendelssohn—had already criticized Baumgarten for his restrictive actualization of what his own thinking implied. Herder proposed to achieve what remained unfulfilled in Baumgarten's project. But like Baumgarten, Herder saw this project not primarily as an investigation aimed *at* the objects of fine art but rather *through* them at the mysterious nature of human subjectivity. "In the sensibility of my soul, in fantasy and taste, feeling and passion, how chaotic everything stood there! And if just in this obscure depth my entire feeling for the beautiful and the good were to lie: o, then let there come a *Montaigne*, a *Rousseau*, a *Locke*, a *Home*, with their insights into the soul to explain and to flesh out for me Baumgarten's psychology."¹³⁵ In his recourse to foreign authors for insight into empirical psychology, Herder carries out an agenda that Kant himself had set forth in the lectures on practical philosophy (we noted this agenda in an earlier context).¹³⁶ That continuity suggests the decisive impulse from Kant toward the supplementation of Baumgarten's approach. But also quite important for Herder was Moses Mendelssohn; in the latter's *Über die Hauptgrundsätze der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften* (1757) Herder found (and cited with approbation) the line: "If the philosopher is to follow the trail of sensations down their dark path, he will need new perspectives on the soul which he would otherwise never have discovered by rational deduction or experience."¹³⁷ Mendelssohn pioneered drawing in foreign resources to carry forward Baumgarten's project.

As Herder developed his views in his "Plan zu einer Ästhetik," his sources for a counter-theory of the aesthetic to Baumgarten would be Rousseau and Reimarus for the theory of the senses and Kames and Hutcheson for the theory of sensibility (*Empfindung*).¹³⁸ Again, Herder specified a *sequence*, a genetic-historical (*ontogenetic* as well as *phylogenetic*) approach: "Man, the animal, first *feels himself obscurely*, then vividly, and pleasure and pain obscurely in himself, then pleasure and pain clearly outside himself, and only then does he recognize/know [*erkennt*]. That is how the subjective order of the beautiful should be studied" (670). The proper matter of aesthetics is feeling, not concept, he maintained (676). He understood the science of aesthetics, in Gaier's words, as "an anthropological discipline which builds upon the 'depths of the soul' which school philosophy is precisely incapable of representing."¹³⁹ The notion of "depths of the soul" (*Grund der Seele; fundus animae*) was articulated by Baumgarten in the *Metaphysica* (§311) as the complex of "feelings, emotions, sensations, confused representations" (*Gefühle, Affekte, Empfindungen, verworrenen Vorstellungen*) (1253).

What Herder proposed to do was to access this not from the vantage of logic, which he found a hopeless and backward endeavor, but rather via

physiology, drawing on Rousseau, on Reimarus, and on Krüger (1258). Herder understood that logic was the governing discipline within philosophy, and he felt that it was the great weakness of the school philosophical tradition that it would not relinquish this vantage in approaching the problem of sensibility.¹⁴⁰ His quarrel with the whole "Baumgarten school" of aesthetics, in other words, with the Berlin intellectuals who followed up on the ideas of Baumgarten and Meier and tried to work out a theory of sensibility—preeminently Sulzer and Mendelssohn—was that this approach was fatally flawed.¹⁴¹ "The more the teachings of philosophy approach experience and the subjective category of being, the more certain they may indeed become, but also the more inexplicable; and the irreducibility of aesthetic principles appears to increase to the degree that they descend to the sensation of the beautiful. . . . it deals with the most delicate experience of *sensibility* rather than general principles of reason."¹⁴² For an alternative approach he turned to those who tried to reconstruct human response from a physiological psychology, usually in juxtaposition to animal response. "One must investigate how much the vocation of man is determined by nature."¹⁴³ Here was the decisive opening for the *médecin philosophe* from France.

At the same time, the key for Herder was his new "capacity to grasp matters genetically in their historical individuality."¹⁴⁴ This program entailed a search for origins: "it is not only pleasing but also necessary to search for the origins of matters that one wishes to understand with a measure of completeness. Lacking the origin, we obviously miss a part of the history, and how importantly does history serve the explanation of the whole, especially the most important part of the history from which, in the end, everything is derived; for, as the tree may be derived from its root, the progress and flowering of an art must be derivable from its source."¹⁴⁵ On the other hand, "[f]or the most part, the origin of human achievements is for us cast in darkness, and we grope nowhere as blindly as when we pursue the question, *How and in what manner did something come to be?*" (71). He elaborates: "No invention came to be *at once*; in the beginning it was not what it was to be; it was unremarkable . . . thus, it was not taken note of in the beginning, because its future greatness was not anticipated" (72–73).

Only when something is established does it come to attention. Thus, Herder discriminates the cognition of man from that of putative divinities: humans "signify things not as they are produced but as they appear to us," whereas "a completely philosophical language would have to be the talk of gods who were present to see how the things of the world took shape, who witnessed their essence in its condition of becoming and emergence, and thus in each name of a thing grasped it genetically and materially."¹⁴⁶ But for

humans, "how difficult does the history of inventions become! A number of causes worked together, alongside and following one another so secretly that even the inventor himself often could not account for them, not even after his creative fire had subsided, allowing judgment to join feeling." The historian feels "called upon to dig into the urn to search in the ashes of death for the germ cell which once gave rise to a living creature."¹⁴⁷ It is little wonder that "philosophical novels" seek a priori to invent the story of such origins: the historical task is just too difficult (82). It was this sort of philosophical fiction that Rousseau practiced, and from which Herder had to free himself, as he was challenged to do by the powerful review of his *Fragmente* by Christian Garve.¹⁴⁸ That is, Herder had become too enamored of the analogy of historical development to the stages of life. As he put it in the *Fragmente*: "this is the cycle of all things. So it is with each art and science: it sprouts, it blossoms, it flowers, and it withers.—So it is with language."¹⁴⁹ Garve persuaded him of the limitations of such analogizing for the complexities of historical human cultures.

This much Herder never repudiated: "The finest flowering in the youth of language was the age of the *poets*" (106). From Hamann, Herder had come indelibly to appreciate "poetry as the mother tongue of peoples."¹⁵⁰ "It is true, indeed, as stated *unanimously* by *all* ancient authors, though little use has been made of it in recent books, that poetry arose to its *greatest* heights *long before there was prose*, but that subsequently prose dispelled poetic art, and that the latter, *ever since*, has been unable to attain its former height."¹⁵¹ In the conclusion of the first collection of the *Fragmente*, Herder returns to his theme:

As long as a language is not yet a book language, but the language of song, it has a wealth of images and the most exalted harmony. As it becomes the language of civilized people, it gains a greater wealth of political expression, but the exalted harmony and the fullness of the images are toned down. As a *book language* it becomes richer in concepts, but the poetic harmony turns into prose; the image becomes parable, the vivid, *ringing* bywords disappear. As a *philosophical* language it becomes precise, but impoverished; it loses synonyms and does not esteem images and harmony. *Poetically*, a language is most consummate *before* it is written; philosophically, when it is written *only*; it is most *useful* and *convenient* when it is both spoken and written. [160]

Thus, Herder insists upon the temporal/historical priority of poetry over philosophy: "Philosophers came forth quite late in time; they themselves

hailed from poets, they spoke in the language of poets; they derived their wisdom from poets and from common life."¹⁵² He criticized the philosophers—even Kant—for striving for a totally univocal language.¹⁵³ That might serve philosophy, he argued, but not culture as a whole, and certainly not the creation of a vibrant German national culture. The latter task called for the "triceps" of history, philosophy, and poetry. *Anthropology* became Herder's umbrella term for this, and he pronounced it philosophy's legitimate successor.¹⁵⁴ Herder believed it was essential to historicize philosophy. Already in 1766 he wrote: "Every philosopher sees from a [particular] vantage point. How depressing to have to demonstrate that historical knowledge occasions a philosopher no disgrace."¹⁵⁵ Such a historical hermeneutic would be his ultimate contribution—to philosophy.

HERDER'S SITUATION IN RIGA

The first two "collections" of the *Fragmente* appeared in 1766, though they were dated 1767 on the title page. The third "collection" appeared in 1767, and a revised version of the first two parts appeared in 1768.¹⁵⁶ While all were published anonymously, Herder was not able to keep his identity secret, and he became widely known and quite controversial in German letters. If Herder found warm reception in the circle around Friedrich Nicolai in Berlin, he found a fiercely hostile reception in the circle around Christian Klotz in Halle. While from our vantage, Klotz has shriveled into nonentity, at the time he was an imposing figure, churning out Horatian odes in Latin and, in his journal reviews, holding every German author up to a fixed ancient standard in a manner that would perhaps even have given pause to Boileau. He was as vindictive as he was pompous. In the first collection of the *Fragmente*, its anonymous author had made it quite clear how unproductive he saw such imitation of the ancients in general, and subsequent collections disputed Klotz by name. Klotz made it his business to find out who the anonymous author was, and to cause him as much mischief as he could, not least by exposing his identity.

The result was a literary war—"yet another" of so wearisomely many in the German eighteenth century—between Herder and the Klotz camp. While, to be sure, Herder's style of thought seemed at this juncture to require some text or author to play off, much of this literary polemic is pointless to modern readers because his targets are so far beneath him and their demolition seems hardly worth the effort. Already permeating the later versions of the *Fragmente*, war with Klotz became the center of Herder's next literary enterprise, his *Kritische Wälder* (1767-1769). He wrote four

volumes of this work, publishing three. Of these, the second and the third were devoted entirely to disputes with Klotz (the first had a more worthy object: Lessing's *Laokoon*). The fourth and most profound never came to publication in Herder's lifetime, though it ended up formulating some of Herder's most important insights into aesthetics.

The immediate provocation of Herder's *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen* was the work of Klotz's disciple Friedrich Riedel, especially his *Theorie der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften: Ein Auszug aus den Werken verschiedener Schriftsteller* (1767). Riedel had identified three major trends in aesthetics hitherto: Aristotle's derivation of genre rules from analysis of works of art; Baumgarten's scholastic psychology; and Kames's literary criticism. Riedel found fault with all of them, but for the most part he privileged Kames and denigrated Baumgarten. In his view, common sense, conscience, and taste were simply unanalyzable attunements to the true, the good, and the beautiful, respectively. Accordingly, Riedel preferred Kames, with his emphasis on immediate observation and experience, over Baumgarten, with his effort at rational derivation. Herder found Riedel's position philosophically naive. He scorned Riedel's cavalier stipulations as mere wordplay. He complained: "The obsession to talk about the fine arts has beset Germany especially."¹⁵⁷ Such *schönwissenschaftlich*—belle-lettristic—rhetoric evaded the earnestness of philosophical inquiry. Riedel and his mentor Klotz were exemplary of a vulgar superficiality that had no right to object to the strenuousness of German academic philosophy, because it did not even grasp what was at stake.

Thus, we find Herder taking up the defense of school-philosophical *Gründlichkeit* against dilettantish *schönendenken*. There is a powerful irony about this text, for Herder's castigations of Riedel and his method read astonishingly like those that Kant would make of Herder himself some few years later at the height of the *Sturm und Drang*.¹⁵⁸ Just that same lack of depth and rigor, of clarity and distinctness in thought, for which Herder condemns Riedel (and Klotz) would seem to Kant to be Herder's great weakness in his writings of the *Sturm und Drang* (and, with less justification, in subsequent writings as well).¹⁵⁹ This disposition to fault others for being too "literary" and superficial seems to have been a pervasive trope of the polemics in the German *Aufklärung*, not least to be discerned in a national-cultural condescension toward the French.¹⁶⁰ But the problem was deeply imbricated in German discourse. Thus, Baumgarten himself, as Herder observed critically, confused a science of the beautiful with a beautiful science, in other words, an art of thinking beautifully (*ars pulchre cogitandi*).¹⁶¹ Even Kant got entangled in these questions in his *Observations*

when he conceived of a "beautiful understanding," which he associated with women and which he upheld in a certain measure against a pedantic and graceless form of male thinking.¹⁶² Mendelssohn, too, had made it clear that philosophy was not doing itself any favors in neglecting altogether the question of grace of presentation and accessibility.¹⁶³ We have discerned in the Herder lecture notes that the Kant at least of the 1760s believed that philosophy did have both the possibility and the obligation of seeking such elegance, notwithstanding his self-righteous denial of all this later in the critical period.¹⁶⁴ The issue of the place and the purview of the *schönen Wissenschaften* was pivotal in the confrontation of popular philosophy with school philosophy, of anthropology (aesthetics) with metaphysics.¹⁶⁵

In the *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, at least vis-à-vis Riedel, Herder aligned himself with philosophical rigor against "thinking beautifully," and he mounted a sustained defense of Baumgarten against Riedel's critique. Indeed, Herder went so far as to claim that there was nothing Kames added to the grasp of empirical psychology that had not already been worked through by Baumgarten.¹⁶⁶ In another context, however, Herder had given the palm to Kames over Baumgarten on precisely these grounds: "*Home's Principles of Criticism* . . . deserve the name aesthetic more than the whole opus of Baumgarten."¹⁶⁷ But Herder believed that only a synthesis of both approaches (supplemented by an exposure to Greek cultural achievement) could achieve a complete aesthetic or anthropology: "these [Home's] principles enhanced by the psychology of the Germans, and at the same time traced back to *that* people [the Greeks] which remained most faithful in its principles of beauty, whether in art or in science, to the experience of nature; after the natural sensibility of that people to have 'beautified [*bellenisiert*]': that would be an aesthetic!" (694). Herder's great synthetic life's work lay precisely in this direction, but he could not break through to it while he remained in Riga.

Herder's obsession with preserving his anonymity betokened a weakness in his own nature, a crack in his self-image that lets a shaft of light deep into his psyche, exposing his existential anxieties.¹⁶⁸ These mounted fiercely in Riga, not least because Herder felt the exposure of his authorship was irreconcilable with his office and social status in that city.¹⁶⁹ The result was first a severe depression and finally a desperate effort to escape. Evidence of this depression, crisis, and longing for escape is particularly vivid in a letter Herder sent to his friend Scheffner in Königsberg: "My almost melancholy way of thinking these days makes everything difficult for me, and me difficult for everything. The place where I live, my place in society [*Stand*], my work, the people with whom I am to socialize: all of these are vexing to me."¹⁷⁰ He complained, "The character of a scholar has no charm for me,

and the best *human* situations—for socializing, for friendship—I have had to learn to do without, and to have to live the best years of my life without their pleasure" (357). Accordingly, Herder believed he had to escape, and he vowed that he would seize any opportunity "to become acquainted with more lands and people. This alone will stimulate me; nothing else" (356). The combination of precocious scholarship, premature professionalism, and prejudicial publicity, as Herder explained with good self-discernment in his *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, had made his identity in Riga unbearable.

Herder's first response to this gathering crisis was the thought of going to Berlin to work in the circle around Friedrich Nicolai, for whose *Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek* he had already become a regular reviewer. Herder wrote to Nicolai (February 19, 1767): "Berlin is the first place to which I wish [I could go], and I have associated myself with Berlin scholars because the spirit of that place has a sympathetic effect on me."¹⁷¹ In an effort to establish himself in that circle, which he called the "Baumgarten school" and among whom he had admired most the late Thomas Abbt, Herder came up with the idea to write a "memorial" for three German writers too early carried off from life: Abbt, Baumgarten, and (the theologian) Heilmann.

Of this entire project, the only piece he published was the first part of his "Torso on Abbt." The fragments he composed on Baumgarten are important but need separate treatment. Nothing ever seems to have been written on Heilmann. As he worked on this project, the Klotz war intensified. Somehow Klotz and his cronies were able to obtain proofs of Herder's revised version of the *Fragmente* before its publication. Not only did they violate his anonymity, but Klotz published a review denouncing Herder's work before it even went to market. With that provocation, the second part of Herder's essay on Abbt got overrun with polemics against Klotz, making it impossible to continue. Herder was at a dead end. When the opportunity arose to leave Riga on a journey to the West (originally Denmark, and ultimately France), Herder seized it. The result was an *Umwälzung* in Herder's career perhaps even more profound than Kant's in that same fateful year, 1769. The ocean voyage and the disturbing experience of France helped carry Herder to a more mature and less encumbered perception of himself and of the cultural situation in his native land. The result would be an extraordinary literary breakthrough upon his return.

ABBT AS A MODEL

In Riga, Herder was seeking models for his own self-constitution as a writer. If there is a figure after whom Herder explicitly seemed to model himself,

next to Kant, it would seem to be not Hamann but Thomas Abbt. The model of Abbt became a powerful vehicle for that figuring of himself that Herder conducted while still clinging to anonymity. He never met Abbt, nor did they exchange correspondence. While Herder became aware of him early in Abbt's publishing career and commented on his work both publicly and privately from the mid-1760s, it was only after Abbt's sudden death in 1766 that Herder conceived the plan to write an extensive reflection on Abbt's work. The degree to which his characterizations of Abbt read like self-reflections has struck more than one reader, and it would appear possible that Abbt represented a model that Herder could be assured would neither change nor challenge his construction, a safe surrogate through which to affirm the identity he craved.¹⁷²

Thomas Abbt became famous for his text *On Death for the Fatherland* (1761), composed in contemplation of the casualties and rationalizations involved in Prussia's Seven Years War.¹⁷³ When Lessing withdrew from participation in *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend*, Abbt became his replacement, writing some of the most important reviews for that journal. These were initially mistaken—even by readers as discerning as Herder—for having been composed by Lessing himself. It turned out that much of what Herder found most worthy of comment in the *Briefe* came from Abbt's pen.¹⁷⁴ Thus, as Herder learned of Abbt's involvement in the *Briefe*, his interest in the latter intensified. In particular, that interest was galvanized when Abbt and Mendelssohn took different sides, in the pages of the *Briefe* in 1764, on the famous question of the *Bestimmung des Menschen* formulated by Spalding. Abbt's sudden death little more than a year later eliminated the possibility of a fuller personal relationship, but Herder made up for that in taking upon himself not only a retrospective evocation of Abbt's work but, several years later, in taking the position in Bückeburg that Abbt had held.

In the first "collection" of his *Fragments*, Herder already greeted Abbt as a model German stylist: "Abbt's writings, for the Germans, are original; the wholesome *common sense of the man and the citizen* prevailing in them is the heritage of our nation; the analytical unraveling of concepts is the finest method of German philosophy; the *character* of his writing, teaching through *history* rather than French symbols and examples constructed in the British manner, sustains our spirit, and his style nourishes our imagination."¹⁷⁵ Abbt, like Herder, conceived the situation of Germany in the 1760s as requiring a turn to popular philosophy. He made this call in 1763 in the context of a review of Johann Süßmilch, in letter 245 of the *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend*.¹⁷⁶

Herder's "Torso on Abbt" is a remarkable celebration of the popular

philosopher in which there was, as one commentator has aptly claimed, as much a projection of Herder himself as a characterization of Abbt.¹⁷⁷ "One can justly call him a writer for *mankind*, and a *philosopher of the common man*: a title which is quite rare and in my eyes worthy of honor."¹⁷⁸ Germany thronged with too many writers possessed only of book learning for whom the designations *man* or *citizen* were off-putting. It would be too easy, Herder averred, to compose yet another fashionable satire on scholars; instead, he proposed to extol a writer for the world. Abbt's first great publication, *Vom Tode fürs Vaterland* (1761), "was not written by some professor from Frankfurt on the Oder; it is by a man who felt in a human way, who thought like a citizen, who wrote as a subject [*Untertan*]" (582). He did not need to emulate Rousseau's vanity, smearing every other author in order to sanctify his own stature as a "writer for mankind" (582). But he deserved to be crowned for his wisdom, "because he calls his philosophy back down to earth, writes for mankind, and is not ashamed of his own" (584). Herder elaborates: "For him the foremost grandeur of spirit is not in speculation but in sublime, active concern for the people" (582). He reminds readers that Abbt in the pages of *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend* had early been an advocate of "philosophy for the citizen" (*Weltweisheit für den Bürger*), praising the Swiss for their leadership in this vein (584). In the preface to his own work, *Vom Verdienste*, Abbt claimed to have sought no more than to "lay before his readers *healthy common sense*." In Abbt's view, this was the most useful application of philosophy, to improve "*judgments about matters of common life*."¹⁷⁹ How lucky for Germany, Herder comments, to have "one writer of this genre, which in the most noble and holy sense of the term can be called *studium humanitatis*" (584).

Abbt's sense for historical method also attracted Herder's interest. "Everywhere in Abbt's works moves and flashes a historical spirit, which seeks to enliven every one of his philosophical ideas and situations through *history*: on this he philosophizes, from this he offers proofs" (586). But perhaps the most important impact of Abbt on Herder came from Abbt's role in the famous controversy with Moses Mendelssohn regarding Johann Spalding's celebrated eighteenth-century best-seller, *Betrachtung über die Bestimmung des Menschen* (1748 et seq.), as it burst upon the public in the pages of *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend* in 1764.

THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE *BESTIMMUNG DES MENSCHEN*

Johann Spalding published his *Betrachtung über die Bestimmung des Menschen* originally in 1748 as a slender, elegant meditation on the meaning of

life. Its "extraordinary acclaim" was a function of the moment of the publication as much as of the elegance of the formulation. Already in 1766, when the text was into its eighth edition, Herder in *Fragmente* pronounced Spalding a "classic" of the new German literary scene.¹⁸⁰ As Horst Stephan notes, "it formulated in an altogether classic way the direction of the German trends of that moment, in particular as against the contemporary materialism of La Mettrie."¹⁸¹ It was, in the words of Alexander Altmann, "one of the most noble testimonies of the rational faith of the philosophy of the enlightenment of the eighteenth century."¹⁸² But just at that moment in midcentury, this rational faith was coming under stringent challenge, in no small part from materialists like La Mettrie. Spalding clearly saw himself defending theological rationalism against the likes of La Mettrie, and this background is essential to the reception of his text.¹⁸³

Spalding sought to set forth in a clear, sequential presentation the rational development of a conviction of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. Rather than resorting to authority or public opinion, Spalding suggested, the issue of what to do with one's life was so important that it was "up to me myself to inquire into the correct path" (a wonderful instance of *Selbstdenken* as the motif of *Aufklärung*).¹⁸⁴ He formulated a crude version of the "stages on life's way" that would become a tour de force in the hands of Søren Kierkegaard in the next century.¹⁸⁵ The argument began with the claim that the life of the senses, of epicureanism, could not be fulfilling to a rational subject.¹⁸⁶ Just the emptiness of merely aesthetic gratification motivated a thinking person to ask whether there was a higher point to life, and this led to a recognition that there was a whole ethical dimension for which he or she was uniquely destined. This carries the reflective person into the regard for intersubjective obligation, a realization that he has "feelings [*Empfindungen*] of the good and of order which were not formed by my mere will and which my mere will cannot dispel."¹⁸⁷ Here Spalding came quite close to a Kantian line of reasoning, as Altmann recognizes.¹⁸⁸ Indeed, Kant consistently expressed the highest esteem for Spalding and for this work in particular, and one senses immediately in the text a pronounced affinity of views between the two figures.¹⁸⁹

The core of Spalding's argument, and the source of much of the contention about it in the reception literature, was the move from the ethical to the religious dimension. Spalding draws lightly on the physico-theological argument that a reflecting person would discern the hand of God in the order of the world, but his main thrust is ethico-theological. Specifically, Spalding proposes that the experience of virtue unrewarded and vice triumphant in this world must occasion in a reflecting person the expectation that this

injustice will be remedied in another world. Spalding claims that not only the sense of the injustice of this world but also of the infinite potential for development that the rational person feels in himself leads inevitably to the insight that "I am formed as for another life."¹⁹⁰ The whole argument is couched in universalist, timeless terms. No sense of historical or cultural contingency clouds Spalding's vision. But objections would be registered to this, along with the other aspects of his presentation. Resewitz, in his review of the seventh edition of the *Bestimmung* in 1764, suggested that Spalding's major argument derived from Francis Hutcheson, and indeed, the latter was one of the most powerful exponents of the view that the injustice of this world was a proof of immortality and reward or punishment in the next. But Resewitz registered his disaffection from this line of reasoning by calling it a "philosophical romance" and asserting that he found the sort of fiction of Henry Fielding far more realistic.¹⁹¹

The review of the seventh edition of Spalding's "classic" for *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend* in 1764 catalyzed the decisive controversy about the text between Abbt and Mendelssohn. Abbt had submitted a review that he wanted Nicolai to publish, but Nicolai had already commissioned and received from Resewitz the review that actually appeared in the journal. Abbt was not satisfied; he wanted his objections to be taken into account. In a letter to Moses Mendelssohn in January 1764, Abbt expressed his strong reservations against the position Spalding presented. Mendelssohn, who admired Abbt intensely, found himself challenged to defend Spalding, whose views he found thoroughly to his taste. The resulting epistolary controversy culminated in the publication of their respective stances in the July 1764 issue of *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend*, an event that was received immediately and has been regarded historically as one of the most significant moments in the intellectual debate of the German *Aufklärung*.¹⁹²

Alexander Altmann has situated this debate in an illuminating manner in the context of a long-standing project of Mendelssohn. Mendelssohn wanted to update the Socratic arguments for the immortality of the soul articulated in the *Phaedo*.¹⁹³ This project was already clearly formulated in his correspondence with Lessing from 1760. Indeed, Mendelssohn was fascinated with the question of the historical Socrates and his eighteenth-century German reception, as is evidenced in a series of reviews he composed on this topic over the early 1760s. In his important review of Hamann's *Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten*, he gave notice that he did not find the Socratic arguments for immortality in their original formulation convincing, but that they could be updated and made so. He applied himself to just this undertaking from July 1762 to July 1763, drawing heavily upon the recent

philosophy of physical science articulated by Roger Boscovich [conservation of matter, law of continuity], as well as the "Achilles of rational arguments," the claim for the simplicity, hence indestructibility, of the soul.¹⁹⁴ This argument was completed by November 1763, when Mendelssohn sent a text of what would be the first of the three dialogues of his *Phädon* (1767) to Iselin in Bern. It was to be a contribution to the publications of the Bern Patriotic Society, which Iselin had invited him to join. (The text was not published in that context, because the Patriotic Society dissolved itself by 1765.) What all this suggests is that Mendelssohn was quite deeply immersed in the problem of the immortality of the soul well before he received the challenge of Abbt's letter of January 1764. But what Altmann shows is how profoundly that challenge shaped the remaining two dialogues of Mendelssohn's 1767 classic.

While both Spalding and Mendelssohn felt thoroughly comfortable with the notion of a divine providence that not only manifested itself in this world but also gave guarantees for the next, Abbt could find little reason for such optimism. Already in a letter to Mendelssohn from November 1762, Abbt had expressed the anxiety that a consideration of human history was arousing in him. "I begin to hate history," he wrote. "What kind of world is this? What can be said about the vocation of man?"¹⁹⁵ The decisive trigger to Abbt's *crise de conscience* was his reading of Johann Süßmilch's *Die göttliche Ordnung in den Veränderungen des menschlichen Geschlechts aus der Geburt, dem Tode, und der Fortpflanzung desselbigen erwiesen* (2d ed., 1761), which he reviewed critically in *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend* (letters 245–250, 1763). Süßmilch claimed to be able to rationalize even infant mortality in terms of divine providence. Abbt would have none of it. Indeed, the issue of infant mortality became one of the linchpins to his resistance to the idea of divine providence. But the argument was more general. Despite Süßmilch, Abbt was convinced that there was no way that human history, as contrasted perhaps with physical nature, could confirm divine order. Instead, it thronged with chaos and injustice. A view of the history of the human race, Abbt was convinced, proved anything but consoling about the vocation of man. This was the line of argument he deployed both in the review he submitted to Nicolai and in his letter of January 1764 to Mendelssohn, and it became the basis for his published formulation, "Zweifel über die Bestimmung des Menschen," in *Briefe* (1764).¹⁹⁶

In "Zweifel," Abbt called upon the ghost of Pierre Bayle to fortify his skepticism against a Providential sense of the history of mankind. Bayle had maintained that history showed nothing more than the crimes and injustices of person against person, a line that was taken up by Voltaire

and the chorus of historical pessimists of the Enlightenment.¹⁹⁷ But behind Abbt's gloomy invocation of the irrationalities of the human past was also an impulse toward a consistent ethical naturalism, the demand that men take responsibility for their own lives and fates without any hope for or recourse to external (divine) redemption.¹⁹⁸ Against Spalding's profession to discern infinite potentialities in man, Abbt opted for a more Lockian approach to human self-recognition, one that was empirical in the two crucial senses of contingency and finitude. At the same time, he resisted Spalding's too ready dismissal of the sphere of sensibility in human experience. But the most pointed form of his objection was his denial that the injustice of this world—that virtue went unrewarded or vice unpunished—represented any form of *proof* of another world in which this injustice would be redressed. That was only a pious hope, and Abbt insisted that only *revelation* could uphold it, never reason.¹⁹⁹ (Abbt invoked revelation, as his readers immediately perceived, just as ironically as Hume invoked miracles in support of such faith.) He formulated a grim parable about the human condition in terms of an army finding itself in hostile territory with no sense of what it had been sent to accomplish, so that each soldier had to make his separate peace with the situation. Abbt's parable showed a world in which, to quote W. B. Yeats, "the best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity."

That was the case Mendelssohn had to answer. He tried to do so in "Orakel, die Bestimmung des Menschen betreffend," published alongside Abbt's "Zweifel" in *Briefe* in 1764.²⁰⁰ Abbt was not convinced, despite Mendelssohn's invocation of the spirit of Leibniz to warrant the harmony of the world, of which the vocation of man to immortality and restitutive divine justice were natural consequences. Mendelssohn persisted in correspondence with an unconvinced Abbt through the summer of 1766, promising the latter a definitive response in the form of a published version of his *Phädon*.²⁰¹ But Abbt did not live to see it, dying suddenly in November 1766. As Herder aptly observed, Mendelssohn's *Phädon* was in a real sense his memorial to his lost friend. After the publication of *Phädon*, Herder took up Abbt's side of the argument and, indeed, *radicalized* it.²⁰² He first criticized Mendelssohn's position in a letter to Hamann from November 1768. In that letter he proposed to add a fourth dialogue to Mendelssohn's three, defending Abbt's skepticism.²⁰³ Shortly thereafter, Herder wrote to Nicolai expressing his strong reservations over the *Phädon*, and proposed such a fourth dialogue as a possible review contribution to Nicolai's journal.²⁰⁴

Herder had never been convinced by Spalding's original argument against sensibility. In an important, if brief, commentary on Spalding's work, presumably from the mid-1760s, Herder—like Abbt—insisted that the

question of the vocation of man needed further specification as to whether it referred to individual destiny or to the destiny of the whole species. One could certainly reflect on the question of how one should live one's life apart from having to reach any conclusion about the destiny of the race as a whole. But his main concern lay with Spalding's underestimation of sensibility: "Senses are *the dominant drives, the dominant ends*."²⁰⁵ There are times in one's life when their use and enjoyment are necessary.²⁰⁶ Indeed, Herder adds, there are ages and peoples for whom this is a sufficiently worthy undertaking. In place of Spalding's other-worldly vocation, Herder proposed a sketch of his own:

The Vocation of the Sensible Man

- α) he enjoys; he does not *think*
- β) what cannot be, he does not *wish* for
- γ) he does not *hope*

Therefore he does without [*entbehrt*] many—and [especially] all *fine*—pleasures and pains. I believe I can find here a complete vocation.²⁰⁷

From such a vantage, it is apparent that Herder would take Abbt's side against Spalding and Mendelssohn. In April 1769, in a long letter, Herder sent his objections to Mendelssohn directly. Where Mendelssohn claimed that the vocation of man is the "*elaboration of all the capacities of the soul according to divine intentions*," Herder opted for a resolute naturalism. "In all of living creation," he wrote, "we see no trace of *upward striving* [*Aufstreben*], *steps in a ladder*, etc., but we do see the striving for persistence [*Fortstreben*], and this *striving for persistence* is a kind of circulation of delight [*Kreislauf des Genusses*]. Everything persists in the same being, develops in response to *different* purposes of determination according to the *stage of life*."²⁰⁸ Herder could not conceive how one element of nature could be "more perfect" than another, one stage in a life more "perfect" than another. He rejected this whole sense of teleology: "I see in no creature or man an *elevation* [*Aufsteigen*], I see a change, a circulation which consumes itself and returns into itself" (137–43).

Herder argued further that there was no rational proof of the soul surviving the body, no argument that could justify rationally our knowledge of a disembodied spirit at all. All that man could know was this life: "All five acts are in this life," he put it to Mendelssohn. "In our nature there is always more specific mass of animal nature than of pure spirit" (138). It was not that Herder denied the existence of the soul, even as a spiritual substance. What he denied is that it could exist apart from some physical

instantiation. Mendelssohn was quite happy to concede that point, as his responding letter indicated: it was consistent Leibnizian doctrine that no finite spirit could exist without a body.²⁰⁹ But he was much less willing to accept Herder's implication that only this world mattered. For his part, Herder was not willing to allow Mendelssohn's all-too-spiritual conception of human development. Mendelssohn stressed the elaboration of the powers of the soul, but Herder insisted that the soul was always embodied and that the vocation of man had to take this unity into account.

Again, sensibility had to receive its due, against the overweening idealism of the Leibniz school. The issue was metaphysical: Mendelssohn was comfortable with Leibniz's windowless monads in preestablished harmony. Herder, having now studied Leibniz closely, followed Kant in opting for a "physical influx" theory. Body and soul were inseparably interactive; through the senses the soul became a nexus of time, space, and force. The soul acquired all its determinate capacities contingently from its experience of the world, and that whole constellation was tied to the physical form in which that experience occurred. There could be no carrying forward into another life. If there was any persistence of the soul, it could only be a "palingenesis," without any transfer of individuality. That completely undermined any notion of reward and punishment in the next life and, as Abbt had already suggested, thrust the entire question of the meaning of human life back upon the individual's existential situatedness in this world. If Herder was already strongly of this view in his first letter, composed just before he left Riga, his second letter, sent to Mendelssohn from France, reflected the full radicalization of his viewpoint that literal sea-change had wrought, shocking Mendelssohn with its adamant sensualist naturalism to such an extent that he broke off their correspondence. That break was symbolic: it betokened the calving of "anthropology" from (German school) philosophy.

HERDER'S APPRAISAL OF KANT IN THE 1760S

Kant was not far from Herder's consideration in the Riga years. His name appeared in Herder's first *Fragments*.²¹⁰ It appeared frequently in his correspondence, especially with Scheffner.²¹¹ Scheffner wrote that he would have asked Kant to review Herder's *Fragments* for Kanter's Königsberg newspaper (Scheffner had succeeded Hamann as editor), but that Kant was "too lazy!"²¹² Obversely, Hamann earlier had it in mind to invite Herder to write the newspaper's review of the academy prize texts of Kant and Mendelssohn.²¹³ Herder was quite concerned about the scarcity of reviews of Kant's work,

which he clearly regarded as of major importance. "Kant's writings . . . have not nearly been reviewed as worthily and extensively as they deserve, and Moses [Mendelssohn] without a doubt failed to understand Kant in his *Proof of the Existence of God*."²¹⁴ We will have occasion in the next chapter to consider Herder's own review of Kant's *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, a work in whose composition he was personally embroiled.²¹⁵ But Herder's most important comment on Kant from this period is in a text composed in 1769 and intended for publication as the fourth *Kritisches Wäldchen*; neither author ever saw it in print:

May I here make a little detour in order to mention a philosopher of the grand and the sublime who in these latter genres is particularly worthy of reading. Kant, altogether a social observer [*gesellschaftlicher Beobachter*], altogether the cultured philosopher [*gebildete Philosoph*], takes up as his field of observation in his treatise on the beautiful and the sublime also specifically the plastic [*bildsame*] nature of man, the social side of our nature in its most delicate colors and shades. The grandeur and beauty of man and human character, and temperaments, sexual drives and virtues and finally national character: that is his world, in which he finely observes to the finest nuances, analyzing finely down to the most hidden motives, and establishing finely even many a particular idiosyncrasy—a thorough philosopher of what is sublime and beautiful in mankind, and in this human philosophy a Shaftesbury for Germany. How is it then that this little text with such a rich content is so much less known and recognized than it deserves? The *Literary Letters* thought about it, but passed it over.²¹⁶

This passage is the strongest possible evidence for the perception of Kant that Herder cherished as late as 1769, even after the only exchange of letters between the two figures had already begun to reveal the differences of their orientations.²¹⁷ That exchange, too, we will reserve for a later chapter. Here I wish to invoke a little-known text from Herder that I believe best captures the entire spirit of the decade as Herder saw it, and within that, his indelible impression of the Kant of 1765, to whom his allegiance never wavered.

HERDER'S "WIE DIE PHILOSOPHIE ZUM BESTEN DES
VOLKS ALLGEMEINER UND NÜTZLICHER WERDEN KANN"

Long languishing obscurely in Herder's *Nachlaß*, "Wie die Philosophie zum Besten des Volks allgemeiner und nützlicher werden kann" gives remark-

able expression to those impulses of *Aufklärung* in the 1760s that galvanized around *Popularphilosophie*, "patriotism," and "publicity," even as it throws great light on the relationship between Herder and Kant in the 1760s. When Herder wrote this essay, he was no longer Kant's student in Königsberg but a preacher and teacher in Riga, embarking upon a literary career of his own. He left Königsberg on November 22, 1764, ending direct personal contact with Kant. In a letter to Hamann of April 23, 1765, Herder announced that he had for some time been totally absorbed in working out some of his "favorite ideas" on the score of how to make philosophy more general and practical for the good of the people. The essay was never completed (indeed, its ambition opened out not only on Herder's lifework but the entire project of Enlightenment in a virtually Habermasian sense!).²¹⁸ Still, enough got set to paper to make this a remarkable document of *Aufklärung* in the 1760s generally, and one particularly illuminating on the reception of Rousseau's thought by Kant and Herder.

The essay needs to be situated in relation not only to its immediate occasion but also to a larger context. The specific incitement was the announcement of a prize competition by the Patriotic Society of Bern, entitled precisely: "How can the truths of philosophy become more general and practical for the good of the people?"²¹⁹ Note that what Herder edited away was precisely that philosophy *had* such "truths." He proclaimed himself in this regard a Pyrrhonist.²²⁰ That suggests an important recourse to Hume.²²¹ But in the wider context, there were actually discussions afoot in the Germanies to do away with the universities altogether!²²² At two points in his essay, this drastic "political" alternative gets evoked. The first passage goes, roughly: either these philosopher-troglodytes have a treasure in their caves, which they ought to be sharing with the rest of us, or they do not, in which case they are useless and their caves should be destroyed. In more civil language: either universities should be teaching-oriented or they should be shut down. The second states: "So press on, o people, into the holy places of philosophy, tear down all the idols, and build there statehouses."²²³ Indeed, the whole essay takes for granted, as its opening line suggests, that academic philosophy is under attack (104). While he rejects such drastic political intervention, Herder nevertheless aligns himself with the "point of view [which] is the most useful, and the one most appropriate to our economic-political epoch" (107). That point of view belongs to the political experts (*Staatskundige*) Herder identifies with the "friends of humanity [*Menschenfreunde*]." He insists on the terms of the Bern query—serving political progress. So he reformulates the question: "How can philosophy be reconciled with humanity and politics so that

she can really be of service to them?" (108). For Herder this is not and should not be a merely theoretical question. "O, is it not thus a task for everyone who has German blood in his veins and a German philosophical bent to develop this patriotic theme[?]" (108). Far from reading this as unsettlingly "nationalist," we must hold open the possibility that in *its moment* this was politically progressive, "patriotic" in a quite affirmative sense.²²⁴

The most radical conjunction I would like to evoke between Herder and Kant in this text comes in the striking line "the state must be reformed from below."²²⁵ To be sure, many of the phrases—and at this point, Herder is down to outline phrases, not continuous text—derive from the political theory of Rousseau, but one can wonder whether Rousseau was optimistic enough to really take such a view in practice. As Gaier observes, this is "an extremely interesting political position in the year 1765."²²⁶ He means this for Germany, which is assuredly true, but it is also true for France, where reform from above was still the preferred strategy among the *philosophes*—including, I might suggest, Rousseau himself.²²⁷ If Herder learned of such radical ideas in Germany in the early 1760s, I suggest, a most likely source was Kant. The *Remarks in the "Observations"* offer us hints of a conception of moral and political reconstruction that is in many ways far more optimistic and radical than the ideas of Rousseau that inspired this political vision. Kant would show a little of this side of himself in the 1780s, and a great deal more in the 1790s, in the context of the French Revolution.²²⁸ In the 1760s, however, Kant withheld himself from any public expression of this engagement.

Herder turns to the appraisal of philosophy in each of its branches, arguing that it has precious little value even for scholars, much less anything worthy of sharing with the people. He castigates philosophy's "borrowing [out of weakness] from mathematics" by which it "really lost its own soul."²²⁹ Here Herder is gesturing, of course, to the conflict between the mathematical and the metaphysical approaches that had climaxed in the philosophical debates of the early 1760s. In particular, Herder is harsh on the teaching of academic logic, which he accuses of dulling rather than enhancing human ingenuity (111). More, he calls it a hypostasis of empirical psychology, bad metaphysics. Yet, crucially, Herder does hold out for a proper empirical psychology as a "logic of wit . . . a logic which *is still uninvented* in part because it is harder than our rules of reason since it has to bring order into imagination and sensibility" (114). That Herder shows sympathy here for Leibniz's project of a "logic of induction," and more generally for

an *organon* of creativity, shows that Herder still holds out some hope for a properly reconstructed philosophy.

Herder flatly denies that the people need philosophy to teach them morality. "Morality, if it is to be philosophical, can remain nothing more than a metaphysics of will" (117). Indeed, in Herder's view the pursuit of moral philosophy has little to do with fostering actual moral practice, and may well be a distraction from it. Humans are moral not on principle but "by the voice of conscience," which, as apostrophized by Rousseau, is a natural endowment of mankind.²³⁰ Herder situates this voice entirely in *feeling*, and he continues: "the minute a feeling becomes a principle it stops being a feeling."²³¹

If neither logic nor moral philosophy hold any value for the people, metaphysics is equally problematic. It is, however, irrepressibly connected with curiosity and this impulse cannot be stilled in humans. To it we owe our science, our advances, but also our follies and our vanities. "Our curiosity is thus hardly an unqualified good" (119). There are mysteries better left unsettled, Herder suggests, invoking the ubiquitous metaphor of the veil of Isis. Besides, philosophizing has been a fruitless war of sectaries with precious little advancement: "our history of philosophy is a fairy tale" (120). The problems posed are simply beyond human grasp: "Who would dare take on the Humian wrangle over the commerce of bodies?" (121). Of course, the *bulk* of Kant's metaphysical work up through the Prize Essay was about exactly that, but the point is that it seemed—even to Kant himself—to have come to nothing by 1765. The more philosophy pushes in a metaphysical direction, the more it arouses appetites that it cannot fulfill. Taking up this classic theme of Rousseau and locating it precisely in the sphere of metaphysical speculation, Herder writes: "as soon as our soul extends beyond the limits of need, it becomes insatiable in the desire for superfluities" (113). Philosophy, Herder writes with biting irony, is surely something perfect, only it has little to offer for mere humankind or for citizens of a polity (112).

An annihilating indictment of academic philosophy! And yet, I would suggest, one intended to be *in the spirit of Kant*! Herder invokes Rousseau as his star witness: Rousseau, a "great philosopher," argued that it is in the best interests of the people of a state *not* to desire the development of philosophical intelligence.²³² Herder continues: "it will take equally great philosophers to put into play, after extended endeavors, a negative logic . . . that will bring the people back to the sources of sound common sense" (114). Could Herder have thought *this* was what Kant was about? That is, was

Herder under the impression in 1764 to 1765 that Kant was a philosopher of "negative logic," debunking the pretensions of the philosophy guild for the sake of the practical improvement of the people? And is this so unreasonable a conception of Kant in that exact historical moment?

A Kantian connection is confirmed by the dialectical reprise with which the essay climaxes: "Only philosophy can be the antidote for all the ills into which philosophical curiosity has plunged us" (122). This is the essence of Kant's redemptive (mis)reading of Rousseau.²³³ Philosophy has to come down from the heavens and take up human causes, Herder urges; it must become "immediately useful for the people (a philosophy of sound understanding)." ²³⁴ Moreover, it is not the state or the people who can judge such an enterprise, but only the philosopher: "the philosopher himself must determine his utility (he is his own high court): he must ask after the human being, the patriot, the philosopher in himself." A great philosopher can "give the thought of others a [higher] tone without trying to absorb them into his guild" (125). To do that he has to put the interests of mankind at the center of his concern, and thus inform his style of teaching. Here Herder invokes Rousseau's *Emile*, to be sure, as his *textual* evidence, but I think we must also register that there was a living *practice* that informed this ideal agenda, the practice of Immanuel Kant. If Herder writes, after Rousseau (and Hume), "form not a philosopher until you have formed a human being," I think we need look only to the glowing praise of his former teacher Herder wrote some thirty years later to see that Kant fits the description.²³⁵ This is the essential meaning of the famous characterization of Herder as a "Kantian of the year 1765."²³⁶

Thus, Gaier sees a direct line from the argument Herder makes in "Versuch über das Sein" to the position he develops in "Wie die Philosophie."²³⁷ It was in this little essay that Herder proclaimed the agenda that would govern the second half of the eighteenth century, not only for him but for a substantial cadre of his countrymen and indeed all of Europe: "what new fruitful developments would not arise if only our whole philosophy would become anthropology."²³⁸ Herder called for and enacted "the reduction [*Einziehung*] of philosophy to anthropology."²³⁹ What Herder envisioned, as Gaier aptly phrases it, was: "a science that would take its point of departure from human beings and ask after the limitations and possibilities of their knowledge and action."²⁴⁰ In Herder's lapidary phrasing: "Philosophy will be drawn back into anthropology[,] modified according to the categories [*Gattungen*] of people."²⁴¹ That is, philosophy would dissolve into social science.

Could Herder's scathing contempt for philosophy in this essay, and his demand that it renounce its presumption and get back down to earth

and empirical inquiry, the "science of man," be consistent with his image of Kant? If we look at Herder's notes from Kant's courses in metaphysics from 1763-1764 and his 1764 notes from Kant's course on ethics, I believe we can find several indications that rather withering remarks upon the condition of academic philosophy passed from the lips of the master himself. That is certainly substantiated by consideration of Kant's correspondence, his *Reflexionen*, his *Remarks in the "Observations,"* and by that most problematic of Kantian texts, early or late, the *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*.

If, however, the credibility of the witness simply cannot be shaken, but the story or the testimony that he gives contradicts reason and experience in the highest degree, then the question arises, do we have to give approval to his assertion in this case and, as it were, deny our reason, or not? Answer: The best thing is neither to reject the cognition nor to accept it as true but instead to postpone one's approval until one has more grounds for or against it.


—Kant, *Blomberg Logic*

Satire never improves anything, so even if I had the talent, I would make no use of it.

—Kant, *Bemerkungen in den "Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen"*

Among friends everyone can talk about himself, for the other always takes what is said as if it applied to himself. In society or among mere acquaintances [*Freunden nach der Mode*] one must never speak of oneself (not even in books) unless one wants to say something that will be laughed at.

—Kant, *Bemerkungen in den "Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen"*



Kant's Crisis of Professional Identity: The Calling of Philosophy and the *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*

*I*n *Freedom and the End of Reason*, Richard Velkley claims that when Kant acknowledged that Rousseau "set him right" about his intellectual arrogance, this betokened a democratic turn of mind that would govern his social, political, and moral attitudes thenceforth.¹ "Kant after 1764-65 is constantly reflecting on how the ultimate end of reason, with its moral character, determines all uses of reason."² Elaborating this line of thought, Frederick Beiser argues that Kant's encounter with Rousseau occasioned "a complete revolution" in Kant's orientation, a redefinition of his project with metaphysics as "a science of the limits of human reason."³ After 1765 Kant believed that "the end of reason should be practical rather than theoretical, so that it serves humanity rather than fostering vain and idle speculations." The end of reason became grasping and fulfilling "the vocation of man."⁴

In his pathbreaking study of the *Remarks in the "Observations,"* Josef Schmucker noted: "This new orientation to man and life naturally brought with it the necessity to sort out his relation to his own profession."⁵ In *Remarks in the "Observations"* Kant said the task of the scholar, and in particular the philosopher, was to address "what it is the most important concern of man to know, how he is to comprehend and to fulfill his place in creation, what a person must be, in order to be a human being."⁶ As Kant put it in another crucial passage: "If there is any science that man has need of it is one that teaches him to fulfill properly [*geziemend*] the station to

which creation has assigned him and from which he can learn what one must do in order to be a human being."⁷ Taking as his model for the teacher and scholar the ideal articulated in Rousseau's *Emile*, Kant pronounced "the scholarly estate the most superfluous of all, for mankind living in a state of simplicity, but the most indispensable in the condition of oppression by superstition and violence."⁸

Dieter Henrich and Josef Schmucker have made the noteworthy claim that in 1765 Kant could have written the first two parts of what eventually appeared in 1785 as the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*.⁹ Why didn't he? More generally, why did he publish so little on ethics, on history, on culture, and on politics until so late? Why did he publish his *Anthropology* more than twenty-five years after he began teaching it? Why was Kant unwilling to publish anything in the domain of political theory until close to the end of his life, though, again, he began much earlier (1767) to offer lectures in this area?¹⁰ If we take seriously Rousseau's influence on Kant's redefinition of philosophy's mission; if it is indispensable for the philosopher, just because people find themselves oppressed by superstition and violence, to help them grasp how to be human; if indeed the task of Enlightenment is what Kant himself would profess it to be in 1784, what was Kant's hesitancy?¹¹ If, further, we take him up on his paradoxical claim about the public and the private uses of reason, how can it be that Kant restricted himself to the "private use" when everything Velkley, Beiser, and others seem to be arguing is that he should have gone public?¹² It turns out the answer is not so simple. The traditional answer, along the lines of what historians of philosophy term "internal" explanations, has been that it was not possible to elaborate practical philosophy without *completing* the project of theoretical philosophy.¹³ Velkley cites Kant's *Reflexion* 6612, which he dates to 1769: "The practical sciences determine the worth of the theoretical. . . . But in execution the theoretical sciences must be first."¹⁴ The epistemological status of our experience of freedom demanded theoretical resolution before the actuality of freedom could be articulated. I propose to add some nuance and complexity by extending our consideration to "external" factors. I wish to explore what might well have been a crisis in Kant's relation to the discipline of academic philosophy, not just in his view of the foundational warrant of metaphysics.

It is clear that Kant thought about and taught a great deal that he did not publish. How are we to reconcile Velkley's claim with the rather different impression created by Kant's admission to Mendelssohn: "I believe many things with the clearest possible conviction . . . which I will never have the courage to say?"¹⁵ What difference intruded between teaching and writing?

Even that does not put the case with sufficient force, for Kant *meant* to write about and publish these things. The strongest evidence we have of this is his 1765 letter to Johann Lambert in which he announced he was at work on two studies, "Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Philosophy" and "Metaphysical First Principles of Practical Philosophy."¹⁶ But when he set himself to the task of composing these, what came out was *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*.

Josef Schmucker makes a great deal of the fact that *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* was not a text Kant had planned to write, but he does not really ask the most significant question about this inadvertency, namely the one about Kant's psychological motivation.¹⁷ Frederick Beiser argues that *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* was Kant's "crowning work" of the decade, "complet[ing] the program set down in the remarks to the *Observations*."¹⁸ That is excessively sanguine. It is not at all obvious *what Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* signifies.¹⁹ Ernst Cassirer long ago posed the question as follows: "Which was the author's true face and which the mask he had assumed? Was the book just a passing by-blow of free humor, or was there concealed behind this satyr play of the mind something resembling a tragedy of metaphysics? None of Kant's friends and critics was ever able to answer this question with certainty."²⁰ As Alison Laywine puts it, "there is little doubt that *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* is a distinctly strange production; the question is why."²¹ Laywine maintains that "an adequate account . . . would have to explain [among other things] how passages in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* can be reconciled with related passages in other works of Kant or in his correspondence" (15). That will be our program.

What was Kant's notion of metaphysics in 1765? In that year he confided unwisely to Johann Kanter that he was just about ready to publish a book establishing the proper method for metaphysics. Kanter immediately advertised *The Proper Method of Metaphysics* by Immanuel Kant in the official Leipzig book catalogue for that year. Of course, Kant had no such book ready for the press. Yet, as Eckart Förster has suggested, we have a useful resource for imagining what Kant might have *published* as "The Proper Method of Metaphysics" by considering what he announced for that very year (1765–1766) as the proper method for *teaching* it.²² Kant's *Announcement* of 1765 still identifies with the position he expounded in the Prize Essay, the *analytic* approach to metaphysics of the system of 1762–1763.²³ Kant announced that his insight into the failures of the traditional synthetic method in metaphysics encouraged him in the hope that "I shall be able in the near future to present a complete account of what may serve as the foundations of my lectures [in metaphysics]" (294–95). That was the same rash prospect

he admitted, in his letter to Lambert, that he had confided to Johann Kanter. Nothing came of Kant's hopes for such a publication for many years.

On the other hand, in his concrete pedagogy, Kant did make a change. He introduced what Gerhard Lehmann calls the "new plan" for his metaphysics course, namely "applying gentle pressure" to the exposition of Baumgarten's textbook.²⁴ Kant proposed henceforth to "begin with empirical psychology." From there he would cover the balance of the text, but this introduction would make the whole field more accessible, he claimed. Already Christian Wolff had used empirical psychology in this way.²⁵ We have reason to believe, from the balance of Kant's exposition in the *Announcement* of 1765, that the motive for his "new plan" in the metaphysics course was far more *pedagogical* than *theoretical*.²⁶ Indeed, I shall argue later, this "new plan" speaks more to the genesis of Kant's anthropology course than to any "breakthrough" to a new metaphysics.

Kant explained in the *Announcement* that empirical psychology "is really the metaphysical science of *man* based on experience [*die metaphysische Erfahrungswissenschaft vom Menschen*]." ²⁷ What clearer attestation from Kant himself can we have that he was far indeed from the critical vantage, for which "metaphysical science . . . based on experience" would be a grinding incongruity? In the first *Critique* Kant makes short shrift of "empirical psychology, which has always claimed its place in metaphysics, and from which in our times such great things have been expected for the advancement of metaphysics, the hope of succeeding by *a priori* methods having been abandoned." He proclaims that empirical psychology ought to be "completely banished from the domain of metaphysics."²⁸ In 1781 Kant suppresses, of course, the measure to which he himself had been one of those who had such great hopes for empirical psychology in advancing metaphysics. Still, even in the first *Critique*, Kant decides—on largely pedagogical grounds—that empirical psychology is "too important to be entirely excluded" and therefore determines to "allow it to stay [in his course] for some time longer, until it is in a position to set up an establishment of its own in a complete anthropology, the pendant to the empirical doctrine of nature" (A849/B877; italics added). But he is clear that in that new establishment it would be merely "applied philosophy, the *a priori* principles of which are contained in pure philosophy" (A848/B876). Thus, the critical Kant showed no interest in displacing philosophy with anthropology, but insisted upon its proper subordination to philosophy.

That is a long way from what he was thinking, writing, and teaching in 1765. We need to go back to the phrase "metaphysical science . . . based on experience" with a different orientation. As Giorgio Tonelli has noted, Kant

had come to the view that "the entire domain of things belonging to causality and most of those which belong to real magnitudes can neither be reduced to principles nor derived from them," and hence what essentially remained was "far more to be established by observations *in concreto*."²⁹ In short, knowledge of the causal relation could only come from experience, hence the causal connection could only achieve probability, never certainty.³⁰ That is, we need for at least a time to consider Kant as an empiricist *malgré lui*.

But what *is* empiricism? Or rather, what aspects of empiricism can we ascribe to Kant in this moment? It is essential to distinguish empiricist epistemology from empiricist ontology. Kant's reorientation was *not* about the primacy of perception or the exclusivity of sense impressions at the ground of experience. Rather, it was about inference and a posteriori synthesis as the preponderant if not the exclusive form of progress in knowledge and *therefore* the fallibility and contingency of knowledge-claims (subjective probability). Accordingly, this made it indispensable to communicate and verify knowledge-claims publicly, through discourse—what we would today call a *social* epistemology.³¹ Since ontological necessity is an inaccessible ideal for the *universal validity* of a claim, the closest surrogate could only be *general consent*: public consensus. And that in turn could be grounded only on mutually accessible states of affairs as evidence.

Kant, in 1766, found the path of moderate—"zetetic"—skepticism and of "critical empiricism" along the lines of Hume the most promising line to follow.³² He adopted, for at least a few years, what he later lambasted as "indifferentism," in other words, the idea that one should resolutely turn away from speculative metaphysics, because it exceeded the limits of reason, and in its place take up down-to-earth empirical inquiry. In the late 1760s, this was the impulse of the best and the brightest minds in Germany.³³ In 1768 two young philosophers explicitly committed to this approach (Feder and Meiners) received appointments to Germany's premier university, Göttingen.³⁴ There were others, for example, Basedow, Platner—even Meier and Lambert—who were moving in that line.³⁵ And one of their principal inspirations, as already Sulzer had prophesied in 1755, was David Hume.³⁶

What needs to be asserted here is that Hume represented at the middle of the eighteenth century the prospect of a redirection of the mission and substance of the pursuit of philosophy: abandonment of the tradition of speculative logic and metaphysics and adoption of the program of empirical inquiry into the "science of man" as a vehicle for social and political "improvement."³⁷ This historical reconstruction of Hume is, of course, orthogonal to the contemporary epistemological concerns with causality and

valid knowledge-claims, and similarly orthogonal to the traditional concern of Kant studies along precisely these same lines. But they miss something essential in what made Hume important in the historical moment of his initial reception into Germany and by Immanuel Kant.

THE KANT-HUME NEXUS

Certainly, Kant scholarship has never been able to ignore the explicit statement in the *Prolegomena* that "the *Erinnerung des David Hume*" awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber.³⁸ What exactly was it from Hume that was recalled or suggested?³⁹ We have no reason to believe that there was one, unchanging Kantian reception of Hume. Indeed, most commentators have noted some dissonance in the various Hume references (explicit and latent) in the Kant corpus.⁴⁰ Manfred Kuehn points out that Kant scholarship has never even established what exactly "Hume's problem" was for Kant, and strife rages still over whether Kant adequately "answered" Hume.⁴¹ Lorna Falkenstein has added an important hermeneutic supplement: "The question of what Hume meant when writing a text and the question of what Kant understood when reading it are not the same."⁴² The problem is not just which Hume text Kant had access to, but what Kant took Hume to mean by it. That bears underscoring not least because there is a reading of Hume that has in the interval come to prominence that would put the whole relation in a strikingly different light, namely, the construal of Hume as a *naturalist*, not simply as a skeptic. Lewis Beck acknowledged the importance of this revisionism in Hume studies when he stated that even the "grand divide between naturalism and transcendentalism in theory of knowledge . . . is not as clear-cut as it once appeared." Once Hume is regarded as a naturalist, it is, he conceded, "possible to see Kant and Hume as engaged in a common project."⁴³

Kuehn points out that scholars have, following Kant's own lead, stressed the *differences* between the two philosophers.⁴⁴ Indeed, Hume has been all too conveniently rendered into a stalking horse for the critical philosophy, a necessary preliminary to be both acknowledged and in the same breath dispensed with.⁴⁵ Yet Lewis Beck once argued we need to see Kant executing a "two-front" strategy.⁴⁶ Kant scholarship has too long concentrated on the front where it appeared Kant and Hume were adversaries (skepticism about objective knowledge). Yet on the other front (against the speculative metaphysics of *Schulphilosophie*), Hume proved a powerful *ally*. There were essential points of agreement between the two philosophers. Kuehn tries to evoke these in terms of "Hume's Principle" as contrasted with "Hume's

Problem."⁴⁷ As Kant himself formulated Hume's principle, it prohibited "the use of reason dogmatically beyond the field of possible experience."⁴⁸ As Kuehn puts it, "Kant and Hume aim at the same thing (or, at least, . . . Kant believed he was aiming at the very same thing as Hume), namely, the determination of the limits of metaphysics and human knowledge in general."⁴⁹ And it behooves us to consider that for a part of his meandering way to the critical philosophy, Kant might have found Hume a welcome traveling companion.

It would be too simple to hope that dissonances in Kant's reception of Hume could be resolved in a neat chronological sequence. But it is not too much to hope that chronology might suggest modal clusterings of construal on Kant's part, which might be rendered more plausible by correlation with the wider German reception in the same chronological frame. Kuehn plausibly claims that there is a striking congruence between the rise and fall of Hume's influence in Germany in the eighteenth century and the career of Kant (177 n). The essential questions to ask, then, if we are to contextualize Kant's crisis of the late 1760s are, what could David Hume have meant to German readers of that time, and specifically what might Hume have meant to Kant?

What *was* Hume to the Germans of the late 1760s? Twenty years ago, this was very poorly documented terrain (178 n). It is no longer.⁵⁰ And prospects are that it will be far less so in the proximate future.⁵¹ Even now, it seems to me, some rough conclusions seem probable. Kuehn argues that in the 1750s and '60s Hume's influence "was strongest in Berlin."⁵² He points not only to Sulzer and Resewitz as editors of Hume translations into German, but also to the Francophone group at the Berlin Academy, Formey and Mérian.⁵³ Especially important for the reception of Hume as epistemologist, according to Kuehn, was Mendelssohn's criticism in the essay on probability (1755).⁵⁴ While Lothar Kreimendahl queries this accentuation of Berlin, certainly he does not dispute Kuehn's overall conclusion that "Hume was much more important in Germany during the fifties and sixties of the eighteenth century than Tonelli would have us believe."⁵⁵ Kuehn is disputing not only Tonelli but the earlier assessment of Benno Erdmann.⁵⁶ We are now quite certain that Hume was widely read by German intellectuals in the third quarter of the eighteenth century. The *Enquiry*, "as soon as it came out in German, was, as Mendelssohn said, 'in everybody's hands.'"⁵⁷ Kuehn himself has documented the extensive reviews of Hume in the most important scholarly journal of record, the *Göttingische Anzeigen* (56). Gawlick and Kreimendahl have given a more extended account.⁵⁸ They tend to the view that it was Hume, the freethinking skeptic, particularly in

matters of religion, who obsessed and offended the German reception in this early period. But their view is challenged by Kuehn and by others. Kuehn shows that, while Hume was clearly identified as a "freethinker" and a "skeptic," most of the reviewers for the *Göttingische Anzeigen* "concentrate on what they take to be Hume's constructive aspects."⁵⁹

We need to retrieve Sulzer's lines from the preface to the German translation of Hume's *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* in volume 2 of the *Vermischte Schriften*, which Kant not only read but owned: "I hope that making this work known will awaken [German philosophers] somewhat from their idle rest [*müssigen Ruhe*] and urge them to a new activity. This is one of the reasons that moved me to publish this work."⁶⁰ That Kant was hearkening back to just this passage thirty years later in the *Prolegomena* is not just Kuehn's presumption.⁶¹ But what Sulzer had in mind was not "answering" Hume but *emulating* him. Sulzer held him out, as Kuehn correctly discerns, as "the model for a truly popular philosopher" (179). There was a link between Hume's popular style and his "down-to-earth" empiricism. Thus, Hume's philosophizing became "a model for philosophers who want to combine philosophical reasoning with common sense" (180).

Lüthe makes a point crucial for the German reception of Hume in the 1760s: "he wanted rather to replace the traditional philosophy, based on prejudice, by a science of man, a scientific anthropology."⁶² That sounds exactly like what Herder called for in his essay of 1765.⁶³ Herder, unsurprisingly, is one of the most important instances of German reception of Hume in the 1760s.⁶⁴ Quite unequivocally, he owed his introduction to Hume to Immanuel Kant.⁶⁵ Gawlick and Kreimendahl claim that Hume was received even in the 1760s primarily as a skeptic, and that Kant shared in this reception.⁶⁶ In a critical review of their work, however, Wolfgang Carl objects: "In contrast to his contemporaries [Kant] manifestly understood clearly that Hume proposed a 'system of general empiricism,' and [Kant] understood [Hume] as a critic of metaphysics who challenged the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori."⁶⁷ Kuehn offers a similar view: "Hume's analysis only revealed the frailty of human understanding and the impossibility of the grandiose metaphysical dreams and schemes in the Wolffian tradition."⁶⁸ This is hardly an instance of an "all-destroying" skepticism (along the lines that alarmed Mendelssohn and offended Hamann in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and led Hamann to call Kant the "Prussian Hume"), but rather a *moderate* skepticism that seemed to bode well *both* for the pragmatic pursuit of empirical science *and* for restraint in speculative metaphysics. Kuehn concludes: "moderate skepticism with regard to matters metaphysical and reliance upon common sense to orient oneself in thinking became the pre-

vailing characteristics of many philosophers during the sixties and seventies of the eighteenth century. Kant was clearly one of them, at least during the sixties.⁶⁹ Already in 1888, Erdmann made the point that it was Hume the moral essayist, not Hume the metaphysical skeptic, who interested the Kant of the 1760s.⁷⁰

Hume was a major force for this "philosophy for the world," the "science of man." And this was a Hume that mattered fundamentally to Kant. As Reinhard Brandt has noted, "Hume belongs, with Rousseau among the most frequently cited and named authors in the notes of [Kant's] anthropology lectures."⁷¹ Heiner Klemme draws attention to Kant's important *Reflexion* 1355: "There is a lot of praise for the improvement in taste in the fine arts in Germany. But where is the author who treats history and the driest philosophical matters with such understanding and deep insight and yet so beautifully as Hume, or the moral knowledge of man as Smith?"⁷² We have good reason to believe that at least in the mid-1760s, Kant had the ambition to be such an author.⁷³ Certainly, Herder saw him that way, as we have noted.⁷⁴ But the point is that Kant himself was drawn—by Hume as much as by Rousseau—to be a popular philosopher.

The context in the *Prolegomena* suggests it was Hume's criticism of the idea of necessary causality that roused Kant. That in turn has generated an enormous controversy over whether Kant could have achieved the insight into Hume's argument about causality from the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, which he clearly had at his disposal, or only from the *Treatise of Human Nature* which was not translated until long after the *Prolegomena* was published. The historical disputes about Kant's acquaintance with the *Treatise* and more generally with Hume's philosophy have been intense from the beginning of Kant scholarship.⁷⁵ Kuehn and Kreimendahl (and a host of others) believe that the *Enquiry* could not really do the job, and that it was only Kant's later exposure to the *Treatise* that did the waking.⁷⁶ They both believe they can establish when and how Kant read the extremely skeptical conclusion of Hume's *Treatise*, Book I, namely, via Hamann's translation published in Königsberg in 1771 but perhaps translated and circulated even earlier.⁷⁷ An older line of interpretation assigned Kant's recognition of an unacceptably extreme skepticism in Hume to his reading of the representation of Hume in Beattie's *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth*, translated into German in 1772.⁷⁸

I sympathize somewhat with Reinhard Brandt's protest that this really underestimates Kant's philosophical understanding.⁷⁹ As Brandt puts it, any philosophy seminar today can extract the radical implications of Hume's skepticism from the *Enquiry*; why should we doubt that one of the greatest

philosophers of all time could do it? Brandt's answer is that it has made historical inquiry into Kant more interesting. Maybe. But only a very teleological history: scholars have highlighted in the *Treatise* a tone of existential pathos over skepticism (notably not to be found in the equable *Enquiry*) of the sort that would *require* transcendental rescue. There is something to the question of tone. Tone is central to Kant's righteous indignation at "indifferentism" in the phase of full-fledged *Kritizismus*.

Thus, we have at least enough evidence to argue for the influential reception of Hume in Kant's precritical phase, and especially in his impulse toward popular philosophy. Whether it took the subsequent jolt of a reading of Hume's *Treatise* to "awaken" Kant may perhaps seem less critical in that light.⁸⁰ Certainly if we postulate Hume's influence on *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, as seems to me entirely warranted, we find Kant already adopting a radical opposition to dogmatic thought.⁸¹

KANT'S RATIONALIZATION FOR WRITING *DREAMS*

Kant's own explanation of the motivation behind the composition of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* has generally been accepted without question, but it is a strange statement deserving of scrutiny: "I have treated an unfruitful subject which the inquiries and importunities of idle and inquisitive friends have forced upon me."⁸² Kant was hardly a man to have something of this sort "forced upon" him.⁸³ What are we to make of Kant's invocation of "the impetuous appeals from known and unknown friends"?⁸⁴ Now, the first thing to ask is what the phrase "unknown friends" should be taken to mean. The most likely sense is that of anonymous but benign queries—the sort of thing one might receive from readers of one's writings, especially in the press. That suggests a connection with the recent article Kant published in several parts in the *Königsberg Gelehrten-Zeitungen* on "Illnesses of the Head."⁸⁵ Then we must turn to the category of "known" friends. Who, among Kant's acquaintances—assuming that he meant friends here in the social, not the intimate sense—might have been pressing him on this score?⁸⁶ Fräulein Charlotte von Knobloch, one obvious candidate, had been answered already in Kant's extensive letter of August 1763—two full years earlier—and she was now married and in all likelihood living far away. She can hardly have been making any further "impetuous appeals." Might it have been Hamann, who reported that Kant was working on this project in November 1764, long before anyone else had an inkling?⁸⁷ Might it have been Herder, his favorite student, who left Königsberg in that same month and to whom Kant sent the pages of his book as each segment

came off the press?⁸⁸ Might it have been other students? Other associates in Königsberg? Who? More importantly, why would "impetuous appeals" have arisen, and why, especially, would they have been directed to Kant? Certainly his interest in the question of Swedenborg had already occasioned more than his letter to Fräulein Charlotte. There he admitted that he had asked about Swedenborg in social circles and even sent a personal letter to the Swede (consider how few letters Kant ever wrote, and especially how few in this epoch).⁸⁹ Even earlier, in the Herder lectures, Swedenborg was a topic of consideration.⁹⁰ Indeed, the first lecture Herder attended, in August 1762, had to do with "pneumatology," and Swedenborg fit into that discourse.⁹¹ But, again, why were the appeals so "impetuous"? The notoriety of Swedenborg's knowledge of the Stockholm fire (1759) and other feats of spiritualism might well have been the talk of Königsberg. Still, all that lay some years in the past. How strong a stimulus could that have been for Kant in 1765? More recent, on the other hand, was his expenditure of a substantial sum to acquire Swedenborg's *Arcana Caelestia*, "eight quarto volumes full of nonsense," about which Kant is so rueful in the text.⁹² If he ordered the book through Kanter, which is highly likely, that would not have remained a secret to anyone. Still, ordering the book was an autonomous act—and a costly one—hence hard to conceive of as "forced" by outside pressures.⁹³

The fascination was internal, and Kant was misrepresenting it in his text, even as he later misrepresented it to Mendelssohn in trying to exculpate himself from having written it:

I don't know if in the course of reading this quite disorderly text you detected any of the signs of the unwillingness with which I composed it; for since my nosy inquiries into the visions of Swedenborg, not only among persons who had the opportunity to meet him in person and via some [direct] correspondence but also by the purchase of some of his works, had caused much talk, I saw that I would never have any peace from the constant queries until I had made public my ostensible expertise regarding all these anecdotes. . . . It seemed to me wisest to forestall other people's mockery by first of all mocking myself.⁹⁴

What we need to grasp in this strange rationalization, and use to situate our appraisal of the whole project, is Kant's acute *embarrassment* over his embroilment with Swedenborg. That was already palpable in his letter to Fräulein Charlotte:

I don't know if perhaps at some moment someone observed in me a trace of disposition toward the marvelous [*eine zum Wunderbaren geneigten Gemüthsart*] or of a weakness prone to credulity. This much is certain: that, without regard for all accounts of manifestations and happenings of the spirit world, I always have considered it most appropriate [to follow] the rule of healthy reason, in inclining to deny such things, not that I had seen their impossibility (for how little do we know really of the nature of a spirit?), but rather, because they have been insufficiently demonstrated; and by the way also the incomprehensibility of this sort of manifestation, together with its uselessness, the many difficulties it presents, and the counter evidence of all the exposed frauds and hence the ease of being defrauded—so many things that I, who very much resist being put in an awkward situation, do not consider it advisable for such reason to wander about in cemeteries in the dark.⁹⁵

Kant did not like the idea of being taken for credulous. "In fact, there is no reproach more bitter to a philosopher than that of credulity, and of yielding to common fancies."⁹⁶ But he also resented the presumption that the matter was settled conclusively. He found himself caught between. He had a third option, to which the above claim would seem to incline him: "not to trouble oneself with such impertinent or idle questions, and to hold on to the *useful*."⁹⁷ But Kant did not take it.⁹⁸ He insisted upon confronting the two illicit poles of credulity and unbelief. But the posture was painful. The author "confesses, with a certain humiliation, that he has been naive enough to trace the truth of some of the stories of the kind mentioned" (126). There is a question of professional philosophical propriety at stake (see the epigraph to this chapter), which Kant will not evade. More, he sees this as an occasion to model the *zetetic* mode.⁹⁹ Yet he is dreadfully concerned that in doing so he will make himself ridiculous. Why would he do this to himself?

To begin to answer this question, we need to delve into his earlier considerations of spirits and of dreams—in his lectures and in his essay on mental illness—and to situate these considerations in some wider issues of the age. I wish to consider the hypothesis that the person of Swedenborg is less central than the question of the relation of spirit to matter, especially in two lights: the philosophical issue of intersubstantial connection and the popular-religious issue of demonism (witches, etc.). These were crucial issues of the early Enlightenment, and central to the elite undertaking to rationalize Christianity.¹⁰⁰ Keith Thomas has demonstrated how central the second problem was to the emergence of Protestantism in seventeenth-

century England in *Religion and the Decline of Magic*.¹⁰¹ In Continental Protestantism, the connection of the two issues, mind-body dualism and demonism, came most vividly into focus in a controversy sparked in Amsterdam by Balthasar Bekker's *The Bedeviled World* (1692).¹⁰² The link between the rationalization of religion in deism and the emergence of freethinking is clear in the related writings of John Toland, so important in the German context because of his connection to Leibniz.¹⁰³ Kant, as a consideration of the Herder lecture notes demonstrates, was aware of this whole connection.¹⁰⁴ It was, indeed, the frame of his exposition.

But there is a second contextual dimension, namely the whole question of religious "enthusiasm," of what the Germans called *Schwärmerei*.¹⁰⁵ These were crosscurrents to the stream of secularization already mentioned, for sometimes the enthusiasts constituted the radical front line, shattering the grip of inherited religious ideas, but at other times, and perhaps more typically, these enthusiasts were caught up in the most uninhibited embrace of the very kinds of "spirituality" that rational religion aimed to purge. This contemporary and sometimes interfused current of "inner light" destabilizes the idea of Enlightenment as a process of rationalization and secularization. It represents one of the gravest challenges to any unified historical conceptualization of the age, and one that will not allow itself to be suppressed from consideration.¹⁰⁶ Nor could Kant ignore these matters; they were central to the German experience of *Aufklärung*.¹⁰⁷ The strongest sense Kant attached personally to the term *Enlightenment* was just this struggle against superstition.¹⁰⁸ As an author, as a public figure writing to enlighten his age, Kant had to take a stand on such matters. But there is a darker subjective side to this same conflict, which Gernot and Hartmut Böhme have articulated: Kant "had uncovered a relationship between enthusiasm and metaphysics that frightened him away."¹⁰⁹

KANT AND MADNESS

Kant's "Essay on Illnesses of the Head" (1764) begins with an intricate and provocative sentence: "The simplicity and contentment of nature demands and cultivates in men merely commonplace concepts and a plain honesty; the artificial compulsion and luxury of civilized society provokes wits and speculators, but from time to time also fools and knaves, and occasions the illusion of wisdom or decency under which one can do without understanding or good deeds so long as the beautiful veil is woven tightly enough which reputation has spread over the vices of the mind or the heart."¹¹⁰ The first thing of note in the sentence is the obvious invocation of Rousseau's

contrast of natural versus civilized. The next is the strong emphasis on the potential for hypocrisy in civilized society, again an idea from Rousseau. Only upon a third pass would one fasten upon the word *fools*, if the title of the essay did not alert one to this possible theme. Kant was writing for the newspaper public, and the mirror he was holding up to them was not entirely complimentary. "I live among wise and well-mannered bourgeois, that is, among those who know how to appear that way" (259). Indeed, Kant rubbed more salt into the wound by suggesting that everyone was far more interested in appearing clever than in appearing just. Setting himself so at odds with his readers, or perhaps, like Rousseau, flattering them by the intimation that they shared his cynical discernment, Kant launched into his topic by suggesting that had he a cure for illnesses of the head and heart he would hesitate to offer it, given the flourishing business in the going nostrums. In particular he maintained that the prevailing wisdom on the score of understanding was that "the human head is really a drum that only sounds because it is empty" (260). In keeping with such dazzling insight, Kant proposed to emulate the medical community, which pretended to help patients simply by giving a name to their ailments. He offered a taxonomy of mental illness.

The method he employed in the article parallels that which had won him great success in the *Observations*. He set about discriminating terms. The first few had to do with the difference among sorts of fools. What Kant ironically emphasized was being *made* a fool, and he suggested that this was what simplicity was taken to mean among the civilized. A person of good mind and heart was naive enough to trust others and thus became the victim of hypocrites, who could only take such a person for a fool because they judged everyone by their own knavery. Kant advanced to the consideration of a person blinded by a passion. Such a person needed to be of good heart and mind not to be thought less than a fool (*Thor*). If the obsessive passion was itself repugnant, Kant called its victim a *Narr*. Kant traced the *Narr* to the two vices of arrogance and avarice.

After all this arch humor, Kant turned to those forms of mental disturbance that occasioned pity rather than mirth or scorn. Here, Kant observed, the authorities needed to intervene. His typology followed his conception of mental faculties: sensibility, understanding, and reason. One could be deranged in one's perceptions, in one's ideas, or in one's inferences; *Verrückung*, *Wahnsinn*, and *Wahnwitz*, respectively (264). Kant maintained that memory and imagination constantly bombarded consciousness with a horde of images, but in wakefulness these were overwhelmed by the vivacity of actual sensory impressions. In sleep and dream, however, this counterweight was

removed and the fantasies achieved a preponderance whereby they appeared to be real. One who was *verrückt* could not tell the difference; he dreamed waking and Kant termed such a person a *Phantast*. In ordinary life some of this was quite common, and from it arose a whole host of fantastic images, the stuff of poetry as much as madness.

A particular locus of such misguided fantasy was hypochondria. Instead of bemusing the outer senses, this form bemused the inner awareness of body or spirit. "The hypochondriac has a malady which, wherever its point of origin, nevertheless in all probability wanders erratically across the entire nervous system to every part of the body. In any event primarily it draws a melancholy cloud over the seat of the soul such that the patient develops the delusion that every disease he has ever even heard of, he has himself" (266). This characterization, we realize, is quite autobiographical, but that is what makes this little essay so interesting. It brings Kant's own anxieties into connection with his assessment of some of the most remarkable figures in his world, whose mental stability was questionable. Foremost among these figures for Kant were Rousseau and Swedenborg.¹¹¹ Kant insisted that often people were held to be phantasists by others who lacked their imagination or their devotion to an idea. He offered the example of Rousseau's reputation at the Sorbonne. They would take him for a mere phantast, but Kant insisted that he was instead an *enthusiast* for the good, and he added a memorable observation about enthusiasm: "nothing great in the world has ever been achieved without it."¹¹² Kant was adamant that an enthusiast of this sort should be distinguished from a fanatic (*Schwärmer*).¹¹³

Kant contended that in the natural state of mankind mental illness would not have been so prevalent, since there would be little occasion for the mind to be strained by circumstances. No stimulus would be so oppressive as to disorder the normal operations of the mind. Thus, "it is in civilized society that all the incendiary materials for these morbidities are to be found."¹¹⁴ This perspective, close to Rousseau's views regarding the decadence of modernity, had a more direct bearing on Kant's own active social life in Königsberg, on his "melancholia" and his "hypochondria."¹¹⁵ Thus, the concluding recourse to ironic humor poked fun at Unzer's popular medical journal, *Der Arzt*, and suggested that while certainly in cases of mental illness a doctor should be consulted, it might not be amiss to let a philosopher consult as well—at no charge.¹¹⁶ For the regimens of the mind that philosophers might recommend *could* in fact remedy the matter, which was as likely as not a mental as a physiological derangement. Kant ended the essay for the Königsberg newspaper, in short, at about

the same place he would take up matters at the far end of his career, in the essay "On the Power of the Mind to Master Its Morbid Feelings by Sheer Resolution." This very title, we now have reason to believe, bespoke Kant's essential response to his "crisis" of the 1760s.¹¹⁷ If the method of the essay pointed back toward *Observations*, the style and the content pointed directly forward to Kant's most bizarre piece of writing, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*.

DREAMS OF A SPIRIT-SEER

"The land of shadows is the paradise of dreamers."¹¹⁸ This opening line, lyrical with a hint of irony, enunciates at once the *literary* mode in which the text will proceed. The balance of the opening paragraph has a stylistic verve and authorial confidence similar to that of the opening to the essay on mental illness and surpasses that of *Observations*. Here, more than in any other text, it is urgent for Kant to establish *authorial* authority, because he will be putting his *philosophical* authority under the most strenuous scrutiny. He is after a situation that demonstrates the impotence of philosophical authority, an impotence in which he is himself implicated, and which he, by means of other resources, must overcome: "What philosopher has not at one time or another cut the queerest figure imaginable, between the affirmations of a reasonable and firmly convinced eye-witness, and the inner resistance of insurmountable doubt?" (38). It is this quandary faced with credulity and utter skepticism that Kant wishes to illuminate, to pronounce the philosopher's true estate. "Philosophy, which on account of its self-conceit exposes itself to all sorts of empty questions, finds itself often in awkward embarrassment in view of certain stories, parts of which it cannot *doubt* without suffering for it, nor *believe* without being laughed at" (91).

In an age when fashion demanded public skepticism of all such spiritual manifestations, no matter what one's private disposition on the matter might be, Kant was incensed at the pretense of philosophical *certainty* that there could be nothing to such claims, even as he was painfully aware how dubious even the most ardent attestations on the other side must remain (92). Hume, in the notorious chapter on miracles, put it bluntly: "no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof. . . . It is experience only, which gives authority to human testimony; and it is the same experience, which assures us of the laws of nature."¹¹⁹ Thus, Kant "confesses, with a certain humiliation, that he has been naive enough to trace the truth of some of the stories of the kind mentioned,"

in other words, he *defied* the conventions of his intellectual community because he saw them as dogmatic. While Kant confessed to humiliation and naivete, what he wanted read in his authorial voice was, quite distinctly, *contestation* and *confidence*. To say one thing and mean another is, of course, a standard conception of the trope of irony, and this work, conventionally regarded as a satire, cannot be read without attunement to its irony. But there is an irony that is the author's device, and there is an irony that undercuts an author. Wayne Booth helped us to grasp this well before "deconstruction" made it the universal solvent for literary analysis.¹²⁰ Kant was writing at high risk in this text, and it is important to recognize that he could have failed to maintain mastery of his medium.¹²¹

Having admitted that he conducted inquiries into the strange matter of spirit-secing, Kant reported that he "found—as usual where it is not our business to search—he found nothing."¹²² First, we must dwell on what he means here by "nothing." Did Kant mean he found no confirmation of the claims? No denial of the claims? No insight of any kind? In inquiry, falsification is as important an outcome as confirmation (indeed, if we follow Karl Popper, it is more important).¹²³ Is that what Kant meant? How should we read the immediate assertion that finding nothing was "a sufficient reason for writing a book."¹²⁴ Was Kant claiming his result was negative or simply *inconclusive*? We must go back to the interjection: "it is not our business to search." Kant was claiming that the inquiry was itself inappropriate, that this was not a matter he *should* have investigated. That would seem to carry him back to the position of Hume, which would have *aborted*, not justified, the work he was presenting. The reader has a right to begin to be restless with the intentions of the text. But Kant assured his imagined reader—naturally, male—that he would *like* the text: "The main part he will not understand, another part he will not believe, and the rest he will laugh at" (39). What we should register in this avowal is not its element of self-consolation but rather its element of *insolence*: the author has become *adversarial* toward the reader. Kant was conflicted within himself—"the victim and the knife"—as much as he was in contest with philosophy in its pretense to certainty, but here he added a contest with the reader as his judge.¹²⁵ The preface reflects this tension, the alienation of person, in the use of "he" for the author, whereas the main text throngs obtrusively with the first person.

Architectonic is a pejorative in many Kant studies. Hitherto, the term has not been used much to castigate the precritical work, and certainly not *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*. But I see architectonic neither as so negative an element in Kant nor as one without utility in the context of that very book.

Kant very *self-consciously* constructed the organization of this work. It has two parts, titled "Dogmatic" and "Historical." One would have expected "philosophical" rather than "dogmatic," but that is Kant's first gesture of ironic contestation. Within each part there are several chapters and a conclusion. The conclusion of the dogmatic part is called "Theoretical," while the conclusion of the historical part is called "Practical." The connection of dogmatic with theoretical is hardly taxing. The connection of historical with practical, on the other hand, carries more within it than is usually registered. Finally, there are the elaborate chapter titles. This literary artifice is unique in Kant's published works. They contain some of the most accomplished irony in the text. Thus, the opening chapter of part 1 is entitled, "A Complicated Metaphysical Knot Which May Be Untied or Cut According to Choice." All the ambivalence of the problem and all the levity of authorial voice is presented in the compass of this title. The next two chapters, composed in deliberate dialectical opposition, are both called "fragments." The idea of the "fragment" as a literary-philosophical genre was made famous a generation later by the Jena circle of Romanticism and canonized by more recent critical theory as a "literary absolute."¹²⁶ The word *antikabala* in the title of the third chapter of part 1 deserves a comment as well, since it suggests that the question of spirit-seeing is embroiled in much larger metaphysical-religious commitments. "Kabala" and "anti-Kabala" had sharp and determinate resonances in the polemical discourse of eighteenth-century German theology and philosophy.¹²⁷ The titles of part 2 are equally sardonic.

But the most interesting architectonic matter is not the symmetry of structure or the irony of titles but the sequencing of treatment. Why did Kant put the metaphysics of spirit before the history of the spirit-seer? We need to consider the title of the whole text: *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by the Dreams of Metaphysics*. Spirit-seeing is to be explained by metaphysics. Kant presents his entire discourse on metaphysics *before* he takes up the case of Swedenborg. He even admits that this seems a bizarre procedure: "as I treated the dogmatic part before the historic, and thus set reasons before experience, I gave cause for the suspicion of underhand dealing, by having the whole thing before my mind from the start."¹²⁸ This, far from troubling Kant, allows him to "digress" on the question of the relation of a priori and a posteriori presentations in philosophy. He characterizes the practices of philosophers in this regard as little short of charlatanry, and he takes pride in exposing them: "They do not tell you that, of course, because it is only fair for the initiated not to betray the tricks of their profession" (100). But in just that measure, Kant is himself adopting the role of betrayer of guild secrets,

a traitor to the academic guild of philosophy.¹²⁹ He uses this to win the reader's confidence: "Anyhow, of what use would it be to me now when I can deceive nobody any more, having given away the secret?"¹³⁰ Why, then, is the consideration of metaphysics before the consideration of Swedenborg? The answer is crucial: Kant experienced an embarrassing "misfortune," which *alone* motivated his interest in the particular figure. He "stumbled upon [a vision] which resembles so uncommonly the philosophical creation of my own brain" as to make him acutely aware how "desperately misshapen and foolish" that philosophical creation should appear.¹³¹ In short, the title of the book is a misrepresentation: it is the cloud castles of metaphysics (particularly his *own*) that are elucidated—in other words, exposed to ridicule—by their juxtaposition with the dreams of the spirit-seer.

Kant lets the reader in on what he thinks he is up to in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* late in the second chapter of part 2:

I really had an aim in view that seemed to me more important than the pretended one. . . . Metaphysics, with which it is my fate to be in love, although only rarely can I boast of any favours from her, offers two advantages. The first is that it serves to solve the tasks which the questioning mind sets itself when by means of reason it inquires into the hidden qualities of things. But here the result only too often falls below expectations.

The other advantage is more adapted to human reason, and consists in recognizing whether the task be within the limits of our knowledge and in stating its relation to the conceptions derived from experience, for these must always be the foundation of all our judgments. In so far metaphysics is the science of the boundaries of human reason. . . . [I]t is this use . . . which is at the same time the least known and the most important, and which further is obtained only late and by long experience.¹³²

This is one of the most important passages Kant ever wrote about himself and his project. It deserves the closest scrutiny. First, the erotic metaphor upon which the passage builds should not escape our attention, especially in light of the particularly conflicted stance of Kant toward eroticism at just this moment. To have been *denied* favors from the (feminine) object of his desire in the sphere of thought can be read as the mirror image of Kant's *resolution* for sexual abstinence in the real world. That he would use a sexual metaphor here for his relation to metaphysics charges the relation with a psychological intensity that suggests a moment of crisis.¹³³ Second,

we must consider the contrast of the viable with the unviable "advantages" of metaphysics. It is unviable to take up metaphysics to "inquire into the hidden qualities of things." The viable use of metaphysics demonstrates that it is beyond the scope of human reason. Metaphysics as the *critique* of the possibility of metaphysics: the irony of this position, the "transcendental" position, is that it affirms as the essence of an action its self-inhibition—courtship as renunciation. "Thus I have wasted my time that I might gain it."¹³⁴ If there is a positive harvest here, it lies in the exposition of the "critical" insight: "recognizing whether the task be within the limits of our knowledge and . . . stating its relation to the conceptions derived from experience, for these must always be the foundation of all our judgments." In the renunciation of metaphysics there is an implied project of empirical inquiry. I wish to cling firmly to this implication, especially since the Kant scholarship is, by contrast, so attentive to the undoubted anticipation of the critical postures of Kant's later career. There is a concluding metaphor in this second chapter of part 2 that is, in my view, as decisive for the cultural moment in Germany as it seemed to be for the personal quest of Immanuel Kant. Whereas hitherto, Kant writes, "we had flown on the butterfly-wings of metaphysics," the "sobering power of self-recognition has caused the silky wings to be folded, we find ourselves again on the ground of experience and common sense" (114). Coming back *down to earth*: that is a crucial motif of *Popularphilosophie* and the *Hochaufklärung*. Kant seemed, with this text, to be their spokesman.¹³⁵ "Happy, if we look at [earth] as the place allotted to us, which we never can leave with impunity, and which contains everything to satisfy us as long as we hold fast to the useful."¹³⁶ But was Kant content to be earthbound? Did his "love" for metaphysics not lure him to transgressions?

"[T]o select from among the innumerable tasks before us the one which humanity must solve, is the merit of the wise." If science feels consternation at how much it does not yet know, wisdom, whom Kant personifies in Socrates, replies: "'How many things there are which I do not need'" (115). Given everything we have learned from our consideration of *Remarks in the "Observations,"* we cannot be insensitive either to the invocation of the person of Socrates or to the idea of renunciation of needs. But just in order to be wise, just in order to know what it is useful for mankind to pursue, Kant argues, we need metaphysics: "To be able to choose rationally, one must know first even the unnecessary, yea the impossible; then, at last, science arrives at the definition of the limits set to human reason by nature" (115). Here we have a conception of *limit* that requires a Hegelian transgression: one can only recognize a limit if one has already seen the other side.¹³⁷

Kant, with a lover's insistence, will see beyond the veil of Isis even as he claims it cannot be done.¹³⁸ Put more prosaically, those human "questions about the spiritual nature, about freedom and predestination, the future state, etc.," which Kant will always aver make metaphysics indispensable for mankind, are the motive *dynamic of reason*, the "erotic" that energizes human inquiry, even if the *outcome* is only the recognition that the object of desire is illusory, or at least that our engine cannot make the flight to such a heaven.¹³⁹

Sobriety comes: "when one has, finally, arrived at fundamental relations, philosophy has no business any more. Questions like 'How something can be a cause, or possess power,' can never be decided by reason; but these relations must be taken from experience alone."¹⁴⁰ Kant is harvesting the sparse crop of his "system" of 1762-1763: "the fundamental conceptions of causes, of forces, and of actions, if they are not taken from experience, are entirely arbitrary, and can neither be proved nor disproved" (117). Immediately, however, Kant transposes the question from a theoretical to a practical, or more precisely, a *pragmatic* register:

I know that will and understanding move my body, but I can never reduce by analysis this phenomenon, as a simple experience, to another experience, and can, therefore, indeed recognize it, but not understand it. That my will moves my arm is not more intelligible to me than if somebody said to me that he could stop the moon in its orbit. . . . I recognize in myself changes as of a living subject, namely, thoughts, power to choose, etc. etc., and, . . . I have good reason to conceive of an incorporeal and constant being. . . . All such opinions, as those concerning the manner in which the soul moves my body, or its relation to other beings, now, or in future, can never be anything more than fictions. (117-18)

The radical character of the skepticism that Kant proposes here should not be passed over too swiftly. Undercutting his own argument for the transcendence of limits, Kant writes:

The vanity of science likes to excuse its occupations by the pretext of importance; thus it pretends in this case that a rational understanding of the spiritual nature of the soul is very necessary for the conviction of an existence after death; again, that this conviction is very necessary as a motive for a virtuous life. . . . But true wisdom is the companion of simplicity, and as, with the latter, the heart rules the understanding, it generally renders unnecessary the great preparations of scholars. (120)

The term *heart* and the general context suggest that we are back with Rousseau's bedrock affirmation of the ubiquity and immediacy of ethical consciousness in man, independent of learning. "Does man's heart not contain immediate moral precepts?" (120). Kant continues, in language that clearly anticipates the famous passages of his introduction to the first *Critique*, that speculations about such matters "are really immaterial to us, and the reasons pro and con which, for the moment, prevail, may, perhaps, decide the applause of schools, but hardly anything about the future destiny of the righteous."¹⁴¹ In this light, it is not so remarkable that Kant should end his little book with one of his most unreservedly positive invocations of Voltaire, embracing the closing sobriety of *Candide* as a turn away from all metaphysical speculation.

Far more interesting, in the immediate context of this text of 1766, is the question of how to describe "recognition" and "understanding" (and their interaction) as human experiences. That is, what guidance does Kant offer for the construction of an alternative, down-to-earth *empirical* science? Kant intimates that a "law of experience within the domain of reason" requires "unanimity and uniformity" among men, otherwise "the historic knowledge about them is valueless for the proof of anything."¹⁴² Are these the underpinnings of "anthropology" as an "academic discipline"?

One of the essential problems posed by *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* is the question of the status of much of the philosophical analysis presented in the text. Is it all ironized? If it is not, where does Kant draw the line between legitimate philosophical analysis and speculation? The question of the "limit of human reason" is one that needs to be pursued *within* the text, not just beyond it in the future "critical" turn. Josef Schmucker adopts what I think is the correct procedure, namely, to realize that much of what Kant writes in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* he means not as irony but as philosophy.¹⁴³ Those who wish to read *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* as the first work of the "critical" period can find some warrant here. But there is another perspective, in which *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* in fact represents a marshaling and assessment of all Kant's philosophical achievements to that point, in other words, the rigorous deployment of the "system" of 1762–1763 in the light of his assimilation of Rousseau and Hume in its aftermath. Thus, the exposition of chapter 1 of part 1 represents, far from merely "dogmatic philosophy," a careful exemplification of conceptual analysis, the correct method in philosophy as Kant characterized it in the Prize Essay. Kant begins with a common expression, a *word*, that requires analysis to be rendered philosophically lucid. The word, in this case, is *spirit*. Kant scoffs at "certain newer philosophers, as they like to be called," who begin with a definition:

in this case, "A spirit, they say, is a being possessed of reason."¹⁴⁴ Kant admits, "I do not even know what the word 'spirit' signifies," but this is not the *end* of the matter, but rather the beginning. It is a word he and others use. Philosophy begins with the analysis of the implications of this usage. "Usage, and the context in different accounts in which the same expression is found, give to the expression a definite meaning" (42-43 n). To get at the essential sense of the term, Kant resorts to its implicit antonym: materiality. The vehicle for his exposition is his extended analysis of space in his prior studies. But also Kant is bringing the question of the usage of *spirit* directly into juxtaposition with natural philosophy and the ultimate problems that divided Newton and Leibniz over the question of legitimate scientific explanation. In this light, Kant registers again—echoing many of his earlier texts—the problem of the divisibility of matter and the continuity of space, in which the mathematical notion of point can serve only as a spatial limit, but not as a basis for the conception of a simple substance or ultimate particle of matter.¹⁴⁵ But Kant also includes the other obvious and essential consideration, the relation between the mind and the body in man, the core metaphysical conundrum of post-Cartesian metaphysics. "With a spiritual substance, which is conjoined with matter, as is the case with the human soul, the difficulty arises that I must conceive of a mutual combination of it with corporeal beings for the sake of forming a whole, and yet must remove the only connective which is known to exist among material beings."¹⁴⁶ Kant insists that while this problem is *acute* in the case of human experience, it is implicit in the theory of physical matter as well, as Leibniz pointed out. This was the problem of "force": "Every reasonable man will readily concede that here human intelligence has reached its limit. For while, by experience alone, we can perceive that things of this world which we call 'material' possess such a force, we can never conceive of the reason why they exist" (46). Physics requires forces, even if it cannot account for them. In this way, simple, immaterial substances force their way into consideration, even in natural science. "The possibility of the existence of immaterial beings can, therefore, be supposed without fear of being disproved, but also without hope of proving it by reason" (46). We are entitled to think the notion; it may even be useful for our inquiries, but that does not entitle us to the view that we have a rational proof of its reality: "From the explanation of what a spirit consists in it is a long step indeed to the proposition that such natures are real, yea, even possible" (45). It is important to recognize that what Kant is presenting here is a restatement of the position developed in the "system" of 1762-1763, particularly in the Prize Essay. Beyond that, he is incorporating all his long

investigations of "physical monadology," all his reception, to that point, of the philosophy of Leibniz. But he turns it in a far more sharply skeptical direction. "Suppose now," he writes, "that it has been proved that the soul of man is a spirit (although it may be seen from the preceding that this, as yet, has *not* been proved)" (48). There can be few more radical insults to traditional metaphysics—ancient, medieval, or modern—than to deny this has been proven, for all of these philosophies took this as the most important accomplishment of their "science." Kant asserts that *nothing* has yet been adduced by philosophy which establishes that the human soul *must* be necessarily immaterial. That allows him a new twist of Leibniz's joke about imbibing souls with one's coffee. And it allows him to stake out the essential human concern in the whole comedy: to flirt with the materiality of the human soul is to put human hope for immortality at risk. This is not a question of logical rigor, but rather of pragmatic considerations: "at times," Kant writes, it is "necessary to frighten the thinker who is on the wrong path, by the consequences" (52). It is *philosophically* unproblematic to conceive the human soul as material. It is, however, practically deleterious: "But there probably never was a righteous soul who could endure the thought that with death everything would end, and whose noble mind had not elevated itself to the hope of the future" (121). Accordingly, Kant writes, "I confess that I am very much inclined to assert the existence of immaterial natures in the world, and to put my soul itself into that class of beings" (52).

The problem here is that what was a pragmatic requirement suddenly takes on a theoretical character when Kant conceives of a "class of beings" of which the human soul is a member. That is, Kant is resorting to theoretical speculations to elaborate what he has already admitted is a practical election. He is reverting to the aporetic situation of physical science, both with reference to the essence of force in general and with reference to the particular quandary of organism more specifically.

Whatever in the world contains a principle of *life*, seems to be of immaterial nature. For all life rests on the inner capacity to determine one's self by one's own will power. But the essential characteristic of matter is that it fills space by a necessary force which is limited by counter action from without. Thus the state of everything that is material is externally dependent and forced. But those entities which are said to contain the cause of life, which act from themselves and from inner power, in short, the intrinsic nature of which is to be able to change themselves at will, can hardly be said to be material. (52 n)

Here we have reached bedrock commitments of Kant, which will endure the entire critical turn unchanged. Indeed, I would assert that the critical turn was undertaken precisely to buttress Kant's commitments in these areas—against dogmatic materialism and absolute skepticism alike. In the *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* Kant gives a most sympathetic rendering of Leibniz's monadology as a perfectly plausible philosophical conjecture in light of the aporias of scientific knowledge. He even goes so far as to render sympathetically—in contrast to his own earlier strictures—Leibniz's problematic conception of the inner form of monads as a power of representation that contains (obscurely) all reality (53 n). In the language of the critical philosophy, Kant presents in chapter 1 of part 1 of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* what philosophy is entitled to "think" about the question of spirit and about the body-soul relation. Even in the critical period, Kant is scrupulous to assert that Leibniz's *thinking* is impeccable; the problem is the claim to *know* that such thoughts legitimately represent the *real*.¹⁴⁷

Taking advantage of the philosophical-scientific aporia with regard to spirit, especially as betokened by the problem of *life*, the second chapter resorts to grander metaphysical speculations. The new question is not the *existence* of spirits, but rather their *interaction* apart from material mediation, "a great whole which might be called the immaterial world (*mundus intelligibilis*) . . . existing by itself, and its parts, as being in mutual conjunction and intercourse without the instrumentality of anything corporeal."¹⁴⁸ The warrant to enter into such speculation is simply the necessary presumption of spiritual agency to explain physics or organic life. For it is not clear how far into matter life penetrates: "to which members of nature life is extended, and which those degrees of it are which are next to utter lifelessness, can, perhaps, never be made out with certainty. Hylozoism imputes life to everything; materialism, carefully considered, kills everything. Maupertuis attributed to the organic particles of the nutriment of all animals the lowest degree of life, other philosophers see in them nothing else but dead masses which serve only to augment the lever-apparatus of animal machines" (57). Crucially, Kant situates his considerations in the intense disputes coursing through Europe at midcentury over the nature of the life sciences and their implications for physical science generally. He writes of the ambiguity at the border between plants and animals: "the close relation of the polyps and zoophytes with the plants." Here we must think of Trembley's famous experiments with polyps, which riveted the scientific imagination of Europe for a considerable moment.¹⁴⁹ Kant goes on to note an even more central scientific development, Haller's discovery of "irritability": "the specific life belonging to the separated parts of some animals, irritability—that quality

of the fibres of an animal body and of some plants, so well demonstrated and, at the same time, so inexplicable."¹⁵⁰

For Kant, philosophy—in the form of natural science—here reaches a “limit of human reason,” for it is both committed to the mechanistic model of explanation in natural science and yet recognizes unequivocally the presence of data that cannot be assimilated to that model. “I am convinced that Stahl, who likes to explain animal processes organically [i.e., animistically], is often nearer to the truth than Hof[f]mann, Boerha[a]ve, and others, who leave immaterial forces out of their plan and keep to mechanical reasons. Yet these follow thereby a more philosophical method” (58). These are the crucial issues for natural science, and hence for philosophy, after the middle of the eighteenth century. They remain the central questions for Kant for the balance of his life, most notably in the *Critique of Judgment* and the *Opus postumum*, but indeed throughout. That is to say, *nothing* about these considerations is hyperbolic or absurd. There is nothing here that Kant would or should have repudiated as arrant speculation. It is only the leap that he then proposes to make *from* this basis into speculation that deserves the latter description. And Kant marks the locus of his speculative leap with clear rhetorical roadmarks. “It begins to be a real trouble for me, always to use the cautious language of reason,” he writes (61). That signals that up to this point Kant was working in the “cautious language of reason,” but he will not continue in that vein. He immediately makes another swipe at academic philosophy: “Why should I, too, not be allowed to talk in the academic style? This exempts the writer as well as the reader from thinking” (61). What motivates such a shift in tone? “It would be beautiful” to envision such an immaterial world, Kant informs us. This intrusion of an aesthetic value should be immediately problematic. The shift from truth to beauty was no small matter for Immanuel Kant, if perhaps easier for his age.

What should ensue is a wild flight of metaphysical fancy. It does not. Instead, Kant presents a whole new domain for consideration. He transposes suddenly into a practical key.¹⁵¹ What had been a discourse grounded on the problems of life forms in natural science is displaced by a new inquiry into the tension between self-interest and altruism in human moral comportment.¹⁵² If what we just considered might be the (premature) precipitate of what Kant had planned as his “metaphysical first principles of natural philosophy,” what he now gives us is a precipitate of his thinking on “metaphysical first principles of moral philosophy.”¹⁵³ The musings scribbled into the margins and blank pages as *Remarks in the “Observations”* here first present themselves to the public. Schmucker has insisted that these were *not*

ideas that Kant took to be mere speculation, to be repudiated later as part of a rhetorical joke.¹⁵⁴ These are not satirical. They are hard-won insights into the essence of human ethical experience. Kant offers a model of the priority of public over private interest not all that far from what would be his "invisible realm" of the "kingdom of ends."¹⁵⁵

When we consider our needs in relation to our environment, we cannot do it without experiencing a certain sensation of restraint and limitation which lets us know that a foreign will, as it were, is active in us, and thus our liking is subject to the condition of external consent. A secret power compels us to adapt our intention to the welfare of others, or to this foreign will, although this is often done unwillingly, and conflicts strongly with our own selfish inclination.¹⁵⁶

Always, against the grain of our self-interest, we confront "the strong law of duty and the weaker one of benevolence." That is, "we recognize that, in our most secret motives, we are dependent upon the *rule of the will of all*, and thence arises in the community of all thinking beings a *moral unity*, and a systematic constitution according to purely spiritual laws" (64). Kant insists that what he is describing is a palpable experience, a moral feeling (*sittliche Gefühl*), "only a manifestation of that which actually takes place, without settling upon its causes" (64). In this, the situation is precisely analogous to Newton's characterization of gravitation: we have recognition (or description) via experience, but not explanation (understanding) via reason. This is all straight Kantian ethical philosophy. *None of it will change in the critical exposition.*

It is only after this second exposition of the "state of the art" in philosophy—or at least the state of Kant's thought—that he allows the speculative impulse to take over. Again, he gives us rhetorical signals. He writes of the *charm* of hypotheses about the interaction of immaterial substances, especially now that they have an ethical dimension: "we shall be drawn by their charm, perhaps unconsciously, into being parties to them" (65). This is the moment for fantasy. Kant rhapsodizes on the spiritual communion in a timeless, spaceless dimension of immediacy.

And here, finally, the term *dream*, so prominent in the book's title, makes its presence felt in the text. "It would not be at all strange to find the spirit-seer to be at the same time a dreamer" (71). In Kant's specific sense, a dreamer is someone who *unwittingly* clothes mental constructs in sensual percepts, or projects into external reality what is a figment of inner imagination, in other words, one who loses command of the critical principle

of delimitation between inner and outer experience. The spirit-seers, as a species of dreamer, are "abnormal" in that they "would think that spiritual natures present with them were affecting their bodily senses, while yet this is only a delusion of the imagination" (71). But in that measure, both spirit-seeing and dreaming have about them something that could be characterized as *diseased*.

The next, antithetical chapter seizes upon this idea to disparage any such spiritual communion. The grounding premise is that the distinction between dream and wakefulness is just the awareness of the source of sensation, whether internal or external. And this is taken to be the essence of normal human experience, in other words, what can be universally recognized and affirmed. Intersubjectivity requires the careful policing of this boundary. "If everyone has his own world, it may be supposed that they dream." To be awake is to have "such a view as does not exclude conformity with other people's common sense" (74). The proper contrast with wakefulness, accordingly, is not dream but madness. Kant's chapter develops a physiological theory of mental illness along just these lines, suggesting that the senses establish a "focus imaginarius" to which they assign sensation. If this focus is not properly aligned, things within the mind are projected falsely outside it. Thus, Kant explains hallucinations (and by implication, spirit-seeing): "it will be easily recognized that the unfortunate subject cannot remove the delusion by any reasoning; for a true or apparent impression of the sense precedes all the judgments of the reason, and carries with it immediate evidence, far exceeding all other persuasion" (82). Thus, spirit-seers are best understood as "candidates for the [mental] hospital" (83).

But one cannot resist the suspicion that this physiological reductionism is as dogmatic and speculative (re: nerve fibers, etc.) as the ethical dreamer's vision of the prior chapter. Unbelief or credulity? The ironic Kant was inviting his reader to say, "a plague on both your houses."

All of part 2 is simply a diagnostic characterization of Swedenborg to confirm that he falls in the category of lunatic diagnosed in chapter 3 of part 1. But the book is not primarily about Swedenborg; it is about Kant, or at least about professional metaphysicians. If I am correct to see spirit-seers as "elucidating" metaphysicians, rather than the converse, then we return to the real theme of the text when we take up, at last, the biting hostile treatment of academic philosophy that characterizes the text from its opening salvo to its final lines. At the outset of the text, Kant considered the possibility of avoiding the whole inquiry by refusing to indulge in inquiries that were not useful. His explanation for not taking this course includes himself in a not-very-admirable guild prejudice: "but because this plan is

reasonable, therefore profound scholars have at all times, by a majority of votes, rejected it!" (38). At the outset of the opening chapter, Kant is even more insolent: "The methodical talk of learned institutions is often simply an agreement to beg a question which is difficult to solve, by the variable meaning of words. For we seldom hear at academies the comfortable and oftentimes reasonable, 'I do not know'" (41). Kant continues the jibes later in the first chapter: "I do not care to join in that kind of learned dispute, in which both parties usually have most to say about that of which they know nothing" (51). Kant goes on, "after all, the appeal to immaterial principles is a subterfuge of bad philosophy" (58). We have already considered Kant's "digression" on the equivocation of a priori with a posteriori arguments by philosophers. He makes a similar disparagement of metaphysical arguments generally: "Metaphysical hypotheses are possessed of such an immense flexibility that one must be very awkward not to be able to adapt . . . to any story he hears even before investigating its truthfulness, which is in many cases impossible, and in still more is impolite to the narrator" (72). More bluntly stated, "What foolishness is there which could not be harmonized with a bottomless philosophy?" (83). But metaphysicians are not only "flexible" with the manipulation of any given fact, they are also displaced in their focus: "Knowledge of the other world can be obtained here only by losing some of that intelligence which is necessary for this present world. I am not sure if even certain philosophers can be freed from such a hard condition, when they turn their metaphysical telescopes upon such far-off regions and tell us of miraculous things" (73). Kant calls philosophers back down to earth, to that shared experience of wakefulness: "philosophers will then inhabit a common world, of the kind which mathematicians have already occupied for a long time" (75). That is, they would be involved in what Thomas Kuhn called "normal science," rather than idiosyncratic divagations. Kant believed that the moment for a "normal science" of philosophy was at hand: he was, he believed, a harbinger of this "scientific revolution." This is the personal dimension of the "theoretical conclusion" Kant offers to the first part of *Dreams*: "I have purified my soul from prejudices, I have destroyed any blind affection which ever crept in to procure in me an entrance for much fancied knowledge. Now that I have nothing at heart, nothing is venerable to me but what enters by the path of sincerity into a quiet mind open to all reasons" (85). This is a most incongruous testimonial, more religious in its valences than scientific. Why was it offered? Why should the reader credit it? What rhetorical relation does it have to what went before (part 1) and what was soon to follow? Could this not really be called a practical conclusion, a matter of moral

resolve, of "character" in one's *Denkungsart*? And, conversely, could we not register the practical conclusion discussed earlier as in essence *theoretical*? But is not that the irony of the book? Or at least, is that not the *intended* irony? But just that allows—indeed compels—us to turn to its unintended irony. Kant's *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* had a most unhappy reception, and all subsequent treatments have agreed that it was, in the final analysis, a failure.¹⁵⁷ Kant got lost in his own game. How, and more precisely, why?

THE CONNECTION WITH THE *SCHÖNEN WISSENSCHAFTEN*

There is a side to the exchange of letters with Lambert that may help us grasp this development. When Lambert contacted Kant, he expressed genuine interest in Kant's work and the desire for closer collaboration.¹⁵⁸ Kant responded by confirming the impression that he had made substantial progress from the position in the Prize Essay toward the *consolidation* of metaphysics as an enterprise. That is, Kant accepted Lambert as an ally and agreed that they were working along similar lines in the rigorous science of metaphysics.¹⁵⁹ The question to raise is who they were allied/aligned *against*. In his letter, Lambert made disparaging remarks about publishers and readers in Germany that take on salience in light of the meaning of *Aufklärung* in the 1760s. Lambert wrote: "If [my work] were a novel, I believe, it would already have found many publishers, since it is so clearly the case that booksellers and readers corrupt each other and back away from fundamental reflection [*gründlichen Nachdenken*]. Around here the only thing one philosophizes about are the so-called beautiful sciences [*schöne Wissenschaften*]." ¹⁶⁰ That was written from Berlin, and it represents a rather jaundiced view of the intellectual culture underway there. It is the view, I might say, of the sort of intellectual elitist Kant claimed Rousseau had discredited.¹⁶¹ But consider Kant's answer:

You complain with reason, dear Sir, of the eternal trifling of punsters and the wearying chatter of today's reputed writers, with whom the only evidence of taste is that they talk about taste. I think, though, that this is the euthanasia [*Euthanasie*] of false philosophy, that it is perishing amid these foolish pranks, and it would be far worse to have it carried to the grave ceremoniously, with serious but dishonest hair-splitting. Before true philosophy can come to life, the old one must destroy itself; and just as putrefaction signifies the total dissolution that always precedes the start of a new creation, so the current crisis [*Crisis*] in learning magnifies my

hopes that the great, long-awaited revolution [*revolution*] in the sciences is not too far off. For there is no shortage of good minds.¹⁶²

Three foreign words add stunning force to this passage: euthanasia, crisis, and revolution. These are words that suggest the depth of Kant's alienation from the prevailing culture of philosophy. And they are written in December 1765, just after Kant had completed the manuscript of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*.

It is clear that Kant has deep contempt for some members of the prevailing intellectual culture, but is not clear which persons he singled out. Lambert, whom Kant hails as a "genius," and with whom he commiserates and identifies vis-à-vis these boneheads, cannot have been meant. Certainly not Mendelssohn. But, judging from the persons to whom he sent copies of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, not Sulzer, either, or Formey or Süßmilch or Spalding—in short, none of the academy crowd in Berlin. Who then? The circle around *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend*? Nicolai? Lessing? Abbt? Were these really persons deserving of Kant's contempt? He usually reserved his venom for pedantic university scholars. Why was he now lambasting those in the *schönen Wissenschaften*? Where were Kant's allegiances?

Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Laywine writes, can be read as an "exercise in satire."¹⁶³ But that is, after all, a genre of *belles lettres* (*schönen Wissenschaften*). She goes on, "this is anything but the satire of Pope and Swift" for "*Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* is very badly written. . . . Second, the satire is out of character for the author. . . . [N]o one could have expected satire from Kant."¹⁶⁴ Kant himself had written only shortly before, "Satire never improves anything, so even if I had the talent, I would make no use of it."¹⁶⁵ What was Kant about? Laywine offers an ingenious reading of the text in which she strives to argue that Kant's own view should be sharply distinguished from the persona he invents for the satirical second chapter of the first part. Nevertheless, she notes that "the satirical persona [of the text] is perhaps as ready as Kant to criticize the standard metaphysics taught in the universities."¹⁶⁶ I submit, at least for *this* sentiment, that we *cannot* distinguish this voice from Kant's own.

It is certainly the case, as Laywine writes, that "by the time we have finished *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, we know for sure that Kant himself advocates an enquiry into the limits of human reason" (86). The open question is whether there is anything beyond "common sense" empiricism left for philosophy and, if not, why Kant does not commit himself to such inquiries, reducing philosophy, as Herder would have it, to anthropology. Laywine believes that Kant remains committed, even in this text, to a technical

philosophical project: "Kant's point at the end of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* is surely that we must do more than construct a genealogy of concepts. Our task is to determine *what is possible* for the understanding and human sensibility" (88). Yet she admits that the text does not undertake such an investigation; instead, she writes, "he wants to prove to learned, brilliant minds like Lambert and Mendelssohn that even the most responsible philosopher is bound to go wrong unless he first investigates the limits of human reason" (88).

I suggest that *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* does not stand as *proof* of anything, but rather as a confused *provocation* unwelcome on all sides. Mendelssohn made the point crisply in his review of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* for the *Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek*: "The jestful profundity [*scherzende Tiefsinn*] with which this little work is written leaves the reader in doubt as to whether Mr. Kant wanted to make metaphysics ridiculous [*lächerlich*] or spirit-seeing believable."¹⁶⁷ The result for figures like Lambert and Mendelssohn, as Casirer noted and Laywine affirms, was "bewilderment [*Befremdung*]." I would go further: it was consternation. Kant was offering a rather insulting mirror to his guild, and the guild took offense. Compare the shift in tone of Kant's two letters to Mendelssohn, one sending the text and the next apologizing for it: there is here something of a gambit gone awry. In the letter envying the text to Mendelssohn, Kant notes that it "contains more a quick sketch of the manner in which one should judge such questions than the exposition itself."¹⁶⁸ It is not entirely clear what "such questions" *are*, but it is clear that Kant shows no reticence about the work; indeed, his mailing list shows remarkable boldness. The persons in Berlin to whom Kant directed copies of the text read like a roster of those "learned, brilliant minds" Laywine writes of, the academic elite like Lambert and Mendelssohn, "geniuses," as Kant rather obsequiously flatters them in their respective letters. Copies go as well to Spalding, Süßmilch, Sulzer, Formey—men who took themselves for the scholarly elite and looked down on popularizers. Lambert had already given voice to his distaste for *belles lettres*, for merely "popular" writing.

Mendelssohn's (lost) letter to Kant must have been rather pointed, because Kant's reply showed a strikingly different tone: he noted Mendelssohn's *Befremdung* over the text, and he urged himself back into Mendelssohn's good graces by claiming that he was not serious in what he wrote, and that the way he wrote it was too disorganized for him to do it successfully anyway.¹⁶⁹ He explained that he was forced to write the text by the pressure of—as the text itself forewarned—"unrelenting pleas of known and unknown friends."¹⁷⁰ In the text he had chosen to satirize himself to show

that he was actually of two minds. The tenuousness of these rationalizations should escape no one.

Then he answered Mendelssohn's central concern:

As to my expressed opinion of the value of metaphysics in general, perhaps here again my words were not sufficiently careful and qualified. But I cannot conceal my repugnance, and even a certain hatred, toward the inflated arrogance of whole volumes full of what are passed off as insights; for I am fully convinced that the path that has been selected is completely wrong, that the methods now in vogue must infinitely increase the amount of folly and error in the world, and that even the total extermination of all these chimerical insights would be less harmful than the dream science itself, with its confounded contagion.¹⁷¹

That is as strong as anything Kant wrote, either in his letter to Lambert or in *Dreams* itself. It suggests that the tone Herder adopted in his contemporaneous essays was not so far out of line with Kant.

But, famously, Kant then relented, arguing: "I am far from regarding metaphysics itself, objectively considered, to be trivial or dispensable; in fact I have been convinced for some time now that I understand its nature and its proper place in human knowledge and that the true and lasting welfare of the human race depends upon it" (70). Thus, with this letter, Kant renewed his vows to metaphysics *in the name of* the "good of the human race." This was Kant's rejoinder to the claims of the *Aufklärung* of the 1760s for more immediate engagement, along Herder's lines.

Kant's promise to Mendelssohn kept him quite firmly in the guild of academic philosophy; the prospect of venturing forth into empirical or popular *writing* was from this moment foreclosed. That was not the impression the text itself aroused in Herder. Kant sent him the text of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* urgently, as each section left the printer, suggesting at the very least his interest in Herder's reception, if not the stronger possibility that Herder represented a kind of "ideal reader" for his text.¹⁷² Herder responded with one of the most appreciative reviews of the work, proclaiming it was evidence that Kant was pursuing "that worthwhile analytic path of always philosophizing *kat' anthropon*."¹⁷³ Recognizing it as a work of *schönen Wissenschaft*, Herder praised the fit of style with theme in the text.¹⁷⁴ He compared its "ingenuous good humor [*treuherzige Laune*]" to Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*, a favorite text of both authors.¹⁷⁵ Herder lionized Kant as "one of the greatest philosophical observers of the pathology of our soul[s]," and he found the concluding sections of the two parts full

of promise of a grand design through which Kant could reform philosophy (127, 130). It is, I think, striking that both the Mendelssohn review and the Herder review seek to understand the *Dreams* as the harbinger of a major philosophical reform, though they are hoping for starkly different directions from Kant. That suggests the text's deep ambiguity. In *Sensualistischer Idealismus* Marion Heinz argues that Herder and Kant were still very close while Herder wrote his review of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*.¹⁷⁶ Herder remained a Kantian not only through 1765, as Haym had it, but into 1766.¹⁷⁷ Yet the Kant in whom Herder believed was never entirely Kant himself. Herder misunderstood Kant's skepticism, Heinz argues, thinking it called for an all-out retreat to empiricism, while Kant was cultivating a more subtle agnosticism, carefully holding open at least the possibility of a spiritual realm. Missing this point, Herder leaned toward what Kant would later pronounce "dogmatic empiricism" from the vantage of his fleshed-out transcendental philosophy.¹⁷⁸

The distance between Kant's and Herder's appreciation of the "crisis of scholarship," in other words, the crisis of philosophy as a discipline over the 1760s, emerges clearly in an exchange of letters between teacher and former student on the occasion of Herder's (anonymous) publication of his *Fragmente*.¹⁷⁹ In May 1768, Kant wrote a letter of congratulations laced with admonitions.¹⁸⁰ He then described his own situation.

In my own regard, since I am bound to nothing and with a deep indifference towards my own opinions as well as those of others turn the whole edifice upside down and consider it from all possible vantages in order that in the end I might find the one from which I can hope to point towards the truth, I thus in the time since we parted have made room in many places for different insights and since my attention is focused primarily on grasping the true determination and the limits of human capacities and inclinations I do believe that I have pretty well succeeded at last, in the matter of morals, and I am at work now on a *Metaphysic of Morals* in which I imagine I shall be able to provide the self-evident and fruitful principles as well as the method according to which the to be sure very commonplace but largely fruitless efforts in this field of inquiry will need to be redirected if they are ever to accomplish anything. I hope to be finished with it this year. [74]

This extraordinarily rambling statement overwhelms the promise at its close in the "indifference"—indeed *aporia*—confessed at its opening. Even after the publication of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, Kant maintained his commitment

to publishing a work in the metaphysics of morals, as the letters to Herder in 1768 and to Lambert in 1770 attest. Yet no such work appeared for almost twenty years.

Presented with his first (and, as it turns out, *only*) letter from his great teacher, Herder sought to seize the opportunity to sound out Kant on the pressing issues of the day. While Kant had exhorted Herder to situate himself closer to Hume than to Montaigne in his style of personal essay writing, Herder argued that his esteem for Montaigne was higher, that Hume had been difficult for him to admire, while under the influence of Rousseau, and most of all that Kant had left out a third great model of this genre of writing, the Earl of Shaftesbury, whom Herder acknowledged as his "favorite companion." As for Herder's ideal writer, he put it so: "What a man that would be who could speak of Baumgarten's rich psychology with the spiritual experience [*Seelenerfahrung*] of Montaigne!" That Kant might be a candidate for this role (however odd that might seem to us) emerges from Herder's enthusiastic response to Kant's mention of his prospective publication on morals: "Provide for the cultivation of our century a work which will do for the question of the good what you have done on the question of the beautiful and the sublime." And that Herder continued to cherish this notion of Kant's pedagogical role is clear from a passage that Vorländer highlights: "In his *Journal of My Travels in the Year 1769*, in the context of his radical plans for reform in philosophy instruction, he proclaimed enthusiastically: 'A lively instruction in this field, in the spirit of a Kant, what heavenly hours those would be!'"¹⁸¹ The most important passage of the letter to Kant of 1768 goes as follows:

How much I would have to say to you if I knew you would have the patience to answer me. Doubts about several of your philosophical hypotheses and proofs, in particular where you concern yourself with the limits of the science of man, are more than speculations: and since there is no other reason why I took up my spiritual office than because I knew—and I am daily learning it more by experience—that it is in this way, under the circumstances of our civil constitution, we can best introduce culture and human understanding into that admirable part of mankind that we call the people; that sort of human philosophy is also my most preferred occupation.¹⁸²

When we contrast this agenda with Kant's, as articulated in the letter to Mendelssohn, we can discern the accelerating distance between teacher and former student.

Was Kant as complete an enemy of academic philosophy as Herder presumed? Was Kant an "anthropologist," a philosopher "for the people," as Herder envisioned? Clearly not. The Kant of 1765 was not yet ready to propagate in a published work the principles that he derived from Rousseau and communicated to Herder. Whatever Herder might have hoped from *Observations* and from Kant's lectures and their personal conversations, Kant would never share Herder's closing, remarkable avowal in "Wie die Philosophie": "what new fruitful developments would not arise if only our whole philosophy would become anthropology."¹⁸³ Kant aimed for a universal, necessary transcendental grounding of human experience; he remained in the established disciplinary order of philosophy.

After a brief interlude of "popular" engagement, Kant returned to a form of writing and thinking profoundly distant from popular audiences and equally remote from direct ethical-political theorizing. His sense—especially his *critical* sense—of philosophy as rigorous science long kept him from acting upon the impetus of his encounter with Rousseau toward public articulation in ethics, politics, anthropology, and history. The shift in Kant from theoretical to practical primacy, postulating that it occurred in the mid-1760s, did not carry with it a shift from academic to popular philosophy. While Kant toyed with that prospect, he turned away from it decisively by the end of the 1760s. Kant *rededicated himself* as an academic philosopher, after having briefly uttered some rather harsh judgments about his guild.

KANT'S PHASE OF "CRITICAL EMPIRICISM"

Where did Kant stand, philosophically, as he completed the text of *Dreams* in the winter of 1765? Josef Schmucker takes the letters to Lambert and to Mendelssohn as his decisive evidence that Kant had made a major breakthrough in metaphysics.¹⁸⁴ Let us look at those letters (again). I first considered them as evidence of Kant's repentance when confronted with the disapproval of his peers over his defection from disciplinary metaphysics to *belles lettres* (*schönen Wissenschaften*). But Schmucker retrieves the traditional reading, which sees the letters as evidence of Kant's unwavering commitment to metaphysics and even the dawning of his critical approach (26). Kreimendahl, eager to save all Kant's "breakthrough" for 1769, challenges his reading.¹⁸⁵ Yet even he grants Kant too much credence on the question of his devotion to metaphysics.¹⁸⁶ Only inveterate reverence for Kant (and our teleological hindsight) thwarts a skepticism regarding his

claims in these letters that the most rudimentary hermeneutical sensitivity would enforce.

The letters to Lambert and Mendelssohn are, to be blunt, disingenuous or self-deceived or both. Kant writes to Lambert, "unless I deceive myself I think I have finally reached some conclusions I can trust." He goes on: "For a number of years I have carried on my philosophical reflections on every earthly subject, and after many capsizings [*Umkipungen*], . . . I have finally reached the point where I feel secure about the method that has to be followed if one wants to escape the cognitive fantasy that has us constantly expecting to reach a conclusion, yet just as constantly makes us retrace our steps."¹⁸⁷ But the fact of the matter is that Kant remained caught up in just this fantasy for the next fifteen years! He constantly deluded himself that he had solved his problem, then awoke from his "dogmatic slumbers" and started again. Compare the virtually identical assurance to the same correspondent, Lambert, some five years later in the letter envying his just printed *Inaugural Dissertation*.¹⁸⁸ Compare his even more famous letter to Marcus Herz of February 1772.¹⁸⁹ We can admire Kant's persistence, but certainly we have grounds to question his success and especially his self-appraisal over that long, glum term.

It was not even accurate for Kant to write, "All of my endeavors are directed mainly at the proper method of metaphysics and thereby also the proper method for philosophy as a whole."¹⁹⁰ Such single-minded devotion to his coy "mistress" seems to me belied by his ventures into *belles lettres* in the *Observations*, by the preoccupations of the *Remarks in the "Observations,"* and even or especially by the satirical negativity of the *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*. We may, of course, grasp at Kant's claim, "I always look to see what it is I have to know in order to solve a particular problem, and what degree of knowledge is possible for a given question, so that the judgment I make is often more limited but also more definite and secure than is customary in philosophy" (82). But what evidence do we really have—especially in the light of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*—that Kant's judgments at that moment were "definite and secure"? The most convincing truth in the letter to Lambert lies largely in the following confession: "I have, however, departed so widely from my original plan that I now want to postpone this book"—and even then Kant cannot resist the delusion—"[for] a little while" (82). We have two sorts of hindsight to bring to bear upon Kant in this trying moment: the teleological consolation that he eventually did achieve "the culmination of [his] whole project" (82). And the historical insight that it would take a very long time for him to work his way through to it.

What of the letter to Mendelssohn? I have already dwelt at length on the element of repentance in Kant's letter. What calls for attention here is his proposal for renewed engagement with the problem of metaphysics. In proposing to "pull off its dogmatic dress and treat its pretended insights skeptically," Kant insists that he is not guilty of "frivolous inconstancy" but drawing the conclusion of "an extensive investigation." He goes on to write, "I think I have reached some important insights in this discipline since I last published anything on questions of this sort, insights that will establish the proper procedure for metaphysics."¹⁹¹ He even claims that he can "provide a specific criterion." It would appear that this specific criterion is what he elaborates a bit later in the letter: "In my opinion, everything depends on our seeking out data for the problem, *how is the soul present in the world, both in material and in non-material things*. In other words, we need to investigate the nature of that power of external agency in a substance of this kind, and the nature of that *receptivity* or capacity of being affected, of which the union of a soul with a human body is only a special case." But Kant raises several difficulties for this enterprise and concludes,

the upshot of all this is that one is led to ask whether it is really possible to settle questions about these powers of spiritual substances by means of a priori rational judgments. This investigation resolves itself into another, namely, whether one can by means of rational inferences discover a *primitive* power, that is, the primary, fundamental relationship of cause to effect. And since I am certain that this is impossible, it follows that, if these powers are not given by experience, they can only be the product of poetic invention.¹⁹²

That sounds very much like "critical empiricism" and even skepticism, not the "breakthrough" to critical philosophy. When Kant concludes, "Here we must decide whether there really are not boundaries imposed upon us by the limitations of our reason, or rather, the limitations of experience that contains the *data* for our reason," there are no grounds for the faith that this is an anticipation of the *transcendental* view and not rather a statement, like the one in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, much more plausibly to be associated with a *skeptical* ("pre-criticistic") one.¹⁹³

The letter to Herder of 1768 is striking both for its admission of aporia and for Kant's strained hope that it would be overcome.¹⁹⁴ In short, Kant in 1765–1767 was not breaking *through* on the front of rational metaphysics. He was breaking *down*. As Giovanni Sala puts it, considering the entire body of Kant's writing of the 1760s, it appeared that "for the entire set of inferences

of pure reason and its ultimate concepts (*conceptus terminatores*) Kant now allowed only a merely subjective or hypothetical character."¹⁹⁵ Kreimendahl makes the same observation.¹⁹⁶ Just here we come to the decisive *historical* crux, namely whether we should see Kant in 1766 as already embarked on the *transcendental* approach or only reaching a dead end—a skeptical-empirical impasse.¹⁹⁷ Assuredly, dogmatic metaphysics appeared to be in dire straits for Kant by the mid-1760s. But it seems that he was rather on the side of those who were toppling the idol than of those who were trying to save it.

There *was*, it seems necessary to remind specialists of the critical philosophy, a substantial period of his thought when Kant can best be understood in terms of a *moderate* skepticism, indeed, a "critical empiricism." Benno Erdmann subsumed the years 1762–1769 under that rubric.¹⁹⁸ In equally important terminology, Kant elaborated a "*pre-criticistic criticism* [*vorkritizistische Kritik*—my emphasis] of rational metaphysics," as Giovanni Sala notes.¹⁹⁹ The very phrase *Kritizistische Philosophie* gets lost in the comfortable English rendition, "critical philosophy," because it misses the hardening into an "ism," a systematic new philosophical position, complete with a whole new terminology and a set of doctrines that were ostensibly not subject to further revision.²⁰⁰ *Kritizismus* is the stance of the *Critique of Pure Reason* of 1781 and the ensuing works of Kant's mature philosophy. But *Kritizismus* took time to crystallize.²⁰¹ The critical turn was so protracted, there were so many turns along the way, that the old Leibnizian term *labyrinth* might come to mind. I think we need to take seriously Manfred Kuehn's suggestion: "In 1766 Kant was more or less satisfied with Hume's own foundation of this principle [of the limits of metaphysics and human knowledge in general], but by the beginning of 1772 he felt another foundation to it had to be given. Kant then rejected the 'indifferentist' view of Hume. Whereas before he agreed that the proposition 'all human reasoning is informal' is 'informally acceptable,' after 1771 Kant reverted to a formal analysis."²⁰² Given that Kant found Hume's "indifferentism" acceptable around 1766, we must explain why by 1771–1772 it was no longer acceptable.

WAS KANT OF ONE MIND IN HIS REJECTION OF POPULAR PHILOSOPHY?

Kant became "silent" for a decade, while the struggle for German Enlightenment in political and cultural terms was at a high tide, and when he published again in 1781, it was in a dauntingly esoteric form that, by his own admission, was not "capable of [much] popularity."²⁰³ One of the few

windows we have into this period is his correspondence with another of his favorite students, Marcus Herz, the eminent Jewish physician of Berlin. Scholars treasure Kant's letters to Herz because they contain some of the clearest indications of how his thinking took off from the critiques of his *Inaugural Dissertation* offered by Lambert and Mendelssohn in the direction of what would ultimately become the *Critique of Pure Reason*.²⁰⁴ But, at one point, this correspondence also sheds light on another—strikingly familiar—set of issues. David Friedländer, son of the Jewish merchant-banker of Königsberg and Kant's student as well, moved to Berlin in 1771, and his report of his studies with Kant jolted Herz, who wrote to his former teacher:

On his arrival my friend Herr Friedländer told me that you were no longer such a dedicated adept of speculative philosophy as you previously were, or even no adept of it at all, since on one occasion you unequivocally asserted that it is a futile form of rumination [*ein nutzlose Grübeleley*] that is understood by only a handful of study-bound scholars far too remote from the business of the world to bring about changes in line with their theories, and which for the remaining, greater part of the world is totally incomprehensible and so cannot possibly have any influence on their well-being. Apparently you told him that the only subject of study appropriate for a scholar was moral philosophy and its implications for the ordinary man.²⁰⁵

Apparently, if Kant's reassurances to Mendelssohn in the letter of 1766 and his endeavors in the *Inaugural Dissertation* of 1770 did signify his permanent adherence to the value of metaphysics, that was not the impression he left with this one student. Kant had not tempered his tone very much! Moreover, one may suspect that Kant delivered himself on this score *from the lectern*, not privately, for that was certainly his practice in the days of Herder. Of course, one wonders that Herz himself never heard Kant take such a tone, studying with him, as he did, in the critical years of 1766 to 1770. But Herz may have had his own reasons for deafness on that score: certainly a perusal of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* should have alerted him to Kant's ambivalence.²⁰⁶

We are used to trying to understand Kant's critical turn in "internalist" terms, as a breakthrough in philosophical argumentation. What we have explored here does not take away from this approach but adds an "externalist" supplement, Kant's vacillating sense of his own professional identification and strategy as a philosopher. That vacillation takes on an especially sharp point in light of the general culture of *Aufklärung* in Germany in the

1760s and the starkly divergent hopes of his still very admiring student Herder. In any event, the outcome allows a new view of the sequel. It is to consider whether Kant's "pragmatic orientation" as a teacher might have contributed to a *divisiveness* between his agenda in metaphysics and his agenda in anthropology ("the only subject of study appropriate for a scholar was moral philosophy and its implications for the ordinary man."). That has decisive implications for the inauguration of a course in anthropology in the year 1772.

'Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even *Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion*. are in some measure dependent on the science of Man; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judg'd of by their powers and faculties. . . .

Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in our philosophical researches. . . . There is no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz'd in the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security.

—David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*

Constituting the Discourse of Anthropology: The "Philosophical Physicians"

The participation of Kant and Herder in the genesis of "anthropology" cannot be grasped in an exclusively German context. To be sure, the Germans, as Cabanis was to observe in one of the culminating texts of the emergent field in 1796, were far more comfortable with the *term*, but the French (and the British) had long before been active in cultivating the *thing*.¹ Thus, we must funnel impulses from the widest European "*longue durée*" through to the two figures in Königsberg (and Riga and beyond) at the close of the 1760s in order to assess how, in the early 1770s, they helped constitute—at least for Germany—the core discourse on anthropology.²

In one of his typically witty and provocative essays, Odo Marquard suggested that a way to mark the epochal shift taking place in Europe around 1750 would be to note the emergence of three new (and in fact quite closely interrelated) subspecialties within philosophy: aesthetics, philosophy of history, and philosophical anthropology.³ It is just that crystallization—not as something *subsumed under* but rather *bursting loose from* philosophy—that characterized the emergence of a new disciplinary discourse of "anthropology" in Germany.⁴

The crystallization of anthropological discourse arose from the convergence ("con-fusion") of a number of disparate inquiries: the *medical* model of physiological psychology, the *biological* model of animal soul, the *pragmatic* or *conjectural* model of cultural-historical theory, the *literary-psychological*

model of the new novel (*Tristram Shandy*, *Sorrows of Young Werther*), and the *philosophical* model of rational psychology grounded in the quandaries of substance interaction (the Three Hypotheses).⁵ Thus, the interpenetration of insights from literature and medicine, from medicine and philosophy, from travel and history—this distinctly *metaphorical* transfer not just of data but of “ways of knowing”—is the distinctive feature of the emergent “science of man.”⁶ Its eclecticism was not a weakness; it was an opportunity for synthesis of an extraordinarily fruitful nature.

The complexity of the impulses out of which anthropology constituted itself is illustrated well in the agenda that the planners of the German conference on “The whole Man” (1994) sent out in their solicitation of participants.⁷ They designated four large areas: a “new discourse on body-soul,” a “new experience of human nature,” typical topics of eighteenth-century anthropological inquiry, and, finally, specifically *literary* anthropology. The first rubric spanned metaphysical and empirical considerations of mind-body interaction. The second referred to the various new domains of eighteenth-century medicine—physiognomy, dietetics, temperament analysis, animal magnetism, etc. Under the third topic, such foci as (empirical) psychology, genius and imagination, enthusiasm (*Schwärmerei*) and mental illness came to prominence. Under the last, travel literature and psychological novels merited special attention. A huge congeries of considerations were flowing together into a self-consciously articulated disciplinary research domain. “One thing becomes clear: the theory of man as a question concerning his essence, his nature and determinations, as a question of his place in the world, his powers and possibilities, his rights and obligations, his purposes and his goals, is the main theme of the century.”⁸

CONSTITUTING THE NEW EUROPEAN DISCOURSE OF ANTHROPOLOGY

As with the “essay” as a literary genre, the historical reach toward constitutive beginnings of the eighteenth-century “science of man” carries us back to Montaigne in France and Bacon in Britain.⁹ They proved seminal for what Sergio Moravia has characterized as decisive “epistemological liberalization[s]” through which anthropology as an eighteenth-century discourse could fashion itself.¹⁰ To that discourse Montaigne bequeathed introspective *observation*, and Bacon, the idea of (natural) *history*. Montaigne’s approach to subjectivity, his unequivocal affirmation of introspection and individuality, showcased an essential component of “epistemological liberalization,” the turn to the “life-world.”¹¹ The popular philosopher Christoph Meiners, in

his history of the emergence of the "*schönen Wissenschaften*," claimed that Montaigne was the originator of "*beobachtende Lebenswissenschaft* [the study of the life world by (empirical) observation]." ¹²

The second legacy, Bacon's notion of a historical approach to inquiry, is even more important, for it is crucial to discern—against the monolithic sense of method that seventeenth-century rationalism seemed to saddle upon the eighteenth—an alternative model, the "notion of natural history, the systematic collection of data, whether or not expressed precisely in quantitative form, without seeking to prove some particular hypothesis or other." ¹³ Thus, the "Baconian sense of history" betokened "the descriptive means to knowledge." ¹⁴ Such systematic fact-finding was "essential and fundamental" to scientific progress, as Bacon saw it. "Natural history" had no diachronic implication in its preponderant early modern usage. The diachronic sense remained concentrated in the sphere of the human. *Historia*, drawing on its original, extensive sense in Greek, entailed accounting for facts—description, to be sure, but also *explanation*, though not necessarily in a *narrative* form. This was Arno Seifert's crucial insight, that *cognitio historica* represented the most embracing concept of an *empirical* form of inquiry, in other words, a method based on observation and experience, in all the various fields touching upon human experience in early modern thought. ¹⁵

Bacon's influence, while it can hardly be termed neglected, nevertheless suffers from a bias in the interpretation of several generations of historians of science who disdain his "crude" empiricism. ¹⁶ The vogue of logical positivism, with its formal mathematical modeling of science, only accentuated this learned contempt. But revisionism in the philosophy of science carries with it revisionism in the history of science, and it is time to see Bacon's influence, especially upon the eighteenth century, in its truly progressive contours. ¹⁷ Nowhere is the case more easily made than in what has become the most exciting context for eighteenth-century studies of late, the Scottish Enlightenment. ¹⁸ P. B. Wood has made clear how important Bacon was in the educational foundations of the Scottish Enlightenment: "the study of Bacon's works was an integral part of the curriculum at each of the Scottish universities" from at least 1730. ¹⁹ Bacon called for "histories of the individual senses, the passions, and the faculties of the mind," Wood writes (91). And that was just what the Scottish Enlightenment proposed to achieve. Wood points to two crucial educational innovators: John Gregory, Professor of Medicine at Aberdeen, who "aspired to effect a Baconian reform of medicine . . . [utilizing] 'the strict method of naturall history & accurate induction,'" and Alexander Gerard, who presented *A Plan of Education in*

the Marischal College and [Aberdeen] University in 1755 on explicitly Baconian lines (91, 94). In his *Plan*, Gerard "argued in a Baconian vein that the arts and sciences served as 'the *sylva*' or 'natural history of the human intellect and its operations' for logic, since they provided the particulars from which the precepts of logic were to be inferred" (94). This naturalistic, generative view of logic as grounded in a historical account of human faculties was the decisive impulse of anthropological discourse (even as it would be, of course, the essential provocation to Kant's transcendental reprise).

David Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739) is the natural recourse for interpreters looking back on the eighteenth century and trying to seize upon the most pregnant formulation of its "science of man."²⁰ The "application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects" was the explicit ambition of Hume's text. Were one to take up the science of man, Hume believed, it would open up "a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new." He elaborated the central premise: "And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science of man must be laid on experience and observation."²¹ But, since Hume's work actually languished little read, the elements of the new style of thinking associated with "observation and experience" were largely constituted out of the legacy of Locke.²²

In conceiving the role of "natural history" in the constitution of eighteenth-century anthropological discourse, G. A. J. Rogers has suggested that we would do well to be more attentive to the famous phrase with which Voltaire celebrated John Locke in his *Philosophical Letters*. Voltaire wrote: "After so many random reasoners had been thus forming what might have been called the Romance of the Soul, a sage appears who has modestly presented us with the history of it."²³ Rogers suggests that Voltaire was consciously inserting Locke in Bacon's research programme.²⁴ Indeed, Locke's approach was largely conceived and received as a "natural history of the understanding," though Locke took history in its widest Greek sense.²⁵ The sanction of Locke's epistemology, together with his pedagogical and political thought, proved quite substantial for the emergence of anthropology in the European eighteenth century. By framing the question of human consciousness as the "history of human understanding," Locke initiated a general temporalization of human faculties.²⁶ As we have already observed, Locke transformed the most fundamental of all the philosophical disciplines, logic, in a starkly psychological direction.²⁷ He was the unquestioned source from whom Condillac, "the leading psychologist of the eighteenth century," drew inspiration, as Condillac in turn proved the inspiration of the Encyclopédistes and of Charles Bonnet.²⁸ Locke broadened the inquiry

associated with logic to a far wider conspectus; he "compared the operations of the human mind with those of the higher animals" and with the "mental states of idiots and madmen," and indeed, sought evidence from "the whole course of Men in their several Ages, Countries, and Educations."²⁹ Breaking free from mere introspection, Locke "opened up new perspectives on the relevance of history, anthropology, and the comparative study of languages for the science of the mind."³⁰

Thus, Locke proved "the source in enlightened Europe" of a set of epistemological liberalizations—the use of analogy, comparison, observation of particulars.³¹ A central metaphor of this trend was "bringing things down to earth" (250). We have repeatedly encountered this metaphor in Kant, Herder, and others as a crucial gesture of the turn toward "popular philosophy" in Germany. The gist is what Mably wrote, "let us study man as he is, in order to teach him what he should be," a line that immediately conjures up Kant's new project for ethical philosophy enunciated in 1765.³² An equally crucial idea, especially for Herder, was invoking the "whole man."³³ Rejecting what it envisioned as "Cartesian" dualism, the eighteenth-century science of man sought to "rehabilitate corporeality" from negative associations that actually had their sources long before Descartes in Platonism and Christianity.³⁴ The new "psychologists" believed even "the most impalpable and spiritual functions of man were to reveal themselves empirically, to exhibit sensible signs, and to permit an empirical analysis."³⁵ For example, from Peter Camper to Johann Lavater, the idea of "physiognomy" emerged as an elaborate effort to develop a semiotic of facial features.³⁶

The phrase "observation and experience," as a unit, fills the pages of eighteenth-century efforts to characterize empirical inquiry.³⁷ For that century, "observation and experience" seemed synonymous with *judgment*, in other words, a concrete, practical skill. For a whole group of thinkers, it seemed possible to make headway beyond a manifestly aporetic metaphysics by recourse to observation and experience. To do so required a fundamental shift in the notion of what *science* signified, the surrender of the idea of *absolute certainty* and the acceptance of a contingent, fallible, continuously evolving series of nominal approximations with some less than perfect order of subjective probability. To be sure, one had to surrender certainty. One even had to surrender conceptual determination through grounding definitions. "Nominal essences" would have to make do since the "real essences" behind the actual world—as Locke argued and even Leibniz sometimes conceded—were not likely to become accessible to human understanding.³⁸ If one made the transition to this "nominal" register, if one were content to settle for what "observation and experience"

could document, what one found was not, to be sure, absolute truth, but it could be an intersubjectively confirmable generalization, a "law," albeit contingent and fallible.³⁹ That change, perhaps one of the most fundamental in the history of human culture, developed, against great resistance, over the course of the eighteenth century.⁴⁰ At its close, neither Kant nor Hegel was comfortable with surrendering the old a priori idea of science. Kant remained conflicted and confusing on the question.⁴¹ Hegel was embarrassingly clear in his adherence to the old ideal.⁴² Leibniz, at the outset of the century, understood the problem and resolved it by discriminating a science as God might see it from the one mere mortals could conjure.⁴³ (How mere mortals could *know* how God saw things we pass over in silence.) Hume understood it, too, and felt quite content to abandon the old ideal and settle for the new one; that was the essence of his program for a "science of man."⁴⁴ Hume wrote:

For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and situations. And tho' we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, 'tis still certain that we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical.⁴⁵

Remarkably, Wolfgang Proß has discerned that the Abbé de Condillac began his decisive text, *Traité des sensations* (1754), with an unacknowledged but presumably transparent literal translation of this last sentence.⁴⁶ This was the core commitment of the whole movement toward empirical inquiry.

A decisive instance of this reorientation to empiricism and probability was Buffon. His enormously influential *Histoire Naturelle*, the first three volumes of which appeared in 1749, was grounded in his earlier methodological and philosophical studies in mathematics, probability theory, and epistemology.⁴⁷ He began his career as a mathematician, the translator and commentator of Newton's *Fluxions* (1740). He took to heart the powerful criticisms of the conflation of mathematics and metaphysics in Newton's natural philosophy regarding absolute space and time, especially as these were formulated by Fontenelle and Berkeley. Accordingly, Buffon insisted

on the distinction between "physical" and "abstract," in other words, between the *real* and the *formal*, in Kantian terminology.⁴⁸ Above all, Buffon insisted upon grounding science always in particulars. In the "Preliminary Discourse" to the *Histoire Naturelle* (1749), he wrote: "one progresses from observation to observation in the sciences of the real [*sciences réelles*]."⁴⁹ His entire enterprise was to "achieve some kind of immanent, connected understanding of [actual] phenomena" (129). Hence the essential recourse of natural science should be ever to induction and, in the absence of perfect knowledge, to *probability*.

The first half of the eighteenth century was crucial for the systematization of probability theory by such mathematicians as De Moivre and Bernoulli, and one of the centerpieces of that systematization was a discrimination of subjective from objective probability in scientific applications.⁵⁰ Most natural philosophers continued to believe that objective probability, as a function of the real order of events, should be regarded as certain. But this was essentially irrelevant to finite human observers, for whom the problem was subjective probability, an estimate of the confidence of the human grasp of objective nature: "The problem was that of assessing the degree to which human knowledge could be estimated to conform to the objective order of events."⁵¹ Buffon systematically invoked this probabilistic approach to underscore his nominalist suspicion of abstractions. As he put it, "That which one terms a physical truth is thus only a probability, but a probability so great that it is equivalent to a certainty."⁵² That is, "[t]he recurrence of the empirical particular organism, perpetuating itself by the 'eternal round' of generation, could satisfy, at least qualitatively, the necessary conditions for this calculus of physical truth" (120). It was on this basis that Buffon challenged the abstract classificatory scheme of Linnaeus, demanding a methodologically more defensible empirical connection to actual particulars.

Such a reorientation of scientific expectations made possible a recognition of the palpable "wholeness of man," despite the metaphysical abysses that "wholeness" bridged. Indeed, displacing the dichotomous mode of "soul/body" discourse (*substance* discourse) by one in the developmental/dialectical mode of "physical/moral" (*attribute* discourse) became, for Moravia, the central feature of the emergence of the science of man in the eighteenth century.⁵³ The invocation of these terms, while it did not solve the metaphysical problem of dualism, made of mind and body "two aspects of human being which are essentially homogeneous, or are at least no longer separated by an unbridgeable ontological abyss" (165). This was a self-conscious *naturalization* of man, and "the naturalists conceived of the *physique* and the *moral* as two sides of one and the same reality, of

one single totality."⁵⁴ Wokler explains that terms like *le physique* and *le moral* might appear interchangeable with *le corps* and *l'âme*, but unlike these, "they have an evolutionary connection in that one may give rise to and become transformed into the other." This allowed a "temporalization of the 'chain of being' in the Enlightenment."⁵⁵ But Wokler detects a decidedly materialist undertow in the terminology: "the Enlightenment distinction between *le physique* and *le moral* came after the mid-eighteenth century to be progressively rejected in favour of one dimension, *le physique*, alone."⁵⁶ More moderately, Lepenies argues that "with the breakthrough of the idea of development both things were possible: to accept the special place of man in nature without subordinating his nature to a uniqueness that set him utterly apart from the animal kingdom."⁵⁷

Indeed, this developmental model or "conjectural history" extended beyond the question of human communities into the natural realm. There was, decisively, a convergence from both conceptual poles, *nature* and (human) *history*, toward a synthetic middle ground.⁵⁸ Nature came increasingly to be conceived as temporalized (e.g., by Buffon), while human history presumed a measure of "universality" if only to encompass the profound "otherness" that its variety presented to the observer.⁵⁹ One of the central premises of the new view was that humans had always to be conceived as situated in, a part of, nature.⁶⁰ Hence the importance of "environment," of milieu and climate in the reconstruction of human experience, inaugurated by Montesquieu, developed by Buffon, and systematized by the Scottish Enlightenment.⁶¹ But the synthetic impulse reached out even more widely than this. Not only the study of primitives conjoined with the history of civilization, but also the question of animal-human comparison, the origins of language, the nature of sexuality, the problems of monsters and insanity—all seemed to be relevant to a grasp of *human nature*, which was, as Robert Wokler notes, a foremost obsession of the eighteenth century.⁶² Again, Buffon proved central in proposing the consideration of the human *species* as an object of natural history.⁶³ That suggests, in turn, an essential methodological parallelism between the new discourse of the "science of man" and the larger "natural philosophy" of the eighteenth century.⁶⁴

Diderot's *Pensées sur l'Interprétation de la Nature* (1753) offers one of the clearest statements of the methodological vantage of the "liberalized" new empiricism of the mid-eighteenth century. His exposition extended the idea of "interpretation"—a poetic or hermeneutic approach—to the natural sciences.⁶⁵ The question for Diderot was how one should guide inquiry, what basis could rescue science from "mere groping."⁶⁶ He resorted to *génie*, the notion that gifted experimentalists simply have a knack for knowing

which trail to follow, "an inexplicable intuitive awareness of the workings of nature."⁶⁷ Diderot believed in the place of hypothesis in empirical science, but such hypothesis was not transcendent (as Newton claimed) or transcendental (as Kant would claim), but imaginative. One had to find a place in the methodology of science for "imagination, analogy, and every individual creative and inventive faculty" (49). This is precisely what Moravia meant by the idea of "epistemological liberalization."⁶⁸ That was why Diderot used the term *interpretation*. That was why he proposed science belonged in an ensemble of inquiries that fell under the large rubric of hermeneutics.

Diderot was not prepared to seek transcendent "real essences": "The inquiry into causes remains so to speak within the domain of appearances, an analysis of the manifestations of the properties of matter rather than their 'nature.'"⁶⁹ Still, he distinguished between the mere *observateur* (Bacon's "empiric") and the *interprète*, for the latter sought general principles behind the phenomena. Dieckmann pulls this together in a summation: "If one now links the conception of the *interprète*, who by his conjectures transcends the endless dependence of one phenomenon upon the other and arrives at a determining cause, to the conception of the *genius of experimental science*, who alone is capable of creative conjectures, we seem to have in the *interpreter of nature* the scientist Diderot expected for the new investigation of things outlined in the *Interprétation*" (53). In opposing the mathematical approach to science on behalf of the emergent life sciences, Dieckmann argues, Diderot "adopts and follows . . . confessedly the ideas of Maupertuis and Buffon" (39). Indeed, one of the central projects of Diderot's work was to come to terms with Maupertuis's *Système de la Nature* (1751). Diderot was responding, in short, to a new breakthrough in science. "A new domain seemed to have been won for science which required a fresh, direct contact with things, new methods for their investigation, and which promised the discovery of the concrete 'individual qualities of things' " (55). Diderot presented a vision for the new empiricism of the second half of the eighteenth century that not only fit the endeavors of "the newly rising branches of natural and medical science" based on a "concept of experimentation which made the older one seem less 'concrete,'" but assimilated those endeavors to the "humanistic" ones involved in the "science of man."

THE "PARADIGM SHIFT" IN NATURAL SCIENCE: FORCE AND EPIGENESIS

Anthropology arose as part of the response to the failure of the mechanist paradigm to incorporate the life sciences.⁷⁰ The problem of human psychol-

ogy and the comparison of man with animals embroiled anthropology in the larger configuration of problems in natural science at midcentury concerning organic form. Organism was the decisive anomaly for the mechanist paradigm. Organism was the principle around which a new paradigm struggled to formulation. The displacement of physics by the life sciences proved decisive in setting the terms of the methodological debate.⁷¹ We can read this most vividly in the reflections of the great French natural philosophers—Maupertuis, Buffon, Diderot, and D'Alembert—around midcentury.⁷² In a short span of years in the 1740s, culminating in a series of decisive publications around the year 1749, this French ferment in natural science burst the mechanist paradigm apart and opened the way for the new life sciences and also for the "science of man."⁷³

This theoretical mutation began in the early work of Maupertuis and Buffon, who were in fact friends in close contact at the time. Maupertuis's *The Earthly Venus* (1746) was a pioneering effort to challenge the adequacy of the mechanist paradigm for the life sciences.⁷⁴ Its influence on Buffon and on the whole discourse of science in the mid-eighteenth century deserves greater consideration.⁷⁵ Moreover, his *System of Nature* (1751) was a statement that triggered some of the most pointed debates on the nature and method of science at midcentury, drawing responses from D'Alembert and from Diderot that are themselves landmarks of the paradigm shift.⁷⁶

There were three decisive frontiers of inquiry, three breaking points in the continuum of general scientific theory. First, there was the divide between the organic and the inorganic, "life" itself. Second, there was the distinction between animals and humans, the question of "spirit" or "reason" [or *language*]. Finally, there was the internal problem in humans themselves, the relation of the mind to the body, the question of "soul." From Descartes forward, these boundary problems had become acute. By the mid-eighteenth century the issues surrounding "animal soul" had taken command of intellectual discourse.⁷⁷ Somehow life, spirit, and soul had to be reconceived, however fallibly and contingently, for "experimental science." Indeed, it was a curious moment, at once unhappy with reductive mechanism (and its implicit or explicit metaphysics of materialism) and unhappy with traditional animism, in other words, the idea of a "soul" intervening in natural phenomena. These polar discontents were energized both by a commitment to *transcendent creationism* and by an admiration for *immanent natural process*.⁷⁸

The crucial breakthrough that brought on the paradigm shift around the middle of the eighteenth century was the connection between revisionist notions of "physical influx" and the idea of *hylozoism*, or "thinking matter."

All the impasses of eighteenth-century discourse in the linked spheres of metaphysics, physical theory, biology, and anthropology came to be bound up in the problem of hylozoism. That is: What properties could intelligibly be ascribed to matter, and how would this explain such issues as the causal relations of distinct substances, the principles of action at a distance, chemical attraction, electricity and heat, the mysteries of biological generation, and the mind-body relation? The inspiration was offered by Locke, though inadvertently, only as a token of the finitude of human knowledge. He made the simple point that because we could know nothing of real essences, we were not entitled to debar the possibility that God could endow matter with the power of thought.⁷⁹ Yolton has documented how Locke's conjecture about "thinking matter" ran like a red thread through eighteenth-century philosophical discourse in both Britain and France.⁸⁰ Nicholas Jolley suggests it was equally central for the genesis of Leibniz's *Nouveaux essais*.⁸¹ Others have discerned in the "sensorium" notion of space that figured so centrally in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence propensities toward a similar immanentism, a notion of "living nature."⁸² "Thinking matter"—hylozoism—became the physical-metaphysical possibility of the day. This was the *positive* sense of the term *Spinozism*, especially after the middle of the eighteenth century.⁸³ Denis Diderot gave brilliant literary expression to the impact of these ideas in *D'Alembert's Dream*.⁸⁴ By inserting into his provocative fantasy as the attending physician the redoubtable Dr. Bordeu, he showed himself quite aware of the importance of Bordeu's conjectures in the new science.⁸⁵ Diderot suppressed *D'Alembert's Dream*, but some of its ideas animated his earlier *Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature*, a text of extraordinary importance not only for the genesis of "popular philosophy" in Germany, via Ernesti, but for the genesis of the closely related new discourse of anthropology.⁸⁶

As Shirley Roe has noted, "biology was undergoing an intense philosophical reexamination."⁸⁷ The paradigm shift was epistemological and methodological more than it was a response to new data. The dominant idea of "preformation" had appealed to the age primarily because it "was consistent with the period's religious beliefs" and "solved a number of philosophical difficulties" (2). In effect, preformation removed the whole of organic life from the sphere of physics and transferred it to the original divine act of creation. Generation was excluded as a legitimate scientific problem; preformationism was not science, it was the avoidance of science, a stipulative denial of the very possibility of a *life* science. But preformation faced serious empirical anomalies. Not only could it not comfortably explain monstrous births or hybrid forms, but it also implied empirical verification

of its postulated homunculi under the increasingly effective gaze of embryological microscopy.

The decisive idea, the great idea of the epoch, was *epigenesis*, the idea of emergent order as an inherent potentiality in nature itself. *Epigenesis* was the scientific theory expressing the fundamental intuition of *hylozoism*.⁸⁸ Through it, the boldest minds of the eighteenth century proposed to explain the continuity between the living and the inert by rendering "force" immanent in the physical world. Through it, as well, they proposed to explain the continuity of animal and man using comparative anatomy to access comparative physiology.⁸⁹ Finally, through it, they proposed to explain the continuity from body to mind through the analysis of nervous response and "material ideas."⁹⁰ Buffon wrote: "it is possible to descend by almost imperceptible degrees from the most perfect creature to the most formless matter; from the most perfectly organized animal to the most inert [brut] matter."⁹¹ The "law of continuity" in its Leibnizian derivation, and the even older notion of the "great chain of being," came to be reconceived in terms of a dynamism that was altogether new. Arthur Lovejoy calls it the "temporalization of the great chain of being," the shift from a mere classificatory schema into a postulation of relation and development.⁹² What made the theory of epigenesis so attractive is that, at the most fundamental level, it accorded nature more *intrinsic dynamism* than its rivals.⁹³

Herman Boerhaave played a paradoxical role in this revolution. Though "a convinced Newtonian mechanist," P. H. Reill points out, "Boerhaave introduced the Trojan horse of substantialized forces."⁹⁴ In that context of theoretical discomfort, Boerhaave's two most famous students, Julien Offray de La Mettrie and Albrecht von Haller, each in paradoxical ways carried the revisionist impulse to a breakthrough around midcentury.⁹⁵ La Mettrie was as notorious in the middle of the eighteenth century for materialism as Spinoza had been for the prior century. But his materialism carried within it a great deal of the scientific novelty of the age.⁹⁶ La Mettrie's *title* and La Mettrie's *text* are two quite different things: there is a great deal more *vitalism* in La Mettrie's materialism than there is *mechanism*.⁹⁷ Moreover, his bold provocations made urgent the methodological and the metaphysical issues of the paradigm shift, with reverberations throughout all the "sciences of man."⁹⁸

Haller simply was the most important pioneer in physiology of his generation, yet his religious and philosophical orientation remained very traditional. It was just this embarrassment that La Mettrie exploited. He recognized that Haller's own research was enmeshed in the new breakthroughs in the life sciences but that his personal religious commitments could not

accommodate their implications. Callously, he exposed Haller's discomfort by dedicating the anonymous and scandalous *L'Homme Machine* to him.⁹⁹ The nasty exchange that ensued between the two figures exposed the crisis of metaphysical and theological commitments that natural scientific developments were occasioning.

Figures like Haller, Bonnet, and Buffon found themselves torn between metaphysical allegiances to dualistic spiritualism and models in empirical life science that clearly undermined such neat distinctions. While it is important to emphasize the undeniable *vitalism* of their research programmes as empirical scientists, simply to label figures like Haller "vitalists" is to obscure this critical problem.¹⁰⁰ Haller could never affirm that vitalism in its *philosophical* implications. Like Haller, Bonnet strove, despite his own theorizing of the law of continuity, to enforce a thorough demarcation between animals—apes in particular—and man. Buffon, for all his other differences with Bonnet, was at one with him here.¹⁰¹ He insisted that the "ape was no mediating link between the human and the animal orders of nature, but 'in truth just a plain animal.'" ¹⁰² Indeed, anatomical similarity only reinforced the claim that the difference which constituted humankind had to be sought in a separate, spiritual dispensation.¹⁰³ Reason and language belonged to a divine, spiritual intervention: that was the line which all these thinkers tried to hold.¹⁰⁴

One of the ways in which these figures, most of them committed like Haller on religious or philosophical grounds to some form of dualism, could work in this field was to distinguish between a "rational soul," which was immaterial and spontaneously active, and an "animal soul," which was corporeal and if not entirely passive, at least susceptible to a "simple model" of causation, which we might anachronistically call "stimulus-response." The model was Haller's "irritability." The distinction between the vitalism of Haller and the animism of Stahl is one of the linchpins for an effective understanding of what was taking place in the life sciences in the late eighteenth century.¹⁰⁵ Yet Haller himself developed the idea of "sensibility," which, if associated physiologically with the nervous system, nevertheless allowed for the "spiritual" intervention in the physical world that all these figures recognized as an empirical fact.¹⁰⁶

Bonnet's psychology was as influential in these regards as his theory of preformation.¹⁰⁷ As Hatfield explains, "Bonnet's psychology shared many features characteristic of the new psychological naturalism: he accepted dualism and the immateriality of the soul, without claiming to achieve an analysis of the substance of the soul; his arguments for the soul's immateriality sprang from the unity of consciousness and contrasted with

the conglomerate nature of material mechanisms."¹⁰⁸ At the same time he sought to assign the origin of all ideas to sense and describe the mechanism of their transmission to the mind in terms of "vibrations of nerve fibers and motions set up in nerve fluid," and especially to elaborate "the 'mechanics' (brain fiber physiology) of each sense with special thoroughness" (206). That made him Kant's target in his critique of "physiological" anthropology, even as it made him Kant's target for "transformationism" in both the first and the third *Critiques*.¹⁰⁹ For Kant, and not just for Kant, Bonnet seemed to be sliding into materialism. But that is just the problem: *all* these anxious thinkers charged the others with sliding into materialism. The boundary line was blurring beyond retrieval. All of these figures inevitably developed elements that *could* be taken in a strictly materialist vein. They dreaded just that. It was La Mettrie's grand offense to do just what they were afraid of. He made it clear that Haller, Bonnet, and Buffon, despite themselves, could be grist for an atheist-materialist mill. For science after midcentury, the divide that separated progressive from regressive "research programmes" (in the Lakatosian sense) came to be precisely the question of willingness or unwillingness to *explore and explain such continuities*. By that test, the greatest German scientist and the greatest German philosopher of the eighteenth century (Albrecht von Haller and Immanuel Kant, respectively) appear strikingly conservative.

Haller spent the balance of his career mending metaphysical fences between his pioneering physiology and the materialism it so largely presaged.¹¹⁰ This tortured role as scientific inspiration and theological-metaphysical obstacle makes Haller a crucial figure in the transition to the new science in Germany. The new generation of biologists learned a great deal from his pioneering work in comparative physiology, particularly from his controversial account of "irritability" and "sensitivity."¹¹¹ Yet they had to struggle to create metaphysical as well as methodological space for the new materialism.¹¹² Despite Haller, the whole movement was toward "vitalism." In that vein, neither the "atheist" La Mettrie nor the "zealot" (Ketzer) Haller appealed to the younger generation.¹¹³ Instead, *Buffon* proved the decisive influence.

BUFFON AND THE METHOD OF "NATURAL HISTORY"

In "The Gaze of Natural History," Phillip Sloan conceptualizes the development of a "natural history of man" in three phases: first, Linnaeus's step of classifying humans among the animals; second, Buffon's step of shifting the meaning of species from merely logical to real, from criterial to ontological; and finally, over the last part of the century, the incorporation of data

on empirical diversity drawn from the travel literature into a theoretical ethnography. We can take these as three decisive steps in the constitution of the discourse of anthropology in the European Enlightenment.

As late as 1693, John Ray had avoided including humans in his classificatory scheme; the break appears to have been Tyson's essay on the orangutan of 1699, which included man among the apes.¹¹⁴ But it was Linnaeus who, starting in 1735, made Europe face the problem that "for the first time human beings were explicitly included within a formal classification of animals and plants."¹¹⁵ Linnaeus made clear the implications of his move, that there could be no physiological basis for discriminating man from the rest of the animal kingdom.¹¹⁶ Buffon argued that it was uncomfortable to accredit "transformationism" because it would betoken some embarrassing kinships people were not willing to consider.¹¹⁷ The great debate in eighteenth-century life science about the "animal soul" was not so much over whether animals had souls or were mere automata as over "the potential conflict which any given answer carries within itself for the self-conception of mankind."¹¹⁸ As Wolf Lepenies has insisted, *man* was at stake in every aspect of natural-scientific inquiry in the late eighteenth century.¹¹⁹ Natural history bore directly on man's place in the cosmos. Theories of generation and species formation had direct consequences for human self-appraisal.¹²⁰

Buffon's break with Linnaeus and advocacy of causal-derivative linkage had radical implications for the treatment of humans. "The location of human beings among the animals was combined with a radical historicizing and naturalizing of the human species that would pursue zoogeographical analysis of humanity in connection with a gradually developing schema of a naturalized account of cosmological and geological history."¹²¹ But "the basis of the argument being developed here by Buffon is not intrinsically biological or even empirical, but epistemological," and its outcome was "opening to true historicity in the concept of species."¹²² In terms of decisive importance for Kant, Buffon maintained that "the question [of biological species] is ontological and not simply criterial" (122). Still Buffon refused to erase the boundary between humans and animals. What physiology could not define, he was prepared to stipulate in terms of reason and language as irrefutable evidences of a spiritual nature in humans irreducible to natural elements.

There remains the third phase of the introduction of natural history into eighteenth-century discourse, the incorporation of travel literature into a methodical ethnography. The very idea of ethnography as a source of insight into human nature, and together with *physical* anthropology constituting

the *same* discipline, Robert Wokler argues, is a recent notion.¹²³ The basis for the confluence was "a new understanding of man as a cultural being constituted through a historical process." Thus, the crucial concern to explain "improvement, refinement, liberty" led to a juxtaposition of the primitive and the civilized. "Comparative and historical methods became inextricable, together contributing to a properly *social science*."¹²⁴ A sense of the environmental context of human experience led to a fascination with non-Western cultures and the full-blown pursuit of *ethnography*—a term coined for Germany by August Ludwig von Schlözer precisely in order to raise historical inquiry to the level of true "universal history."¹²⁵ Here lies part of the explanation for the enormous vogue of travel literature. The key idea was that the *synchronic* dispersal of cultural levels demonstrated by the travel literature mirrored faithfully the *diachronic* evolution of human cultural levels, so that the juxtaposition of the "primitives" (Hottentots or Hurons) with contemporary Europeans told the same story of human "civilization" that could be constructed from the sequence of historical cultures from the ancient Fertile Crescent to the *siècle des lumières*.¹²⁶ One could set conceptually side by side Lafitau's *Moeurs des sauvages américains, comparées aux mœurs des premiers temps* and Voltaire's *Essai sur les mœurs* and establish four universal "stages of society."¹²⁷ Here, Buffon's most important reception came in the Scottish Enlightenment.

This grand "conjectural" project was the essential undertaking of the Scottish Enlightenment. It was there that the "science of man" found explicit articulation as "a genuinely sociological study of man, society and history."¹²⁸ The impetus is clear in Adam Ferguson, whose "whole approach to the study of man and society was grounded in the methods of the natural historians."¹²⁹ Likewise, Lord Kames "treated the whole of man's past as the subject of the natural history of man."¹³⁰ Monboddo and Kames proved enormously influential upon the German reception of the "natural history of man."¹³¹ Hume, Ferguson, and Smith were decisive in advancing the idea of a "science of man" grounded in a historical approach to human societies.¹³² The impact was not only on the *philosophy* of history but on the methodological practice of historiography.¹³³ Perhaps no one in Germany was as caught up in this whole consideration as Johann Gottfried Herder, but it is noteworthy that the professional historians, Johann Gatterer and A. L. von Schlözer were just as concerned to work out the implications of "ethnography" for "pragmatic history." The issue was precisely, how could one compose an authentic history of *mankind*? Herder and Schlözer would engage in a landmark debate on exactly that matter in 1772.¹³⁴ It betokened the full-fledged emergence of anthropological discourse in Germany.

THE EMERGENCE OF GERMAN ANTHROPOLOGY

At the close of the eighteenth century, looking back with a synthetic historical eye, Georg Gustav Fülleborn wrote:

[After 1750] anthropology in all its aspects and bearings became the concern of all, in particular at the instigation of English and French thinkers. Everywhere one insisted on the thorough study of the philosophy of life: The attention paid to natural history, philosophy of history, history of mankind, aesthetics, and pedagogy was partly the fruit, partly the cause of a practical approach in philosophy. This became increasingly popular and urged philosophers to look everywhere for new subject matter with which to enrich their discipline and to make it useful in life.¹³⁵

British influence was even more important than French.¹³⁶ "British philosophy of the eighteenth century . . . is no philosophy of professors for professors, but rather a philosophy in the world and for the world. It received its direction from society and gave the society direction."¹³⁷ David Skene, physician and naturalist of the Scottish Enlightenment, "asserted that the natural historian had to draw on history, biography, plays, novels, and the pages of the periodical press for his evidence."¹³⁸ Hume was one of a whole host of British thinkers who seemed to be recommending the same strategy and bringing it to fruition.¹³⁹ "Psychology, that is the motto," writes Reinhard Brandt.¹⁴⁰ He concedes that continental thought never became quite so psychological and reason remained a metaphysical idea, and this is surely true for Kant. But the psychological turn—and with it the turn to observation and experience, to empirical, a posteriori science—proved preponderant impulses from Britain that swept up Germany in the 1760s and constituted popular philosophy and anthropology.¹⁴¹ Brandt is clear that the *popular* orientation is part and parcel of the whole impetus. He traces it to "Addison's program . . . to bring philosophy into the coffee houses."¹⁴² Addison himself represented this as the second phase of a democratization of philosophy, in which the first came when Socrates "brought Philosophy down from Heaven, to inhabit among Men."¹⁴³ One of Addison's allies in this endeavor was the Earl of Shaftesbury, who complained that philosophy "is no longer active in the world. . . . We have immersed her, poor lady, in colleges and cells."¹⁴⁴ The British eighteenth century set about liberating her, and the primary vehicle was the blurring of the boundary of philosophy and literature in the common pursuit of (empirical) *psychology* as the key to human nature: in a word (though largely without it), *anthropology*.

One of the texts that transmitted the Western European impulses into German psychological discourse was Carl Friedrich Flögel's *Geschichte des menschlichen Verstandes* (1765).¹⁴⁵ In explaining his ambitions for his work in the preface to its second edition (1773), Flögel noted, "I wanted to maintain the methods of a natural scientist; to observe man himself or to see him observed by other reliable witnesses, and on this basis essay to construct a natural history of human understanding."¹⁴⁶ Flögel particularly disowned a "speculative" approach: "one ought to derive theory out of the given data and not, inversely, data from speculation" (7). Moreover, given the complexity of the matter at hand, overly drastic reduction in explanation was counterproductive: "an all too exact determination of human understanding leads us into labyrinths" (8). Huarte, in Flögel's view, had opted prematurely for an environmental determinism and Helvétius, in response, had asserted an equally reductive cultural determinism (7). Instead, a patient, empirical accumulation of relevant materials seemed an essential point of departure.¹⁴⁷

The natural history of the human understanding as Flögel sought to present it was a form of *schönen Wissenschaft*—in the broad sense of *studia humanitatis*. He insisted upon the integrity and seriousness of this form of *Wissenschaft* in explicit defense against its disparagement by Christian Wolff: "Wolff, that great mind, . . . knew little of the beautiful arts and sciences, [and yet] how often in his lectures would he make fun of linguists and 'Schöndenker' as he liked to call them."¹⁴⁸ The undertakings that constituted the natural history of human understanding set out under this cloud of disparagement in Germany, and Flögel sought to vindicate their legitimacy. The source of the disparagement, as Flögel clearly understood, was an imperious "received view" of philosophy as the arbiter of all science. Logic and metaphysics still presumed to constitute "first philosophy," and as such, first *science*. But it did not appear constructive to the other disciplines to await philosophy's *imprimatur*. Eighteenth-century inquiry into human nature—what would after 1770 call itself *anthropology*—constituted the birth of what we would today call the social sciences—or better, the humanities and the social sciences—not simply a vulgarization of "rigorous science," that is, philosophy grounded in a priori principles. The proper register in which to regard this phenomenon historically, I am contending, is the "calving away" or speciation of new disciplines. In that frame, it is simply begging the question to insist upon philosophy's prerogatives.

The core of a natural history of the human understanding was *psychology*, and psychology had to consider the relation of the mind to the body. "I do not propose to treat how the soul acts upon the body, but rather how the body and its different conditions have an influence on powers of the human soul"

(138). Flögel realized that the Leibnizian doctrine of preestablished harmony, or the philosophy of "monadism" as he termed it, denied the interaction of body and mind, but he argued that the "best philosophers" nonetheless operated on the assumption that the body affected the mind. He abjured achieving a *metaphysical* resolution of this problem, but he insisted that it was still possible to make empirical and pragmatic inroads into knowledge of the *fact* of body-mind interaction, however impenetrably mysterious its ultimate metaphysical ground (137–38). Along these lines he pointed to the work of Reimarus on the comparison of animal and human capacities, to the first efforts at brain physiology, to Haller's work on sensitivity in embryos, and to Krüger's program for an experimental psychology—all as impulses toward an empirical science of (physiological) psychology of great utility to the natural history of human understanding (or, anthropology) (140–54).

One crucial domain for inquiry in this psychology was the question of *genius*. The term came to theoretical attention, Flögel averred, first in France, but it had become the focus of intense discussions throughout Europe. He summarized the view of Du Bos, of Haller, of Helvétius, of Baumgarten, and of Sulzer (13–57). Genius as a *topic* and genius as a *resource*—this represents one of the most important elements in the emergence of anthropology in Germany. It proved of enormous interest to Mendelssohn, to Herder, to Platner, to Garve—and even to Kant. In Berlin, Resewitz, delivered a lecture on the subject of genius in 1755.¹⁴⁹ In 1757 Johann Sulzer addressed the Berlin Academy with an important "*Analyse du génie*," which was then published in the Academy yearbook.¹⁵⁰ Mendelssohn's theory of genius was part of this whole series of considerations taking place within the Berlin *Aufklärung*. In his essay on the sources and linkages of the fine arts and sciences, Mendelssohn had adhered firmly to Baumgarten's theory of *ingenium* as formulated in §648 of the *Metaphysica*, in other words, that genius was the perfect harmony of the human faculties, but no separate faculty of its own. But in his reviews for Nicolai's journal, the *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend*, starting in 1759, Mendelssohn began to move away from Baumgarten's theory. The first sign of this is Mendelssohn's defense, in the sixtieth letter, of the "unschooled" genius against those who insisted that genius must always be tutored by taste and regimen, as Gottsched and Gellert had made the premise of German criticism.¹⁵¹ Mendelssohn's effort to integrate foreign aesthetic theory into the German approach led him, perhaps somewhat unintentionally, to shift the discourse in a psychological and empirical direction away from Baumgarten's project as a cognitive approach to beauty. By incorporating a more psychological approach into his essays, especially the later ones, Mendelssohn helped bring the sensationalist and

naturalistic viewpoint of Du Bos, Batteux, and the French Enlightenment, and the related British school of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Kames, Hume, and Burke into fashion in Germany.

Shaftesbury set the British discussion in motion by linking genius with the "principle of pure aesthetic intuition," or "the process of pure creation" (322-25). He shifted the inquiry into beauty "from the world of created things to the world of creative process" (316). Thus, Porter observes that "after Shaftesbury the basis for aesthetics shifted from metaphysical geometry to empirical psychology, but the method of such analysis was largely introspective."¹⁵² Shaftesbury sought to articulate a notion of human creativity and spontaneity of a sort that, while immanent, was not material or mechanical.¹⁵³ The linkage of the strong feeling within the subject with imaginative responsiveness to grandeurs in the outer world of Nature provided all the elements of a theory of human creativity, the crucial notion of "genius."¹⁵⁴

The idea of the "unschooled" as opposed to the "learned genius" came from Addison's celebrated essay on genius in the *Spectator* in 1711, which had been translated into German in 1745.¹⁵⁵ While Addison celebrated the natural genius for the originality and power of his work, he also warned that this was exceedingly rare, and that it was highly dangerous to emulate such figures. The British Augustans generally believed genius could quite comfortably go to school in taste, learn rule and reason, and emerge the better for it as Virgil had done among the ancients, and Pope, among the moderns. It was against this that Warton rebelled in *Essay on the Genius and Writings of Pope* (1756). He denied that Pope was a genius at all. *Genius* meant for him precisely the mysterious and unschooled "originality" of a Shakespeare. In what was the most famous manifesto in this vein, *Conjectures on Original Composition* (1758), Edward Young put this quite bluntly: "An Original may be said to be of a vegetable nature, it rises spontaneously, from the vital root of Genius; it grows, it is not made."¹⁵⁶ Works of art developed as an organic consequence of the genius's soul.¹⁵⁷ Finding a response to this "enthusiastic" theory of original genius preoccupied the most serious philosophical minds in Britain in the late 1750s.¹⁵⁸ Mendelssohn and his colleagues were quite familiar with the debate provoked by Young's view, and had published an earlier essay by the poet in the second volume of their *Sammlung vermischter Schriften zur Beförderung der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste* (Berlin, 1759).¹⁵⁹ Flögel and the other anthropologically oriented popular philosophers thus took genius as a central concern for psychology as well as an essential resource for insight. All the major works in this vein would offer extensive discussions of genius.

Another important impetus in the *schönen Wissenschaften* and in the "natural history of human understanding" was the pursuit of historical inquiry, especially under the new methodological rubric of "pragmatic history." Flögel from the outset sought to present his own work as governed by the ideals and aspirations of this new idea of history.¹⁶⁰ Linking this new methodological aspiration with his elaborated theory of genius, Flögel suggested that even historians could demonstrate genius, but only if they conducted their inquiry pragmatically, that is: "If [the historian] writes pragmatically, if he tracks down the sources of events and the tiniest circumstances which often have so great an impact on the most important events though they are hidden from ordinary perception, then [he] demonstrates insight and discrimination and not mere memory" (26). The idea of pragmatic history was especially crucial for Herder.

I have suggested throughout that the impulses I have identified with popular philosophy and with anthropology linked up directly with the Enlightenment ambition for social-political progress, even in Germany. In one of the later chapters of his work, Flögel made the important observation that Shaftesbury and Addison, in addition to their advocacy of popularized philosophy, stood out as admirers of republicanism (225–30). That is, interest in the new science of man had a political overtone. Enlightenment, to make the point again, was for these advocates of anthropology not simply a matter of *popularization* but of *progress*, social and political change.

Empirical psychology in all its complex manifestations represented a major current of thought transmitted to Germany from Britain.¹⁶¹ This was true from literature to medical practice to formal philosophy. W. H. Walsh argues that what distinguished the British empiricists from Kant was their commitment to a psychological reductionism.¹⁶² "When Hume discusses what he calls 'the operations of the understanding' his ambition is to reduce them as far as possible to 'transitions' in the 'imagination' which come about as a result of past conditioning. . . . What we have here is not logic . . . but psychology: an account of mental operations which simply takes them as facts, without any attention to their purpose" (408). Locke and Hume carried German psychology away from its rational elaboration in Wolff and Baumgarten toward a physiological-observational psychology, an *Erfahrungsseelenkunde*. This was expressed most famously late in the century in Karl Philipp Moritz's journal, *Gnosse Seauton: Magazin für Erfahrungsseelenkunde* (1783–1793).¹⁶³ Martin Davies demonstrates effectively how Moritz's agenda for *Erfahrungsseelenkunde* was not simply idiosyncratic, but derived from the Berlin medical milieu in which his thought developed, especially the thought of Marcus Herz, Kant's student and one of

the most prominent physicians in Berlin, if not Germany altogether.¹⁶⁴ While Moritz's journal sought to systematize for the public the epistemological and scientific status of case-study analysis, this was a longstanding medical practice already.¹⁶⁵ Specifically, as Davies notes, the medical practice out of which Moritz developed his ideas involved "the assumption that the task of diagnosis is concerned with both the physical and moral nature of man."¹⁶⁶

THE GERMAN "PHILOSOPHICAL PHYSICIANS"

In the traditional early modern German university, the faculty of theology reigned. Gradually, in the era of absolutism, cameralist concerns with "policing" the state, together with the emergent sense of a "society" of economic activity in tension with the administrative state, promoted the faculty of jurisprudence to prominence.¹⁶⁷ Medicine was the one higher faculty in the German eighteenth century that seemed not to be pressing for any leadership role in academic culture. And, perhaps, within a strictly *academic* perspective, that remains true.¹⁶⁸ But by midcentury, medicine as a discipline was making a grander claim for itself, not within but beyond the academy, in the sphere of lived experience. Medical thinkers made the "whole man" an issue. In medicine the categorical dualism of body and soul made no sense at all. Physicians refused to allow "life" to be mystified into an inexplicable fiat. The register was not initially or essentially metaphysical or theoretical. It was not even simply diagnostic. It was *therapeutic*. The concern of the medical theorists was a health that required the harmony of body and soul and that had to attend to their mutual determinations. They had no choice but to intrude into the sacrosanct spheres of metaphysics, to become, in the revealing phrase of the day, "philosophical physicians."¹⁶⁹

That term originated in France as a rubric for the school of Montpellier, among others. Bordeu was among the most explicit in identifying himself as a *médecin philosophe*.¹⁷⁰ La Mettrie, another example, insisted that the philosophical physicians, and only they, could penetrate through the labyrinth of man.¹⁷¹ The French "materialists" saw themselves as anthropologists, and they proceeded with the "optimistic attitude that a physiological consideration of man would throw light upon obscure epistemological and moral-legal problem constellations."¹⁷² But the same impulse animated the Scottish Enlightenment. John Gregory was unquestionably a "philosophical physician." He "drew on Bacon's methodological legacy and developed a natural historical, comparative method, which incorporated the investigation of both body and mind, along with their interconnections" in his important work *A Comparative View of the State and Faculties of Man with Those of*

the Animal World (1765).¹⁷³ He "recommended as 'a very important enquiry to a physician' the investigation of the 'laws relating to the mutual influence of the mind and body upon each other,' along with the study of the 'history of the faculties of the human mind'" (93).

This "medical enlightenment" was the decisive background out of which anthropological thought arose in Germany after the middle of the century. Kondylis has made the important argument that the Enlightenment engaged in a "rehabilitation of sensibility" not simply in the sense of taking sensible experience seriously in cognition but in recognizing and attaching positive value to the animal nature of man.¹⁷⁴ This was the special project of the "philosophical physicians." One leading "philosophical physician" in Germany was Johann August Unzer.¹⁷⁵ In *Philosophische Betrachtungen des menschlichen Körpers überhaupt* (1750), Unzer maintained that there was a complete duplication or correspondence between every mental and every physical event in the human organism (43). From 1759 to 1764 Unzer edited *Der Arzt*, the most important periodical advocating "philosophical medicine" at midcentury.¹⁷⁶ Another key figure was Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Struve, who published *Anthropologia naturalis sublimior* in 1754. He called it *sublimior* because it included a discussion of the "higher faculties" within a general discussion of man: indeed, Linden sees Struve as the key forerunner of Ernst Platner in stressing the essential feature of anthropology as the wholeness of man.¹⁷⁷

The philosophical physicians found the antimetaphysical thrust of empiricism distinctly to their liking. They were committed to *influxus physicus* as a methodological premise, even if they recognized that they could achieve no metaphysical solution to the conundrum of the *commercium corporis et mentis*.¹⁷⁸ The work of the "philosophical physicians" was caught in the polarized field between Stahl's animism and La Mettrie's materialism, but like the latter they were determined to let "experience and observation [be] our sole guide."¹⁷⁹ The dominant medical hypotheses of the day presented a similar polarity, between Boerhaave's "humoral" and Stahl's "animist" theory of disease, but, as Wolfgang Riedel observes, "independently of the discussion about humoral, nervous or spiritual causes of illness, the therapeutic measures aimed at one and the same time at body and at soul."¹⁸⁰

The crucial enterprise was to develop empirical psychology from a medical vantage. The heroes of the "philosophical physicians" were the physiological psychologists, above all Albrecht von Haller and his disciples, Johann Georg Zimmermann and Charles Bonnet. Zimmermann published an important tract on medical practice, *Von der Erfahrung in der Arzneykunst* (1763–1764), in which he insisted that physicians needed to be diagnostic not only

of the physical but of the moral condition of their patients: "Moral and medical observations require the same spirit of observation. Whoever is capable of observing moral man well is capable of observing his illnesses well. . . . A true physician determines the illnesses of the body through immediately and correctly observed signs, just as a true moralist [discerns] the dispositions of minds."¹⁸¹ This is no exact science, Zimmermann admits, but it is an essential *empirical* practice.¹⁸² That is, "empirical knowledge is historical, narrative, and indicative."¹⁸³ Thus, Zimmermann celebrated his mentor, Albrecht von Haller, for having an interest simultaneously in anatomy and in literature, thus modeling what it meant to be a "philosophical physician."¹⁸⁴

Another key figure in German "philosophical medicine" was Johann Gottlob Krüger (1715–1759), a member of the medical faculty at Halle, then, later in his career, at Helmstedt. Krüger was a dedicated disciple of Wolffian *Wissenschaftlichkeit*, and he sought in his three-volume *Naturlehre* (1740–1749) to offer a rigorously causal account of human health not based merely on empirical ("historical") knowledge but grounded in principles, hence a "philosophy of the human body."¹⁸⁵ His later *Versuch einer Experimental-Seelenlehre* (1756) was another crucial text in the emergence of "philosophical medicine."¹⁸⁶ His key theoretical recourse was to the physiology of Albrecht von Haller. Krüger's interpretation of the body was "vitalist" but not "animist." He explicitly rejected Stahl.

In the first half of the eighteenth century, as John Yolton has observed, most advocates of the "physical influx" tradition were "content to trace the physical antecedents of perception to some area of the brain. . . . What the connection was between brain states and perceptual awareness [between body and mind] was left blank."¹⁸⁷ In the second half of the eighteenth century, advocates of physical influx became bolder. Central to the constitution of anthropological-psychological discourse in the second half of the eighteenth century in Germany was the concern with *animal soul*. Already a substantial literature had developed on this theme in France, and the Germans took that up and elaborated on it.¹⁸⁸ A particular focus of the German writing was the identification of language as the decisive divide between animals and man. The controversy centered on whether the orangutan could speak.¹⁸⁹ Anatomically, some thinkers argued, the ape should be able to do so. That only confirmed the spiritual nature of the distinction of humans from the other animals. The origin of language marked a decisive providential intervention in human history. This was the line taken up in Germany. G. F. Meier published *Versuch eines neuen Lehrgebäudes von den Seelen der Tiere* in 1749. Herman Reimar was another important theorist in this vein. His *Allgemeine Betrachtungen über die Triebe der Tiere, hauptsächlich*

über ihre Kunsttriebe (1762) insisted that there was a categorical difference between humans and animals, namely language capacity, that could not be naturalized.¹⁹⁰ Along the same line, Johann Süßmilch wrote an essay on the problem of language in connection with animals in 1766.¹⁹¹ This was the direct provocation to Herder's prize-winning essay on the origins of language, 1772, one of the breakthrough works of German anthropological discourse.¹⁹²

ANTHROPOLOGY AS *SCHÖNE WISSENSCHAFT*: THE "GÖTTINGEN PROGRAM"

Anthropology as a new discourse in Germany was the product of the alliance of these "philosophical physicians" with the popular "philosophers for the world."¹⁹³ Together they raised the new anthropology "into the central science of the time and into the more or less radical science of enlightenment."¹⁹⁴ Wolfgang Riedel minces no words: "One does not overstate to say that the German late Enlightenment stood out as an epoch of empirical psychology."¹⁹⁵ Accordingly, anthropology became "the royal science of the second half of the century."¹⁹⁶ With regard to this empirical psychology, no boundary could be set between science and literature. This was particularly vivid in the sibling nature of the domains of anthropology and aesthetics.¹⁹⁷ Wolfgang Riedel writes of a "triangle" formed by psychology, moral philosophy, and literature.¹⁹⁸ As Helmut Pfotenhauer has argued, literature was utterly embroiled in the ascendancy of anthropology as "the new, popular science of the eighteenth century" both as instigator and as executor.¹⁹⁹ To consider literary authors as merely the receivers of psychological insight from scientists and philosophers simply will not do.²⁰⁰ Hume was explicit in his acknowledgment of psychological insight from Alexander Pope, and there are few texts that so firmly deserve central place in any history of eighteenth-century anthropology as Pope's *Essay on Man*.²⁰¹ A strong case can and should be made as well for Laurence Sterne's *Tristram Shandy* as a major sourcebook for psychology, not simply a derivative of it.²⁰² In 1770 an astute observer of the times, Christian Garve, came to the conclusion that "the turn to psychology, that optic for analyzing the soul, was the real point of differentiation between ancient and modern literature."²⁰³ It constituted the programmatic literary theory of authors like Wieland, Blanckenburg, and Engel. Wieland called it "pragmatic" narrative, for it cast an analytic glance into the souls of its characters.²⁰⁴ Blanckenburg recognized literary authors, especially novelists, as *authorities* on psychology, working in parallel and in competition with physiological psychologists.²⁰⁵ The psychological novel became a vehicle, indeed a school, for moral judgment in the eighteenth

century [35]. Blanckenburg's celebrated theory of the novel of 1774 saw this as its decisive domain, and he used as his crowning evidence Goethe's *Sorrows of Young Werther* (1774).

In the late 1760s, as the impulses in medical psychology combined with the considerations of metaphysical teleology associated with the *Bestimmung des Menschen*, the German discourse of anthropology achieved its breakthrough. Feder and Meiners launched the "Göttingen program" of empirical inquiry into human experience.²⁰⁶ In the hands of Feder and Meiners, the Göttingen program represented the most aggressive agenda for *Popularphilosophie* in Germany in the *Hochaufklärung*.²⁰⁷ The "flowering" of the Göttingen school spanned the *Hochaufklärung* from the call to Feder and Meiners in 1768 to the fatal denunciation in Kant's *Prolegomena* (61). Indeed, this school dominated German discourse for a generation before its infamous and catastrophic tangle with Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy in the years 1781 to 1783.²⁰⁸ Colored by a (moderate) skepticism of British provenance, these philosophers propagated a critical-empirical eclecticism "not without an enlightenment pathos for thinking for oneself."²⁰⁹ The movement had a "prelude" in the more than fifty-year tenure of Samuel Hollmann, the first professor of philosophy at Göttingen and a strong anti-Wolffian.²¹⁰ By the time Feder arrived in 1768, though, Hollmann was, in Feder's words, "perhaps a bit too learned for the younger people, perhaps too old and too dry for the aesthetic tone that had come to dominance by that time."²¹¹

Feder became the acknowledged leader. Born in 1740, he had completed his dissertation in 1765 at Erlangen under Suckow. The dissertation was a defense of man as a social animal, against Rousseau's paradoxical primitivism.²¹² Indeed, hostility to Rousseau was one of the prime movers of Feder's early work. In 1768, anonymously, he published *Der neue Emil*, offering a far more conventional idea of education over against Rousseau's radical original.²¹³ In 1767 he published a textbook entitled *Grundriss der philosophischen Wissenschaft nebst der nöthigen Geschichte zum Gebrauch seiner Zuhörer*.²¹⁴ It sufficed to win him the *venia legendi* to Göttingen a year later. But, as Zimmerli has it, "When he came to Göttingen in 1768 Feder had no powerfully developed systematic or methodological standpoint."²¹⁵ The *Grundriss* was "an opportunistic and an embarrassing book [*ein Ge- und Verlegenheitsbuch*]" (64). Feder himself admitted he was "not yet ready for Göttingen. Without a fixed system, I waffled between Wolffian dogmatism and a skepticism produced by natural inclinations and readings[;] deeper insights had not yet been distilled, and proper bounds had not yet been established. These traits must have been discernible to

any expert."²¹⁶ His inaugural lecture was entitled *De sensu interno* and it appealed to Locke and the Scottish Enlightenment for a new approach to philosophy.²¹⁷ Immediately he plunged into the production of a textbook more in keeping with the avant-garde status he had suddenly attained. In the preface to this second textbook, *Logik und Metaphysik nebst der philosophischen Geschichte im Grundrisse* (1769), Feder proclaimed the book he had published only two years before and which had earned him the call to Göttingen "unusable," assuring his readers that he had applied himself "to prepare a more appropriate [textbook] for my current lectures."²¹⁸ A striking feature of the opening section, "Preliminary Report on Philosophy and the Philosophical Sciences in General," is that it sets out with an epigraph from Herder's *Fragments on Recent German Literature: Third Collection*.²¹⁹ The anonymous text gave expression to a sense for philosophy to which Feder felt an obvious kinship: "That philosophy [*Weltweisheit*] is the goddess of my heart which to begin presents sensible understanding, deigns to speak its language, goes along with it and then finally appears to it in the sphere of reason with all the brilliance of distinctness, then disappears."²²⁰ Just this manner, Feder argues, seems to him the best way to present philosophy to his students (6).

One of the central features of popular philosophy as I have tried to reconstruct it historically, is its insistence on the importance of the humanistic disciplines for the pursuit of philosophy, not only in terms of the *tone* of its presentation but in terms of the educative and humanizing burden of its content. At the outset of *Logik und Metaphysik* Feder proclaims, "it is my intention to advance knowledge that is of general utility."²²¹ Feder carries virtually unchanged from his earlier book into the new one a defense of the *schönen Wissenschaften* as the "daily physicians" of philosophical taste.²²² In his 1767 textbook, Feder had written, "Nothing is more unjust than when one urges that philosophy have nothing to do with the *schönen Wissenschaften* and nothing is more foolish than when one imagines that philosophy can do without them."²²³ In the new text Feder writes "Who could doubt that the *schönen Wissenschaften* must be the tenderest friends, the most constant playmates of philosophy?"²²⁴ This literary adornment of philosophy was rapidly becoming insufferable to Kant, as we shall see.²²⁵

The most important endeavor of Feder's new textbook, which became a best-seller in Germany and made him one of the most prominent philosophers of the decade, was to advance a starkly psychological reinterpretation of logic, deriving it from common sense. The origins of this notion lay unequivocally in John Locke. In *Logik und Metaphysik*, Feder made that clear in the crucial section on the "History of Logic." John Locke's *Essay*

Concerning Human Understanding, he wrote, "without doubt marked the most important epoch in the history of logic since that of Aristotle."²²⁶ In addition to Locke, the origin of this notion lay in the Scottish Enlightenment, and especially in the "common sense" school.²²⁷ But Feder was not nearly so rigorous as Reid or Beattie in his theory of knowledge. He opted for what Zimmerli calls a "quasi-empiricist basis" that he could never clarify. The resulting criterion of truth was utterly subjective: "what for all men cannot be thought otherwise, that, therefore, is true."²²⁸

Klaus Petrus argues that the idea of a "psychologistic grounding of logic in the sense of tracing logical thought back to healthy common sense" was the core idea of the Göttingen program. Feder inaugurated it, albeit imprecisely, and it was "carried to completion in a radical manner by Meiners with his distinction of exoteric from esoteric logic."²²⁹ Zimmerli agrees, noting that not only Meiners but Feder's student Michael Hißmann, before his untimely death, carried out this program with great rigor. The upshot was to find metaphysics completely pointless, a conclusion Hißmann drew explicitly.²³⁰ Hißmann produced a survey of literature in philosophy in 1778 that the review in the *Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek* recognized as one of the most discerning assessments of the trends in thought in the decade, and that made it clear that metaphysics was obsolete and "as an independent discipline should be allowed to disappear entirely."²³¹ In its place, Hißmann presented a rich characterization of the emergent fields of anthropology and philosophy of history. The reviewer was thoroughly in agreement: "That history is the main repertory of philosophy is correctly observed" (248).

The text that, in my view, presented the most persuasive formulation of the Göttingen program appeared anonymously in 1772.²³² The book was entitled *Revision der Philosophie*, and the author, an open secret, was Christoph Meiners. It was greeted with an enthusiastic review (also anonymous) in the *Göttingische Anzeigen von Gelehrten Sachen*.²³³ (The reviewer was not really secret either: it was Feder.) More than anything Feder composed, I suspect, *Revision der Philosophie* must have presented itself as a fundamental challenge to Kant's conception of philosophy, especially after his critical turn.²³⁴ Meiners, like Feder before him, took a Protagorean view of philosophy: "I believe that knowledge of man in this sense not only encompasses all the objects worthy of investigation by a philosopher, but also that it determines the boundaries [of philosophy] and its kinship with other sciences, and finally that it determines the differing order of importance for the presentation of its parts."²³⁵

Meiners was an unequivocal Lockian.²³⁶ The core of his book was the argument that logic be reduced to psychology. "Psychology and logic are re-

lated to one another," his famous simile went, "like an Aesopian fable to the attached moral."²³⁷ Thus, he proposed to discriminate two ideas of logic, the esoteric and the exoteric. While the former was a matter for abstruse thought, it was also not immediately accessible and not for the uninitiated. First, Meiners argued, novices needed to go through the preparation of "exoteric logic." That entailed first, familiarization with a complete ("encyclopedic") scheme of the disciplines; second, a study of general theoretical-scientific prejudices; third, an investigation of what was fashionable in the current culture; and fourth, practical guidelines for (a) how to be a scholar, (b) what to read, and (c) the "art of observation" (23). Meiners laid out his schema for this exoteric logic in great detail.²³⁸ As to esoteric logic, Meiners thanked Locke and Sextus Empiricus for keeping him from getting lost in all the nonsense of false precision (161). At the conclusion of his inquiry, Meiners averred, "I perceived that it was not possible to divide psychology from logic, and still less to allow the first to derive from the second" (164).

As his main sources for an adequate psychology, Meiners pointed to Condillac and to Bonnet.²³⁹ But he appreciated most David Hume's radical dichotomization of philosophy into two camps—philosophy of ordinary life and esoteric metaphysics—the better to debunk the latter. In Germany it was hard to grasp Hume because "in Germany hardly anyone knows the first kind, because we still have too few writers who have made true philosophy available in the language of the beautiful world."²⁴⁰ To accomplish this, Meiners contended, philosophy needed support from the *schönen Wissenschaften*. "History of mankind has filled the gap which lay between the general doctrines of philosophy and the particular facts of history. Before the long separated sisters were reunited, philosophy had lost herself in useless and indeterminate general propositions which had no fixity, no ground on which they were built; the historical inquirer on the other hand was bereft of principles and illuminating ideas through which the formless givens of history could be properly taken up" (139). It would be wonderful, Meiners professed, "if aesthetics and the history of the human mind and heart would be regarded as sciences which an ordinary professor of philosophy could not do without."²⁴¹ Unfortunately, metaphysics, "as soon as she elevates herself to queen of the sciences, contemplates beautiful literature, history and classical scholarship as unworthy slaves."²⁴²

Most significantly there was what Zimmerli called an "explosive element" in Meiners' *Revision*: "Once one can show that no philosophical opinion in the tradition has any advantage over any other, that all of philosophy can be transformed into the relativism of history, one forces oneself and others to think *independently* [*selbst denkend*] in coming to a position: 'The

great advantage of this method, transforming all of philosophy into mere philosophical stories, would be without question the healthiest imposition which one could make upon one's audience to think for themselves.'"²⁴³ The challenge of "historicity" to philosophy could not be stated more explicitly.

The constellation by 1770 was clear. Gatterer had established the *Allgemeine historische Bibliothek* to propagate the new "pragmatic" history. Herder began the reflections that would lead to his *Essay on the Origins of Language*, and Ernst Platner began the work that would result in his 1772 publication, *Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise*, a work that has ever since been recognized as the single most important indication of the emergence of anthropological discourse in Germany.

ERNST PLATNER'S *ANTHROPOLOGIE FÜR ÄRZTE UND WELTWEISE*

Ernst Platner was the most important figure in the emergence of anthropology in Germany, much to Kant's consternation. Platner's book defined the discipline for a generation. Eventually, however, Platner himself sought accommodation to Kantian philosophy, not least out of anxiety that his former student, Karl Reinhold, head of the Kantian circle at the University of Jena, would beset him with the same polemical vigor with which Reinhold and the Kantian circle assaulted the popular philosophers at Göttingen, whom Platner long admired, but whose reputations, he saw, were permanently destroyed by the polemic.²⁴⁴ Platner was born in Leipzig in 1744, the son of a surgeon. His father's early death left his education under the care of the great Leipzig philologist, Johann August Ernesti, whom we have recognized as a pioneering advocate of popular philosophy in Germany. In Platner the two currents of popular philosophy and philosophical medicine were fused from the outset. His university studies fused medicine and philosophy and he became extraordinary professor of medicine at Leipzig in 1770 (12–13). He was a brilliant teacher, "an unconventional, witty-ironic scholar who encouraged his students to make use of their own understandings" (13). He was, as one of his students observed, a philosopher for the world, not a speculative metaphysician.

Platner's book of 1772 set out from the quandary of the Three Hypotheses, arguing bluntly that none of them worked, and that this aporia of metaphysics allowed a new, empirical natural science to intervene, "anthropology" under the aegis of the "philosophical physician."²⁴⁵ Platner was more concerned to convince physicians that philosophy was worth their attention than to persuade philosophers to consider the medical is-

sue seriously. He pointed to the precedents of Boerhaave, Haller, Tissot, and Zimmermann, constituting the tradition of "philosophical physicians" upon which he proposed to base his own enterprise (viii). At the same time, he expressed his skepticism about the accessibility of this empirical-physiological science to the ordinary layman or even the university student and maintained that his work was intended for specialists, as the title implies (xviii). He characterized the field in terms of three sciences: first, a physical science of anatomy and physiology; second, a mental science or psychology (in which he included logic, aesthetics, etc.); and finally, his own science, anthropology, which achieved a synthesis of the two prior sciences: "body and soul in their mutual relations, limitations and interactions" (xv). Wolfgang Riedel observes: "Platner's concept of anthropology marks the exact point at which physical and moral anthropology, which [the two most important philosophical lexica of the first half of the century] had kept strictly separate, enter into interaction."²⁴⁶

Platner saw himself synthesizing the work of Albrecht von Haller and William Cullen, creating a new "central science" by binding together "physiological, vitalistic and neuropathological medicine."²⁴⁷ The problem, as Platner put it, was to conceptualize "the ways and means by which, out of movements of matter ideas emerge in the soul, and out of ideas of the soul movements emerge in matter."²⁴⁸ Platner unequivocally advocated physical influx and devoted an important section of his text to "the influence of the body on the soul."²⁴⁹ But he stressed *two-way* interaction, and he was very concerned—as were all the "philosophical physicians"—with the mental origins of physical disorders. Platner subscribed to the notion, already articulated by Haller and his disciple Zimmermann, that excessive mental exertion could result in brain damage (225–49). All in all, Platner relied heavily on Haller for his conception of the nervous system and its relation to the soul. "Platner's 'Anthropology' follows Haller's neurological model in all its parts: brain and nerves are a 'system of canals' in which a 'fluid material' called 'nerve fluid' or 'spirit of life' moves."²⁵⁰ Given this fascination with the nervous system, Platner was very interested in the question of a "place of the soul [*Sitz der Seele*]" in the body.²⁵¹ For Platner, this could only be at the center of the nervous system, in the brain. (This was the sort of thing, as we shall see, that Kant could never tolerate, either in Platner in 1772 or in Thomas Soemmerring in 1795.)

But this is not to say that Platner abandoned the immaterialist view. He believed unity of consciousness required the immateriality of the soul, because only simplicity could account for that unity, and the body, like all matter, was obviously a compound.²⁵² "The essence of the soul cannot

be recognized via reason but only and exclusively via experience," Platner maintained. "The essence of the human soul consists not in thinking but in a power to think."²⁵³ "The great difficulty for Platner as well lay in the question how one could describe the mediation of the physical with the psychic domains. The physician spoke of an inner movement of the nervous fluids in the brain and a setting of itself in motion by the powers of the soul. The reaction of the soul on the physical mechanism evaded all explanation."²⁵⁴ Still, Platner was sanguine about the prospects: "The question of the influence of the body on the soul is therefore no more difficult than the question of the influence of any simple element upon another." That is, "the attraction of magnets, the reproduction of animals—among other recognized mysteries of nature—are to be sure incomprehensible [*unbegreiflich*], that is, the external possibility of their effects is unknown by virtue of an absence of experiential knowledge; nevertheless it is possible to offer all sorts of possibilities and hypotheses about them."²⁵⁵

Platner's work was reviewed prominently in the best journals in Germany. Johann Feder reviewed the work in the *Göttingische Anzeigen*. Christian Garve reviewed it in *Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften*, and Marcus Herz reviewed it in *Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek*.²⁵⁶ Feder's review suggests the important sense of affinity that the Göttingen Program felt for Platner's project. In the same year, anonymously, Christoph Meiners had published *Revision der Philosophie*, and Platner had recognized the affinity, referring to that work explicitly as sharing his vantage.²⁵⁷ Meiners's work argued that it was impossible to distinguish logic from psychology, much less to derive psychology from logic, he argued that aesthetics was a form of psychology; and he argued that philosophy should be the study of man.²⁵⁸ All this Platner fully endorsed. (So would Herder, but not Kant.) Garve's review was far longer than Feder's and even more welcome to Platner, who began a long correspondence with the reviewer.²⁵⁹ Garve focused the bulk of his review, bespeaking his own and his journal's interests, on Platner's observations on imagination and on genius.²⁶⁰ While he raised some questions, the review's overall tone was quite positive. Marcus Herz, too, offered a positive assessment, much to the (somewhat circumspect) disgruntlement of Kant. Herz, a practicing physician, fully endorsed the concern that physicians must have with the relation between body and mind.²⁶¹ He saw a clear therapeutic imperative: bodily remedies affect the mind just as mental regimens have positive physical effects. He postulated that there must be a systematic and exact correlation between mental states and physical states. Herz asserted that medicine could not proceed a priori in its methodology but must resort to observation and experience (29). Unlike

Garve, but understandably in a student of Kant, Herz was interested above all in Platner's account of cognition.

These reviews were uniformly positive, and so was the wider reception. Platner's book became the text for a number of anthropology courses that developed over the last quarter of the century in Germany despite his view that this was not appropriate. More important, it was cited as the seminal text in the field by a generation of authors. Mareta Linden has surveyed this material in detail, pointing especially to such key figures as Johann August Ulrich, Christian Erhard Schmid, and Johann Karl Wezel.²⁶² What she adds, and what we need to underscore, is that "consequently Kant follows a different path from the anthropologists of his time" (137). To be sure, after 1790 there would be sustained efforts to integrate Kant's version with the other, even by Platner himself, who feared the polemical Kantian clique in Jena led by his own former student, Karl Reinhold.²⁶³ But for the better part of a quarter century, Kant's anthropology was at a considerable remove from what the preponderant pursuit of that field meant for Germany. Kant had little interest or confidence in *Erfahrungsseelenkunde*. By contrast, the young Friedrich Schiller, for example, steeped himself in these matters in preparing his various medical dissertations between 1779 and 1780.²⁶⁴ Kant was *not* a significant resource, but Platner was. Linden neglects Herder in her study, but there is at least some evidence that Schiller's most important teacher in this regard, Jakob Friedrich Abel, was quite familiar with Herder's key work, *Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele*.²⁶⁵ Platner—and Herder—proved extraordinarily important for the emergence of empirical anthropology in the late eighteenth century in Germany and—what needs underscoring—for a generation it was they and *not* Kant to whom the discipline looked for orientation.

Since, however, the sceptical method of escaping from the troublesome affairs of reason appears to be, as it were, a short cut by which we can arrive at a permanent peace in philosophy, or [if it be not that], is at least the road favoured by those who would feign make show of having a philosophical justification for their contemptuous dislike of all enquiries of this kind, I consider it necessary to exhibit this way of thinking in its true light.


—Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*

Nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu. Nisi ipse intellectus.

—Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *New Essays
Concerning Human Understanding*

Universal knowledge will always precede local knowledge as long as it is to be arranged and guided by philosophy, without which all acquired knowledge can provide nothing but fragmentary groping, and no science at all.

—Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*



Kant's Critical Turn and Its Relation to His Anthropology Course

Scholars have found little of interest in the chronological proximity between Kant's "breakthrough" to the critical philosophy and his creation of a new course in anthropology. The most important argument we have on this score is what I shall term the "Brandt thesis," namely that Kant's invention of an anthropology course followed directly from his determination, expressed in the *Inaugural Dissertation*, that there could be no place for any empirical inquiry in metaphysics.¹ While that is, of course, consistent with the evidence, I am not satisfied that it is a sufficient explanation. I propose to complicate this thesis in what follows.

We have established that the wider culture of the German *Hochaufklärung* found the turn to the "science of man," to anthropology as empirical inquiry, a far more exciting and culturally constructive enterprise than the traditional pursuit of metaphysics. Many, had they but known of it, would have adopted Herder's proposal of 1765: "What fruitful new developments would not arise if only our whole philosophy would become anthropology."² I have suggested that this was the message the Germans of the 1760s took from David Hume—indeed, from the entire British Enlightenment—and that it represented a fundamental redefinition of philosophy's *mission* as much as its *tone*. It was to be "philosophy for the world," not just in the sense that it would be accessible to common readers but that it would have a real and practical impact in the world. Concrete knowledge of actual affairs, not

speculation about ultimate meanings—that was the agenda at the core of the revisionism. Not that what Kant termed the timeless human concerns with metaphysics—God, freedom, immortality—had vanished from the cultural horizon, but clearly these values were no longer invulnerable to skepticism or critique. Moreover, the mundane had its own demands. Indeed, just these propensities alarmed cultural conservatives of the age.³ The issue is, where did Kant stand in all this turmoil?

Clearly, Kant emerged in his critical period as the great defender of traditional human concerns, albeit through a revolutionary new approach to metaphysics: limiting reason to make room for faith.⁴ For him, the interests in God, freedom, and immortality were not only persistent, they were paramount. It is one thing to suggest that Kant may have found academic philosophy pompous and obscure, but quite another to suggest that Kant *ever* fundamentally doubted the core values. That would seem to betoken that Kant could never have been a serious participant in the current of thought I have highlighted.⁵ But there is just too much evidence that in fact he was, at least in the 1760s. And in the 1770s he did become one of the most important German exponents of anthropology. But when he reached his ultimate stance, the vantage of the critical philosophy, Kant emphatically condemned the impulses associated with empirical psychology as an obtuse “naturalism.”⁶ His savage assault on popular philosophy in the ensuing years sufficed to ruin its reputation for good.⁷ What place, then, could anthropology have had for Kant in the context of his critical system? He insisted upon its utter subordination to metaphysics. But that was clearly in stark contrast with the impulse of the wider culture. Kant, as critical philosopher, became the opponent of the mainstream of the German *Aufklärung*.⁸ He sought to bend it to his will and in that he largely succeeded.⁹ But I want to hold out the prospect that this victory was one not only over external impulses, but over impulses very much Kant’s own. What we can ascertain about Kant’s critical turn, both in terms of his establishment of a new approach to metaphysics and in terms of his repudiation of popular philosophy, should occasion some disquiet regarding the coherence of Kant’s goals for his new anthropology course in 1772–1773 with the goals of the wider movement to found that discipline.¹⁰

Therefore, I suggest that we adopt the heuristic of conceiving Kant as advancing on two fronts at the close of the 1760s, one that led to the critical philosophy via the *Inaugural Dissertation*, and one along the lines of the popular philosophers toward an empirical science of anthropology. The actual anthropology lectures from 1772–1773 onward represent the vector sum of these divergent forces. It would appear that for the better part of the

late 1760s Kant was much farther along on the anthropological track than he was on the metaphysical one. But two things happened to Kant's plan to become the German academic authority in anthropology. First, it was thwarted by the appearance of rival experts, notably Platner. But second, it was thwarted—or at least *dwarfed*, by Kant's even greater ambition to become the authority on *metaphysics*.

There are, accordingly, two distinct undertakings in this chapter. First, we must grasp Kant's critical turn in the years between his publication of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* and the first anthropology lectures. Second, we must ask what philosophical concerns motivated Kant to repudiate popular philosophy and conclude that anthropology must be subordinated to metaphysics.¹¹

In his various drafts of the 1790s for the *Preisschrift* on progress in metaphysics, Kant characterized the history of philosophy in three epochs: dogmatism, skepticism, criticism.¹² The inherent flaws of dogmatic metaphysics inevitably provoked a skeptical attack, he maintained, which brought such metaphysics to a "standstill (*Stillstand*)," to an "impasse (*Sackgasse*)."¹³ But because the interest in metaphysics was indispensable for humankind, things could not be left there, and criticism came to the rescue by finding a way properly to meet the skeptical challenge. Kant's famous narrative of the history of philosophy is, of course, simultaneously if not even primarily intellectual autobiography. The heroic final movement preoccupied not only the original narrator but also his epigoni. By contrast, the second, negative moment was, in the nature of all such narratives, a trial swiftly to be got through in the retelling. Kant, after all, had a *romance* with metaphysics, and in the story of his life he insisted on its happy ending.¹⁴ Overcoming skepticism: this has always been the climactic moment of the narrative—for Kant as for philosophy. That is the monumental achievement of the first *Critique* of 1781. Kant's personal history of philosophy became in substantial measure the discipline's. It has shaped the self-conception of modern philosophy—and not just among orthodox Kantians.¹⁵

KANT AND THE "CRITICAL TURN"

There is enough material from Kant unequivocally to establish that the project which culminated in the *Critique of Pure Reason* of 1781 lasted approximately twelve years, with the final collation of the text taking place in four to five months in 1780.¹⁶ That would put the origin of the critical period around 1768–1769. When Kant was asked, at the end of his life, how to assemble his collected works, he recommended that nothing before the

Inaugural Dissertation (1770) be included.¹⁷ Accordingly, we can presume that for Kant the cesura in his philosophical endeavors lay between the *Inaugural Dissertation* and what had gone before, and this is what Kant scholarship has generally presumed by the terms "precritical" and "critical" in periodization. Clarity dissolves, however, when we seek to get much more concrete. Can we ascertain how and when Kant moved out of the aporia of 1766 to the "optimism" of 1770?¹⁸ Was that even the decisive step from "critical empiricism"—from skepticism as the standstill of dogmatic metaphysics—to full-fledged *Kritizismus*? Kant, the narrator, leaves us somewhat in the lurch here. He tells too many stories and they do not all converge.¹⁹

With the possible exception of the nature and validity of the transcendental deduction, nothing has been so minutely examined, so heavily contested, and so dauntingly unresolved over the two centuries of Kant studies as the account of Kant's critical turn. In the second half of the nineteenth century, it seemed to many scholars that a "developmental history (*Entwicklungsgeschichte*)" of Kant's thought was the only way to comprehend its systematic meaning. Kuno Fischer was perhaps the most outspoken proponent of this view, but it animated the indispensable work of such great Kant scholars as Wilhelm Dilthey, Benno Erdmann, Alois Riehl, Erich Adickes, Hans Vaihinger, Emil Arnoldt, and Otto Schöndorffer.²⁰ With them, the *philological* challenge of building the critical edition of Kant's writings—especially the painstaking work of establishing the sequence of his unpublished texts—compounded with the *philosophical* challenge of finding the entire corpus logically coherent. But then the so-called metaphysical school of Kant interpretation of the German 1920s, led by Heinz Heimsoeth, and later the Anglo-American analytical appropriation of Kant after Peter Strawson shifted Kant interpretation in a sharply antihistorical, systematic direction.²¹ Especially for the last mentioned school, the question was not the *historical* influence of Hume on Kant, for example, but rather how each of the two philosophers measured up to contemporary standards of epistemological rigor.²² Developmental-historical issues were not resolved; philosophers simply changed the subject.²³ As Lothar Kreimendahl puts it, "no one any longer expected from the reconstruction of the history of the emergence or development of Kant's critical philosophy any directing insight for its systematic interpretation or superior understanding."²⁴

Yet historical issues have resurfaced with the philological innovation in Kant studies associated with the critical edition of Kant's lectures. Today again attention has focused on the moment—or perhaps the *series* of moments—at which Kant worked out the decisive lineaments of transcen-

dental philosophy.²⁵ It is tempting, of course, to conceive the shift to have occurred all at once, along the lines of Kant's metaphors of (sudden) "awakening" and of "great light."²⁶ Indeed, there is a strong desire to concentrate the entire reorientation in the year 1769.²⁷ Unfortunately, the evidence is not so cooperative. Even Kant's autobiographical testimony is conflicted, and the assessment of the developmental history of his writings has proven ferociously controversial.²⁸

If we are to take the claim about "great light" seriously, we must find something very special to have occurred in 1769.²⁹ But that does not necessarily mean that the entire breakthrough to critical philosophy took place then. It goes without saying that we take seriously Kant's claim that David Hume awakened him from his dogmatic slumber, but we are hard pressed to identify when and how this took place, and it is by no means certain that it was in a single moment and that this moment came in 1769.³⁰ If we are to take seriously Kant's claims that it was the problem of the antinomy of pure reason that occasioned his creation of the critical philosophy, there is even more reason for ambivalence, for it is still less clear that the antinomy problem (or even the idea for its resolution) can be pinpointed to the year 1769.³¹ The most innovative developmental historians of the critical philosophy have been pressing us to take Kant's engagement with Hume and his engagement with the antinomy problem as two sides of the same coin.³² Yet it is hardly unequivocal to presume that the antinomy problem and the "reminder" from David Hume should have been one and the same, especially since Kant nowhere explicitly linked them.³³

To turn from autobiographical hints to text-immanent philosophical issues, if the point of the critical philosophy is to proscribe dogmatic metaphysical speculation—or "dialectic," in the terminology of the first *Critique*—then the *Inaugural Dissertation* seems an inauspicious text with which to mark its inception. If we take another of Kant's claims seriously, namely that the transcendental deduction was the most difficult and important achievement of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the evidence is little short of overwhelming that this idea had not occurred to Kant until after 1772.³⁴ And if Kant's essential rebuttal to "empirical psychology" is not that it has no place in metaphysics but that it has no claim to objective warrant whatsoever, in other words, that it can never be rendered "rational" or "scientific," then we are pressed to ask when Kant conceived the "Paralogisms" and the fundamental rejection of rational psychology, and that seems clearly to belong to the later 1770s.³⁵ In short, the long passage from the *Inaugural Dissertation* to the first *Critique*—what has been called the "silent decade"—suggests that only conceiving the emergence of critical

philosophy as a *sequence* of difficult breakthroughs, rather than a single, transfiguring moment, can be adequate to the historical evidence.³⁶ The more we know about it, the more nuanced is our sense of the steps it took to get all the way to the stance of the first *Critique*. We now ask the much more sophisticated question, "from what moment did the possibility (and the necessity) of submitting his already formulated and already elaborated critique of rational metaphysics to revision on the basis of transcendental idealism occur for Kant?"³⁷

I suggest this is even more the case if we consider the *fifteen* years and more from *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* to the appearance of the first *Critique*. The first historical point to establish is the protracted silence of Kant *before*, not after the *Inaugural Dissertation*. There were five long years separating the publication of *Dreams* (early 1766) and that of the *Inaugural Dissertation* (late 1770). These five years represent the most perplexing and critical years for any conception of Kant's intellectual development, yet they are very thinly documented. We have, for example, not one single publication or letter from Kant for the entire year 1767. In 1768 he published the brief essay "Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume," with important implications for the *Inaugural Dissertation* and the ultimate "transcendental aesthetic."³⁸ The only correspondence we have from that year is the exchange of letters with Herder discussed earlier and considered anew in the pages to follow. For 1769, we have only the letter Kant wrote to decline the offer of a chair at Erlangen.³⁹ For the rest we are thrust back upon Kant's *Reflexionen*, to the phases Adickes subsumes under the Greek letters ζ through κ. As it turns out, these *Reflexionen* are pretty thin, especially with reference to the relation of anthropology to metaphysics, and their dating is sometimes excruciatingly controversial.⁴⁰

So what was Kant writing for those five years? A first response is that this is the wrong question to ask. We need to consider what Kant was *reading* then, namely Leibniz's *Nouveaux essais*, the new edition of the *Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence*, Plato, Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Euler's *Reflections sur l'espace et le temps* and later his *Letters to a German Princess*, and Lambert's *Neue Organon*. Equally important for Kant was the debate over the *Bestimmung des Menschen* and the Platonic turn Mendelssohn took in consequence of it in *Phaedon*.⁴¹ Kant read Basewitz's *Philalethie* and Meier's influential *Beyträgen zu der Lehre von den Vorurtheilen des menschlichen Geschlechts*.⁴² But Kant was also immersing himself in the literature of the wider Western European Enlightenment. As he advised his students in the *Blomberg Logic* of 1771, "Some books are of great importance and require considerable inquiry[;] these one must read

often. E.g., Hume, Rousseau, Locke, who can be regarded as a grammar for the understanding, and Montesquieu, concerning the spirit of the laws."⁴³ I believe that all this reading—notably including David Hume—"roused" Kant, but in a paradoxical way.

On questions of metaphysics, it sent him literally back to the drawing board. In his system of 1762–1763 and in the Herder lectures, Kant built his metaphysics primarily around the three fundamental "synthetic" concepts of space, time, and force.⁴⁴ In an annotation from the 1790s, Kant identified several loose pages of his *Reflexionen* as "from my oldest deskcopy of Baumgarten's *Metaphysics* with interleaved pages[,] from when Herder was my student. Space, time and force. Long before the Critique."⁴⁵ In all likelihood these loose pages are Adickes's *Reflexionen* 3716 and 3717.⁴⁶ *Reflexion* 3716 sets out from a distinction between probability and truth, and between subjective and objective warrant. "Truth has objective characteristics [*Merkmale*], but the certainty that in any given case this objectivity has been attained we can only have subjectively, that is, by the consistency of knowledge with itself."⁴⁷ To this statement the reflection then adds a series of annotations of uncertain dating, one of which sets out with a discrimination between the principle of noncontradiction as the ultimate criterion for reason and the "principle of the highest reality" which is the parallel ultimate criterion for all sensibility. That suggests that Kant is already working (at least in these annotations) with the distinction of sensibility from understanding, which is the harvest of his "great light" and the basis for his *Inaugural Dissertation*. He adds that metaphysics "is not a philosophy about objects, for these can only be given through the senses, but rather about the subject, namely its laws of reason" (259). Kant holds in the *Reflexion* that it is possible for metaphysics to treat the subject "dogmatically," in other words, with rational certainty, but the object only problematically.⁴⁸ Thus, he claims that "to determine the limits of reason has a positive as well as a negative component; in the first case, to demonstrate the scope of rational knowledge, and [in the second] to demonstrate the constraints."⁴⁹ It is the scope of rational knowledge that occasions interest in this discussion. But the essential point for Kant *in retrospect* was his discrimination of space, time, and force as *synthetic* concepts, from all other concepts, which were merely "analytic" (257, 259).

In *Reflexion* 3717, Kant reorganized his conceptualization in terms of *three* sorts of principles. Space and time were "principles of form of all experiences," noncontradiction was the "principle of form of judgments of pure reason," and there was a third sort: "the principle of form of all judgments of reason *a posteriori*," and here Kant situated "ground and force."⁵⁰

The *transfer* of force from its association with space and time betokened two crucial discriminations on Kant's part. First, *sensibility* (space and time) represented a different mode of cognition from the other conceptual principles; and second, *force* (and with it, cause and effect) belonged to the domain of a posteriori concept-construction. That is, causality (force) was neither merely formal nor capable of independently securing the reality of any substantive judgment. Kant developed the first distinction at length in terms of the notions of coordination versus subordination as he would in the *Inaugural Dissertation*. But he insisted that "all connections (in the real sense) [still require] space, time and force." Presumably this also made real connections inevitably a posteriori, but the text is not explicit. What is explicit is that Kant believed it both possible and necessary to investigate a priori the "grounds of knowledge," even if the *objects* of knowledge could only be known a posteriori (260). Whence came this confidence in reason's self-scrutiny? One answer is that the "great light" of 1769, just by establishing the separate character of understanding from sensibility, gave Kant the hope that an isolated and purified reason, freed from the *vitium subreptionis*, could proceed with utter apperceptive lucidity. That, as we shall see, was the source of a tremendous new optimism in Kant about the prospects for metaphysics after 1769, something Herder had never experienced when he was Kant's student.

Kant's motive for highlighting the origin of these *Reflexionen* was Herder's publication of the *Metacritik* in the 1790s.⁵¹ Kant and his circle sought to discredit Herder by claiming that the basis for Herder's "new empiricism" (*Jäsche*) was not original, but cribbed from Kant, and from a superseded, precritical phase of Kant's thought.⁵² That in the recollection of the old Kant it was important to situate the critical philosophy *after* Herder was his student suggests a distance was rapidly growing between the two men at the close of the 1760s. Stavenhagen reports Kant was "horrified" by Herder's *Fragmente*.⁵³ He probably got this impression from something written much later, when Kant was unequivocally bitter toward Herder. But Kant was disturbed by Herder's first publications—and not just for the sake of his former student but for the sake of the larger course of *Aufklärung* in Germany.

What Kant feared above all was the intrusion of aesthetic criteria into the domain of rigorous inquiry, the collapse of *cognitio philosophica* not merely into *cognitio historica* but into "beautiful science," a mannerism without warrant or worth.⁵⁴ This is clearly discernible in his admonitions in the letter to Herder of 1768.⁵⁵ The intrusion of such a "beautiful science"—literally *schöne Wissenschaft*—into philosophy was highly deleterious, Kant

maintained. "Much, e.g., that now is actually accounted as lastingly beautiful in our writing style is nonetheless nothing but the fashion of our time. Very many learned men and beautiful minds [*schöndenkender Geister*] are actually often more harmful than useful to the learned world. A *Young*, a *Klopstock*, a *Gleim*, etc., have, e.g., really spoiled a multitude of weak minds."⁵⁶ These are the pioneer authors associated with what in Germany came to be called *Sturm und Drang*.⁵⁷ Kant's distaste for Herder's dominant role in *Sturm und Drang* would become blatant in his *Reflexionen* of the mid-1770s.⁵⁸

With the publication of the logic lectures, among other sources, we now have reason to trace Kant's anxiety earlier, and even to attach to it a systematic significance. Especially in the *Blomberg Logic* we can see Kant wrestling with the question of whether aesthetic perfection and discursive perfection can be brought into synthesis.⁵⁹ He still acknowledged the ideal, but he began to shift it beyond human capacity (54–55; tr. 39). Of course, Hume and Rousseau represented real exemplars of just such an approach, but Kant was now turning to the view that their literary brilliance was detrimental to their philosophical reception, if not even to their philosophical insight. "What prevails in our current age," Kant lectured at the outset of the 1770s, "is not an addiction to demonstrating but instead a certain shallowness, a kind of gallantry even in learned cognitions" (235; tr. 187). He elaborates elsewhere:

It is absurd to mix feelings [*Empfindungen*] with appearances [*Erscheinungen*] in philosophy. Meier and Feder have this flaw. If the author [Meier] says such judgments are very practical what he should be saying is that they are very moving and exciting [*rührend und reizend*]. Many authors have compromised the esteem for their philosophy because they allowed themselves to be misled into mixing feeling [*Gefühl*] and taste in with it. Rousseau is one of the greatest geniuses. But he mixes into his writings something novelistic [*romanhaftes*], and therefore his sharp mind is not really recognized by everyone and the power of his arguments remains unknown to a portion of his readership. Hume, because he mixes a great deal of novelty into his writings, is considered by many a rhetorician [*ein beredeter Mann*] more than the acute philosopher that we have really come to recognize.⁶⁰

Already in a *Reflexion* from the mid 1770s, Kant has made his choice: "Even if like Hume I had all the decorative skills [*alle Verschönerung*] in my power, I would still have reservations about making use of them. It

is true that some readers will be frightened off by dryness. But is it not necessary to frighten some off, since otherwise what matters would fall into the wrong hands?"⁶¹ Here we perceive the origin of what would become Kant's blatant estrangement from popular currents of *Aufklärung* by the time his first *Critique* appeared.⁶² Tracing the divergence of paths between popular philosophy and metaphysics in Kant himself over the years of the late 1760s and early 1770s, especially as it affected his conception of his anthropology course, will lend more substance to this hypothesis.

THE "GREAT LIGHT" OF 1769 AND THE INAUGURAL DISSERTATION OF 1770

The publication of the *Inaugural Dissertation* of 1770 is central to the developmental history of Kant's critical turn.⁶³ It has led most scholars to believe that the breakthrough of 1769 had to do with Kant's subjectivization of space and time and discrimination of sensibility from understanding as human faculties of cognition.⁶⁴ At the same time, the *Inaugural Dissertation* has appeared as much a *roadblock* as a breakthrough on the path to *Kritizismus*, because, side by side with the innovative approach to sensibility, space, and time, it clearly embraced a dogmatic metaphysics of the retrograde sort that even "critical empiricism" should have circumvented. Thus, we are presented with the spectacle of Kant scholars explaining away the *Inaugural Dissertation* in their quest for a smooth passage from 1769 to the first *Critique*. Giorgio Tonelli is particularly anxious: "The *Dissertation*, whose philosophical orientation evinces great differences from the doctrines of 1769, is accordingly no immediate consequence of the 'great light' of the year 1769; and its problematic cannot be appraised as symptomatic of the experiences which led to the peripety (*Umwälzung*)."⁶⁵ Josef Schmucker, Lothar Kreimendahl, and Frederick Beiser are also eager to look past any dogmatic "backsliding" in the *Inaugural Dissertation*.⁶⁶ By contrast, Lewis White Beck views this as the moment of Kant's deepest dogmatic slumber, and there are others, notably Norbert Hinske and Reinhard Brandt, who insist that we do not get to the decisive critical turn until after 1772.⁶⁷

Something clearly did happen in 1769. What was the "great light"? Kant suggests in the *Reflexion* that culminates in the famous line about the great light in 1769 that it was considerations about the antinomy of pure reason that ushered in his breakthrough.⁶⁸ Norbert Hinske has formulated the developmental history of Kant's antinomy problem in terms of three phases.⁶⁹ The first phase Hinske associates with Kant's growing awareness of contradictions in particular philosophical claims. Historically, the wrangle

between Newtonians and Leibnizians over the first half of the eighteenth century offered paradigmatic instances.⁷⁰ Sometime, certainly by the *Inaugural Dissertation* according to Hinske, Kant advanced to a second stage, in which he found a systematic *explanation* for this discord, what Kant called "subreption," namely, the conflict between the human faculties of cognition: sensibility and understanding. According to Hinske, this was not the ultimate form of the problem, however. That was only achieved at the third stage, when Kant realized that the source of the conflict lay entirely within reason itself, in the internal conflict of its own principles. Hinske believes that this came only in the period after 1772. It was this problem, a singular "antinomy of pure reason," that preoccupied Kant in the critical writings, even in the expanded sense of antinomy presented in the second *Critique*. For Hinske, only this compelled Kant at last to enter the full-fledged transcendental phase of his philosophizing, what we are calling here *Kritizismus*.

What is latent in Hinske's account is that Kant could entertain, in the so-called second phase, the short-lived illusion that simply isolating the two faculties of sensibility and understanding might resolve the antinomy problem. Thus, it might well have appeared to Kant, as he wrote in his letter to Lambert in 1770, that he had finally achieved a definitive solution to the problem of metaphysics. In this connection, Lewis Beck suggested an interesting thought experiment. He suggested that we imagine what Kant would have composed as his *Inaugural Dissertation* had the chair in Logic and Metaphysics at Königsberg been conferred upon him in 1768, say, just after he published his essay on the regions in space, instead of 1770.⁷¹ For Beck the decisive point of this thought experiment is to reveal Kant's newfound faith in the possibility of a "theoretical, speculative metaphysics." If that is the consequence of the "great light," Beck goes on, "the essential discovery [of 1769] was that of the difference between the senses and the faculty of thought as a difference between two independent sources of knowledge" and this "radical differentiation" owed more to the Leibniz of the *Nouveaux essais* and to Plato than to either the antinomy problem or to David Hume. Beck points especially to the new terminology of the *Inaugural Dissertation* whose origin appears "genuinely Platonic and genuinely Leibnizian."⁷²

In the period under consideration, Kant seemed to cling unhesitatingly to supersensible metaphysical *beliefs* (God, freedom, immortality) while insisting upon the redirection of theoretical *inquiry* to empirical science. In that light, the *Inaugural Dissertation* is all too consistent. Tonelli notwithstanding, the "great light" associated with the distinction of sensibility from understanding in 1769 could occasion just the sort of "optimism" necessary

to inspire this Indian summer of dogmatism.⁷³ If all the problems with metaphysics lay in "subreption" and if we could have "pure" reasoning on supersensible matters, then Kant could keep all his old beliefs and still be "critical." He could suit Mendelssohn and Hume. While with the actual world we could only work with nominal definitions, because the real essence of objects was inaccessible to experience, in the case of our own reason we were fully capable of attaining to the real essence, and hence to apodictic certainty about these concepts. Or so Kant thought in 1770.

Already in his letter to Lambert of September 2, 1770—only some twelve days after he defended the *Inaugural Dissertation*—Kant wrote, "The first and fourth sections can be scanned without careful consideration; but in the second, third, and fifth . . . there seems to me to be material deserving more careful and extensive exposition."⁷⁴ That is, Kant already dismissed the sections that dealt with the intelligible world as not worthy of further discussion. Only his discrimination of the laws of sensibility and his insight into their subreptive impact upon epistemology seemed important to Kant. "The most universal laws of sensibility play a deceptively large role in metaphysics," he wrote to Lambert, and therefore "a quite special, though purely negative science, general phenomenology [*phaenomenologia* [sic] *generalis*], seems to me presupposed by metaphysics" in order to prevent the application of the principles of sensibility "to objects of pure reason, as has heretofore almost always happened" (108). Kant believed, in short, that he had made a breakthrough in isolating and therewith empowering the proceedings of pure reason, "that is, something thought through a universal or a pure concept of the understanding as a thing or substance in general" (109). Thus, despite his apparent dismissal of sections 1 and 4 in the letter to Lambert, Kant still clings to the prospect of *substantive* supersensible knowledge (although he does use the less ambitious term *thought*, rather than *knowledge*, here). In other words, the propaedeutic new science of "general phenomenology" might be purely negative, but the ensuing metaphysics would *not* be. Kant was in that measure still a "precritical" thinker.

Yet there is a procedural sense, even of the most egregiously "metaphysical" arguments in the *Inaugural Dissertation*, that has philosophical force. Kant makes a meaningful distinction when he writes, "whatever conflicts with the laws of the understanding and the laws of reason is undoubtedly impossible. But that which, being an object of pure reason, simply *does not come under* the laws of intuitive cognition, is not in the same position." Kant explains: "subjective resistance often creates the false impression of an *objective* inconsistency. And the incautious are easily misled by this false impression into taking the limits, by which the human

mind is circumscribed, for the limits within which the very essence of things is contained."⁷⁵ Kant will persist in this view throughout the critical period, holding out, for the sake of practical-metaphysical concerns, the possibility of *thinking* the supersensible without contradiction, even if no *knowledge* of this realm is possible. In section 5, the epistemological consequences of his insight are spelled out in terms of three classes of "subreption" arising from the confusion that the laws of sensibility that limit human cognition also necessarily limit all rational possibility. The general principle is enunciated in section 5, §24: "great care must be taken *lest the principles which are native to sensitive cognition transgress their limits, and affect what belongs to the understanding*" (407). Subreption is the creation of a "hybrid axiom, which tries to pass off what is sensitive as if it necessarily belonged to a concept of the understanding."⁷⁶

In the *Dissertation* Kant blames this error for what in the first *Critique* he will call the antinomy of pure reason. In particular, Kant identifies the two so-called *mathematical* antinomies in §28 of section 5:

According to the laws of the pure understanding, . . . any series of caused things has its own *principle*; that is to say, in a series of caused things there is no regress which is without a limit. According to sensible laws, however, any series of co-ordinates has its own specifiable *beginning*. These propositions, of which the latter involves the *measurability* of the series and the former the *dependence* of the whole, are mistakenly supposed to be identical. In the same way, *the argument of the understanding*, which proves that, if there is a substantial compound, then there are principles of composition, that is to say, simples, has added to it something *suppositious*. This addition, which has been covertly drawn from sensitive cognition, maintains, namely, that in such a compound there is no regress in the composition of the parts to infinity; that is to say, that there is a definite number of parts in any compound. (411)

These two metaphysical issues of the *simple* and of a *world* were, indeed, the starting points for the whole *Inaugural Dissertation* (377–79). Kant sought throughout the text to explicate the radical difference between coordination and subordination, sensibility and understanding.⁷⁷ His hope was that the traditional metaphysical ideas could be rescued from their apparent impossibility once freed from the influence of misguided subreption. Kant's insistence that reason could think a principle encompassing infinity, without being subject to the imagination's capacity to supply that principle with a corresponding intuition, remains central to the argument in the

"Transcendental Dialectic" of the first *Critique* and in the treatment of the mathematical sublime in the third *Critique*.⁷⁸

The thrust of Kant's thinking in the entire *Inaugural Dissertation* is to liberate reason from the bounds of sense, but in just so doing he creates monumental problems for his eventually central project of bringing reason and sense together in determinate judgment.⁷⁹ Thus, the second and third forms of subreption he identifies in the *Inaugural Dissertation* need to be considered in that light. It is especially critical to ask about the role of *time* in the constitution of judgment. Kant writes, "although the concept of time does not enter into the concept itself of the predicate [of a judgment], it nonetheless serves as a means for giving form to the concept of the predicate. Thus, as a condition, it affects the concept formed by the understanding of the subject, for it is only with its help that we reach the latter concept."⁸⁰ For Kant in the *Inaugural Dissertation*, this is a source of fallacy. For the Kant of the "Transcendental Analytic"—especially of the "Analytic of Principles" and the "Schematism"—of the first *Critique*, however, this is an indispensable mediation which alone allows the pure categories to apply to sensible intuition.⁸¹ But this problem—the transcendental problem—is not apparent yet to Kant in 1770. He still sees only the problem of subreption, the introduction of *impurity* into reason. Thus, he is concerned to rescue the essential *analytic* principle of pure reason, the law of noncontradiction, from temporal contingency. The judgment, *whatever simultaneously is and is not, is impossible*, he calls a properly formed judgment of reason, which imposes an a priori rule upon a sensibly constructed subject. But the judgment, *everything impossible simultaneously is and is not*, is "predicating something generally by means of sensitive cognition about an object of reason," and while that is "in the highest degree true for the laws, by which the human understanding is constrained and limited; it cannot, however, in any way be conceded objectively and generally."⁸² Possibility and impossibility, Kant is saying, are matters of pure reason, which cannot be constrained by the sensible form of time, even if humans can only experience contradiction *through* the form of time (simultaneity). The domain of the *logically possible, hence thinkable*, extends beyond the bounds of the sensibly given (and, in critical theory, therefore *knowable*).

The third form of subreption Kant identifies in the *Inaugural Dissertation* is even more imbricated in the problem of determinate judgment, for indeed, "the conditions which are peculiar to the *subject*" are relevant to empirical cognition "because it is only with their help that a concept of the understanding can be applied to a case given by experience" (413). As

his critics were swift to point out, by *isolating* pure reason so effectively in his work, Kant had made a severe problem for himself in establishing just how, at all, pure concepts of the understanding could apply to experience.⁸³ His category of "subreption" proves too extensive: it renders determinate judgment impossible.

Yet, I would suggest, that is a position of some integrity. It is the position, namely, of David Hume, for whom relations of ideas could well be *a priori*, but remained strictly *formal* (or *analytic*), while judgments concerning matters of fact were inveterately *a posteriori*.⁸⁴ Judgments of matters of fact, while *actual* (or *synthetic*) in reference, were always only *probable* in validity. Kant himself offered a throng of *Reflexionen* in the mid to late 1760s that took just this stance. Thus, *Reflexion* 3738 claims: "all analytic judgments are rational and vice versa; all synthetic judgments are empirical and conversely."⁸⁵ This conception Kant seemed clearly to be deriving from Locke (279). Kant makes the same claim in *Reflexion* 3744.⁸⁶ Kant distinguishes between analytic and synthetic in just this manner: "Rational [judgments] are analytic, empirical [judgments] are synthetic."⁸⁷ The consequence was precisely that Kant could not yet even conceive of *synthetic judgments a priori*, and therefore the transcendental question, *how are synthetic judgments a priori possible?* could not arise for him. "Causal concepts are synthetic and therefore empirical."⁸⁸ Accordingly, "the possibility of a real connection in primitive grounds cannot be seen by reason."⁸⁹

When Kant maintains that pure reason can reach *a priori* certainty in its judgments about its own process, he denies access to "real essences" of any entity in the world. This is clearly the position Kant enunciated in his logic lectures from the period immediately ensuing upon the *Inaugural Dissertation*, and it is central to his *Reflexionen* on logic and metaphysics in the period leading up to it as well. Thus, the essentially *dogmatic* feature of Kant's thought in the *Inaugural Dissertation* revolves around the sense to be made of the "real use" of the understanding in *reflection*, namely, in connection with the *origin* of its own principles. If reason has complete access to this originary order, transcendental arguments are sound. If not, however—if access to the origin of these principles is *inferential*, or "suppositional" as Kant likes to call it—then Hume's position is not so easily "answered."⁹⁰ While Hume, perhaps, and Locke certainly would allow that there *appear to be* procedural constraints upon reflection, and that orderly thinking is compromised severely by their neglect or suspension, they do not believe we can ever attain to the warrant that would stipulate their *a priori* necessity. Everything, in short, hinges on the problem of *apperception*. In

1766 Kant is close to the empiricism of Locke and Hume on this question. By 1770, he is utterly confident in going beyond them. What has intervened? With Lewis Beck, I have to believe the answer is the revelation of Leibniz's *Nouveaux essais*.

LEIBNIZ, LOCKE, AND THE "GREAT LIGHT"

In 1765, some sixty years after its composition, Leibniz's *Nouveaux essais* finally reached print.⁹¹ In that work, Leibniz subjected John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* to a running commentary from the vantage of his own philosophy.⁹² Thus, in that one text were presented in explicit juxtaposition the two most important (tacit) epistemologies of the beginning of the eighteenth century. Giorgio Tonelli has offered grounds for believing that the immediate reception of the new work in Germany was not as discerning or as extensive as we might have expected, but he is clear that gradually it worked a revolution in Leibniz reception.⁹³ Tonelli leaves open the question of an immediate impact of the text on Immanuel Kant: "Influence of the N[ew] E[ssays] on Kant may be explained by individual reasons only" (453). At the same time, Tonelli establishes that by 1770, especially in the circles of the Berlin Academy, a sustained effort to rehabilitate Leibniz, and to reconcile him with Locke and Newton, was well underway. "Wolff was no longer fashionable . . . [and] the Wolffians were thus trying to refurbish their reputation by appealing to Leibniz himself" (450). Tonelli points especially to a 1770 Academy presentation which recognized that Locke's view on innate ideas did not preclude active reason.⁹⁴

This was precisely what the reading of Leibniz's *Nouveaux essais*, and then the rereading of Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, garnered for Kant in the late 1760s. The simultaneous *spontaneity* and *self-transparency* of reason—the essential elements of the idea of apperception—struck Kant as a decisive new foundation for metaphysics. It triggered an enormous optimism about the project he had for some time considered hopeless. At the same time, however, this new prospect for *metaphysics* shifted merely *empirical* investigations into relative insignificance. For the better part of twenty years, I submit, Kant would consider merely empirical problems of knowledge trivial. Only in the third *Critique* would he confront anew and with great anxiety the question of whether he had made transcendently secure the practice of *empirical* inquiry.⁹⁵ Accordingly, after 1770, not only the *epistemological scruple* of Hume—the "suppositious" character of the principles of rationality—but the *empirical agenda* of Hume—the "science of man"—could be suspended with conviction. Metaphysical

"dogmatism"—in the generous Kantian sense of this era—had a (brief) new lease on life.

In his letter to Garve of August 7, 1783, Kant explained the new optimism about reason's immanent powers of critique in terms that reflect the "great light" that reading Leibniz and Locke at the close of the 1760s had occasioned for him:

[I]t is not at all metaphysics that the *Critique* is doing but a whole new science, never before attempted, namely the critique of *an a priori* judging reason. Other men have touched on this faculty, for instance, Locke and Leibnitz, but always with an admixture of other faculties of cognition. To no one has it even occurred that this faculty is the object of a formal and necessary, yes, an extremely broad, science . . . and at the same time (something marvelous) deducing out of its own nature all the objects within its scope, enumerating them, and proving their completeness by means of their coherence in a single, complete cognitive faculty.⁹⁶

Empowered by this new science, Kant could be scornful indeed of skeptics and their professed "indifference" to the questions of metaphysics. He was beyond Hume. Can we trace the origins of this posture more precisely? The logic lectures offer some insight here.

In the *Blomberg Logic* (1771), we can discern Kant clearly straining away from the popular orientation, which in his view has become too much of a fad. "People talk much now about the healthy understanding [*gesunde Verstand*]; they praise it too highly."⁹⁷ Kant continues a bit later: "We commonly oppose healthy reason to the affected learnedness of proud erudition. But this will not do, for learnedness always presupposes the healthy understanding." That is, learnedness builds upon, and hence is not to be contrasted with, "healthy reason." "It has become the fashion, however, to praise the healthy understanding to the detriment of the honor of the sciences" (21; tr. 9). Admittedly, Kant goes on, "through an excess of learnedness people often become all the more absurd and completely unfit for judging *in concreto*" (22; tr. 10). But there is no ground for a systematic disparagement of learnedness on these lines.

"Healthy reason" is unselfconscious. It characterizes how in fact human thinking proceeds, rather than how it *ought* to proceed. Learnedness introduces a concern with "objective rules." "Healthy reason and learnedness are distinct not merely in degree but also in species" (17; tr. 6). Learned understanding recognizes normative procedural constraints. "The understanding cognizes everything *a priori*, healthy reason *a posteriori*" (20; tr. 8).

"Healthy reason" may "suffice for *belles lettres* [*schönen Wissenschaften*]," and indeed taste is best without the admixture of learning ("learned taste is false").⁹⁸ But Kant claims that science requires rational learnedness.

The problem is to establish how these implicit and explicit procedures of understanding function. That requires an examination of human practices of knowledge, and this is the domain of logic. "*Logica* [generically] will thus have no other grounds or sources than the nature of human understanding," Kant elaborates, "and so in sciences of the understanding I have to study man first and foremost" (25; tr. 12). But the generic study takes up both subjective and objective (implicit and explicit) rules. Kant contrasts empirical psychology, which examines the subjective rules that govern "healthy reason" with logic [proper], which considers "the objective laws of the understanding and of reason" (26; tr. 13).

One feature of the *Blomberg Logic* is its recurrent and harsh repudiations of Crusius.⁹⁹ This is not surprising in a course based on a textbook by Meier, an orthodox Wolffian.¹⁰⁰ It is also appropriate to the Prussian University context in which Frederick II had pronounced Crusius and his teachings *non grata*.¹⁰¹ Yet Crusius was, as Tonelli has argued convincingly, one of Kant's most important philosophical influences.¹⁰² Contempt seems excessive in that light. What was it that Kant found so repugnant in Crusius? He "errs particularly in wanting to prove many propositions merely from the nature of the understanding."¹⁰³ How is Kant different? Presumably because he distinguishes subjective from objective nature and grounds metaphysics only in the latter. Crusius, on the other hand, is satisfied with subjective grounds: "He says, e.g.: something is true because no one regards it as, or can hold it to be, other than true" (82; tr. 62).

Clearly, Kant intimates that a pure, a priori consideration of these normative objective laws is accessible, yet his exposition of the Meier textbook upon which his lectures were based begins with an evocation of Francis Bacon, who "first showed the world that all philosophy consists of phantoms of the brain if it does not rest on experience" (28; tr. 16). This seems a drastically empiricist position to ascribe to Meier; but how is it even consistent with Kant after the *Dissertation*? Kant elaborates, "we have to look at the nature of human understanding, so that one can set up rules appropriate to it. It would be foolish to set up logic for rational beings in general . . . and to think, in doing so, that it could be useful to us too" (28; tr. 16). This is a bewildering stance, for it seems closer to Humeian empiricism—to anthropology—than to transcendental method. It is not entirely clear how "universal basic truths of human cognition" which are "the *principia* of all sciences" can be discovered other than through experience, and how, if

they are learned, they can have the necessity that Kant wishes to ascribe to them. Kant clearly believes it is possible to *regress* to necessary prior logical structures in a manner that is not contingent learning but necessary knowledge, even if we start with the context of experience. Originary authority may be discovered contingently in its governance of experience, without, however, being constituted by experience. That is the heart of the "transcendental method" of argument, over which so much ink has been spilled.¹⁰⁴

The *Blomberg Logic* proceeds on the presumption that the originary warrant of "universal basic truths of human cognition" is established. In that sense, one wonders whether Kant should situate it among the *dogmatic* or the *critical* efforts of philosophy. Kant considers Locke the paradigmatic critical philosopher, and Wolff his dogmatic counterpart.¹⁰⁵ Whether he felt closer to Locke or to Wolff in this exposition is not entirely clear, though Kant made it clear that Wolff's Germanness was important.¹⁰⁶ Yet he is also clear that Wolff and the German dogmatic approach have become beleaguered: "now, finally, the critical philosophy thrives most, and in this the English have the greatest merit." Indeed, "for the most part the dogmatic method has fallen into disuse in all sciences; even morals is not expounded dogmatically any more, but more often critically."¹⁰⁷ The important question for us is what exactly the "critical" method betokened for Kant in these passages. There are two radically different senses of *critical* in Kant's usage: an earlier one, associated with the English sense of "criticism" as an a posteriori question of judgment, which could never be brought to principles (in German school-philosophical language, *cognitio historica*), and the ultimate one, *critique*, identified with transcendental argument, which is by contrast preeminently the penetration to a priori principles of pure reason. There is every reason to believe that by *criticism* in the cited passages, Kant still meant only the first of these senses. If so, we must consider seriously the significance of his concession that virtually all the sciences were following this critical method. The canons of empirical inquiry, it would appear from that, did not seem to be awaiting transcendental authorization.

"We have . . . pure concepts of reason which are given a priori . . . Where do we get them from? Understanding, in attending to its own procedure on the occasion of experiences, has acquired them for itself [*hat . . . sie sich erworben*]."¹⁰⁸ Kant is confident that this attention of the understanding suffices when "I have to see whether a concept emerges in my soul out of experience or out of pure reason" (403). He admits that "a science which delineates with certainty the limits of our knowledge is hard," and here he finds the value of skeptical *method*, since it forces us "to the investigation

of our own reason" (376, 438). His elaboration of this thought is particularly deserving of consideration:

For since we can see for any given proposition both proofs and counterproofs which establish the opposite, it must be the case, since a proposition must after all be either true or false, that the difference must lie in the [nature of the] subject. And knowledge of the subject is the true object of philosophy.

The great conflict arises accordingly that we take subjective grounds for objective ones; because we cannot think of a thing in any other way, we believe therefore that it must be so. It takes a great deal of insight before one becomes convinced that the limitations of the subject are not the limitations of the object. (438)

The idea that by introspective attention understanding can penetrate beyond the subjective necessities of experience to the objective a priori grounds of reason, and that only this can be adequate to the actuality of knowledge: this is *the* transcendental premise. It was because Kant had finally achieved the "considerable insight" to distinguish objective from subjective conditions of validity in knowledge that he turned so savagely on Crusius, who could not make that transition. Crusius erred because he made truth a function of mere subjectivity. The British empiricists made the same mistake in imagining that principles of the understanding could emerge somehow from the concatenation of experiences. "In the case of the concept of cause and effect, many commit the *vitium subreptionis*, in that they want to derive it from experience, although it is a pure concept of reason."¹⁰⁹ Similarly the British moralists were guilty of subreption: "A *vitium subreptionis* is when one ascribes to an experience from the senses what is in fact a concept of reason; as, for example, Hutcheson and Shaftesbury took the concept of virtue for a concept of experience."¹¹⁰

How could Kant be so confident Hutcheson and Shaftesbury, Hume and Crusius had got it wrong? Ironically, John Locke may have been the decisive factor.¹¹¹ Locke not only keyed Kant's discernment of the difference between synthetic and analytic judgments, but Locke proved—precisely in the light of Leibniz's criticisms in the *Nouveaux essais*—a most discerning judge of the problem of subjective versus objective constraints in judgment. Leibniz was of course famous for the decisive rebuttal to crude empiricism—"nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu. Nisi ipse intellectus."¹¹² But Kant believed that Leibniz went too far in the direction of *substantive* innate ideas, whereas Locke remained more cautiously *processual* in his

conception of what was independently given in reason. It is this processual structure of empirical judgment that is the ineluctable evidence of the active intervention of reason (or "reflection" as Locke termed it). Kant explained: "All experiences have the form of reason, and without this they will not be experiences . . . [because] experience is nothing but reflected sensation, or sensation that is reflected in a judgment." Accordingly, crucially, "with experience we must be active through reason."¹¹³

In the *Lectures on Philosophical Encyclopedia*, Kant insists that "the canon of logic is not derived from experience. The universal conduct of reason can be demonstrated *a priori*, it is thus not derived from psychology."¹¹⁴ Kant gives transcendental philosophy the following explication: "The objects that are given through utterly pure reason [*die pure reine Vernunft*] belong to ontology. But are they also actual things? No, but rather a mere thinking [*ein bloßes Denken*]. Ontology contains no objects, but rather only concepts, laws and principles of pure thought" (11–12). Thus, Kant here is clearly taking a rationalist view. The question is whether in this 1775 version Kant holds the dogmatic rationalist view of the *Dissertation* or the more critical view of the first *Critique*. Kant clearly rejects intellectual intuition. He dismisses that as mysticism. Plato was such a mystic, in Kant's view, and "Among the moderns, Leibniz was a follower of Plato" (16). Kant makes it clear that Leibniz did not believe we had intellectual intuitions, but rather innate ideas. Yet that is still too mystical or dogmatic for Kant. By contrast, while Locke was conventionally viewed as a follower of Aristotle in maintaining that all our concepts are acquired from the senses, Kant points out that this does not do Locke justice. "Concepts are not innate in us, but rather the capacity to reflect. Aristotle believed that our cognitions are created out of the senses and arise from them. That was not what Locke taught, but rather that they arise when occasioned by the senses" (16). This is an enormously important passage, for it suggests that Kant took Locke to be closer to his transcendental vantage than even Leibniz.

Kant elaborates his insight into the inevitably ordered intervention of reason in experience by exploring the crucial problem of truth and error. Truth is knowledge of the thing as it actually is, Kant says at one point, and at another, "truth is nothing but the agreement of a cognition with the laws of the understanding and reason" (40, 64). This equivocation between "objective reality" and "objective validity" persists through the critical period, as I have argued in my study of the third *Critique*.¹¹⁵ He adds, "Truth and error are never found in concepts but only in judgments."¹¹⁶ The "connection and mixing together of the understanding with sensibility is the source of all errors" (87; tr. 66). Error is indeed "a bastard of sensibility

and the understanding" (84; tr. 64). That is, "error proceeds merely from the understanding and from reason, because foreign powers interfere. . . . All error arises when we hold subjective grounds of our judgment to be objective ones . . . No error can arise from the understanding or from reason alone, for no power can act against its own law" (103–4; tr. 79–80).

In the *Encyclopedia* lectures Kant makes explicit the connection between the two definitions of truth that are in some seeming tension in his logic lectures. "Truth," he says at one point, "is the agreement of a cognition with its object." A bit later he says, "All truth consists in the agreement of a cognition with the laws of understanding and of reason." These two definitions are presented without relation in the *Blomberg Logic*, for example, but now Kant explains, "for the statement that [truth] is the agreement of a cognition with its object is insufficiently determined."¹¹⁷ The question of truth for Kant is always a question of the validity of a judgment. Judgment is always procedurally sound; it errs only in misapplication. "In order to secure ourselves from error, we must (1) investigate the influence of the senses on the understanding, [and] (2) isolate our understanding from sensibility" (22). Thus, Kant here places the full burden of the folly of judgment at the feet of "subreption." There is no sign that reason could be internally contradictory. While Kant is emphatic that philosophy must seek out the "limits of human understanding" and that this requires a rigorous analysis of human understanding, he does not imply that such a scrutiny would discern internal difficulties. Isolation, purity, would appear to suffice. Of course, that is still an enormously difficult undertaking: "self knowledge is the most difficult [sort], for here understanding must judge its own conduct" (23). That is a question not so much of refuting error as discovering illusion.

Kant is confident that "the dogmatic method can be used in philosophy if the cognitions are apodictically certain." Dogmatic cognitions, he explains, are "general (or rational) cognitions that are apodictically certain" as contrasted with "experiential cognitions [*Erfahrungs Erkenntnisse*] which are also apodictically certain but which are not rational cognitions. (Apodictically certain really means *a priori* certain.)" (27). That experiential cognitions could be *a priori* certain (apodictic) is an important claim that would prove problematic in the critical period.¹¹⁸ Kant contrasts the dogmatic method with a skeptical method that wishes first to *establish whether* a knowledge-claim is really apodictic. "In metaphysics, where our reasoning concerning the vocation of man goes beyond the bounds of the world and experience, where we have nothing to guide us, the skeptical method is appropriate."¹¹⁹ But Kant insists that the skeptical *method* is to be distinguished from the skeptical *philosophy*.¹²⁰ Indeed, "If we were to

suppose that some judgments could be utterly free, it would have to be possible for the understanding to deviate from all laws, and in this way[,] under this supposition[,] all the prestige of our doctrine of reason would fall and disappear[;] on the contrary, we would be able to trust it very little" (94; tr. 72). Kant here makes two enormously important points. First, he insists that it is inconceivable (presumably *objectively*, not simply *subjectively*—"an sich" not just "für uns") that judgment can operate without structure.

Second, he suggests that the suspension of this principle would result in a complete collapse of philosophy into aporia. That is what skeptical philosophy—as opposed to *method*—concludes. Skeptical method is a good thing "provided only that one does not have the constant resolve to doubt everything forever, and to leave everything undecided. . . . The withholding of approval . . . with the intentional inclination never to decide anything is really nothing but a lazy doubt, a lazy addiction to doubt [*faule Zweifel-sucht*]," and "no more miserable condition for man can be thought . . . than the condition that leaves us undecided . . . particularly . . . when it affects our interests" (159–60, 203; tr. 126–27, 160).

Here Kant appears to be appealing to his argument that the vital human interest in metaphysical concepts militates against a skeptical ("indifferentist") aporia. "If something is very weighty for us and of very great importance, so that a great part, indeed, even the greatest part of our peace of mind and of our external well-being and happiness depend upon it, then in this case the mind is just not free enough to consider the matter indifferently and impartially from all sides" (158; tr. 125). Yet one can surely wonder whether Kant is entitled to press *this* argument. Kant is quite clear in these logic lectures that we do not need *theoretical* certainty to attain practical certainty. "Even what is logically improbable can nonetheless be morally certain," he says in the *Blomberg Logic* (200; tr. 158). In the *Logik Philippi* he introduces an important instance, Socrates himself: "Even in the context of utter uncertainty in speculation there can be complete decisiveness in action. Socrates was uncertain whether there was another world, but he acted as if he were certain."¹²¹ The only legitimate invocation of the argument about the perennial human interests in metaphysics is really a defensive one, as Kant recognized in the first *Critique*: the polemical refutation of any effort by reason to deny their possibility. Hence, one may claim that the epistemological concern—already in the early logic courses, and a fortiori in the fully developed critical system—stands or falls on strictly theoretical grounds: the argument that experience is impossible without structure from an active reason (the "transcendental analytic"), and the argument that the reason's apparent conflict with itself can only be resolved by delimiting the

validity of such rational interventions to the domain of sensible intuition (the "transcendental dialectic"). What we have seen is that Kant was working through a lot of this in the early logic lectures, and that he was doing so in the context of a clear sense that Hume and popular philosophy—the whole ensemble he would label "indifferentism" in the first *Critique*—fell distinctly short of both his *practical* and his *theoretical* concerns. Philosophy, accordingly, had to be rescued from psychological and empirical reduction. Anthropology could not presume to displace or explain philosophy. It had to be mercilessly subordinated.

KANT'S REPUDIATION OF "INDIFFERENTISM"

Negativity toward Hume appears to have intensified among German commentators after 1770, especially late in that decade with the appearance of Hume's posthumous *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*.¹²² Generally the 1770s were dominated by the German reception of the anti-Humeian "common sense" school—Reid, Beattie, and Oswald.¹²³ For those who had made the Scottish Enlightenment a major source for German *Aufklärung*, the internecine strife between Hume and the common-sense school was grievous.¹²⁴ With the *Dialogues* Hume's freethinking took on more dangerous connotations, and common sense seemed to fit more comfortably the general tenor of popular philosophy. Johann Feder and Christoph Meiners were particularly divided in their loyalties. Turning away from Hume to common sense was not without its costs in the general diminution of philosophical rigor; popular philosophy—and Johann Feder, in particular—never lived that down.¹²⁵

But not all the German opponents of Hume in the 1770s ended up in the arms of common sense. One remarkably hostile reading of Hume from 1770 deserves particular attention, namely, Johann Heinrich Lambert's review of Resewitz's German translation of Hume's *Four Philosophers*.¹²⁶ Lambert condemned Hume as an extreme and destructive skeptic.¹²⁷ Indeed, in what appears to have been a first draft for the published review, Lambert was even more scathing: "Hume belongs among the so-called philosophers who have read a bit and digested it ill, who have a certain measure of wit, but who want to smuggle in more than they have, who find their greatness in sophistries, and who fall back into a childishness which cannot discriminate between right and left."¹²⁸ Given Kant's high esteem for Lambert, whom he flattered in 1765 as "the greatest genius in Germany," and the high profile of the journal in which Lambert published the revised version of this review—Nicolai's *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek*, with which we can

be certain Kant was familiar—the harsh negativity of this judgment might have contributed to a less affirmative view of Hume in Kant himself. The dating makes this particularly interesting.

In a lecture we can date fairly confidently to the period shortly after Kant published his *Inaugural Dissertation*, he presented his students with an extended characterization of David Hume:

In most recent time, *David Hume* is especially known as a *scepticus* who had an overwhelming, indeed, a somewhat extravagant inclination to doubt. His writings, which appeared before the learned world under the title, "Philosophical Inquiries," and were also called "Miscellaneous Writings," contained political articles, essays on literature, moral and also metaphysical articles[;] but they all tended toward to [sic] skepticism. In these writings of Hume is to be found a gentle, calm, unprejudiced examination. In them he considers, namely, first of all one side of a thing; he searches for all possible grounds for it, and expounds them in the best oratorical style. Then he takes up the other side, presents it for examination, as it were, completely without partisanship, expounds again all the opposing grounds with just the same eloquence, but at the end and in conclusion he appears in his true form as a real skeptic[;] he complains about the uncertainty of all our cognition whatsoever, shows how little these can be trusted, and finally he doubts instead of inferring and settling which of the two cognitions is true and which false. He would, however, certainly be one of the best authors, and one of those most worthy of being read, if only he did not have the preponderant inclination to doubt everything, but instead wanted to seek to attain a true certainty by means of the examination and investigation of cognitions.¹²⁹

Thus, already here Kant stresses the extravagance of Hume's skepticism and insists upon the prospect of attaining certainty through an analysis of cognitive process.

Certainly ten years later, in the first *Critique*, Kant took Hume to task for excessive skepticism. The A-Preface and the "Discipline of Pure Reason in Respect of Its Polemical Employment" of the *Critique of Pure Reason* constitute the *locus classicus* for Kant's repudiation of Hume and skepticism. What seems to have emerged in Kant is a conviction that "a consistently developed empiricism could lead to skepticism not only in metaphysics, which is as far as he thought Hume pushed it, but also in our natural and mathematical knowledge."¹³⁰ As Lüthe puts it, in Hume "[t]here is nothing like a proof concerning our own rational notions of ourselves and

of the world outside. We have experience, but experience only suffices to give us factuality, not necessity."¹³¹ Patricia Kitcher has argued that "the essential difference between Hume and Kant is precisely that the latter is willing to go beyond the Empiricists' picture of mental life and consider what types of faculties for cognition are necessary for cognition and how their existence might be established."¹³²

Kant starts the preface to the A-version of the first *Critique* with language that unmistakably highlights the intrinsic dialectic of reason: "Human reason . . . is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer."¹³³ This is the most eloquent testimony that the "antinomy problem" lay at the origin of the critical philosophy, just as Kant claimed many years later in his letter to Christian Garve.¹³⁴ But what Kant goes on to write in this preface widens our perspective, for if the antinomy problem is Kant's unique philosophical formulation, the crisis of metaphysics belonged to the age. "The changed fashion of the time brings [metaphysics, once the Queen of all the sciences] only scorn . . . her empire gradually through intestine [sic] war gave way to complete anarchy."¹³⁵ In his letter to Mendelssohn in 1783, Kant adopts a similar view of the fate of metaphysics in his time: "That you feel yourself dead to metaphysics does not offend me, since virtually the entire learned world seems to be dead to her."¹³⁶ That is the central thrust of Kant's new pejorative term, "indifferentism":

And now, after all methods, so it is believed, have been tried and found wanting, the prevailing mood is that of weariness and complete *indifferentism*—the mother, in all sciences, of chaos and night, but happily in this case the source, or at least the prelude, of their approaching reform and restoration.

But it is idle to feign indifference to such enquiries, the object of which can never be indifferent to our human nature. Indeed these pretended *indifferentists*, however they may try to disguise themselves by substituting a popular tone for the language of the Schools, inevitably fall back, in so far as they think at all, into those very metaphysical assertions which they profess so greatly to despise.¹³⁷

Still, Kant claims that this phenomenon of indifferentism "calls for attention and reflection" because "it is obviously the effect not of levity but of the matured judgment of the age, which refuses to be any longer put off with illusory knowledge."¹³⁸ In a note to this passage, Kant makes explicit his

affirmation of his times as an age of enlightenment: "Our age is, in especial degree, the age of criticism, and to criticism everything must submit" (Axi, n). Kant's thrust in the note is that skepticism should not be suppressed by edict, but answered by reason: "It is a call to reason to undertake anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge . . . the *critique of pure reason*" (Axi-xii).

Now again we encounter the language that Kant had so frequently employed in his letters over the long fifteen years of gestation, but here, finally, delivering on his claim: "I have entered upon the path—the only one that has remained unexplored—and flatter myself that in following it I have found a way of guarding against all those errors which have hitherto set reason, in its non-empirical employment, at variance with itself" (Axi). What is striking in this final version of Kant's claim is that it concentrates precisely on the antinomy problem—reason's variance with itself in its nonempirical employment.

It would appear a seamless transition to pick up Kant's thread of thought across the entire expanse of the first *Critique*, in chapter 1, section 2 of the "Transcendental Doctrine of Method"—the "Discipline of Pure Reason in Respect of Its Polemical Employment." The chapter opens with another ringing endorsement of enlightenment critique: "Nothing is so important through its usefulness, nothing so sacred, that it may be exempted from this searching examination. . . . Reason depends on this freedom for its very existence" (A736/B766). The particular context of the "polemical use" of reason is the situation in which reason is interested not so much in making a definitive case for a belief but rather in insulating vital beliefs from definitive refutation: it is a defensive strategy, acceptable, Kant notes, *kat' anthropon* even if never secure *kat' aletheian* (A737/B767). Kant dismisses the hopes of thinkers like Sulzer that someday a dogmatic-rational metaphysics might succeed in the proof of God or immortality. Such proofs are impossible, but so are proofs of their contraries (A741-42/B769-70). And that means, for Kant, that "we are always in a position to accept these propositions—propositions which are so very closely bound up with the speculative interests of our reason in its empirical employment, and which, moreover, are the sole means of reconciling the speculative with the practical interest" (A742/B770). That is, "although we have to surrender the language of *knowledge*, we still have sufficient ground to employ, in the presence of the most exacting reason, the quite legitimate language of a firm *faith*" (A745/B773).

It is in this dramatic context of the primacy of practical reason that Kant turns to David Hume and the problem of skepticism. While he characterizes Hume as "dispassionate" and "peculiarly fitted for balanced judgment,"

as "well disposed and in his moral character quite blameless," he also charges him with "far-fetched subtleties . . . elaborately thought out," which threatened to "undermine . . . the conviction which is so comforting and beneficial for mankind."¹³⁹ Nonetheless Kant argues that Hume could defend himself with the claim that he was simply in the service of critical reason in its ruthless inquisition of dogmas, since "it is the duty of philosophy to counteract their deceptive influence, no matter what prized and cherished dreams may have to be disowned" (Axiii). Kant, indeed, welcomes any study that endeavors to refute categorically a dogma vital to human interest. "Already, before having opened it, I am perfectly certain . . . that, as reason is incompetent to arrive at affirmative assertions in this field, it is equally unable, indeed even less able, to establish negative conclusions in regard to these questions" (A753/B781). But—and this is the decisive point—Kant is not prepared to linger in aporia:

But to allow ourselves simply to acquiesce in these doubts, and thereupon to set out to commend the conviction and admission of our ignorance not merely as a remedy against the complacency of the dogmatists, but likewise as the right method of putting an end to the conflict of reason with itself, is a futile procedure, and can never suffice to overcome the restlessness of reason. At best it is merely a means of awakening it from its sweet dogmatic dreams, and of inducing it to enter upon a more careful examination of its own position. (A757/B785)

While skepticism can be a "resting-place for human reason, where it can reflect upon its dogmatic wanderings," it is no "dwelling-place for permanent settlement" (A757/B785). Kant invokes the image of the skeptic as a *nomad* (Aix). This is, without the term, the pith of Kant's denunciation of "indifferentism" from the A-Preface. And here we have Kant's fullest exposition of what he deems the insufficiencies of skepticism, of "critical empiricism" or "indifferentism."

"The celebrated David Hume," Kant writes, "was one of those geographers of human reason who have imagined that they have sufficiently disposed of all such questions by setting them outside the horizon of human reason—a horizon which yet he was not able to determine" (A760/B788). Kant recognized Hume as "perhaps the most ingenious of all the sceptics, and beyond all question . . . without rival in respect of the influence which the sceptical procedure can exercise in awakening reason to a thorough self-examination."¹⁴⁰ Where Hume went wrong, according to Kant, was "in inferring from the contingency of our determination *in accordance with the*

law the contingency of the *law itself*" (A766/B794). Thus, he "regarded all the supposed *a priori* principles . . . as . . . nothing but a custom-bred habit arising from experience and its laws, and . . . consequently merely empirical, that is, rules that are in themselves contingent, and to which we ascribe a supposititious necessity and universality."¹⁴¹

Here Kant is launching his grand narrative of the history of philosophy, with its climactic moment, the overcoming of skepticism. Kant credited Hume merely with *censorship*, not *critique* of reason. That was only a second, negative moment in the evolution of philosophical understanding.

The first step in matters of pure reason, marking its infancy, is *dogmatic*. The second step is *sceptical*; and indicates that experience has rendered our judgment wiser and more circumspect. But a third step, such as can be taken only by fully matured judgment, based on assured principles of proved universality, is now necessary, namely, to subject to examination, not the facts of reason, but reason itself, in the whole extent of its powers, and as regards its aptitude for pure *a priori* modes of knowledge. This is not the censorship but the *criticism* of reason, whereby not its present *bounds* but its determinate [and necessary] *limits* . . . are demonstrated from principles.¹⁴²

By ascending to this timeless universality, criticism is the *restoration* or *redemption* of the naive interests of dogmatic reason on epistemologically unassailable grounds.¹⁴³

At least Hume, the skeptic, is credited by Kant with scientific method, albeit skeptical rather than critical. Far more scathing is Kant's denunciation of what *he* called "naturalism":

The *naturalist* of pure reason adopts as his principle that through common reason, without science, that is, through what he calls sound reason, he is able, in regard to those most sublime questions which form the problem of metaphysics, to achieve more than is possible through speculation. . . . This is mere misology, reduced to principles; and what is most absurd of all, the neglect of all artificial means is eulogised as a *special method* for extending our knowledge.¹⁴⁴

Kant's target here was popular philosophy, especially as it endeavored an empirical anthropology. His contempt was blatant. The question is, how long had he been of this view. Lewis Beck holds that Kant had never had any patience with "naturalism" in this sense.¹⁴⁵ Kant, in Beck's view, could

never have taken common sense seriously. But in his commentary on Kant's *Lectures on Philosophical Encyclopedia*, Manfred Kuehn suggests something quite different: "Kant sounds like a common sense philosopher."¹⁴⁶ And Kuehn establishes quite compellingly that Kant gave this lecture series in 1775!

TRANSITION TO ANTHROPOLOGY: THE PEDAGOGICAL EVIDENCE

Kant—simply on the basis of his publication of *Observations* in 1764—could see himself as a pioneer in the disciplinary construction of "anthropology." What needs to be clarified is why, given Kant's interests, he did not inaugurate an anthropology course in the mid-1760s. The most important text to consider for an answer to that question, in my view, is his *Announcement of the Programme for his Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765–66*. What is striking in Kant's *Announcement* from our current perspective is precisely the *absence* of any indication of plans to create a separate course.

In his course announcement, Kant indicates that he will begin to teach empirical psychology at the outset of his metaphysics class, and this for two sorts of pedagogical reasons; first, on the optimistic basis that students will stay the course and be able to use the concrete examples of the early phase to grasp the abstract formulations of the later stages; but second, on the pessimistic basis that students might well fade out. For these dropouts, starting with empirical psychology, Kant avers, is a good thing since it is comprehensible, pleasant, and useful.¹⁴⁷ A similar pragmatism motivates Kant's plans for teaching logic. He distinguishes between a critique and canon of common sense (*gesunden Verstandes*) and a critique and canon of *real learning* (*eigentlichen Gelehrsamkeit*). While a logic in this second, critical form is the true capstone for philosophy and should only be presented at its culmination, a canon for common sense is more generally useful and should be the starting point for all learning. Kant proposes to teach this first form, which he holds to be serviceable for "the life of action and society" (311). Thus, both in his metaphysics and in his logic course, Kant clearly privileged accessibility for students, in accordance with his general pedagogical view that education should try to avoid burdening students with ideas that "outstrip their years" and "can only be understood by minds which are more practiced and experienced" (305). The wider culture of popular philosophy in the *Hochaufklärung* made the pragmatic pedagogy associated with *Weltkenntnis* quite palpable both for Kant and for his public.¹⁴⁸ Clearly Kant was *personally* accomplished in this sphere, as his lifestyle and also

his writing—above all, *Observations*—demonstrated. He could easily incorporate all that into his pedagogy. Indeed, on the evidence of the Herder lectures it is clear he *did* include it in his technical courses on metaphysics and on practical philosophy, if only as *asides*.¹⁴⁹ That is, pedagogical goals of a “pragmatic” sort played a prominent role in his conventional courses.

In addition, they constituted the *primary* agenda of his physical geography course. Kant explains that this course had always been designed with the utilitarian agenda foremost, in other words, to provide students “adequate knowledge of historical matters which could make good their lack of *experience*.”¹⁵⁰ Kant was already quite clear about *Weltkenntnis* when he inaugurated the course in 1758.¹⁵¹ In the introduction to the published version of his course on physical geography, Kant wrote, “The experience of nature and of man constitute together the knowledge of the world. The knowledge of man is taught us by anthropology, the knowledge of nature we owe to physical geography or description of the earth.” Kant claimed that physical geography could only be a “propaedeutic for the knowledge of the world” because instruction in the field was still too primitive. Its practical utility made the study nonetheless indispensable. Merely to travel would not net such insight; what was required was a plan of study. The “other part of knowledge of the world encompasses knowledge of man. Socializing with people expands our knowledge. Nevertheless it is necessary to establish a preliminary exercise for all these future experiences. Through it one becomes acquainted with what is *pragmatic* in man and *not* speculative. Man is considered there not *physiologically*, in which the sources of phenomena are distinguished, but rather *cosmologically*.” Kant generalized his pedagogical point: “An education is still seriously lacking if it does not teach a person how to apply his acquired knowledge and bring about a useful employment of these [acquisitions] in accordance with his understanding and the situation in which he stands, or [in other words] to make our knowledge *practical*. And that is what knowledge of the world is.”¹⁵² The text cited was only published in the 1790s, and while the bulk of it originated very early, we cannot be certain these introductory remarks were not the insertion of a later systematizing hand.¹⁵³ We can, however, coordinate these observations with those which Kant published in 1775 in his essay “Von den *verschiedenen* Racen der Menschen.” There he wrote:

The physical geography [course] which I herewith advertise, belongs to an idea which I have developed for a utilitarian academic instruction, which I may term the preliminary exercise in the knowledge of the world. This knowledge of the world is what serves to provide the *pragmatic*

[dimension] for all the otherwise attained sciences and aptitudes, so that they are usable not merely in the *schools* but in *life*. Thereby the prepared student may be introduced to the stage where he will practice his vocation, namely the *world*. Here he confronts a field of two parts, of which he requires a preliminary sketch in order to be able to subsume under rules all his future experiences: namely *nature* and *man*. Both parts must however be developed *cosmologically*, that is not according to that which makes their objects remarkable in particular (physics and empirical psychology) but rather what is to be gleaned about their relation to the totality in which they stand and in which every individual must take up his place. The first instruction I call physical geography and I have set up a series of lectures on this for the summer, the second [I call] anthropology, and I will give this in the winter.¹⁵⁴

The terminology and the conceptualization is identical, and there is little reason to believe that much of it was not already set in Kant's mind not only in 1775 but in 1772, at the opening of his anthropology course, and indeed—and this is my point—over much of the 1760s.¹⁵⁵ The contrast between “philosophy, according to the academic concept” and “philosophy, according to the world concept,” which was developed by Kant in his logic lectures, then replicated virtually verbatim in the first *Critique*, stood at the core of Kant's whole sense of his pedagogical mission from the outset.¹⁵⁶

Still, in 1765 Kant seemed to have no plans for any new course “according to the world concept.” There is specifically no aspiration to create a separate course, or indeed to designate a separate discipline, for anthropology. But there is other evidence we need to consider. I would like to explore a rather remarkable development in Kant's pedagogy which has not received nearly enough attention. In 1767–1768, Kant *did* inaugurate a new course, the *Vorlesungen über Philosophische Enzyklopädie*.¹⁵⁷ We know that he offered the course again in 1768–1769, 1769, 1770, 1770–1771, and 1771–1772.¹⁵⁸ For three years the course was not offered, then it resumed in 1775 (for which we have the only surviving lecture notes), 1777–1778, 1779–1780, and 1781–1782, never to be taught again.¹⁵⁹ No one seems to have asked why Kant decided to offer this new course, why he would have done so in 1767, how the course might relate to the monumental changes going on in his thought at the time, or why it would have been interrupted in the crucial years (from the vantage of both the critical turn and the beginning of the anthropology course) 1772–1775. At least Lehmann has offered some conjectures on why it stopped in 1782.¹⁶⁰ The text for the course was from Johann Feder. The acrimony over the Garve-Feder review in 1782 reflected

in Kant's appendix to the *Prolegomena* may well, Lehmann suggests, have motivated Kant to abandon the course.

Feder is a clue I want to take up as to the course's origin. If hostility to Feder motivated Kant to abandon the course, might sympathy for Feder's position have motivated its inception? What was Feder's position in 1767–1768?¹⁶¹ What was the nature of Feder's textbook? Actually, that question turns out to be more complex than we would like because Feder published two compendia, and the famous one only became available in 1769.¹⁶² Lehmann presents a brief account of Feder's publications, noting that the compendium Kant apparently used, *Grundriss der Philosophischen Wissenschaft nebst der noethigen Geschichte zum Gebrauch seiner Zuhörer* (1767), was joined in print by the other and far more successful compendium from Feder's pen two years later.¹⁶³ As newly installed *Ordinarius* at Göttingen, Feder in 1769 published his *Logik und Metaphysik, nebst der Philosophischen Geschichte im Grundrisse*, which achieved wide acclaim throughout Germany. His fame rested considerably on this work. Lehmann suggests that Kant could well have switched from the first to the second compendium in 1769, since "there are between the two compendia many factual concordances."¹⁶⁴

Lehmann, in his annotations to the Academy edition of Kant's lectures for this course, notes that it may well be only a fragment of the course, since it breaks off as it gets to empirical psychology, and thus leaves out a great deal that is to be found in the textbook from Feder that Kant was using in the course.¹⁶⁵ This seems to be altogether likely. Moreover, the binding of the existing lecture notes together with a complete set of notes from Kant's anthropology course and a substantial segment of physics lecture notes may betoken that the collector of these materials (all of the same ink and paper) collated together notes from three separate courses to generate what the collector took to be a complete representation of Kant's teachings. Lehmann points out that the physics excerpts show a remarkable parallel not only to the other fragments of Kant's physical science lectures but also to the presentation of some of the material on physical science in Feder's textbook (664). Similarly, one might conjecture, the anthropology notes would present a far more thorough articulation of empirical psychology in the wider context of a general "science of man" that would supersede whatever Kant might have presented based on the Feder text on such questions. That is, admittedly, conjectural. There is yet a further conjecture, and one that other commentators have seen fit to offer already, namely, that the earlier versions of this course—those offered between 1767 and 1772—might well have been more extensive than the surviving notes from the 1775 course

would indicate.¹⁶⁶ All the more reason to wonder why Kant should have felt this new course necessary, or Feder's compendium appropriate for it.

It behooves us to go back to the inception of the course. Feder's compendium was just published in 1767. It was produced while Feder was still *Hofmeister*, and it would be more than a year before he received the *venia legendi* at Göttingen.¹⁶⁷ He was, in a word, a young and relatively unknown figure in the German academic world. What was Kant doing adopting Feder's textbook for a new course? What was this textbook designed to provide to the academic market, in the first place? What sort of course did it imply? Why would Kant, still a *Magister* who needed to attract students to provide for his slender economic wherewithal, undertake such a course? These are questions that no one has seen fit to ask. Emil Arnoldt, who knew more about Kant's university teaching than anyone, bluntly claimed he knew *nothing* about the content or motivation of this course, maintaining that Feder's text was useless in that regard.¹⁶⁸ He was able to report only the external details of when Kant offered the course and what text he used as his basis.¹⁶⁹ Lehmann finds fault with Arnoldt's dismissal of the Feder textbook as any indicator of what Kant may have taught.¹⁷⁰ Lehmann thinks there is something we can learn from it. I agree; indeed, I wish to fault Lehmann himself for a dismissiveness on this score little short of Arnoldt's own. Lehmann writes, for example, "That for Kant what mattered was not so much the coherent text but rather its headings [*Stichworte*] goes without saying" (663). Or, Feder's text was "so wooden and poorly thought-through that it could at the very most have been useful for Kant only in making associations" (666). Nevertheless, Lehmann concedes that from the existing lecture notes it does appear that, "in short, for all the differences in level between Kant and the young Feder, Kant nonetheless followed his 'author' " (666).

The title of the course needs our attention: "Encyclopedia of Philosophy as a Whole with an abridged History of Philosophy based on Feder's Sketch."¹⁷¹ The idea of a philosophical encyclopedia in 1767 would of necessity evoke associations with the great French endeavor of Diderot and D'Alembert, launched a decade before and widely esteemed the most important project of the European Enlightenment.¹⁷² In that light, it is good to recall the ambition of the original *Encyclopédie*, not only to make all knowledge *accessible* to the widest public but to act to *transform the world* in a progressive direction.¹⁷³ That is, the *Encyclopédie* was the fulfillment of Diderot's call, "*Hâtons-nous de rendre la philosophie populaire*."¹⁷⁴ When Feder released his original compendium, he resisted his publisher's pressure to use the word *encyclopedia* in the title, choosing instead the less explicit term *sketch* [*Grundriss*].¹⁷⁵ Yet he clearly followed the same agenda as his

mighty predecessors, in other words, to create a vehicle for enlightenment, to serve "philosophy for the world"—in short, to propagate "popular philosophy." The first two parts of his original compendium—his "Introduction to the History of Philosophy" and his "Outline of the Most Important Parts of Philosophy"—accordingly suffered Lehmann's contemptuous summation: they "contained too many commonplaces and polemics along the lines of the 'enlightenment' of the time."¹⁷⁶ I would like to hold out the prospect that Kant had a far more positive view of Feder's effort, especially in 1767. Kant, after all, had received a very positive review of his *Dreams* from Feder, and the two actually became correspondents, though the correspondence has not survived.¹⁷⁷ Feder was enthusiastic about Kant at this time: "For Kant I had the highest respect from the time that I read *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, while I was still in Coburg. Even though I did not yet know who the author was, in the *Erlangen Gelehrten Zeitung* I praised in the strongest terms this comic-skeptical piece of writing, which all the same revealed the most profound insights, for it coincided very well with the dispositions of my own mind at the time."¹⁷⁸ In the review, Feder's praise clearly pointed to their common agenda: "But in philosophy in general and in particular in psychology to be able to keep oneself from useless questions, from prejudices, from fraudulent propositions and overhasty contradictions—that is the greatest advantage that one can derive from [this book]. To conduct philosophy with an academic tone: *that* the author is unwilling to do."¹⁷⁹

In a word, Kant adopted Feder's text and designed a whole new course in 1767 as a part of his own commitment to popular philosophy. Hence Kant's use of the term *Encyclopedia*. The evidence of this lingers even in the fragment of his course in 1775 that has survived. Manfred Kuehn makes the decisive observation: "in comparison with the very negative strictures of the first *Critique* and the *Prolegomena* Kant is almost a common sense philosopher" in the *Enzyklopädievorlesungen*.¹⁸⁰ Kant introduces the course by explaining what he means by *encyclopedia*. It is a "short excerpt from a whole science" aimed to "provide an overview of the whole."¹⁸¹ The implication is that in this endeavor, a *historical* approach might be taken even to *philosophy*. In fact, Kant spends much more time on the history of the various branches of philosophy in this set of course lectures than in his other courses. That suggests that the historical approach to philosophy seemed to Kant more viable at this moment than typically. In general, this is problematic for Kant because philosophy is not a body of knowledge to be learned but rather a form of thinking to be cultivated. This is *the* fundamental pedagogical idea in Kant. "One must think for oneself," Kant proposes in the *Encyclopedia* lectures, then he adds: "and indeed *a priori*" [7]. This elaboration should

draw our attention. The insistence on a priori thinking is a departure from the many similar passages in which Kant stresses thinking for oneself, and this alerts us to the possibility that in 1775 Kant was particularly concerned to uphold this aspect of philosophy. Certainly, Feder's compendium makes no similar claim. In any event, Kant spells out the mission of philosophy for his students: "Philosophy has as its domain all human knowledge of matters of whatever origin [*von Sachen, die sich befinden mögen wo sie wollen*]. It is at the same time the highest tribunal of reason" (7). Thus, Kant maintains for philosophy both a universality of breadth and an authority of judgment that makes it, in effect, the "Queen of all the sciences."¹⁸² More precisely, Kant adds immediately, "philosophy is really about the rules for the proper use of understanding and reason."¹⁸³ The difference between these two sorts of claims for philosophy is that the first claim is a stipulation of authority; the second is a characterization of methodology.

What is crucial is the next discrimination, in which Kant distinguishes the "artist of reason," a merely *speculative* philosopher, from the "leader [or lawgiver] of reason," who "leads mankind to their destiny [*Bestimmung*]. His cognitions have to do accordingly with the vocation of man [*Bestimmung des Menschen*]" (8). Kant is clearly inserting his argument into the ongoing tradition of discourse under this rubric, which dominated the *Hochaufklärung*.¹⁸⁴ But the point here is that he is accepting one of the crucial claims of popular philosophy in so doing: "Science is really not our vocation." There is a difference between science and wisdom, and "the use of reason in consideration of purposes is its most noble application."¹⁸⁵ Only when the philosopher brings all his science to the service of the vocation of man can he be a teacher of wisdom. Thus, Kant criticizes Wolff by name as *merely* speculative, "a great artist serving the curiosity of mankind" (8). This, it must be noted, is a long way from Kant's praise for Wolff in the first *Critique*, as the great bastion of rigor in German philosophy.¹⁸⁶ Kant is here very much on the side of popular philosophy against the school philosophy personified in Wolff. "One must seek to be wise and not simply to accumulate speculative knowledge, for [such] knowledge leaves a vast emptiness [*Wissen läßt eine große Leere*]."¹⁸⁷ And that is Kant in 1775; we are free to conjecture how much more emphatic his judgment might have been earlier—or, better, we might well take this as a *holdover* from an earlier version. Kant thinks that certain ancient philosophers—and among the moderns, Rousseau—came closest to the ideal of a philosopher who was a teacher of wisdom, a leader of mankind in its grand vocation (8). Socrates, Kant points out, is often acclaimed as the one who brought philosophy down from heaven [to earth] by distinguishing between speculation and wisdom

(9). To invoke Socrates in this manner is a key trope of the eighteenth-century effort to foster "philosophy for the world," as we have seen from Addison.¹⁸⁸ Thus, of a philosopher in his own time Kant made two demands: first, that he oppose superstition, for this was the archenemy of enlightenment; and second, that he think for himself: "philosophy and taste require genius and not imitation."¹⁸⁹ One of the points that Norbert Hinske has made is that Kant was fond, in his early years up through 1772, of identifying philosophy with genius and creativity—indeed, the phrase "artist of reason" is a prime example. That language, which thronged in his logic lectures of the early 1770s, for example, came to be purged utterly from Kant's characterizations of philosophy as a rigorous science in the phase of *Kritizismus*.¹⁹⁰ Associating philosophy with genius was, one can surmise, a part of his transient identification with popular philosophy.

Kant turns to the exposition of philosophy as a speculative science from three vantages: the faculties of man, principles, and the objects of knowledge.¹⁹¹ Philosophy, he contends, considers either objects of pure reason or objects of the senses. "The science which has as its topic an object of pure reason is called transcendental philosophy." Kant terms psychology the "science of thinking nature," which can be either rational or empirical. Rational psychology "considers the soul not at all via experience, but rather through principles of pure reason, for example, whether it is a spirit, material, simple, etc. etc. If one considers the soul empirically, the science is called anthropology" (11).

Kant turns then to the question of education, and he starts with the matter of reading. He distinguishes books that provide cultivation along with entertainment from those that are merely entertaining. Novels he is inclined to consign to the latter category, especially if they "make the heart soft" or "awaken passions." But he admits that "those that are written with wit [*Laune*] are good, and travelogues are the best for entertainment and cultivation." Especially "whatever is written with genius is worth thinking through." Thus, "only novels where one finds sentiments, and comedies in the manner of Shakespeare, where the author has discovered a hidden aspect of man, represents character traits, etc., are useful" (29). Here Kant is in the thick of popular philosophizing, but a few pages later we find him in the thick of his great transcendental argument about the necessity of binding understanding and sensibility together for a valid cognition. Kant uses the phrase "*Titel des Denkens*"—title to a thought, as in legal title—to characterize what he thinks transcendental philosophy must explain. "The research into the origin of the action of reason is the [proper] pursuit of metaphysics," he proclaims (35). The problem is: "we must investigate

whether perhaps we are caught up in a confusion in which we take subjective conditions of thought for objective ones" (36). Here we stand at the very threshold of the first *Critique*.

The text breaks off just as Kant introduces the theme of empirical psychology. How he introduces it is very interesting, for it gives us insight into precisely how Kant viewed the project of anthropology in 1775: "Empirical psychology or anthropology is of such great utility that one can certainly believe that education would remain faulty so long as this science is not treated *ex professo*, it will never come to perfection until it is taught in academies after the manner of the guild [*sie wird nicht eher zu ihrer Vollkommenheit kommen, woferne sie nicht gleichsam zunftmäßig auf Akademien gelehret wird*]" (44). I submit that this is a remarkable assertion. It is remarkable first for its guild affirmation. Second, it is remarkable in that Kant clearly perceives anthropology as an independent, empirical science that requires systematic formulation. The *Lectures on Philosophical Encyclopedia*—even in their fragmentary, 1775 form—offer us vital insight into the connection between the Kant of the 1760s, the Kant of popular philosophy, and the Kant of the anthropology lectures of the 1770s: a Kant who may not have been entirely of one mind with the "critical" Kant.

KANT AND ANTHROPOLOGY: OF (AT LEAST) TWO MINDS

I have made a *circumstantial* case that Kant was considered a leader in popular philosophy in Germany in the late 1760s, and thus a key player in the German crystallization of "anthropology." But it remains to ask whether Kant himself cultivated this self-image. The answer is a resounding "Yes," and the proof is in one of the most striking *images* we have of Kant, the portrait by Becker from 1768. Reinhard Brandt and Werner Stark have brought the connection clearly into consideration in the decisive context, for they note that Becker portrayed Kant holding a volume whose title is clearly legible: *Anthropologie oder Naturkenntnis des Menschen*. They comment: "Kant would surely not have chosen this motto for his portrait if he had not seen in anthropology a central domain of his efforts at knowledge; at the same time, it is with this [pursuit] that he presented himself to a larger public."¹⁹² Both those points are essential, but there is a third: the characterization of anthropology which is offered in the motto *Naturkenntnis*—natural science. Given everything we have discussed about the emergence of the anthropological discourse of the eighteenth century, that is a striking piece of evidence. And, finally, so is the date: 1768. Kant was *already* very advanced toward his conceptualization of a new disciplinary anthropol-

ogy four years before Platner or his own course presented themselves to the public.

There may not have been a need for a separate course to achieve Kant's *pedagogical* goals. But then, when and why did Kant decide that anthropology warranted not only a separate course but a separate *discipline*? The portrait by Becker proposes a conception of anthropology as *Naturkenntnis*—a special empirical science, not simply a pragmatic propaedeutic for metaphysics (or even an application of a priori moral imperatives). The notion of anthropology as a *Fachwissenschaft* brings us to a crucial contextual perspective on Kant's development, namely that Kant sought to achieve public stature as an *authority* in this domain of inquiry, at least for Germany. In short, I think we need to grasp the question of the anthropology course in terms of Kant's ambitions as an *academic* expert in a new empirical discipline. Kant was not only divided—of two minds—between the metaphysical and the anthropological in these years, but also between the theoretical and the pragmatic conceptions of anthropology in his own pedagogy.

In one of the most important essays written on Kant's anthropology, Norbert Hinske took issue with Odo Marquard over the inception of Kant's project.¹⁹³ Marquard simply gestured to the year 1772 as an inaugural moment; Hinske insisted that the genesis of Kant's idea of anthropology was far more protracted, stretching back well into the 1760s. That is unquestionably correct, but, as Hinske realized, it thrust him into the thick of an old and bitter controversy between Benno Erdmann and Emil Arnoldt about the origins of Kant's anthropology course. Erdmann, in some of the earliest work on this domain in Kant's writings, maintained that the anthropology course emerged out of Kant's physical geography course. He argued that Kant's omnivorous consumption of travel literature expanded his ethnographic resources beyond the space available in what was essentially an earth-science lecture course.¹⁹⁴ Arnoldt bitingly disputed Erdmann's claims, arguing that there was no evidence that any of the anthropology materials had been covered in the geography lectures.¹⁹⁵ Instead, they originated in the section on "empirical psychology" in Kant's metaphysics lectures. This was the view adopted by Adickes as well, and it has prevailed for the most part.¹⁹⁶ Brandt is thoroughly of this view.¹⁹⁷ But the connection between the physical geography course and the anthropology course cannot be so lightly dismissed. They shared a unity of pedagogical and cultural mission that should never be dropped from sight, and even the point Erdmann made about the ethnographical materials is not entirely to be dismissed.¹⁹⁸

In the *Announcement* of 1765 Kant suggested that he planned to adjust *the physical geography course* "by condensing that part of the subject

which is concerned with the physical features of the earth, to gain the time necessary . . . to include the other parts of the subject, which are of even greater general utility . . . a *physical, moral* and *political* geography." The physical segment would lay the environmental parameters within which alone human history could be "distinguishable from fairy stories," but the second part would "consider *man*, throughout the world[,] from the point of view of the variety of his natural properties."¹⁹⁹ That suggests that, at least in plan, Kant's physical geography course from 1766 onward *did* contain an anthropological element.²⁰⁰ Kant elaborates: "Unless these matters are considered, general judgments about man would scarcely be possible. The comparison of human beings with each other, and the comparison of man today with the moral state of man in earlier times, furnishes us with a comprehensive map of the human species."²⁰¹

But there also emerges a strong connection between anthropology and *ethics*. Kant writes: "[Concerning man] I shall always begin by considering historically and philosophically what *happens* before specifying what *ought to happen*" (311). But if the physical geography aimed to discern humankind in its variety and to achieve through comparison some generalizations about the "map of the human species," the ambition of the moral anthropology was different:

I do not only mean *man* as he is distorted by the mutable form which is conferred upon him by the contingencies of his condition. . . . I rather mean the unchanging *nature* of man, and his distinctive position within the creation . . . to establish which perfection is appropriate to him in the state of *primitive* innocence and which perfection is appropriate to him in the state of *wise* innocence. . . . This method of moral enquiry is an admirable discovery of our times, which, when viewed in the full extent of its programme, was entirely unknown to the ancients. (311-12)

In contrasting this *essential* inquiry with the study of *contingent variations*, Kant claims to be able to "make clear what method ought to be adopted in the study of *man*" (311). This suggests that another locus to seek sources of Kant's anthropological considerations should lie in his early lectures on practical philosophy, and the Herder lecture notes confirm this.²⁰²

As it was presented from 1772 onward, the primary topic of Kant's anthropology course was the internal organization of the human mind, a "facultative approach."²⁰³ That had already been elaborated as "empirical psychology," first by Wolff and then by Baumgarten. Kant clearly followed in their footsteps, albeit creatively, in his metaphysics course.²⁰⁴ This material

shifted to the anthropology course after 1772–1773, becoming its so-called *Didaktik*, the first and preponderant part of the course.²⁰⁵ Clearly none of this derived from his physical geography course, and Arnoldt has the upper hand here. On the other hand, the crucial source of material (and structure) for the balance of the anthropology course was Kant's own *Observations*.²⁰⁶ The same materials, the same sources, and the same organization that prevailed there came to be incorporated in the anthropology course as its second part. That part was what most closely correlated with the sorts of investigations that constituted the wider "science of man" in the European Enlightenment.

The most important document we have concerning Kant's conception of his project with the anthropology course is his letter to Herz of winter 1773. He had given his course once already. Before that, in March 1772, Ernst Platner's book had appeared. The occasion of Kant's letter was to comment on Herz's important review of Platner in the *Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek*.²⁰⁷ Or, rather, Kant used Herz's review as the occasion to assert his own alternative vision of anthropology against Platner's.

I have read [your] review of Platner's anthropology. I would never have offered my advice to the reviewer without leave, but I am happy to comment on the progress in expertise [*Geschicklichkeit*] manifest in [your text]. I am presenting this winter for the second time a lecture course in anthropology which I am now thinking of instituting as a regular [*ordentlichen*] academic program [*disciplin*]. However, my plan is entirely different [from Platner's]. The intention I have is to present through it the sources from all the sciences which [bear on] mores [*Sitten*], efficacy [*Geschicklichkeit*], socializing [*Umgang*], the method of cultivating and governing men, and in the process to open up everything practical. In this I am more interested in phenomena and their laws than I am in the first grounds of the possibility of the *modification* of human nature in general. Therefore the subtle and in my view eternally vain investigation of the manner in which the organs of the body enter into relation with thinking I leave entirely aside. I am so directly concerned with observations themselves in ordinary life that from the very beginning through to the end my listeners never have a dry but rather an entertaining occupation since they always have the opportunity to compare my remarks with their own ordinary experience. I endeavor in my spare time to develop out of this very pleasant corpus of observations [*Beobachtungslehre*] a preliminary exercise in expertise [*Geschicklichkeit*], in cleverness [*Klugheit*], and even in wisdom [*Weisheit*] for the academic youth which, together with physical geography, is to be distinguished from all other

academic instruction and which can be called knowledge of the world
[*Kenntnis der Welt*].²⁰⁸

It is striking that Kant explicitly repudiates for the course just the sorts of metaphysical pursuits to which he promised his undying allegiance in his letter to Moses Mendelssohn in April 1766, in other words, the question of *commercium mentis et corporis* and the ultimate foundations of the possibility of human nature.²⁰⁹ It would be one thing to register this as a segmentation of effort, in other words, to claim that in *anthropology* such questions were not appropriate but that in metaphysics they remained essential, but Kant wrote, quite explicitly, that the investigation of the body-soul relation was an “eternally vain [*auf ewig vergebliche*] inquiry.” Thus, the target of this renunciation cannot have been just Platner, but his own earlier ambitions, his “precritical” metaphysics.²¹⁰ Of further note is Kant’s repeated emphasis on the *pleasurableness* of this mode of inquiry, presumably in explicit distinction to the “dry” pursuit of abstract academic philosophy. Yet Kant was not content merely to enjoy or be enjoyed: he meant to turn anthropology into a disciplinary vehicle to prepare students for their active lives in the world. In this, he linked the anthropology course with the physical geography course as pursuing an entirely separate pedagogical ambition from that of ordinary university courses. The word Kant would use for this pedagogy is *pragmatic*. Kant would already have instituted this change in the title of the course by the time he wrote to Herz, since the course was given in the winter term and hence was well underway as Kant was writing. But significantly the term does not appear in this letter.

The last point is to take seriously the impact of Platner’s publication on Kant’s sense of his own project. The upshot of his reaction to Platner was nothing short of a reformulation of Kant’s project, organized around his contrast of the “physiological” and the “pragmatic” approaches to anthropology.²¹¹ Brandt makes the important point that the reformulation remained primarily one of overall rubric, not of substantive revision of material or structure.²¹² Still, that Kant would wish to reconfigure his presentation of the overall enterprise is, as Brandt affirms, a sharp enough turn to demand examination. It is a turn “decisively against not only a medical anthropology but against his own original conception” (21). In the original version of the course, Kant was at pains to depict anthropology as an empirical natural science, analogous to physics.²¹³ Neither had a place within metaphysics as a priori science, but they remained legitimate *disciplines* of empirical inquiry. In the initial lecture series, Kant explicitly based anthropology on “observation and experience [*Beobachtung und Erfahrung*]”—that constantly

conjoined terminology for the "new" method in the "science of man."²¹⁴ Indeed, Kant was explicit in the first version of the anthropology lectures to discriminate such an approach as distinctively modern.²¹⁵ Moreover, Kant claimed that this new empirical science could never *mature* if it were not organized and formulated as an academic discipline.²¹⁶ That is, Kant saw himself involved in an ongoing research program for a *theoretical* branch of knowledge. This research program had clear progenitors: "But why has no coherent science of man been constructed from the great treasure of observations of the English authors?"²¹⁷ On this presentation, if anthropology had pragmatic payoffs, these were a consequence of its theoretical insight.

A year later, Kant rejected the "physiological" approach as fundamentally misguided.²¹⁸ Only a "pragmatic" anthropology promised anything of value. But *pragmatic* was a highly polyvalent term—for the culture and for Kant.²¹⁹ Brandt and Stark suggest that Kant's adoption of the term in this specific context drew heavily on the new sense of *pragmatic* developed by the historical theorists at Göttingen, led by Gatterer, and especially on the construal of Hume's practices in *History of England*.²²⁰ These theorists were interested in historical interpretation as an *explanatory* structure, organizing things in causal sequence.²²¹ Kant's sense for the *pragmatic* in history was somewhat wider: "The historical method of instruction is pragmatic if it has another motive besides the academic, [if it is] not merely for the school but for the world and morality."²²² And his sense for the *pragmatic* generally was even more extensive: "A knowledge-claim is pragmatic if it is capable of general use in society."²²³

The emphatic sense of *pragmatic* in Kant's revision of his anthropology lectures was the repudiation of somatic/physiological considerations. The connection of soul to body was simply not something to be elucidated further, even if it was obviously not to be denied.²²⁴ Instead, Kant stressed theory of action and the self-consciousness of choice. Kant from the outset concerned himself with self-consciousness as the unique mark of the human. While this repudiation of the "philosophical physicians" was most salient in Kant's disparagement of Platner in his letter to Herz, it was already a feature even of his first lecture course. In the notes of Philippi from 1772, Kant is quoted as follows: "The transition of bodily motion into spiritual [motion] cannot be further elucidated, hence Bonnet and several others err severely when they seek to infer from the brain to the soul with any certainty."²²⁵ Similarly, Kant had no interest in considerations of animal-human parallels in psychology.²²⁶

The point to emphasize at the outset is, however, that in contrasting the pragmatic to the physiological, Kant was not yet renouncing its "scientific"

status as a discipline.²²⁷ That now became a lesser consideration: the systematic organization of the knowledge (which still mattered very much to Kant) came to be subordinated to the *use* of the knowledge "for the world." Still, that left seriously at issue what exactly the "scientific" organization of that discipline could be, once the "physiological" was dismissed.²²⁸ Not a few critics have registered some consternation at the peculiar *disembodiment* that follows from Kant's distinction and shift in emphasis.²²⁹ Brandt states it bluntly: "Kant's anthropology does not set out from the 'whole man' as a unity of body and soul but rather presents the self as mere soul which only in later developments discovers that it is embodied."²³⁰ Helmut Pfothenhauer suggests that Kant bans rather than resolves the anthropological contingencies: "Those irritating experiences of the complex and often obscure, alienating properties of individuality which interested the psychologists and which approached articulation in the attempts of self-reflexive anthropology, came [by Kant's measures] to be tabooed."²³¹ Problems of coherence are only compounded when one asks the question of the ultimate connection of this "pragmatic" anthropology to the "moral" anthropology Kant gestured to repeatedly in his ethical works but never explicitly formulated.²³²

There is an even deeper issue: How was a *Beobachtungslehre* ever to meet the standards of Kantian science?²³³ It is not clear that anthropology was in any better state than empirical psychology. Perhaps the most cogent way to warrant Kant's project would be to register his discontent with the traditional formulations of empirical psychology concerning the problem of relating the soul to the body as an exercise in "reduction." Rather, Kant sought to *widen* the inquiry to the whole man.²³⁴ That is, the solution to problems of "body-mind" interaction could only be approached "pragmatically" in terms of the whole man, and this not through introspection but through observation and experience in the world. Yet it would be apt to note Kant's reservations about even these empirical recourses: if introspection was compromised by self-delusion, observation of others was compromised by projection and misinterpretation.²³⁵ Mere observation could not be controlled carefully to mitigate such distortions, and the very idea of experimentation with mind seemed to Kant either immoral or dangerous to health.²³⁶ That left the field in considerable obscurity.

In the earliest surviving version of the anthropology lectures presented under the new, "pragmatic" rubric, the Friedländer lectures of 1775-1776, Kant's introduction to the course is strikingly different. It is all about *Weltkenntnis*, about the proper use of knowledge, which, Kant pointedly observes, separates theory from pedantry.²³⁷ Kant is still adamant that there is a need for *systematic study*. In this formulation, Kant argues that only

from the vantage of the whole can the particular observations have any weight. This emphasis on system is new compared with what we find in the Collins or Parow versions of the 1772–1773 course. Kant finds here a new vehicle through which to reassert his sense of disciplinary authority even after having cast off any “physiological” basis for the new science. To this Kant adds a second, crucial methodological constraint: anthropology is not particular but rather universal. “Anthropology is not a local but a general anthropology. One becomes acquainted in it not with the condition of men but with the nature of mankind, for the local characteristics of men are always changing, but the nature of man does not” (471). The problem with this formulation, from the vantage of eighteenth-century practice in the “science of man,” is that for most practitioners the “nomothetic” regularities of a human nature were conceived as *results* of the inquiry, and thus as contingent and fallible *empirical* generalizations. Kant, however, was totally committed to a preemptive, metaphysical prescription of human nature grounded in his conception of reason and the categorical imperative. And that could hardly change in the critical period. Kant did not propose to *discover* human nature through a consideration of human variety. He proposed to *derive* it from a metaphysical—“transcendental”—argument about the “fundamental grounds of the possibility [of] human nature.”²³⁸ More generally, in the words of Kim, “all in all the truths about man which are presented in his pragmatic anthropology are derived from and ordered according to the so-called faculty-theoretical approach” he took over from Wolff and Baumgarten, without ever having rigorously questioned “how the generality or completeness of the theory of faculties as a general scheme was guaranteed.”²³⁹

Kant published a version of his anthropology in book form in 1798, but it was not well-received. Indeed, a lot of the energy and liveliness that had characterized the course in its early years seems to have been wrung out of the published version. Consequently, after Kant's death there was an important effort to retrieve the earlier, more brilliant version of his anthropology lectures. Under the pseudonym F. C. Starke, the freelance writer Adam Bergh published a volume entitled *Immanuel Kants Menschenkunde oder philosophische Anthropologie* (1831), and then a second volume drawn from a variety of Kant's lecture courses and other materials.²⁴⁰ The *Menschenkunde*, as it was known, came to be one of the most important sources for understanding Kant's views. It remained crucial through the early twentieth century, especially in coordination with Adickes's edition of the *Reflections on Anthropology*. The *Menschenkunde* text has been relegated to its proper philological standing in the new academy edition of

the ensemble of Kant's anthropology lectures. Brandt, in that light, rejects the phrase "philosophical anthropology" as Bergh's invention, insisting Kant *never* used that terminology.²⁴¹ That point is certainly sound enough, philologically. It settles nothing *philosophically* about whether Kant *practiced* philosophical anthropology, though Brandt is certainly warranted to claim that Bergh offered little evidence for that interpretation.

More interesting for our current consideration is the word *Menschenkunde*, the German word form for the study of man. This might seem to be an anachronistic term, more in line with nineteenth-century usage, and Brandt could just as easily have claimed that Kant never used *this* term either. But the term was used extensively by the end of the eighteenth century, and by the popular philosophers. Bergh's choice of this title has a philological shrewdness about it, because it situates Kant's lectures in a popular-philosophical discursive frame. In fact this version of Kant's lectures, which Brandt now dates with some uncertainty to 1781–1782, explicitly presented itself in the language of popular philosophy, to which we have good reason to believe that Kant was extremely sensitive in just these years.²⁴² Kant introduced the course as

not just created to achieve a reputation among one's fellow guild members of the academy but rather . . . stretching knowledge [*Wissen*, not *Kenntnis*] beyond the school, in the endeavor to propagate one's insights [*Kenntnisse*] for general use: that is what study for the world is. A science is academically proper which is appropriate to the school and to the professional requirements; this is not a perfection to be despised, for all sciences must first become academically proper; thereafter they can also become popular, and available to amateurs for their appropriation and use.²⁴³

The language here is unquestionably picking up on the jargon of popular philosophy, but it is just as unquestionably *defending* academic *Gründlichkeit* in a manner far more explicit than in the earlier versions we have considered. Here it takes *precedence* in a manner that heightens the elitism and expertise of academic learning. That is in considerable tension with Kant's longstanding claim that no one needed any expertise to approach the anthropology course.²⁴⁴ Yet in this same version we find Kant citing his own reviewers from the 1760s (concerning *Observations*) and claiming that what he presented was so accessible that even "ladies at their toilette" could find it interesting.²⁴⁵ Kant reconciled these two professions by arguing that the academic needed to become a "man of the world"—the opposite of a

pedant—by learning how to make his knowledge applicable in a popular context, so that the unschooled could appreciate and understand what he had to offer. Still, the task was first to learn the field, and this had as its criterial standards Kant's clearly *academic* notions of rigor (*Gründlichkeit*) and system.

The published version of the anthropology lectures, prepared by Kant himself in 1798, contrasts the physiological and the pragmatic approaches to anthropology as alternative *systematic* studies. The first offers a conceptualization of what nature makes of man, while the latter presents what man "does, can and should make of himself." But Kant drastically denigrates the former study as "a sheer waste of time."²⁴⁶ He insists that there can be no application of such knowledge, even if we could secure it, and he holds this pragmatic standard to be the essence of *Weltkenntnis*. At the same time, the pragmatic study must be systematic. Moreover, it begins with the universal: "Universal knowledge will always precede local knowledge as long as it is to be arranged and guided by philosophy, without which all acquired knowledge can provide nothing but fragmentary groping, and no science at all" (5). It will not escape the reader that this is an antipathetic stance toward empirical inquiry in general and more specifically in the case of the "science of man."²⁴⁷ In short, if we consider the manner in which Kant introduced his new "science" of anthropology to his students over the course of the some thirty years he taught it, what emerges is an increasingly dogmatic and antiempirical posture, and a more and more marked academicism within a putatively worldly project.

The bulk of Kant's anthropology, its first or "Didactic" part, was a detailed presentation of what had always been his "empirical psychology" and was still taught, with not too much amendment, from Baumgarten's formulations in the *Metaphysica*. The elaborations of the second part, too, followed closely the agenda and often the very examples and language of his *Observations*. As Brandt has stressed, Kant's conception and his delivery of the anthropology course was entirely unaffected by the "critical revolution" of the 1780s.²⁴⁸ Steven Lestition has argued that there are virtually no discernible changes in the course after about 1779.²⁴⁹ By contrast, the great promise of a "moral anthropology," included in every one of Kant's writings in ethics, was never fulfilled. Nor, assuming this was ever Kant's intention, was any "philosophical anthropology" that would unify the various elements of the critical philosophy, as he hinted in a few tantalizing places.²⁵⁰ It is not that one cannot *reconstruct* what a Kantian anthropology—moral or philosophical—might look like.²⁵¹ Scholars have attempted that, as even earlier Kant's epigoni did.²⁵² The point is that *Kant* did not undertake it.

One might claim that it was too massive an undertaking. I think, however, that the alternative possibility must at least be considered, namely that he considered it superfluous.

KANT AND PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: THE IDEA OF "EPIGENESIS"

Kant's immediate influence on the "science of man" was not in empirical psychology or pragmatic history, but rather in the field of *physical* anthropology.²⁵³ Kant's reception of Buffon and his elaboration of a theory of epigenesis in the context of human races, together with a metatheory of natural history and of the regulative use of teleology in the life sciences, made Kant important to the practicing anthropologists in Germany. Above all, the crucial connection is with Johann Friedrich Blumenbach of Göttingen. Kant's interest in the questions of biological generation and their metaphysical implications was clear already in his *One Possible Basis* of 1762, if not even earlier in his *Universal Natural History*. Still, he stayed scrupulously close to the thematics of the Leibniz-Clarke debate in his own natural philosophy, concentrating on developing a dynamic theory of matter in the line of Leibniz.²⁵⁴ The parallels with Boscovich from about 1758 are striking, but the evidence is sketchy regarding Kant's acquaintance with Boscovich's texts.²⁵⁵ In any event, it was only after 1770 that Kant became explicitly concerned with the biological side of man, with what we would now call physical anthropology.

The first evidence of this interest was Kant's review of Moscati in 1771, in which the important issue was erect posture and its biological versus cultural determinants.²⁵⁶ Moscati had argued that there were significant biological costs associated with upright posture. Kant found this extremely interesting and he claimed that it confirmed the intervention of reason in the natural order, manifesting its power and its autonomy in the case of man. Thus, Kant used Moscati as a vehicle to stress the delimitation of humans from the rest of the animal kingdom, to resist any impulse toward naturalism. At the same time, Kant was steeped in the writings of Buffon, Maupertuis, Bonnet, and Haller on the questions of biological generation. He was aware that here an even more sweeping naturalism was in the offing, and he sought to formulate a theory that at the same time acknowledged the scientific efficacy of some of these ideas and bracketed safely their metaphysical and their moral-political excesses. Metaphysical excess had to do with the ascription of immanent properties to matter that violated its inertness. Moral-political excess had to do with the argument that human

differences of race were in fact differences of species, in other words, that other races were distinct from and *inferior* to the European race.²⁵⁷ All these issues came up in Kant's important essay, "Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen" (1775). This text was originally published as an advertisement for his physical geography course, but two years later an expanded version appeared in what is an important venue from our perspective, J. J. Engel's highly successful anthology, *Philosophie für die Welt*. Thus, this text represented Kant's only significant *publication* as a "popular philosopher" in the 1770s.

Kant argued that science had to recognize that even the best description of how the forms of nature stood at present did not explain how they got that way. That required a new conception of "natural history" that

would teach us about the changes in the form of the earth and at the same time about the [changes which] the creatures of the earth (plants and animals) suffered in the course of their natural wanderings, and the consequent variations [*Abartungen*] from the original form of their ancestral line [*Stammgattung*]. It would in all likelihood reinterpret a large number of apparently distinct types [*Arten*] into races of the same species [*Gattung*] and transform the currently so diffuse system of academic natural description into a physical system for the understanding [i.e., a science]. (434 n)

Kant argued that the distinction between heuristic and actual categories (*Schulgattungen* and *Naturgattungen*) could only be sustained if one could discover, beyond the artificial typologies (Linnaeus), natural laws (Buffon). "The divisions of the schools have to do with *classes* based on *similarities*; the divisions of nature, however, concern lineages [*Stämme*] which discriminate animals in terms of *consanguinity* [*Verwandtschaften*] in terms of their generation" (429). Kant used this methodology to account for divergences of races within the single human species over long stretches of time. Kant asked how, from any original form of the species, one could derive "through a chain of alterations" the varieties or races encountered in present natural descriptions.²⁵⁸ He argued that the potential for variation was built into the organism as part of its species heritage: "The grounds of a particular development [*Auswicklung*] which lie in the nature of an organic body (of a plant or an animal) are called *germs* [*Keime*] if these developments affect particular parts, but if they affect only the size or the interrelation of the parts, then I term them *natural endowments* [*natürliche Anlagen*]." ²⁵⁹ Variation was part of the original germ plasm, and it manifested itself when

the environment placed the species under specific ecological constraints for a sustained period of time. Hence, Kant maintained simultaneously that species were fixed and that varieties arose within species as adaptations to ecological constraints.

He held to these doctrines because the alternative would be to allow that environmental factors could cause the strictly genetic nature of the species to alter, and Kant insisted, "Chance or general mechanical laws can never bring about such adaptation. Therefore we must see such developments which appear accidental according to them, as *predetermined* [*vorgebildet*]." External factors could be occasions, but not direct causes of changes which could be inherited through generation. "As little as chance or physical-mechanical causes can generate [*hervorbringen*] an organic body, so little will they be able to effect in them a modification of their reproductive powers which can be inherited" (435). Therefore, it had to be possible to establish an account of their variation, a "natural history," that would indicate the original natural endowment of the species and explain its actualization in variety over time in different environments.²⁶⁰

In 1775, the same year as Kant's essay, Blumenbach published his dissertation on similar themes: *De generis humani variatione nativa*.²⁶¹ It is not clear whether Kant read this before composing his own essay. Indeed, there is even some question as to whether Kant may already then have influenced Blumenbach. Clearly the "critical" Kant was a major influence on Blumenbach, but it seems dubious that the precritical Kant would have had such an impact. Blumenbach derived his data from Buffon and from his predecessor at Göttingen, Albrecht von Haller, but his concepts of process came largely from Leibniz. Blumenbach and Kant in 1775 both subscribed to the notion of "preformation," even as they sought to modulate it in the direction of epigenesis. Their shared objectives were to uphold the differentiation between man and animals and to explain the different races of man from the basis of the unity of the species, against the polygeneticism newly invoked for Europe in the writings of Lord Kames.²⁶² This was a moral-political, as much as a physical-anthropological, stance. That may well account for the interest that J. J. Engel showed in Kant's essay, leading to its republication in expanded form in the 1777 volume of his highly successful series, *Philosophie für die Welt*.

What needs to be emphasized is that the preformation that Haller and Bonnet revived in the years 1758–1762 was different from the Russian doll model of *emboîtement* that had dominated earlier preformationist thinking.²⁶³ Instead, Haller and Bonnet insisted that the germs—*Keime* in German—for all organisms were preformed but that they had within them

the capacity for *growth* and even, within starkly circumscribed limits, for *adaptation*. This was a far harder form of preformation, and, at the level of the *species*, it persisted even into the early forms of *epigenetic theory* in Johann Friedrich Blumenbach and Immanuel Kant. But a more radical theory of epigenesis pressed for acceptance in the later eighteenth century, which, I submit, found more enthusiastic approval in Johann Gottfried Herder than in Blumenbach and Kant, though they grudgingly came around.²⁶⁴ The source of the more radical theory of epigenesis in Germany was Caspar Friedrich Wolff.

In a crucial controversy spanning the 1760s, Haller used his enormous prominence in Germany to squelch the superior theories of Wolff and force the latter off to the remoteness of Saint Petersburg. Wolff published his dissertation, *Theoria generationis*, in 1759 at Halle. Wolff argued that his detailed experiments in embryological microscopy not only failed to turn up any of the structures that a preformationist approach postulated must be present, but also, and more positively, gave evidence of an actively ongoing formation of organic tissue from inorganic materials in a sequential process of secretion and solidification. That was the experimental basis for Wolff's contention that an alternative *theory* was required, namely, *epigenesis*. Wolff's dissertation postulated the presence of a *vis essentialis*, an essential (immaterial) force that was necessary to explain the observational evidence. Haller reviewed this dissertation in the *Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen*, mixing praise for the empirical research with criticism for the theoretical argument. In 1762, Charles Bonnet published his major statement for preformation, *Considérations sur les corps organisés*, which appeared to contain criticism of Wolff's dissertation (though Bonnet had not read the work yet) along the same lines developed by Haller (who had, indeed, communicated them to Bonnet by letter). Wolff therefore published a commentary and defense of his original work, this time in German: *Theorie von der Generation* (1764). In the 1764 work, Wolff not only inveighed against this notion by which all organic bodies became blunt miracles but offered a clear sense of the *theoretical* alternative offered by *epigenesis*: "a nature that destroyed itself and that created itself again anew, in order to produce endless changes, and to appear again and again from a new side," "a living nature, which through its own forces produced endless changes."²⁶⁵ Haller reviewed that work with equal disfavor in the *Göttingische Anzeigen* in 1765. While there is little explicit evidence, it is likely that Haller's negative attitude played a major role in Wolff's failure to obtain two positions in his field that came open in 1764, and Wolff eventually left Berlin to take a position with the Saint Petersburg Academy of Sciences in 1767. While he continued

to work and publish in the field, he languished clearly in the periphery; his work was little cited, and it would only be the conversion of Haller's disciple, Johann Blumenbach, safely after Haller's death, that would turn the tide for epigenesis.²⁶⁶

From what we learn in Kant's essay of 1775, what is offered is still a version of Haller's sophisticated preformationism, not yet at all an articulation of epigenesis—at least in the radical form I have ascribed to Wolff (and, implicitly still, to Herder). Yet we see certain central *theoretical* considerations preponderate in his essay that tally tightly with those in Blumenbach's simultaneously published dissertation, above all a concern with species fixity and the radical discrimination of humans from the rest of the animal kingdom. The specific issue of race, however, placed stress precisely on the question of the *scope of adaptation* that a preformationist theory had to ascribe to the original germ plasm, and hence on the fixity of species and on the "mechanism" of adaptation. Here was where epigenesis could introduce a powerful rival theory.

Epigenesis, as I have tried to argue, is the scientific effort to discern, to describe, and to account for the *immanent capacity* ("force") of nature to *transform itself*, to construct higher plateaus of order—discontinuously, *emergently*, and thus to preserve the idea that, at least *empirically*, it is possible to conceive nature as coherently lawful. I therefore find it impossible to concur with the recent posture and postulates of Helmut Müller-Sievers who proclaims: "The obliteration of preformation by epigenesis is a purely textual event. . . . There is no discovery, no experiment, no microscopic evidence that could demonstrate, beyond doubt and according to the parameters established by the scientific community, the superiority of epigenesis."²⁶⁷ He maintains, accordingly, "a critical history of epigenesis, therefore, has to disorganize, or mechanize, its discourses, to inspect the claim of epigenesis through the lenses of preformationism."²⁶⁸ Nothing is "beyond doubt" in science, but the "parameters established by the scientific community" *did and do* warrant that epigenesis had a superior *empirical* claim over preformationism in the eighteenth century.

Epigenesis is a theory of immanent change. Kant was prepared to believe it operated within fixed structures in the biological world.²⁶⁹ But he never acknowledged the ontological commitment that epigenesis carried with it. Ultimately, he took refuge in his theory of "regulative ideas" or "reflective (teleological) judgments." He never relented in his denunciation of hylozoism as a *logical* contradiction.²⁷⁰ The very idea of emergence or evolution in our sense *frightened* him.²⁷¹ Nothing was more important to him, metaphysically or methodologically, than to police the boundaries between the organic

and the inorganic, and, again, between man and animal.²⁷² Feuer specifically links this anxiety to epigenesis.²⁷³ Yet when epigenesis came to triumph in Germany, it came ironically under the auspices of Kant's philosophy of science.²⁷⁴ Kant used his authority to denounce the immanentist version in the person of Herder. To claim that each was a major proponent of epigenesis in late eighteenth-century Germany is, therefore, to miss the abyss that separated them. That suggests that more work must be done to clarify the idea of epigenesis in that epoch.

In the context of race theory and epigenesis we have grounds to believe Kant played an important role in the physical-anthropological discourse of the 1770s. On the other hand, it remains that his "pragmatic" anthropology, in the measure that it claimed to derive from universal philosophical (albeit "practical") principles, deviated significantly from the empirical impulses of the general "science of man" of the later eighteenth century. His former student, on the other hand, not only fit but furthered every one of those impulses.

[A]n account should be given of the characters of the several regions and peoples; their natural disposition, whether apt and suited for the study of learning, or unfitted and indifferent to it; the accidents of times, whether adverse or propitious to science, the emulations and infusions of different religions; the enmity or partiality of laws; the eminent virtues and services of individual persons in the promotion of learning, and the like.


—Francis Bacon, *On the Advancement of Learning*

But why has no coherent science of man been constructed from the great treasure of observations of the English authors?

—Kant, [*Anthropologie*]-*Vorlesungen
des Wintersemesters 1772/73*

In Herder's view, the task of the new scientist must be not simply to take over the method that was inaugurated by Francis Bacon, but also to explain that method in terms of its times and then to develop it in terms of the knowledge of more recent times. In that way the modern scientist could become a 'second Bacon.'

—Gunter Grimm, commentary on
"Über Thomas Abbt's Schriften"



"Enough Speculating;
 Let's Get Our Facts Straight":
 Herder and the Agenda of German
 Anthropology in the 1770s

Herder's victory in the Berlin Academy prize competition for 1771 proved as monumental for his career as Kant's honorable mention in the prize competition of 1762 had been for Kant. It made Herder a figure of national stature, a vanguard author in the campaign for German cultural parity with Western Europe. This prize-winning *Essay on the Origin of Language* was not only a continuation of the earlier work he had published anonymously in the 1760s but far more the fruition of his traumatic but transfiguring year of 1769, the year of his journey to France. In a series of compositions that year which he never published in his lifetime, Herder drew the balance of his achievements hitherto and set the agenda for the rest of his life. These texts constitute the corpus which Herder scholarship now recognizes as decisive for his mature thought: *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, and "Zum Sinn des Gefühls." The prize-essay on language (completed December 1770; published 1772) was the *public* harvest of all these crystallizing insights. It was also one of the inaugural monuments of German "anthropology."¹

Herder, far more than Kant, adopted the whole cultural shift toward "epistemological liberalization" that constituted the emergence of anthropological discourse. For Herder, analogy, metaphor, observation, and experience, bringing thought back down to earth and concerning oneself with the whole man were the sum and substance of thinking in an enlightened

manner about the problem of anthropology. Moreover, he grasped fully and remained committed to the point Hume made in "Of Essay Writing" (1743), namely, that philosophy had to reach out from the academy to the wider public. But it was not just a question of reception. It was a question of authenticity.² More than simply to *explain*—Herder remained true to the argument of "Wie die Philosophie"—more than just to understand the world, the task of the philosopher was to *change* it.³ "Today," he wrote in *Journal meiner Reise*, "everything must be connected to politics."⁴ He insisted that he must endeavor "to think of everything in *practical* terms" (29). Just because this *pragmatic* dimension had come to the forefront, philosophers had the prospect of a greatness exceeding anything before. They could be involved in shaping entire nations—Russia, for example: "There one could be more than Bacon, there one would be able to be greater than Newton in one's wisdom; there one would have to see things with the spirit of Montesquieu, write with the fiery pen of Rousseau, and have the luck of Voltaire for finding the ear of the mighty. Our century is the time for it: Hume and Locke, Montesquieu and Mably have appeared" (68). On his journey and in the journal he composed to garner the sense of it, Herder gave the strongest indication of his desire to be a man of action, not merely a thinker (29). That these need not be set in opposition was just what *Philosophie für die Welt* proclaimed. In the crisis of 1769 Herder bade adieu to any notion of mere scholarship, *Gelehrsamkeit*, and committed himself to *allgemeine menschliche Bildung*, the agenda of popular philosophy.

The *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen* was the earliest of the three texts of 1769, commenced before Herder left Riga in June, but revised extensively after Herder arrived in France. In this text Herder formulated a harsh critique of mere book learning.⁵ That critique is paralleled in his *Journal meiner Reise*: "Our times have fallen into such a wilderness of nominal concepts, definitions, and text books."⁶ In one sense, he was echoing the school-philosophical critique of *cognitio historica* as secondhand knowledge. But he proposed that this severe pedagogical flaw be remedied *not* by logical abstraction into general principles but rather by intensified sensible experience.⁷ In that measure he opted for popular philosophy instead of the schools. His recourse was precisely to *Beobachtung und Erfahrung*, to the "new experimental method" of the "science of man." The key, he asserted, was to develop a rigorous, genetic-psychological examination of the "history of human understanding" starting from the physiology of the human senses.

His point of departure was Alexander Baumgarten's aesthetics. As Hans Adler observes, there was a sense in which Baumgarten for Herder remained a philosopher of the "second rank."⁸ He achieved some partial insights,

but he never allowed himself to go all the way, bound as he was to the school-philosophical form of thought.⁹ In Herder's words, Baumgarten "held himself aloof from knowledge of the world."¹⁰ Yet against the widely bruited charge of aridity, Herder defended Baumgarten as subtle and penetrating. Baumgarten was "the first philosopher of modern times to have carried into these [obscure] regions of the soul the bright torch of philosophy and even of poetry."¹¹ The Germans were only *rediscovering* in Kames what Baumgarten had already articulated.¹² In his "Bruchstück von Baumgartens Denkmal," Herder argued that Baumgarten's definition of the essence of poetry ("sensually perfect speech") deserved the highest admiration.¹³ Herder adduced four reasons: first, and most important, because "it carri[ed one] most deeply into the soul, and allow[ed one] to develop the essence of poetry out of the nature of the human spirit"; second, because it said the most in the fewest terms; third, because it offered a model for generalization to all the other arts; and, finally, because it allowed the least misuse in application to poetic composition.¹⁴ Baumgarten, Herder affirmed, sought to locate poetry (and by implication all the arts) in a *theory of the human soul*, to trace the origins of objects of art to the faculties of the human mind. Baumgarten had launched the endeavor to correlate the "extensive clarity" of the concepts expressed in works of art with the "lesser faculties" in the obscure ground of the human soul (*fundus animae*).

Herder called this "subjective philosophy," which invited misinterpretation.¹⁵ More justly, it was philosophy of *subjectivity*. Herder proposed to emulate and elaborate what Baumgarten had only begun.

For me Baumgarten's psychology has always been a rich treasure chest of the human soul, and a commentary on it with the poetic-intuitive gift of a Klopstock, with the easy-going cleverness of observation of a Montaigne, and with his calm view of himself in the sphere of common sense, and finally in the higher reaches with the keen insight of a second Leibniz: such a commentary would be a book of the human soul, a plan for human education and the portal to an encyclopedia of all the arts and sciences.¹⁶

This is one of the most important formulations of Herder's project, especially for its indication of the crucial sources upon which he would build.

One should not pass too quickly over the phrase "a second Leibniz," for this is different from references to the other figures evoked. Might this second Leibniz be Kant? Had he not given Herder precisely this commentary on Baumgarten's psychology in his metaphysics lectures? In this context we should retrieve Herder's comments in his 1768 letter to Kant, together

with his extensive reference to Kant in the draft of the *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*. In the letter Herder was responding to Kant's suggestions of models and strategies for intellectual identity that he believed would serve Herder better than the ones Herder had selected. Herder was not at all convinced by Kant. Indeed, part of his strategy was to turn Kant's own *example* against Kant's *advice*. Kant had written the following:

In so far as criticism does not bring upon itself the disadvantage of making genius frightening and the finesse of judgment does not make taking stock of oneself very hard, I would hope that based on my limited ventures with your work I might awaken in you that manner of poetry which is the grace of wisdom, and in which Pope still shines forth in solitude as the master in our times. In light of the early elaboration of your talents I look forward with much satisfaction to that time when the fruitful spirit is no longer so driven by the warm impulses of youthful feelings and achieves that tranquility which is gentle and yet full of feeling and at the same time is the contemplative life of the philosopher, the very opposite of the one that mystics dream of. I hope, based on what I know of you with confidence, that this epoch of your genius will be a constitution of mind which for those who possess it and for the world is of all the most useful, [and] in which Montaigne holds the least and so far as I know Hume the highest place.¹⁷

Herder answered only some six months later, and began by excusing himself for the delay by invoking the distractions of his multiple endeavors and more precisely "that *uneasiness* [in English] of the soul which Locke considers the mother of so many enterprises [but] for me for some time has been the mother of a paralyzed tranquility [*Ruhe*] from which I hardly ever awaken."¹⁸ The negative echo of Kant's term, *tranquility*, is the first sign that Herder has no interest in the "contemplative" tranquility Kant is proposing for him. After a lengthy discussion of his effort to retain anonymity for his publications, though only in order to reserve the association of his name with a publication worthy of higher esteem, Herder turns to the issues Kant raised about his writing. "Why shouldn't I apply the little bit of philosophy I possess to the fashionable materials of our quarter century, if the application of a sound philosophy, as I flatter myself, can correct so many things?" He goes on: "The field you, my dear friend, suggest to me for my future years in the line of Montaigne, Hume and Pope, were the *hope* for it not too flattering, is at least (with a slight change of course) the *wish* of my own muse" (76). He writes of how much he enjoys reading Montaigne, in whom he finds stimulating

"art experiments with the human soul." That brings him to the crucial point: "What a man that would be, who could discourse on Baumgarten's rich psychology with the experience of the soul of a Montaigne!"

That, I submit, was the standard Herder held out not only for himself, but also for Kant: it was the essential combination for the new "science of man," as well as for the new "philosophy for the world," as Herder believed he had learned it from Kant himself. Herder confessed that under the aura of Rousseau he had not appreciated Hume.¹⁹ But, he went on, as soon as he had come to the realization that man must be a *social* being, his appreciation for Hume had risen. Herder called him "a philosopher of human society in the most authentic sense." Then Herder challenged Kant for having left out a third great exemplar of "human philosophy [*Menschliche Weltweisheit*]," the Earl of Shaftesbury. Herder claimed, with some minor reservations, that Shaftesbury was "my favorite companion."²⁰ If we compare this letter to what Herder wrote of Kant in his *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, I submit, we establish clearly that when Herder envisioned Kant as the "German Shaftesbury" this whole configuration of their respective—and especially, as he hoped, their *joint*—projects was clearly delineated.²¹

What Baumgarten called "gnoseology," knowledge of the organization of human experience, required a clear empirical *description*—for Kant no less than for Herder. Kant and Herder differed in the importance they attached to *sensibility* in description and especially *explanation*.²² Herder believed that "philosophy" as an academic endeavor had leaped far too swiftly past *cognitio historica* into *cognitio philosophica*. "If our systematic philosophers in the theory of spirit are [like] Linnaeus, in that they idiosyncratically discriminate and classify, it is a good thing to set over against them an unsystematic thinker like Buffon, who [equally] idiosyncratically shakes up their classes and analyses individuals."²³ Philosophers lacked interest in the individual; that was where historians stepped in (572). In a 1766 piece entitled "On the Writings of Christian Wolff," Herder wrote: "It seems to me that the three genres [of knowledge, i.e., *cognitio historica*, *philosophica*, *mathematica*] are not to be placed side by side at the same level. The philosophical is subsumed under the historical, and the mathematical is a genre of philosophical knowledge."²⁴ Moreover, for Herder, the very proposition that human experience could be classed under merely three headings seemed preposterous.

This three-way division is not complete. Sensibly I take in [*werde ich inne*] that there is something—that is one thing. In this interior I take in that I exist—that is something else. I *infer* causes, and this approximation

of cause to effect, and of effect to cause, is already a very constructed conclusion of comparison [*componierter Schluß der Vergleichung*]: not at all a simple cognition. The sensible which I recognize, I feel in all its coloration or I recognize only a unity in it, as I am disposed [so *wie ich mich fühle*]. The former is the poetical, the latter is intellectual knowledge. [There are] thus so many primary and secondary applications of my power of knowledge, so many varieties: this chapter [can only be] straightened out by psychology. {158}

What this psychology would provide is a "map of the human soul." To sketch it, Herder would require the reports of every brave explorer who had plunged into this "truly inner Africa"—among whom he figured prominently Montaigne, Shaftesbury, Kames, Rousseau, and Locke (though interestingly neither Hume nor Kant).²⁵ It was for providing data of this "journey into the interior" that Herder actually distinguished Kames's project from Baumgarten's: "His book has a different point of view, it is a world of reflections on singular phenomena and data which others had never yet brought into the field of observation."²⁶ Montaigne, Shaftesbury, and all these others offered pieces of a puzzle Herder hoped to reconstruct, that new "logic" of creativity, of the "lesser faculties," of the *fundus animae*. This adamantly eclectic strategy was Herder's fundamental revisionism against philosophy: "Enough speculating; let's get our facts straight [*Nicht vernünfteln, sondern sammeln*]."²⁷ In 1785, in a letter to Soemmerring, he would be even more blunt: he proposed to get away from "the palaver of philosophy to the plain facts."²⁸

Like Kant, Herder believed the sources upon which the new anthropology should draw spanned all the genres.²⁹ He turned to novels and plays, to history and physiology—anywhere an insight penetrated into the depths of the human soul.³⁰ In his grand scheme for a new curriculum of education in the *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, Herder included courses in physical geography and ethnography whose descriptions clearly show their derivation from Kant's course. Of a course in physical geography, Herder wrote that "here would be gathered natural science, natural history, some mathematics, and much data, many appearances, many histories." Immediately he added *ethnography*: "the species of man, political and wild and half wild world, in their forms, clothing, style of life . . . lots of data about mores, major institutions and conditions: what they have and produce, are and are not, in what measure it is a unity or not."³¹

Herder specified his project even more succinctly in another passage: "to our Leibnizes [to add] the Shaftesburys and Lockes, to our Spaldings the Sternes, Fosters, and Richardsons, to our Moses [Mendelssohn], the Browns

and Montesquieu.³² Assimilating into a nascent German culture the best of French and British thought: this was what "nationalization" meant for Herder.³³ Far from exclusive, he believed the German spirit was a spirit of synthesis. Herder's aspiration in 1769 was to achieve this monumental synthesis:

If I were worthy and able to be such a philosopher, what my book would be is a book about the human soul, full of observations and experiences! I would like to write it as a human for humans: it should instruct and cultivate! The foundations of psychology, and after the development of the soul as well ontology, cosmology, theology and physics! It should offer a living logic, aesthetic, historical science and theory of art! [It should show] how from every sense a fine art develops. And from every power of the soul a science arises. And from all this a history of scholarship and science in general! And a history of the human soul in general, by ages and peoples! What a book!³⁴

Young people have great dreams, but before we shrug these great expectations off, we should consider how Herder proposed to carry off this titanic enterprise. Though it was, for him, an enthusiastic, "rhapsodic" totality, we can break it into three huge chunks: philosophy, psychology, and history.³⁵

HERDER AS A SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHER

Despite two centuries of (Kantian) allegations that he was a mere "dilettante," Herder pursued rigorous philosophical studies over the entire span of his career. As Marion Heinz rightly stresses, there is a "continual sequence of systematically developed sketches and texts on fundamental problems of epistemology and metaphysics in Herder's work."³⁶ To be sure, he developed no *system*, but that was precisely because he believed that the penchant to system was the great error of German philosophizing: "Nothing makes me sicker than the arch-error of the Germans, to build systems, so please permit me my *philosophizing art* of speaking: I am contemplating some few such contributions, but I have no taste for [system] building."³⁷ That did not mean he was an "unsystematic" thinker.³⁸ The difference between the "spirit of system" and the "systematic spirit" was articulated brilliantly at midcentury by the Abbé de Condillac and Jean D'Alembert, and it describes Herder very aptly.³⁹

If Herder did not have a system, this did not mean he had no grand philosophical ambitions. In his *Erstes Kritisches Wäldchen*, Herder wrote:

"a metaphysics and a physics of our concepts, in which every one was traced back to its origin in a particular sense, and in which touch and sight in particular were distinguished . . . what a work for knowledge and education of the human spirit!"⁴⁰ In stressing sensibility over formal logic, Herder sought to explain the fundamental, unanalyzable concepts of space, time, and force in a more lucid and defensible form than German school metaphysics had hitherto achieved. That entailed, as Heinz spells out precisely, a "double structure of spiritualization of nature and naturalization of spirit":⁴¹ "What characterizes the sketches of the year 1769 is Herder's effort to make conceivable the unity of body and soul of every existent through the unification of powers [*Kräfte*] which Kant had divided between the immaterial and the material monads, the power of representation on the one hand, and the forces of attraction and repulsion on the other."⁴² For Herder, reason and reflection (*Besonnenheit*) were *emergents* from nature, not transcendental interventions.⁴³

Having made a case for the importance of Kant in Herder's ongoing "philosophizing," I want to return to the *first* Leibniz. In his last year in Riga Herder devoted himself to an intense study of Leibniz's *Nouveaux essais* along with some of his earlier essays, and to the study of Spinoza in a Leibnizian context.⁴⁴ Beate Dreike has noted that the most important features of Herder's engagement with Leibniz were his acceptance of the theory of dynamism and his rejection of the idea that substances could not interact.⁴⁵ Wolfgang Proß agrees: "The main point of Herder's criticism is the incommunicability of the monads, which already in Diderot's article [in the *Encyclopédie*] had been identified as the critical point of the entire system."⁴⁶ In short, Herder sought to revise Leibnizian dynamism from a transcendent to an immanent monadology. In this he was following in the footsteps of Kant, but he was also carrying the argument even further than Kant had taken it and, of course, in a direction Kant explicitly repudiated after the "critical turn."⁴⁷ He sought to explain both the physical and the moral world, both nature and spirit, in attractive and repulsive forces that were unanalyzable but actual, efficient causes.⁴⁸ He read Leibniz through Spinoza and Spinoza through Leibniz to find a philosophical mode for articulating his consistently naturalist insight.

Leibniz was important for Herder because he dynamized the natural order. Force and dynamism were essential for the new natural philosophy, but it was equally essential that these be seen as immanent in nature. Leibniz robbed the material world of all metaphysical reality, whereas for Herder (and Goethe) Herbert Lindner rightly observes, "Nature had the most exalted reality."⁴⁹ Thus, Herder complained against such idealistic metaphysics:

"It is simply madness [to think] that we are merely self-reflecting pure spirits, philosophical atoms in ourselves: we are sensual creatures, who must enjoy nature sensually or not at all. Sensual impressions, forces, drives are the strongest things we have, as they are the earliest and most youthful [*frühesten und jugendlichsten*]." ⁵⁰ Herder was convinced that insufficient attention had been paid to the physicality, indeed, the animality of man: "We are at once animal spirits [*Tierartiger Geister*]. . . . The whole foundation of our soul is [composed of] obscure ideas, the liveliest, the majority, the mass, out of which the soul prepares its finer [ideas], the most powerful drives of our lives." ⁵¹ Herder insisted that humankind always be situated in nature: anthropology was part of the philosophy of nature.

This insistence on the actual world brought Herder far closer to the viewpoint of "physical influx" than Leibniz had at all been prepared to go. ⁵² But just this also shows how the project of a theory of "physical influx," of "hylozoism," needed to appropriate Spinoza to balance Leibniz: "By rendering the 'active side' of Leibniz in a materialistic manner and introducing it into their vision of nature, Goethe and Herder were able to overcome the mechanistic tendencies of Spinozism. Nature could now be seen in constant movement and development. The events of nature took on a process character." ⁵³ "The fixed substance of Spinoza was transcended by the admixture of the Leibnizian principle of force" (92). Thus, Herder's "transformation of Spinozism was initiated by Leibniz's philosophy" (89).

The question of Spinoza emerged for Herder out of his struggles to think his way through the relation of philosophy and "anthropology" in the years after his passage out of the tutelage of Immanuel Kant. It was the stimulus of the problems of "vitalist materialism"—specifically the writings of Diderot and Condillac—that informed his reading of Leibniz and Spinoza and carried him in a direction significantly different from Kant's. ⁵⁴ Herder's "empirical psychology"—the correlate of this philosophical vitalism—was shaped by Condillac's and Diderot's reception of Leibniz. ⁵⁵ A philosopher of lesser rank, whom Herder nonetheless read and cited frequently, the Marquis d'Argens, in *Philosophie de bon sens* (1763) made the essential point: "Whatever the theologians will bring forward in order to find philosophical grounds to insist that matter cannot think and cannot have any moving force, will only be an empty grab-bag of words." ⁵⁶ Herder himself made reference, crucially, to "Maupertuis's ladder," in other words, to the idea of the great chain of being, especially in the immanent and genetic sense that Maupertuis, Buffon, and Diderot were developing over the 1750s. ⁵⁷ Thus, it was hylozoism, the need to see matter and spirit in continuity, that carried Herder decisively to Spinoza. ⁵⁸

The earliest mention of Spinoza in Herder's writings came in his 1765 essay "Wie die Philosophie zum Besten des Volks allgemeiner und nützlicher werden kann."⁵⁹ But that was only a mention, probably an echo from Kant's lectures, not a token of textual familiarity. Still, the context suggests that Herder was already situating Spinoza, as Mendelssohn had proposed, within the philosophical dynamic of the Three Hypotheses.⁶⁰ Lindner suggests that Mendelssohn's *Philosophische Gespräche* may very well have been the first source for Herder's engagement with Spinoza.⁶¹ He affirms Willi Vollrath's argument that Herder began seriously to work through Spinoza's ideas in 1769.⁶² There is evidence of this engagement in the "Grundsätzen der Philosophie" of that year.⁶³ This meditation picked up directly on the lines of speculation that Mendelssohn had introduced, but in a far more favorable manner. Indeed, without any knowledge of them, Herder replicated the philosophical line of thought that Lessing had worked out only a few years earlier in brief texts for his correspondence with Mendelssohn.⁶⁴ The assimilation of Spinoza to Leibniz in this fashion, I submit, was most successfully achieved by the young Herder. This construction of Spinoza's metaphysics as a theoretical resource for the articulation of a more subtle and dynamic materialism earns Herder a more significant place in the emergence of natural philosophy in Germany. He has long enough been seen merely as a rhapsodizer, a poet, or a mystic. Herder deserves a place among the methodological thinkers of the emergent natural sciences of the late eighteenth century, especially the life sciences—what we have termed the "medical enlightenment"—at the core of the new anthropological turn.⁶⁵ Herder's reading (along with that of others, e.g., Diderot) made Spinoza a viable resource for the new vitalism.⁶⁶

That was the philosophical soul of the Spinoza renaissance that burst upon the German public in 1786 but had been germinating for decades.⁶⁷ The congruity in the reception of Spinoza at this historical moment is striking. It is situated, metaphysically, in the problem of the Three Hypotheses, and more specifically in a monist resolution of that problem: hylozoism as a reformulation of "physical influx." As Hermann Timm has argued, "The impulse is commonly shared. All are caught up in a general concept of power, force or life."⁶⁸ In his *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*, for example, "Lessing formulated an analogy between biological science, psychological pedagogy and traditional theology of development [*Bildungstheologie*], with the speculative consequence of a cyclical self-confirmation of the highest being" (278). Herder elaborated the idea into an "axiom of a general ontology of life" (285). One found this dynamic polarity, Herder wrote,

spread throughout the whole world order. Everywhere two forces set against one another which nonetheless must work together and in which only by the combined and appropriate influence of both emerges the higher reality of a wise order, development, organization, life. All life arose in such a manner from death, out of the death of lesser forces, all wholes of order and of design from light and shadow, out of diverging, mutually opposing forces, where the higher positive law, which limits and transcends both, alone inaugurates and harmonizes *cosmos*, world, design, whole, highest good, communal happiness. Mathematics, physics, chemistry, physiology of living beings all seem to me to provide evidence for this everywhere. In man, it seems to me, this contrariety is consequently only the most blatant perhaps because he is the most spiritual, developed being of our world, the convergence and center of our creation.⁶⁹

Herder had developed this ubiquitous vitalism fully by the mid-1770s. He wrote these lines in "Über die dem Menschen angeborene Lüge," which can be dated to those years.

This systematic vision was accompanied by an equally systematic effort to grasp the character of human knowledge. But unlike the rationalist school or Kant, Herder started from sensibility, not logic. Herder concentrated on the *fundus animae*, that obscure ground of the soul that Baumgarten had named and Sulzer wished to see explored.⁷⁰ Herder sought to find there that whole representation of the cosmos that Leibniz signified by his *petites perceptions*. Herder accepted Leibniz's doctrine that each monad carried within itself an (obscure) representation of the totality.⁷¹ At the same time, Herder rejected the project of simply dispelling this obscurity by raising all concepts to distinctness. Granted the finitude of the human subject, that was impossible in principle. Even more significantly, logical abstraction, as it gained in precision, lost in content: the more universal concepts lost ever much more of the concrete richness of their subordinate instantiations. Accordingly, for Herder the project needed to explore all the various particularities of the givens. As Hans Adler puts it, Herder had a new project for philosophy: "a *centrifugal* movement from the subject as the center of the certainty of being outward into all the realms that the senses, the understanding and reason can grasp . . . a holism appropriate to the human constitution."⁷²

The other side of Herder's revision was strong resistance against any idea of *innate* faculties. "Thus I see no inner, immediate, general, reliable teacher

of truth."⁷³ Here Herder aligned himself with the empiricist tradition; he would heartily have endorsed Locke's words: "practice makes [the mind] what it is, and most even of those excellencies, which are looked on as natural endowments, will be found, when examined more narrowly, to be the product of exercise."⁷⁴ For Herder, this entailed a drastic revision of the place and nature of logic: Logic could only be a matter of empirical inquiry within a general "gnoseology," in other words, "study of the soul" (*Seelenkunde*)—which is a "form of empirical psychology."⁷⁵ "Logic becomes nothing other than the experimental psychology of the higher faculties, and thus becomes something quite different from what it now is."⁷⁶ Reason was not ready to pronounce rules, since it had not sufficiently taken cognizance of its own actual process. The greater part of this new science was yet to be discovered: "What an abyss of insights into how the soul gathers, judges, infers ideas lies hidden here!" (48). "Wolff and Leibniz laid the first cornerstones of [logic], and never got farther than ideas, judgments and distinct inferences. . . . Accordingly, the whole *part of practical truth and probability* has only come into place in most recent times, when we no longer need logic."⁷⁷ We must think here of how, at this historical moment, Kant suggested philosophers approach the problems of morality, asking what men actually did before prescribing what they should do, and then see that Herder was projecting this same principle even into the most sacrosanct sphere of formal logic.⁷⁸ Here was a naturalism that Hume and the Göttingen school, but never Kant, might endorse. Herder stressed the new theories of probability, which he associated with Hume, with Mendelssohn, with Bernoulli, and with Lambert, as having a great deal of potential for a more adequate approach to human knowledge.⁷⁹ We should think, too, of Andreas Rüdiger's earlier *probabilitas kat' anthropon*.⁸⁰

To construct this new logic of creativity was the task of "aesthetics, as a philosophy of the senses, of imagination, of poetry! . . . The philosophy of true *bon sens*."⁸¹ In a 1772 review of Beattie's *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth*, Herder argued against speculation as a form of "opium" and celebrated Beattie for his attentiveness to the "whole man."⁸² The task for philosophy was not to persist in the arid formalities of logic as Leibniz and Wolff had formulated it, but rather to take up the new business of "the whole *part of practical truth and probability*" (459). This explains Herder's naturalist deviation from Kant toward Bacon, perhaps most simply expressed in Herder's poem of 1764, "Erhebung und Verlangen": "and listened to Kant / And drifted sideways after Bacon."⁸³ Herder was no "irrationalist," he was a *naturalist* in the line of Bacon, Hume, and Diderot.⁸⁴

The line from Bacon through Diderot to Herder, I submit, is a decisive line of genesis of German eighteenth-century anthropology. In one of the few sustained examinations of Diderot's crucial text, *Pensées sur l'Interprétation de la Nature*, Herbert Dieckmann took up the widely held notion that it was simply a reinvocation of Baconian method.⁸⁵ Clearly, the Baconian enthusiasm of the editor of the *Encyclopédie* was indisputable, but that enthusiasm did not betoken a simple assimilation of Bacon's view. Diderot was writing a manifesto for the paradigm shift in natural science of the mid-eighteenth century. To that end, he found it instrumental to invoke the name and the methods of Bacon. Diderot took his title from Bacon's *Interpretatio Naturae*, but much of Diderot's text "deals with problems which were either unknown to Bacon or which seemed to have had little interest for him" (36). Diderot's text is an attack on the preponderance of the mathematical (and mechanist) paradigm in natural science, in favor of a *physique expérimentale* that was emerging in the new fields of "chemistry, physiology, and biology" (37). And "Bacon's example in inaugurating a new experimental philosophy inspired Diderot with the idea of outlining the methods of what he thought was to be the new experimental science" (37). In criticizing the "mathematical" method, Diderot faulted its perfect abstraction, which bore little resemblance to the actualities of observational science when they were "brought back to earth."⁸⁶ There was about the mathematical natural sciences a penchant for reason "to consult itself instead of nature."⁸⁷ By contrast, "with both Bacon and Diderot we find the same thorough comprehension of the unlimited wealth and variety of nature which the mathematical scheme excluded or ignored" (39). Dieckmann expresses skepticism about that stance, which he views as a crude inductivism, "a tendency to overrate the efficacy of simple experience" (42). He notes that even Bacon criticized "empirics," describing their method as "a mere groping, as of men in the dark, that feel all around them for the chance of finding their way."⁸⁸

The disputation of Baconian empiricism in the case of Herder is even stronger than in that of Diderot, perhaps just because of the proximity of Kantian critique. "Critics are more or less agreed that there is a pronounced 'empirical' element in Herder's thought . . . it was chiefly to Bacon, with his *commercium mentis et rei*, that he looked as his *theoretical* guide. . . . He refers to Bacon again and again when he impugns a priori thinking," writes H. B. Nisbet. It was Bacon's "general approach to knowledge, universal, dynamic, open and naturalistic, which appealed to him." But Nisbet believes that such empiricism was already hopelessly "naïve" by Herder's day. It "lacks the sceptical, self-limiting discipline found in all modern scientific empiricism, and is not even as consistent as that of Locke." Herder

"never attempts a thorough logical analysis of the limitations of empirical enquiry," which was already the practice of "more rigorous empiricists in his own time."⁸⁹ In short, Herder was methodologically a throwback to "Renaissance" optimism about crude induction. Like Bacon in "accepting simple induction as the means of discovering natural laws," Herder "fail[ed] to realize that the primary role of experiment, or indeed of observations in general, is 'to test theories, not to furnish them'" (271-72). Thus, he believes that Herder's "inadequate . . . philosophical naturalism" simply replicates Bacon's inadequacies since "both lack a thorough critical epistemology" (274).

I would like to demur on two counts. First, I believe that Nisbet here operates with a version of the contrast between the "context of justification" and the "context of discovery" that has lost credibility in current theory of science.⁹⁰ That is, he proposes a view that is too distant from actual scientific practice. To be sure, observations and experiments test theories, but it is simply wrong to claim that they do not also furnish them, and this a fortiori at the origins of a theory or a discipline. Nisbet himself observes that Herder found most attractive in Bacon the "conception of learning as a continual dynamic process."⁹¹ Yet he fails to recognize that Herder concentrates his methodological attention on the "context of discovery"—indeed, insists on its primacy in the construal of human scientific practice. Kant's famous claim about the blindness of intuition without concepts and the emptiness of concepts without intuitions makes for excellent epistemology, but it is too abstract for the *methodology of science*, which must in iterative process move from event to conjecture and back in a problematic inductive round—a hermeneutic circle—which may not satisfy the rigors of proponents of the "context of justification" but remains indispensable for the *grasp* as for the *practice* of "contexts of discovery," that is, *actual science*.⁹²

Second, I believe that Nisbet is insensitive to the actual state of science in the eighteenth century in precisely the measure that he privileges the mechanistic model of late-seventeenth-century physical science over the most innovative and important impulses in the eighteenth century. He writes, accordingly, that the eighteenth century "witnessed a widespread decline in exact experiment after the great era of mechanics. . . . It was in many ways an age of speculation and hypothesis."⁹³ One should compare and contrast this view with that developed by Peter Hanns Reill in a sustained series of essays, referred to earlier. There is strong reason to believe that Professor Nisbet has taken too negative a view of just what was most innovative and important in that epoch. The reason, it seems to me, is that he shares the "received view" of philosophy of science common to

both the Logical Positivists and their ostensible critic, Karl Popper. That view has been criticized effectively by the whole postpositivist approach. Thus, both on historicist grounds (the actual practice of eighteenth-century science) and on presentist grounds (the postpositivist philosophy of science), Nisbet's presuppositions in judging Herder's empiricism can and must be challenged.

Nisbet writes that "Herder was rather a general theorist of science than an exact scientific investigator."⁹⁴ That is quite true a propos the natural sciences, though it would also hold, I would add, for Kant. Nisbet goes on that Herder "lacked a thorough training in scientific observation and experiment" (325). Perhaps, if that means that Herder did not spend a great deal of time in a physics or chemistry laboratory. If, on the other hand, we consider the fields in which he did conduct specialist inquiry—history, cultural anthropology, and so forth—he was a prodigious and rigorous inquirer. Moreover, if we retrieve the character of eighteenth-century "natural history" as a matter of collecting and examining specimens, then Herder, with Goethe, represents one of the most assiduous of the "amateurs" of science in the late eighteenth century, and even Nisbet admits that it was an age in which amateurs could make real contributions to science (hence, the term must not be taken as synonymous with *dilettante*) (6). Finally, Nisbet himself notes Herder's repeated call for additional empirical investigation to settle disputed questions—often against a widespread but misguided view that matters were already settled. All of this, I submit, blunts the force of implication of Nisbet's point, which was to belittle Herder's scientific stature.

Nisbet makes the observation that "Herder's scientific ideas are often influenced by aesthetic judgments" (309). Here he echoes Kant's greatest anxiety—the dread of an aestheticization of science. Nisbet acknowledges that "great scientific achievements are not lacking in something akin to artistic imagination and creativity," and therefore there is some "justice and originality" in Herder's insight, but Nisbet is swift to add that Herder "allowed his conviction that imagination can lend support to science to do violence to the empirical principles he learnt from Bacon, the early Kant, and others" (306–7). Here again, Nisbet is too locked into the "context of justification" and fails to see that Herder is trying to conceptualize discovery. Diderot had earlier invoked imagination and genius as the necessary ingredients of the new scientist as *interpreter* of nature.⁹⁵ Herder is carrying on in this line of thinking.

Finally, and most centrally, Nisbet unquestioningly affirms Kant's discreditation of logic from empirical psychology, and faults Herder for obvi-

ously failing to respect that boundary: "Kant's faculties are logically distinct functions in epistemology, not innate psychological compartments of the mind, such as less meticulous analysts like Riedel, who failed to distinguish clearly between the logical and the empirical, between epistemology and psychology, had postulated. Herder himself failed to distinguish between psychology and epistemology."⁹⁶ The distinction between the logical and the empirical was *in dispute* in the philosophical context of the eighteenth century, and it cannot be *presumed* that Kant's a priori view was already authoritative. Today, again, these issues are in dispute. Both on historicist and on presentist grounds, Nisbet's presumption can and must be taken as problematic. "Epistemology analyses the logical conditions, limitations and forms of knowledge, whereas empirical psychology examines the actual mental processes and behavior of the individual in relation to the causal world of experience" (271). I submit that there were a host of philosophers throughout Enlightenment Europe who would not have conceded the indubitability of this discrimination. I submit further that it would not receive an uncontroversial reception among cognitive scientists or epistemological naturalists today, either. My point, simply, is that Professor Nisbet certainly has room to find fault, but it does seem to me that he is all too positiv(istic) about what a "critical philosophy" of science *should have been* in 1770. As Roy Porter puts it, "the line between blind empiricism and vain rationalism was difficult to trace and tread" in the eighteenth century.⁹⁷ Pfothenauer made it clear that, in most instances, the turn to empirical inquiry was a "changing of the subject" rather than a *resolution* of the metaphysical conundrums of dualism.⁹⁸ Pfothenauer at one and the same time—and correctly—sees the *absolute* slippage and the *pragmatic* gain.⁹⁹ To fail to do so is to credit the absolutist agenda of Kant's philosophy of science: precisely what we have had to surrender. Herder is better understood in terms of the methods and the disputes of his age, and of interest less for his "naive" Renaissance residue than for his impact on the discussion of his times and for his invocation of issues we find of interest today.

Herder sought to explain—albeit empirically—the totality of human experience, and he set about to do so from the evidence in human sensuousness. As Wolfgang Proß claims, this is the "core of H[erder]'s anthropological proposition: external and internal are related to one another reciprocally. . . . There is no expression of the physical which does not immediately appear as 'spiritual,' as the symbol of some psychic process of reworking."¹⁰⁰ This set him against what Kant would call the "transcendental." If this was clearly not "critical" Kantian philosophy, that is no reason to contend that it was not systematic and philosophical. There is less of the "dilettante" here than

of the pathbreaker, for Herder was striving to articulate the most ambitious idea of his generation. It was, indeed, a different conception of philosophy, a "philosophy in the frame of the humanly possible."¹⁰¹ As Heinz puts it, "Since Herder separated Hume's insight into the limits of human knowledge from its skeptical consequences, he assigned to philosophy a new field of endeavor: the illumination without prejudice of the organization of the finite-human subject and the boundaries and possibilities that this would determine."¹⁰² This entailed, for Herder, a thoroughly *empirical* conceptualization of space, time, and force, going against the view he had received from Kant, in the courses of 1762–1764, that all these should be conceived as objective, if nonetheless unanalyzable, concepts. Herder claimed that the exposition of space, time and force in science could only be grounded in experience.¹⁰³ This "subjective" philosophy turned on the finitude of the human subject, a finitude Herder identified with human sensuousness.

Nevertheless, Herder's polemic against Riedel centered on the claim that aesthetics must be *philosophy*, not a guide to taste.

The essence of philosophy is to raise to view ideas that lie within us, to bring to the light of distinctness truths that we know only darkly, to develop proofs for which we do not grasp all the intermediate steps clearly. . . . Here lies the essence and the creative power of all philosophy, that through it I am empowered to see distinctly truths at least to a level of evidentness, of certainty, that I would previously never have had or at least never so clearly.¹⁰⁴

Aesthetics was a branch of *philosophy*, "which must possess all the properties of science and of inquiry—analysis, proofs and method." In it, "truth takes the place of beauty." It had to be an "abstract science," and as such should not seek "rules [for artistic composition]; it should be observations [*Beobachtungen*], illuminating [*aufklärende*], developing philosophy for philosophers, not for poetizers [*Dichterlinge*]." It had the prospect of becoming the "most fruitful, most beautiful, and in many cases the newest of the abstract sciences" (264–69). Just because the various forms of artistic expression constituted "'effects' of man, through which he could become acquainted with himself," Herder argued that the investigation of the arts ("aesthetics") constituted a critical project for anthropology:¹⁰⁵ "[Aesthetics, as science] is the most rigorous philosophy concerning a worthwhile and very difficult wholeness [*Inbegriff*] of the human soul and of the imitation of nature: it is . . . a part, a difficult part of anthropology, of the science of man [*Menschenkenntnis*]."¹⁰⁶ As empirical effects, aesthetic forms could

give token of the primordial forces (*Grundkräfte*)—Kant's *Realgründe*—in the nature of man that authored them, thus permitting an "inner physics of spirit."¹⁰⁷ This explains how anthropology as empirical psychology could be thought analogous to empirical physics. "This undiscovered land that we are seeking is no metaphysical concoction of words: it is the inner physics of spirit, a fruitful and useful terrain in the theory of the soul regarding the beautiful."¹⁰⁸ Kant himself propounded a similar analogy of anthropology to physics at least until 1773.¹⁰⁹ For Herder, the project was precisely to refashion philosophy into such a psychology, and while Kant might serve as a model for the pedagogical delivery, it was Bacon who represented the model for the intellectual method:

Psychology: what is that if not a rich physics of the soul? [what is] Cosmology if not the crown of Newtonian physics? . . . I willingly concede that we do not yet have any philosophy in this fashion. . . . Oh, what metaphysics would be like if it followed this spirit generally, building its viewpoint from each concept to the one above it, in the spirit of Bacon, what a work that would be! And a lively instruction in it, in the spirit of Kant, what heavenly hours!¹¹⁰

The main point was that Herder insisted that philosophy was not the ground upon which empirical study should be built, but rather "the culmination of all the empirical sciences" (48).

HERDER AS AN AESTHETIC PSYCHOLOGIST

In the final version (1778) of his major work of the 1770s, *Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele*, Herder asserted emphatically, "no psychology is possible which is not step for step determinate physiology."¹¹¹ The question of the relation of body to soul was a question Herder insisted upon resolving by empirical inquiry, but this required both the suspension of the privilege of metaphysical dualism and the imputation of a far more dynamic potential to the physical order and specifically to the biological organism—the body—of human beings. The issues of empirical psychology could not be isolated from the larger issues of vitalist materialism in the theory of the life sciences. Herder, in thinking through Leibniz and Spinoza in terms of the problem of the Three Hypotheses, took aim continuously at the question of physiological psychology. Here Herder found great stimulus in Diderot's discussion of Maupertuis's *System of Nature*.¹¹² Clark has suggested that Herder could have achieved vastly sharper articulation of his psychological

insight had he read by 1769 the major works of Haller.¹¹³ But there is good reason to believe that Herder had access to these ideas, if not directly from Haller then through Charles Bonnet.¹¹⁴ On the other hand, Wolfgang Proß has suggested that Herder could not find what he sought in the "mechanical physiology of Haller."¹¹⁵ He suggests instead that Herder's psychological ideas derive from Krüger's thoughts on experimental psychology. Yet Krüger himself was influenced by Haller, and it is hard to imagine, Clark and Proß notwithstanding, that Haller's ideas did not permeate all discourse about physiology in the German 1760s. It is incontrovertible that Herder had studied Haller thoroughly by 1771.¹¹⁶

It is clear that Haller was a decisive resource for Herder in the 1770s, yet what he endeavored to do, as Simon Richter perceives, was "deliberately misinterpret" Haller in a creative manner.¹¹⁷ Haller, as we have already noted, sought to maintain a strict metaphysical dualism on top of his empirical vitalism.¹¹⁸ One way to do this was to draw sharp lines between sensibility and irritability, between the responsiveness of the rational soul and that of the animal soul. Life, for Haller, had nothing to do with irritability, *Reiz*. His whole effort was to make of this phenomenon a kind of mechanism, an involuntary response of tissue, even in isolation from a living organism, which was to be explained by the structure of the muscle tissue.

Thus, Haller, having elevated the phenomenon of irritability to salience, sought to locate it in "a space of undecidability between life and death."¹¹⁹ But if Haller "refused to recognize irritability as a form of life," Herder, by contrast, read Haller precisely as providing evidence for a theory of the "transformation of dead matter into moving life" (88). In his text of 1778, Herder wrote, "The irritated fiber contracts and expands; perhaps a root—the first glimmering of sensibility—by which dead matter through many steps and stages of mechanism and organization refined itself."¹²⁰ Nisbet is adamant that Herder "misinterpreted Haller's vitalism, linking it to his own metaphysics of 'Kräfte' rather than to precise physiological functions, as Haller had intended."¹²¹ That is, Herder "fails . . . to distinguish clearly between irritability, which is common to all living matter, and what we should call contractability, encountered in fibres, muscles, etc." (264). Herder "completely misunderstood Haller, and ignored almost everything of scientific value in his work" (265). He disregarded Haller's precision about "the specific physiological functions of muscles, nerves, etc. . . . (i.e., perfectly local phenomena)" (256). Haller insisted that "irritability and sensibility are quite separate and discontinuous phenomena, each associated with different physiological reactions" (264). Nisbet is correct about what Haller intended; where he seems insensitive is in regard to the theoretical

desiderata of the biological and psychological sciences in extricating themselves from the palpable limitations of his intentions.¹²²

What Herder was doing, in fact, constituted a necessary endeavor for the emergent sciences of life in this historical moment, the theoretical invention of *epigenesis*, out of and yet against the pioneering physiology of Haller.¹²³ But there is more, as Simon Richter has shown. Herder was not just reinterpreting Haller's physiology; he was deploying a crucial *analogy* between medicine and aesthetics via the polysemantic valences of the term *Reiz*.¹²⁴ In medicine, *Reiz* signified simply "that which causes a physical sensation of pleasure or pain." But in aesthetics, *reizend* had a dramatically different register. It was an adjective used preponderantly to refer to the "gentle violence" of "feminine beauty," as in the phrase *reizendes Mädchen*.¹²⁵ That is, *reizend* betokened that which aroused (erotic) desire.¹²⁶ This was emotional, aesthetic—a matter, assuredly, of a sentient agent. Thus, as Richter correctly perceives, Herder "grasped at the analogy [between the medical and the aesthetic senses of *Reiz*] as a means to bridge the gulf between irritability and sensibility."¹²⁷ That was a methodological as much as a metaphorical undertaking.¹²⁸ It represented the necessary move to establish a physiological psychology. While Nisbet has made a powerful case for his general principle that "in nearly all areas of [Herder's] thought, the concept of '*Kraft*' greatly detracted from the scientific value of his ideas," such that "Herder's psychological vitalism thus shares the defects of his biological vitalism," there is a powerful body of evidence amassing that suggests that the concern with vitalism and epigenesis was central to the most innovative currents of science in the age.¹²⁹ An extended study of the period detects the centrality of force in eighteenth-century neurophysiology and medical psychology.¹³⁰ Haller's desperate effort to contain this vitalism was simply incongruous with the impulses of the best empirical research.¹³¹

Herder proposed to offer an empirical description of how the essential but underivable concepts of human understanding emerge "out of the nature of the subject as an explicable matter of fact."¹³² He endeavored to understand concretely and in detail how the specific senses served as organs of *cognitio historica*: "It is a very difficult matter to trace every science in all its concepts and every language in all its words back to the senses in which and for which they arose, and yet that is essential for every science and every language."¹³³ Here was the most original and powerful aspect of his approach. Herder offered a remarkable analogy out of which to grasp his idea of the emergence of sensibility out of the primordial ground of being: "[man] turned from a situation in which he was only a thinking and sensing plant toward the world, where he began to be an animal. There appeared to accompany him

no other sensation than the obscure idea of his own self, as obscure as only a plant could feel it."¹³⁴ The only innate certainty that Herder would acknowledge was this plantlike sense of self: "immediately, through an inner feeling I am convinced of nothing in the world but that I am, that I feel myself" (252).

Herder insisted upon the inordinate complexity of the first unified discrimination of an external object. "When one considers how many secret connections and divisions, judgments and conclusions a developing human must make, in order to establish within himself the first idea of a body outside himself—of *figure, shape, size, dimension*—one has to be astounded" (252). No philosopher could possibly speculate all those synapses, yet for the human subject, happily, all that became second nature. These basic cognitive operations lay so far back in human developmental psychology, so deep in the obscurity of the human soul, that we took them for innate feelings. Such was the fundamental error of Riedel's claims for common sense, for conscience, and for taste. These were all elaborate psychological constructions, but at the preconscious level: "How many truths must one not reckon really to this obscure mechanism of the soul!" (275). In conceiving the problem of consciousness in terms of the transition from plant to animal, Herder gives a rich instantiation both of his notion of the sensuality of primordial being, and also of its ineluctable project(ion) in the world of sense: animate now in a sense that amalgamates Leibnizian with Aristotelian entelechy. "How beautiful such a view of the human soul! Unity at the ground, thousandfold multiplicity in the development, perfection in the sum of the whole!" (280).

Herder offers a theory of developmental psychology grounded in the specificity of each of the senses, which he finds confirmed in the characteristics of the particular forms of fine art which appeal to these specific senses.¹³⁵ His most essential argument has to do with the feeling of touch: "touch is at once the first, certain and faithful [*treue*] sense which emerges: it is already in its first stages of development in the embryo, and only gradually over time do the other senses distinguish themselves from it."¹³⁶ For the relationship between consciousness—the soul—and the world, the model with which he seeks to operate is the analogy of attraction-repulsion in physical theory. In "Zum Sinn des Gefühls," Herder worked this idea out. Through the sense of touch, Herder hoped to be able to make the transition from a metaphysical dualism to a sensual self, a soul immersed in the real via space, time, and force.¹³⁷ Herder planned to start from the senses to construct a general psychology; his model in the endeavor was Denis Diderot: "Diderot can be the model for making experiments but not

simply to build on his experiments and to systematize them! A work of that sort can become the first psychology, and since from this all the [other] sciences follow, simultaneously a philosophy or encyclopedia for all that! Especially, however, I want to resist the temptation of the Germans to try to develop everything out of nominal explanations of what follows or what cannot follow."¹³⁸ In his correspondence from Paris, where he claimed to have actually met Diderot, Herder proclaimed him the greatest philosopher in France.¹³⁹ This argues for a measure of influence of Diderot on Herder that goes beyond merely having read his *Letter Concerning the Blind*. Wolfgang Proß argues convincingly for a "period of intense study of the writings of Condillac, Diderot and Robinet" at the close of the Riga period.¹⁴⁰ Herder had begun to study Condillac in 1764 (1182). He was especially fascinated with the famous "statue" analogy, and with Condillac's stress on the sense of touch.¹⁴¹

These were the very things that Diderot had taken up and developed in his *Letter Concerning the Blind*: the key features of the "Molyneux problem."¹⁴² This problem was presented to Locke by his friend and admirer, the physician Molyneux, and Locke made it famous in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. The issue was whether a blind person suddenly endowed with sight could distinguish merely from visual perception what he already knew tactilely as a sphere and a cube. Molyneux denied this, as did Locke. Berkeley went on to make even more drastic arguments both about the separateness of senses and about the phenomenal character of "primary" qualities no less than "secondary" qualities.¹⁴³ Especially in response to additional experimental evidence offered by the physician Cheselden, Diderot took up all this in his enormously influential *Letter Concerning the Blind* in 1749.¹⁴⁴ That text, in fact, persuaded Condillac to undertake the *Traité des sensations* (1754) to correct some weaknesses in his earlier work, which Diderot had criticized in *Letter Concerning the Blind*.¹⁴⁵ Condillac attempted a full derivation of everything in consciousness strictly from sensory perception. Even the operations of reflection should be explained mechanically from the juxtaposition of sensations. This was the endeavor of his famous marble statue illustration in *Traité des sensations*, probably the most important work in perceptual theory after Berkeley.¹⁴⁶

Herder followed this whole literature avidly.¹⁴⁷ It was decisive for Herder's empirical psychology, especially his theory of the primordially and priority of the sense of touch.¹⁴⁸ Herder first gave expression to this in the *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen* and "Zum Sinn des Gefühls," in 1769, and he developed it fully in his major works of the later 1770s, *Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der Menschlichen Seele* and *Plastik*. Herder sought to link the

insights of psychologists investigating the Molyneux problem empirically with his own theory of the developments of the senses as linked to the character and emergence of the forms of art. "It is exactly the same in the history of art among the peoples as with the history of human nature. Formation for the sense of touch had long been in place before representation for the sense of sight could emerge."¹⁴⁹ As with the blind person suddenly sighted, there was a propensity to image the tactile all out of proportion, a propensity toward the colossal, in early art (320, 330). "The first ideas of religion and theory of nature, the first ideal of their poetry and music, the first laws of their political organization and socializing, the first beginnings, finally, of philosophy and the arts—[all] are exaggerations" (333).

Also important for Herder were the ideas of Burke on the physiological bases for such subtle aesthetic feelings as the sublime and the beautiful, and the ideas of Morelly on the "physics of the beautiful."¹⁵⁰ German assimilation of the discussion of the animal soul in the works of Reimarus and Krüger proved equally influential for Herder's "physiological psychology," his "subjective philosophy."¹⁵¹ Where Kant rejected physiological psychology explicitly in his anthropology lectures after 1773, Herder took up and elaborated precisely this idea in his key work of the 1770s, the three versions of his *Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele*.¹⁵² In this, Herder was fully in step with the discourse of anthropology in Germany and Europe generally; it was Kant who chose to follow a different path. Thus, Wolf Lepenies acknowledges Herder's importance in the maturation of the discourse: "With Herder, we can speak of the combination of a philosophical-biological and of an ethnological-descriptive anthropology."¹⁵³

Herder's ultimate question was about the nature of humans in general, the "fundamental question of anthropology." For Herder, in the words of Reiner Wisbert: "man is a unity of feelings, imagination and understanding and in all his powers—and this is the decisive thing—a creature of historicity."¹⁵⁴ Thus, Herder saw a complete homology between his project with empirical psychology at the level of the individual and his project of conjectural history at the level of the species: "A human race and a human child are very like one another."¹⁵⁵ The ontogeny/phylogeny parallelism is central to his whole way of thinking. But it is more sophisticated, for Herder was quite cognizant that the way in which any discreet individual came to particular consciousness was always itself a product of the larger historical-cultural configuration of development.

Herder's argument for the *construction* of consciousness carried him beyond subjectivity to collectivity, from ontogeny to phylogeny, and, crucially, to *cultural* constructions. Sensibility induced in humankind an end-

less proliferation of differences, tastes, and predilections that differentiated not merely cultures and peoples but individuals within them. "Common sense" was *not* common, it was culture specific, a function of the discriminations that a culture cultivated, and the same was true of conscience and of taste. "I see [only] a skill to apply capacities for knowledge according to the measure that these have been cultivated [*Fertigkeit, Erkenntniskräfte anzuwenden, nach dem Maß, wie sie ausgebildet sind*]." ¹⁵⁶ That meant that all human reasoning was conditioned by context, a function of experience, and hence *constructed*—and *culturally constructed*. "Nations, centuries, epochs, persons—not all arrive at the same level of aesthetic cultivation." But these differences were also not inexplicable; the explanation, however, had to be historical, not speculative: "is it not to be explained in terms of ages, mores and peoples?" ¹⁵⁷ Thus, Gaier summarizes the harvest of Herder's crucial *Essay on the Origins of Language*: "The sensual certainty of space and time concretizes itself in geography, climate—in a word, the conditions of human life which jointly cause [man's] individual and historical differentiation. And, finally, it is through the powers [*Kräfte*] of man, which derive their situation and tendency from reflection [*Besonnenheit*], that consciousness [*Besinnung*] and language at once present themselves, arise together and mutually elaborate each other." ¹⁵⁸ Herder imagined the particularities each culture achieved strung together like beads on the thread of the history of the species and transmitted via *language*: "an instrument [*Werkzeug*] which enables one to stir the soul of another, to plant knowledge immediately there, which the latter has not created, but which has been created for it by others." ¹⁵⁹ Herder's theory of developmental psychology thus carried him inevitably to a theory of cultural difference and of historical proliferation and cumulation.

HERDER AS A HERMENEUTIC HISTORICIST

While there was a historical component to Herder's writings from the early unpublished essays of the 1760s onward, his earliest methodological reflections on the field date to 1767 or 1768. ¹⁶⁰ Herder by that point envisioned a kind of history that would combine "cultural history with geography and natural history" to create a "natural history of peoples." ¹⁶¹ Here, in the evocation of natural history, the question of Buffon arises. Herder's reactions to Buffon were mixed; he regularly associated him with the *absence* of system, sometimes in praise and sometimes in scorn. ¹⁶² Yet Herder adopted Buffon's strategies of a "natural history of man" pervasively, and this suggests that the influence of Buffon on Herder was in fact quite substantial. ¹⁶³ As Herder

put it in a fragmentary essay from 1769, "laws of human and animal nature, I wish to call upon you for succor in the darkness of my labyrinth, [to show me] how the laws of nations are to be formed so that they, like you, will be valid and effectual, make people happy, reach their goal! Laws of bodies first, for they are the best known. Attraction and repulsion! I cannot explain them, but I detect them. They have in all probability formed the bodies [I observe]."164

The Scottish Enlightenment was unquestionably a major stimulus for Herder's historical thinking.¹⁶⁵ In an important review of a work by Millar (*Observations on the Differences in Rank in Civil Society*), Herder clearly identified the Scottish Enlightenment as the center of British philosophy for his times. He mentioned Millar, Ferguson, Robertson, Gerard, Home, and Beattie in this regard and identified what linked them all together: "philosophy of the forms and alterations of the human race according to the measure of history and experience—a great, great field!"¹⁶⁶ Still, he faulted Millar, at least, for having too presentist a bias, offering "a one-sided history of the human race" that failed to recognize that every epoch was an end in itself—the only view, he asserted, that would befit "the true dignity of philosophy" (455). The main thrust of the Scottish school was to develop the four-stages theory of historical development, which put primary stress on the economic institutions of each stage of society and on the question of property.¹⁶⁷ Herder was not particularly convinced of this model of unilinear progress, and he had reservations about the commercialization of modern society that resonate strongly with those of Rousseau.¹⁶⁸ Far from subscribing to the Scottish theory of human "improvement," Herder expressed sharp reservations against modernity. He argued that the same moderns who denounced medieval serfdom were more encumbered and enchained than the slaves of yore (310). Pascal has good grounds for the view that Herder was "a passionate partisan" who would not allow his own epoch equal dignity.¹⁶⁹ In the *Journal meiner Reise*, Herder castigated himself for his unhappiness with his own times and insisted that he come to terms with his age, but he was not always able to measure up to that admonition.¹⁷⁰

In any event, that was not what Herder saw as the real project of a "history of mankind." It was not to trace the trajectory of "progress" but to discriminate the varieties of human excellence. In *Yet Another Philosophy of History* Herder put it in its most memorable form: "every nation has its own center of well-being within itself, just as every globe has its center of gravity."¹⁷¹ He sought to "conjure up before our eyes the spirit of a people." He held that "the uniqueness of each people is more striking in its spiritual

form than in its material."¹⁷² It was this uniqueness above all that Herder believed history should capture.¹⁷³ Indeed, one of Herder's strongest claims was that cultural variables considerably outweighed geography and climate in the constitution of the history of a people.¹⁷⁴

The main provocation for Herder's historical criticism was the so-called philosophical history articulated by Voltaire but practiced in significant measure by Montesquieu and even Hume.¹⁷⁵ Their complacent Eurocentric presentism—the origin of what we know as "Whig history"—offended Herder's "historical sense."¹⁷⁶ In Herder's own cultural milieu, their approach found capsule summary in Isaac Iselin's *Geschichte der Menschheit* (1764). Iselin was less a creative theorist of history than a weathervane of the historical interest of that cultural moment.¹⁷⁷ He dwelt mainly on incorporating empirical psychology (Baumgarten) into historical theory and above all on disputing Rousseau's antimodernism. Iselin lacked both a richness of documentary research and a rigor of historical method, which made him a provocative target—and not just for Herder.¹⁷⁸ The "professional" historians at Göttingen, led by Johann Gatterer, were equally hostile to the kind of work Iselin and his models offered. They were deeply suspicious of French "philosophical" history, especially Voltaire's. Gatterer and the others offered what Reill terms "the critique of a professional historian against a more brilliant yet less thorough dilettante." The idea was that these "amateur" historians proved "more concerned with felicity of expression than with correctness of the narrative." Reill detects some tell-tale language: these were "*schöne Geister*."¹⁷⁹ Gatterer found similar fault with many of the authors involved in translating and bringing up to date the great English project of "World History" for the German audience, inaugurated by Siegmund Baumgarten, because their work lacked rigor. One of the authors Gatterer criticized was Thomas Abbt.¹⁸⁰ Gatterer and his circle in Göttingen believed that "progress was to be achieved through professional expertise animated by a concern for the public good."¹⁸¹ In those terms, they situated themselves—as Göttingen itself as a university was situated—between the fronts of academic guild mentality and popular philosophy. What they sought was to lend rigor to the pursuit of history, to rescue it from mere *Schöndenken*. In this, it must be observed, Herder was entirely in agreement with them.¹⁸² But he doubted that the professionalization of history into an academic guild would achieve the desired result.

Herder was more philosophical and more literary in his approach to history as a form of interpretation.¹⁸³ The major German influence on Herder's sense of historical method was Johann Winckelmann.¹⁸⁴ As Rainer Wisbert notes, "[Winckelmann] taught him to see works of art in the horizon of

history, pointed out to him the importance of climate and nation for the character of each particular work and emphasized for the historical writer the necessity of working from his own observations and experience with art.¹⁸⁵ Herder, like all Germans of his epoch, came away with a vision of Greek aesthetic creativity that became the model for culture, and yet Herder ultimately adopted a critical stance toward Winckelmann's representation.¹⁸⁶ First, he found it ahistorical in its refusal to see any connection between the prior art of Egypt and the cultural efflorescence of Greece.¹⁸⁷ A crucial principle of developmental historical interpretation was at stake.¹⁸⁸ But even more, while Herder admired Greece and wished that his culture could have a similar naturalness and wholeness, he nevertheless rejected the idea that contemporary Germans could simply ape Greek forms. He faulted this sterile classicism in Klotz's Horace imitations, and he would not allow it even when the more profound Winckelmann attempted to found a general theory upon Greek art. Simultaneously, Herder rejected Winckelmann's methodological proposal that history could serve as the vehicle for the exposition of a theoretical system (*Lehrgebäude*). He acknowledged that the original Greek word, *history*, had a wider span than mere narrative reconstruction, but he questioned whether even it was wide enough for a theoretical system.

While reflecting on the historical achievement of Winckelmann, Herder set down his earliest methodological views on historical interpretation. In disputing Winckelmann's effort to collapse general theory with history and his effort to make Greece the eternal standard for cultural achievement, Herder found himself driven to a relentlessly empirical approach to historical writing and to emphasis on the situatedness of cultural forms. This resulted in a relativism far more hermeneutically radical than any of his day. Herder used the example of Herodotus, the "inventor" of history.¹⁸⁹ Having no model and having a public attuned to the epic, Herodotus developed a historical style in emulation of Homer; he became a "historical Homerist."¹⁹⁰ But he could not thereby become a model for all times. Not even Thucydides, who studied Herodotus assiduously, cared to adopt his model. That superb fitness for his own moment made Herodotus all the more problematic for imitators in later times. For Herder, historical writing was a form of art, not a science: the "true historical artist" was the "creator of a world of occurrences" as a "beautiful totality."¹⁹¹ Accordingly, "one is more likely to find exemplars of history rather than rules for a historical art."¹⁹² And each example would have to be *situated* in its historical moment to be appreciated. No one exemplar, even if it was the best for its moment, could then serve "for all nations, for all times, for us" (689).

Who, then, were Herder's own models, closer to him in time and cultural circumstance? "Tacitus," he writes in *Fragmente*, "with his reflections that penetrate the spirit of events, is a historian for Germans."¹⁹³ But two modern historians stood out as models for Herder at the close of the 1760s: David Hume and Thomas Abbt.¹⁹⁴ They shared what Herder termed "pragmatic historiography." This was how Abbt conceived this practice: "If the most certain and the most hidden driving impulses are presented to the reader by the historian himself in the correct connection of events, this would be the highest level of pragmatism. . . . One has to be attentive to consequences; . . . one must have the talent distinctly to set forth the connections among the driving impulses and their effects; and finally freedom and a love of posterity in order to report all this to them."¹⁹⁵ Abbt failed, however, to achieve results that satisfied him along these lines in his own historical writing.¹⁹⁶ Part of the animus behind his debate with Mendelssohn over the *Bestimmung des Menschen* arose from the fact that he could find no pattern of order in history.

The idea of "pragmatic history," as Peter Hanns Reill has established, was a commonplace among the new professional historians at the Royal Institute for History at Göttingen.¹⁹⁷ Pioneered by such figures as Johann Jacob Schmauß and Johann Martin Chladenius, the new historical methodology found its most powerful articulation in the writings of Johann Christoph Gatterer during the 1760s. In the inaugural volume of the new disciplinary journal of the Royal Institute, *Allgemeine historische Bibliothek*, in 1767, Gatterer articulated the ideal of "pragmatic history" in the following terms: "The chief concern of the pragmatic historian is the search for immediate inciting circumstances and causes of important events and to develop as well as possible the whole system of causes and effects, of means and intentions, no matter how confused they may at first seem."¹⁹⁸ A year earlier his colleague, the classical philologist Johann Michaelis, had called pragmatic history simply a "history that traces driving forces."¹⁹⁹

As Reill summarizes the conventional wisdom of this school, "pragmatic history placed particular events into a complex system of acting and interacting relations." It was characterized by "thinking in terms of connections."²⁰⁰ In this it separated itself both from the polyhistorians of the prior century who seemed to be characterized by an "aimless empiricism," and from the (French) philosophical historians whose treatment of historical detail was altogether too cavalier and who failed to register the complexity of actual history in their application of preconceived general theories, especially of unilinear progress.²⁰¹ But in this sensitivity to *Zusammenhang*, significantly under the auspices of Leibniz, the new "pragmatic" historians

were acutely aware of the difficulty of the enterprise of establishing causal accounts from their own situatedness in time and place. Nevertheless, they felt impelled to make the effort, because they saw history as an essential discipline for *Weltkenntnis*, the great pedagogical endeavor of Enlightenment to which they were committed (45-46). While they were aware of classical precedents for this pedagogical history, their immediate inspiration came from Montesquieu and Hume (56). If Montesquieu presented them with rich models for the environmental contextualization of events, Hume was even more important for his exploration of the psychological origins of human action.

The project of these new pragmatic historians of the *Aufklärung* was to assimilate Hume to the Leibnizian approach, especially as it was being developed in the empirical psychology of the later Wolffians: Baumgarten, Sulzer, and Mendelssohn. The new philosophical interest in aesthetics dovetailed with the new methodological interest in historical causation: both stressed the "process of creation."²⁰² Thus, this new historical approach fit thoroughly into the emergent "science of man." Reill characterizes their epistemological orientation under the rubric of "direct perception [*anschauende Erkenntnis*]" associated with "focus on the individual event," "life as experienced," "science of the real and the actual"—all features of that "epistemological liberalization" that Moravia identified as the core of the emergence of anthropological discourse.²⁰³ Indeed, Reill suggests that "history became the starting point for all inquiries into the science of man."²⁰⁴ Above all, the enterprise to develop a "natural history of mankind" or a "natural history of human understanding" carried with it the obligation to establish "that the study of history constituted a reliable form of knowledge." That is, a theory of historiography, of the "requirements of historical criticism," became indispensable in this context.²⁰⁵

Herder followed this emergent historical discourse closely in the 1760s.²⁰⁶ Perhaps it was Abbt who set him on the trail, or it might have been simply the reading of Hume's *History of Britain*. But Herder quickly became caught up in the theoretical problems of "pragmatic" history. It irked him that the term had become something of a commonplace and that even mediocre historians had taken up the rubric.²⁰⁷ He had every intention of seizing command of this trend for himself. Herder envisioned a whole school of German history inspired by this method. He thought enough of his own theory of history to compose a letter that he intended for publication in the most important historical journal of the day, the newly established *Allgemeine historische Bibliothek*.²⁰⁸ He never sent the letter, but it remains a clear and imposing statement of his theory of history. A few years later,

Herder would declare war on the historians at Göttingen in one of the most famous methodological controversies in eighteenth-century German historiography.²⁰⁹

His main thrust in the letter was to stress the perspectival nature of human understanding: "every human eye has its own angle of vision: every one makes a projection of the object before him after his own fashion."²¹⁰ That in itself preempted any pretense of totality even in the description of a single particular. But that kind of scrupulosity seemed irrelevant to Herder: "we always take as the basis for rules and practical investigations what is possible, what is doable, and say for the rest: *quae supra nos, nihil ad nos!* [what is beyond us is nothing to us]" (685). (Here we have one of Herder's clearest statements of empiricism.) He insisted that the discourse on historiography should always be "reckoned in human terms" and in that light proposed that particular historical totalities could be (approximately) described. Still, if the project of history even in this frame was to advance complete causal accounts, Herder expressed doubt whether this was possible for the historian and was not rather a matter for philosophers. He invoked Hume's skeptical account of the idea of cause and effect: these were "never seen, always inferred, implied, conjectured" (686).

Moreover, there was a different concept of truth operative in history as compared with philosophy. "The historical writer and the philosopher of history never stand on *one* and the same solid ground." Two historical observers might, everything being equal, offer pretty much the same description of an evident matter, but their *judgments* about that would be far from uniform, but instead "each after the situation of his mind and after the preferred paths of his spirit of reflection" (686); "In matters of history precisely in what measure is the *sensus communis* of judgment among persons of different social strata and styles of life, among people of different compositions of spiritual energy, and most of all of different education and cultivation of that spiritual energy, still the same?" (687). Herder made it plain that he thought it could not be common.²¹¹ He celebrated Hume's *History* in particular for recognizing that "every social stratum, every style of life has its own mores."²¹²

Hume was the most important and the most problematic modern historian for Herder. In his classes, Herder wrote to Kant, he usually set out from "the *History of Britain*, for the most part in order to be able to reason through his history with the greatest historical writer among the moderns."²¹³ In "Do We Still Have a Public," Herder wrote, "in my view, the greatest man in that regard is the *historian of Britain*, *Hume*, a writer who has mastered the difficult art of applying the pragmatic strategies of a *Tacitus* and a *Polybius*

in conformity with the taste of our age."²¹⁴ Already in the so-called *Älteres Kritisches Wäldchen* (1767–1768), Herder had recognized David Hume as a particularly important representative of "pragmatic history":

Hume, certainly one of the greatest minds of our age, always read by me with veneration. But read, may I say again, not as a writer of history, but as a philosopher of British history. He would not be worthy to be Hume's reader, who did not admire in him the clear-sighted statesman, the profound thinker, the penetrating narrator, the enlightening judge. However, as much as I wish to learn from him, the least among the plenty—is history. History is what Hume thinks of it, how the relationship of things appears to him, his judgment flowing from his perceptions, his perceptions of events and persons of the past, and how he positions them, but not necessarily how they happened and how they were.²¹⁵

In this passage, Herder expressed an ambivalence about "pragmatic historiography" that one needs to keep clearly in focus in assessing his position.²¹⁶ He demanded that the historian reflect upon and judge the material he was narrating, but not simply *use* the historical material as a vehicle for the exposition of his own doctrines. Reading Hume was a useful instance of the difficulty of discriminating these two elements, and hence Hume stood out as an exemplary modern historian, as Herder noted in his letter to Kant.²¹⁷

It is this richer sense of historicity that Herder sought to bring to historicism itself. "Every philosopher sees things from his own point of view. How depressing to have to demonstrate that historical knowledge does not bring shame upon a philosopher."²¹⁸ The crucial innovation in Herder's hermeneutics is recognizing the openness of the subject, not simply of the object, of interpretation. This is the core of Herder's radically hermeneutical historicism.²¹⁹

I must interject here, however, what person knows what is in a[nother] person, without the presence of the spirit of that person in him? And even this can be known [only] as we know our own face: in an image [*anschauend*] but not distinctly. With a lively but confused consciousness of ourselves we go about as in a dream of which on occasion this or that piece occurs to us, cut off, fragmentary, without connection. We often fail to give attention even to our own thoughts, we recognize ourselves only in that moment when another shows us thoughts which seem to have sprung from ourselves, as in the Platonic recollection from the realm of

spirits. We are not even answerable for a complete account of our own countenance, but we are quite able to step outside ourselves when we are presented with an image of ourselves, a second self. . . . I pass over the entire *obscure ground* of our souls, in whose abysmal depths unknown forces like unborn kings sleep, in which, as in a terrain covered with snow and ice, the seed molders toward a spring of paradisiacal thoughts, in which glimmers, as in a dark cinder, the spark of great passions and drives.²²⁰

The essential point of Herder's hermeneutics is that it commences in uncertainty, both about the object and about the subject of the interpretive act.²²¹ This uncertainty is, however, epistemological, not ontological. Herder is *not* questioning the actuality of the past or of the self, but only our capacity to render these in a theoretically adequate formulation.²²² (One must go back to the distinction between objective and subjective probability as it was enunciated by Buffon and by Mendelssohn.) He is suggesting that the dialogical situation, and especially the reflection of the other, proves decisive in our own identity formation. As Hans-Georg Gadamer has formulated it, one's historicity is achieved in the *effective history* of those one encounters, who occasion in us a redefinition of our own horizons.²²³ Thus, like fields ready for sowing, we await the fertile dissemination of other spirits. Such encounters are epiphanies: "It is hard to catch a glimpse of such moments, when the soul disrobes and shows herself to us like a beauty in her transfixing nakedness, when we are able to become intimate with the way of thinking of another and, as with a kiss, gain truth."²²⁴

"Treating of the Art of Making an Image of the Soul of Another," the introduction to the "Torso on Abbt," is, as Hans Dietrich Irmischer pointed out some time ago, one of the most important sources for Herder's early ideas about hermeneutical method.²²⁵ Herder's ambition as an interpreter was to retrieve the *spirit* of his author. "The first thing is to show the *unique manner* of my author, and to note the original strokes of his way of thought: a difficult but a useful endeavor."²²⁶ Herder put it bluntly: "I care nothing about what Bacon thought, but only about how he thought. An image of that sort is not dead; it takes on life, it speaks to my soul" (577). For Herder, the uniqueness of an author was always a function of his historical situatedness. "That commentator of an author is for me the greatest who does not *transfigure* him according to the taste of the current century but who explains him in terms of all the nuances of his own time, and thereupon elaborates" (577). He explained more concretely what this meant:

It is most essential that one draw from an author what belonged to *his time or the world preceding him*, and what he leaves behind to *posterity*. He carries the chains of his epoch, to whom he presents his book: he stands in his century, as a tree in the terrain in which it is rooted, from which it draws its sap. . . . The more he makes himself of service to his own world, the more he must accommodate himself to it, and he must penetrate into its ways of thinking, in order to shape them. In the measure that he is formed according to that taste—and the first form never allows itself totally to be revised—every great writer *must* carry in him the birthmarks of his time. (579)

It was just this approach that distinguished Herder's 1773 essay on Shakespeare, one of the landmarks of historical hermeneutics.²²⁷

Herder shaped the ideas for this approach already in his critique of the historical interpretations of Winckelmann and Lessing.²²⁸ This methodological insight was clearly articulated in the 1767 essay on Abbt. "That *interpreter* [*Erklärer*] is the man for me who marks the boundaries of the background, the times and the posterity of an author: what the first offered him, what the second helped or hindered, what the third carried further. A history of a writer that was based on this idea: what a work that would be! The basis for a history of science, and of human understanding."²²⁹ Such interpretations were rare; instead what one normally got, Herder complained, were canned summaries or exposés of error (577). "We read judgments that either lead us into error or more typically leave us empty, just as the glow of the moon brings light but no warmth" (577). Herder made a striking further analogy, namely, to bourgeois socializing, which "entertains itself with nothing and in so doing noticeably weakens the true commerce of human spirits and hearts" (577–78). Art critics (*Kunstrichterseelen*) stole from the public those "sweet moments when we perceive the spirit of another and seek to form ourselves in that image" (588). Herder made it clear in this last phrase that the purpose of searching for an author's spirit was self-transformative: the encounter should change the interpreter.

There is, unquestionably, a "naivety" or "utopianism" about Herder's hermeneutics.²³⁰ He is both aware of the fixity of the historian as subject and intensely committed to the possibility of transcending this fixity:

to liberate oneself from this innate and enculturated idiosyncrasy, to develop distance from the irregularities of a too singular situation and ultimately to be able to relish without [the intervention of] national, temporal and personal taste, the beautiful as it presents itself in all times

and all peoples and all arts and all forms of taste . . . to taste it purely and to be sensitive to it. Happy is he who can so relish! He is the initiated into the mysteries of all the muses and all the times and all the mementos and all the works: the sphere of his taste is infinite as the history of mankind.²³¹

If that is Herder's ideal, he is generally realistic and pragmatic enough to recognize its superhuman aspiration. Herder's utopianism is tempered and in his best work controlled, but it gives him the energy and the inspiration to dare to enter the hermeneutic circle and bring back to historical consideration treasures of the cultural past. The Shakespeare essay alone suffices to warrant his achievement, and there is a wealth beyond it.

The Shakespeare essay appeared in the great manifesto of the German *Sturm und Drang*, *Von deutscher Art und Kunst* (1773). It signaled a new epoch in Herder's literary production as well as a new epoch in German letters overall. But it also gives evidence of Herder's synthesis of hermeneutic historicism. Herder found fault with all the reception of Shakespeare to his moment because it all adhered to classical standards, whether to condemn Shakespeare or to excuse him. Herder proposed the radical alternative of challenging the criteria themselves. He had a different hermeneutical goal in approaching Shakespeare: to "explain him, feel him as he is, use him, and—if possible—make him alive for us in Germany."²³² This sense of the present concern of the interpreter, of the situatedness of the historical subject, was acute in Herder, who even asked how it was possible for him to make this move: "perhaps I can ascribe it to my time or even to chance" (144).

The key interpretive move was *historicization*. "In Greece drama developed in a way in which it could not develop in the north. In Greece it was what it could not be in the north. Therefore in the north it is not and cannot be what it was in Greece. Thus Sophocles' drama and Shakespeare's drama are two things that in a certain respect have scarcely the name in common" (144). To register historical distance was the essential first step in interpretation. "Great heavens, how far we are from Greece! History, tradition, customs, religion, the spirit of the time, of the nation, of emotion, or language—how far from Greece!" (150). Thus, "if Sophocles represented and taught and moved and educated Greeks, Shakespeare taught and moved and educated northern men!" (152). This insight opened the horizon for Herder's interpretation of Shakespeare: "I am closer to Shakespeare than to the Greek" (151). To make this case, Herder proceeded to anchor Greek tragedy in its historical context, deriving it from the ritual features of the dithyramb and making the argument that Greek drama took simple mythical

events and worked toward complicating their simplicity (146). The "Aristotelian unities" that had been ossified by tradition were, in the original moment, simply *natural* expressions of the time, the place and the cultural resources of the Attic people. That was what French Neo-Classicism missed: "Whatever splendid or useful name it may bear, it is not Greek drama! It is not Sophoclean tragedy! It resembles Greek drama as an effigy might! The effigy lacks spirit, life, nature, truth—that is, all the elements that move us; that is, the tragic purpose and the achievement of that purpose—so how can it be the same thing?" (149). Sterile imitation, as Herder had been arguing throughout the 1760s against Klotz and his circle, could neither awaken the spirit of the original nor incite the creation of something new. For, as Herder concluded, drama had to express "the epitome of a country's national identity," it was "a national institution in which each minute particular has its effect and is the bearer of the richest, deepest culture" (149). A nation "will create its drama out of its own history, the spirit of its age, customs, views, language, national attitudes, traditions, and pastimes" (150). And this was Shakespeare's project, to "create a dramatic oeuvre out of this raw material as naturally, impressively, and originally as the Greeks did from theirs" (150).

Thus, "every play is history in the widest sense . . . the heroic drama of the nation's identity" (160). Shakespeare was thus a historical dramatist, because history was the stuff out of which he had to work. "He took history as he found it, and his creative spirit combined the most various stuff into a marvelous whole." Presented with "a multiplicity of estates, ways of life, attitudes, nations, and styles of speech," Shakespeare achieved an essentially *historical* synthesis, which at the same time bespoke the highest *artistic* genius (151). He fused "individual impressions of nations, classes, souls, all the most various and disparate machines" that the complex "northern" historical experience imposed upon him, and thus spoke "the language of all ages, of all sorts and conditions of men," became "the interpreter of Nature in all her tongues" (152). Thus, "Shakespeare discovered the godlike art of conceiving an entire world of the most disparate scenes as one great event" (154). Herder could not resist linking this synthesis to an even grander one: "the whole might well bear the name of Spinoza's giant god: Pan! Universum!" (157).

Thus, Herder concludes, "Shakespeare is Sophocles' brother, precisely where he seems to be so dissimilar, and inwardly he is wholly like him," for what each great artistic genius does is to demonstrate *situated* "authenticity, truth, and historical creativity" (156). And that is the lesson for the historical interpreter to take up: "How much it could contribute to our reading of

history, our philosophy of the human soul, our drama!"²³³ Yet Herder cannot resist making the *Sturm und Drang* gesture of protest, not simply against French fashion, but against German academic pedantry. "But I am not a member of all our academies of history and philosophy and the fine arts, where in any case they turn their minds to anything but such a question" (159). None of them could ever come to the insight Herder was offering, "since it is well known that genius is more than philosophy, and creation a very different thing from analysis" (151). That was the clarion call of *Sturm und Drang*. It was also Herder's not very gracious public declaration of independence from Kant.²³⁴ What I hope I have shown is that the essay as a whole was also an exemplary distillation of the discourse of anthropology in the German eighteenth century.

HERDER AS THE COMPLETE ANTHROPOLOGIST

Herder sought to integrate in his own practice all the impulses of the newly emergent "science of man," of anthropology, in the second half of the eighteenth century in Germany. He made that point clearly at the end of his *Essay on the Origins of Language*: his purpose had been, he wrote, "to collect accurate data from the human soul, human organization, the structure of all old and primitive languages, and from the whole economy of the human race and to prove his principle in such a way as the most certain philosophical truth can be proven."²³⁵ Herder sought to bring all the modes of inquiry together into a "science of man," into anthropology in the eighteenth-century sense. He was, in that measure, the "complete" anthropologist of that age. But more, he passed on a legacy across a host of disciplines. Herder has long been recognized as a pathbreaker in historiography. But he has also been situated at the origins of sociology.²³⁶ And the same is true for comparative literature.²³⁷ His contribution to hermeneutics in general has been stressed by Irmscher and others. And, ultimately, the established discipline of anthropology, both in its physical and in its cultural wings, acknowledges him in its historical self-constitution. In the end, it must be said, the discipline of anthropology does not look back to Immanuel Kant as a crucial predecessor. But Herder is and will remain a major figure in the emergence of that discipline.

To be sure, Herder was no Darwinian, but he was prepared to imagine continuities between the human and the animal kingdom, to blend natural history with human history with a thoroughness that was remarkable for his age.²³⁸ Far more swiftly and far more radically than Kant, Herder abandoned the traditional preformationist views of embryology, with their substantial

philosophical and anthropological implications, for the new theory of epigenesis.²³⁹ His thoughts on the physical anthropology of race are, for modern eyes, vastly less painful than Kant's. Herder was skeptical of the fixture of distinct racial groups, precisely for the fear that this would lead to hypostasis of distinctions in their capacities.²⁴⁰ Kant, as recent criticism has brought uncomfortably to our attention, allowed such distinctions to lead him into troubling claims about non-Western races.²⁴¹ Herder's pluralism was not quite so impeccable, either, as Hans-Jakob Werlen has shown with reference to his treatment of the Chinese.²⁴² Still, his *cultural* contempt seems less fatal than Kant's *biological* disqualification of non-Western peoples for self-determination.²⁴³

But it is in the domain of ethnography and ethnology that Herder, taking off, to be sure, from the inspiration of his great teacher, broke through to a level of insight and articulation that remains important to the self-constitution of that discipline.²⁴⁴ Ethnography was, as Karl Fink astutely observed, central to the emergence of European "universal history" in the eighteenth century.²⁴⁵ That connection is clear in A. L. von Schlözer's invention of the term *ethnography* for Germany precisely as a vehicle for achieving a more authentic universal history.²⁴⁶ That is, "European expansion and contact with strange cultures opened the horizon [of cultural awareness] and they could no longer be excluded from consideration."²⁴⁷ Herder was among the most sensitive and creative respondents to this challenge.²⁴⁸ While travelers rarely had the leisure or the learning to generalize theory out of their particular exploits, it was the readers and systematizers of the enormous travel literature who both created standards for ethnographic reports (e.g., the plans Albrecht von Haller worked out for Christlob Mylius's ill-fated expedition to the Americas), and also elaborated a general theory, an *ethnology*, out of these reports. Herder's unfinished masterpiece, *Ideas for a Philosophical History of Mankind* (1784ff), stands as one of the great monuments of eighteenth-century ethnography and ethnology.²⁴⁹ In comparison, the second part of Kant's *Anthropology* makes a poor impression.

CONCLUSION

Kant has been the overshadowing presence in the historical reconstruction of the German *Spätaufklärung*. His "critical" philosophy overran popular philosophy. It captured the imagination of the best and the brightest minds of Germany after 1786. While it was never taken as the complete system Kant desired it to be, and thus most Kantians busied themselves with rebuilding the edifice on ostensibly deeper and more unified foundations, there is little question that the enormous cultural energy of the era from 1790 through 1810 is marked by Kantianism.¹ But there remained a resistance movement led not merely by such figures as Feder or Meiners but most importantly by Herder. That resistance was often petulant and excessive, but it was not entirely misguided.² More important than the *rejection* of Kant, however, is the *mutation* that Herder insinuated into the evolution of Kantianism and of *Aufklärung* more generally.³ His hermeneutic historicism was far more important to Schiller, Humboldt, and ultimately Hegel than they were perhaps willing to admit.⁴ We have not had an adequate register in which to conceive this rivalry between Kant and Herder or the subtle victories of the "loser" in the struggle for cultural dominance. Anthropology may well be that register. It is a concept that, like everything else after Kant's "critical" revolution, has long borne a Kantian stamp. Yet Kant's anthropology was *not* the paradigm for that discourse but a deliberate deviation from it. In Germany it was Herder who most thoroughly embodied and embraced the

new "science of man" in the late eighteenth century. By assigning him a rightful precedence here, we may be able to set the historical record of this titanomachy a bit straighter.

If Kant chastised every other approach to "anthropology" for being "theoretical" and not "pragmatic," it was primarily because he chose to read that project against his own exclusive sense of "pragmatic," if not, as well, his own restrictive sense of "theoretical." The figures of anthropology in Germany were nothing if not pragmatists, nothing if not *Aufklärer*, intent upon making the world over in the image of (bourgeois) liberty.⁵ Those who inaugurated the discourse of anthropology in Germany—Herder foremost among them—were not simply interested in *knowing* man; their intention was to *change* him.

Kant created the "critical philosophy" at the cost of forsaking the "science" of anthropology. He sought to *relegate* it—not *promote* it—to the "pragmatic." This is doubly ironic, since for the broader Enlightenment, the pragmatic was the greatest consideration, while for the critical Kant it was not only subordinate to, but perhaps even *negligible for*, the "primacy of practical reason." Thus, the critical period systematically deployed the practical *against* the pragmatic: the first transcendently warranted, the second not only *empirical* but (ethically) *heteronomous*. And yet, against the grain of his own rigor, despite the "purity" he demanded of the critical and of all philosophy, there is an important sense in which Kant recognized and sought to address the question of the application of philosophy in the actual world. This sense of "philosophy in terms of the world" was not only a matter of the primacy of practical reason but far more a question of establishing the very possibility of practical reason operating effectively in the actual world. It is this "impure" reason, embodied and contingent, that has become the most important focus of concern of some of the most exciting recent work in Kant studies. In a word, there remained an anthropological dimension in Kant's critical philosophy couched in his sense that a "moral anthropology" would work out the concrete problems of mediating the principles of pure practical reason in the actual world. There is considerable evidence that Kant never completed this project, but there is also considerable evidence that he assembled a substantial body of thought toward its formulation. Moreover, the execution of such a project seems to many who study Kant the most interesting heritage of philosophical inquiry the Königsberger has left us. But there is a larger question, which is how—or, indeed, *whether*—"philosophical" anthropology can be conceived as the ultimate goal of the entire critical philosophy.⁶ There are a couple of famous passages in which Kant seems to gesture to anthropology as the umbrella concept for his

whole enterprise: a fourth question, "what is man?" that encompasses all the specific questions to which he devoted the key works of the critical system.⁷ There has been vehement protest against this construction, led by Brandt.⁸

The issues are quite complex and they constitute nothing less than the crucial divide now facing Kant scholarship. In my view, the future of Kant studies lies with the "informal" impulse that Friedrich Kaulbach tried to give it in the 1960s, and which Volker Gerhardt in Germany and a number of younger American scholars, inspired by Allen Wood, have taken up—namely the reenvisioning of the entire Kantian system as precisely an anthropology.⁹ The one reservation I would retain in enlisting in this project is that I am suspicious of the measure to which Kant himself was committed to it. Here, however, Kant's intentions seem less important than Kant's significance for current thought: a presentist, not a historicist judgment. It is a little easier to justify for a historian in light of the pervasive importance of such an anthropological orientation among his contemporaries, and that is one of the things this study has attempted to demonstrate. Nevertheless, if we go about reconciling Kant with anthropology, we must never forget the adamance of his opposition. Metaphysics in its critical form and, above all, the transcendental authority of the categorical imperative are the foundations and the constraints for any possible anthropology: without this *a priori* commitment to "pure" reason, Kant becomes unrecognizable. We are considering here, then, *our* philosophical use of Kant. But that has its own integrity.

There seems to have been a revolution of sorts in American Kant studies over the last twenty years. Today the crucial ideas are precisely those that had earlier been consigned to the periphery: unity, system, purpose, aesthetics, the primacy of practical reason, the highest good, anthropology.¹⁰ Underlying all these is the problem of coming to terms with the dynamism of reason—with its spontaneity and autonomy, and with its embodiment and efficacy, in other words, the whole *experience of freedom*.¹¹ A benchmark of this shift might well be the distance between Paul Guyer's first major work on the *Critique of Judgment*, his *Kant and the Claims of Taste* (1979), "a work conceived during the early and middle 1970s [which] certainly reflected the predilections of the analytical aesthetics of the period," and his recent work, *Kant and the Experience of Freedom* (1996). That distance is best captured in his own account:

In my earlier work I was rash enough to suggest that Kant's discussions of such topics as the sublime and genius . . . were mere concessions to the literary fashion of his day, thus not essential to his fundamental argument

about the conditions under which it is epistemologically justifiable to claim the universal validity of one's pleasurable response to a work of nature or art. . . . I might now be tempted to assert the opposite . . . that the real heart of Kant's aesthetic theory and the underlying motivation for its creation is the connection of his moral theory which appears in his discussion of the sublime, of aesthetic ideas as the content of works of artistic genius, and of beauty as the symbol of morality.¹²

Karl Ameriks has labeled this a "welcome re-orientation," and I could not agree more.¹³

Perhaps the most important point Guyer makes about this reorientation is that "Kant did not look to moral theory to solve a problem in aesthetic theory; instead he looked to aesthetics to solve what he had come to recognize as crucial problems *for morality*."¹⁴ Those problems revolve around Kant's assertion that "no transition from the sensible to the supersensible (and hence by means of the theoretical use of reason) is possible, just as if they were two different worlds, the first of which cannot have any influence on the second; and yet the second *is* to have an influence on the first, i.e., the concept of freedom is to actualize in the world of sense the purpose enjoined by its laws."¹⁵ How is this conceivable? In Guyer's formulation: "the rational ideal of autonomy that underlies morality . . . cannot merely be understood by disembodied reasons but can be made palpable to fully embodied rational agents like ourselves."¹⁶ As Paul Crowther puts it, "there is a primordial significance to the aesthetic."¹⁷ He identifies it, crucially, with "the ontogenesis of experience itself," and because "the individual moment of aesthetic pleasure *exemplifies* a mode of experiential formation . . . [it is] decisive for . . . the origins of individual self-consciousness" (118-19). Hence the intense new preoccupation with the sublime, artistic genius, and aesthetic ideas, all toward cashing out Kant's tantalizing promissory note, "beauty is the symbol of the morally-good."¹⁸

What is at stake in the new prominence attached to the problems of the sublime, of aesthetic ideas, of artistic genius and above all of beauty as the symbol of morality is recognizing Kant's ultimate philosophical project as one of *bridging*, not just *sounding* the abyss of dualism between reason and nature. It is *unity* that is crucial here: unity of reason, unity of the individual human, unity of humankind. Unity, to be sure, is problematic, but it is an existentially ineluctable desideratum. How to negotiate this divided oneness is just what it means to ask, "What is a human being?" Just the shift from the primacy of theoretical reason to that of practical reason moves us into position to conceive—and more importantly to *enact*—this unity. As Nancy

Sherman puts it in her appraisal of Guyer's book, the idea of an "experience of freedom" emphasizes "how, according to Kant, we *experience* and represent to ourselves practical freedom, . . . how according to Kant, we *embody* moral agency," that is, "what Kant would call moral anthropology."¹⁹

A major effort to integrate these matters is Allen Wood's recent essay, "Unsociable Sociability: The Anthropological Basis of Kantian Ethics."²⁰ The thrust of three recent essays suggests that the integration of the revisionist line of thinking culminates in a substantial elevation of the status of anthropology in Kant's system.²¹ These ideas, indeed, animate some of the most exciting recent work in Kantian ethics, characterizing Kant's notion of moral practice.²² In seeking to grasp the embodied and palpable experience of freedom, Kant scholars are drawn to the problem of the "highest good" as a question of the historical actualization of the moral law. Thus, it would not be altogether amiss to suggest that not only the immediate reception of Kant but also its most interesting current reception seeks to reinterpret Kant's entire opus in anthropological terms. The critical philosophy as the systematic articulation of the experience of freedom, in other words, as the problem of the actualization of ethical principles in the phenomenal world, *ends up* constituting a discourse of judgment, practice, and pragmatics not at all remote from that of the eighteenth-century "science of man."

NOTES



Because the following works are cited frequently, I have identified them in the notes by the following abbreviations.

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| AA:vol.:p. | Immanuel Kant. <i>Gesammelte Schriften</i> . Edited by the Königlich-preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. 29 vols. to date. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1910-. |
| Suphan:vol.:p. | Johann Gottfried Herder. <i>Herders Sämtliche Werke</i> . Edited by Bernhard Suphan. 33 vols. Berlin: Weidmann, 1893. |
| DKV:vol.:p. | Johann Gottfried Herder. <i>Werke in zehn Bänden</i> . 10 vols. Frankfurt: Deutsche Klassiker Verlag, 1985. |

In most references to Kant's writings, I have included a citation to the German text of the Prussian Academy edition and to the English translation. To save space in the notes, I have usually given only the English title. Thus, these notes would be of the form: Kant, *Prolegomena*, AA:4:373-80; tr. 112-19, with the title followed by the volume and page reference in the Prussian Academy edition (AA), followed by the page reference in the relevant English translation (tr.).

INTRODUCTION

1. I have written a great deal on this theme before. See my essay " 'Method' versus 'Manner'? Kant's Critique of Herder's *Ideen* in the Light of the Epoch of Science, 1790-1820," *Herder Jahrbuch/Herder Yearbook*, 1998, ed. Hans Adler and Wulf Koepke (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1998), 1-26; and my monograph *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
2. Rudolf Haym, *Herder*, vol. 1 (Berlin: Aufbau, 1954), 55.
3. Hans Dietrich Irmischer, "Der geschichtsphilosophische Kontroverse zwischen Kant und Herder." There is also, of course, an extensive earlier literature, notably: Anna Tumarkin, *Kant und Herder* (Berlin: Seibert, 1896); Karl Lamprecht, "Herder und Kant als Theoretiker der Geschichtswissenschaft," *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik* III. F., 14 (1897), 161-205; and Theodor Litt, *Kant und Herder als Deuter der geistigen Welt*, 2d ed. (Heidelberg: Quelle und Meyer, 1949).
4. Ulrich Gaier, *Herders Sprachphilosophie und Erkenntniskritik* (Stuttgart: Frommann & Holzboog, 1988); Hans Adler, *Die Prägnanz des Dunklen*

(Hamburg: Meiner, 1990); Marion Heinz, *Sensualistischer Idealismus* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1994).

5. The German distinction between *Rezeptionsgeschichte* and *Wirkungsgeschichte*, best articulated in the respective hermeneutics of Hans Robert Jauss (*Toward an Aesthetic of Reception* [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982]) and Hans Georg Gadamer (*Truth and Method* [New York: Continuum, 1996]), highlights the difference between the creative appropriation [in postmodern terms, "strong misreading"] of an influential predecessor and that predecessor's authoritative intervention in the thought of a successor. In the case of Kant and Herder, both elements need to be considered, and from very early on in their relationship.

6. On the rise of anthropology in Germany see, e.g., Monika Linden, *Untersuchungen zum Anthropologiebegriff des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Bern: Lang, 1976); Andreas Käuser, "Anthropologie und Ästhetik im 18. Jahrhundert," *Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert* 14:2 (1990): 196-206; Jürgen Barkhoff and Eda Sagarra, eds., *Anthropologie und Literatur um 1800* (Munich: Iudicium Verlag, 1992); Katherine Faull, ed., *Anthropology and the German Enlightenment* (Lewisburg, Penn.: Bucknell University Press, 1995); Karl J. Fink, "Storm and Stress Anthropology," *History of the Human Sciences* 6 (1993): 51-71; and above all Hans-Jürgen Schings, ed., *Der ganze Mensch: Anthropologie und Literatur im 18. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1994).

7. One of the most provocative accounts of disciplinary "speciation" is the work of the late Thomas Kuhn, especially "Afterwords," in *World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science*, ed. Paul Horwich (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), 311-41. For scruples about imposing (the earlier) Kuhn on the eighteenth century, see Joseph Musser, "Paradigms, Narrative, and Genetic Histories," in *Man, God, and Nature in the Enlightenment*, ed. Donald Mell, Theodore Braun, and Lucia Palmer (East Lansing, Mich.: Colleagues Press, 1988), 225-35. For a more general discussion of the relation of disciplines to intellectual history, see Stefan Collini, "'Disciplinary History' and 'Intellectual History,'" *Revue de synthèse* 3/4 (1988): 387-99. For historical considerations closer to the specifics of my study, see Wolf Lepenies, *Das Ende der Naturgeschichte* (Munich: Hanser, 1976); and Donald Kelly, ed., *History and the Disciplines* (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 1997).

8. For the role of Ernst Platner, see chapter 6 below and Alexander Kosenina, *Ernst Platners Anthropologie und Philosophie* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1989).

9. Herder, "Wie die Philosophie zum Besten des Volks allgemeiner und nützlicher werden kann" (1765), DKV:1:134.

10. It is the decisive harvest of the wide-ranging studies in *Der ganze Mensch*, ed. Schings, that Herder played this role: Herder proved "the undeclared, but omnipresent leading figure of our undertaking" ("Vorbemerkung des Herausgebers," 8).

11. Claude Blanckaert, "Buffon and the Natural History of Man," *History of the Human Sciences* 6 (1993): 42.

12. As Christopher Fox puts it: "The human sciences did not have the formal and conceptual structures of modern academic disciplines, or the same institutional support" ("How to Prepare a Noble Savage: The Spectacle of Human Science," introduction to *Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth-Century Domains*, ed. Christopher Fox, Roy Porter, and Robert Wokler [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995], 4).

13. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York: Vintage, 1973). J. Christie, "The Human Sciences: Origins and Histories," *History of the Human Sciences* 6 (1993): 1-12. Christopher Fox endorses Keith Baker's pronouncement that Foucault's thesis that "human science was simply unthinkable" in the eighteenth century was "sheer intellectual provocation" yet notes that it was useful in eliciting greater precision in historical conceptualization of the developments in the eighteenth century ("How to Prepare a Noble Savage," 3). Roger Smith seems to think there is more to Foucault's thesis ("The Language of Human Nature," in *Inventing Human Science*, 93-94), but his argument seems to credit Foucault with an innovation he nowhere claims and to strip him of all those he so dearly professes.

14. Francisco Vidal, "Psychology in the Eighteenth Century: A View from Encyclopedias," *History of the Human Sciences* 6 (1993): 90.

15. Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

16. Blanckaert, "Buffon and the Natural History of Man," 42-43.

17. Karl Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant: der Mann und das Werk* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), 158.

18. In addition to Vorländer, Kant's most prominent biographers have been Ernst Cassirer, Arsenji Gulyga, and Wolfgang Ritzel. Though their accounts vary in the manner in which they address these questions, I believe my characterization nonetheless holds for all of them. See the overview of these biographies in Rolf George, "The Lives of Kant," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 47 (1987): 485-500.

19. Heinrich Heine, "History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany," in *The Romantic School and Other Essays* (New York: Continuum, 1985), 203. What needs resistance is the view expressed by T. D. Weldon: "There is no reason to suppose that his [Kant's] experiences, except in the strictly intellectual sphere, were of the slightest interest or importance; and if they were, we shall certainly never know it, since his biographers could discover nothing but the most meagre trivialities to record of him" (*Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* [Oxford: Clarendon, 1958], 1). The issue about timelessness and contextualization is at the heart of the dispute within the discipline of philosophy over the place of its own history, or more precisely about how one should construe history from within the discipline of philosophy. See Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner, eds., *Philosophy in History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

20. There are numerous indications of interest in contextualizing Kant. The title of a recent book by Hermann Schmitz posed the question, *Was wollte Kant?* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1989). In *Constituting Critique: Kant's Writing as Critical Praxis* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994), Willi Goetschel has examined Kant's self-constitution as author, and in *The Embodiment of Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), Susan Shell has examined Kant's concern with his own physicality. A major contribution on the general context is James Schmidt, ed., *What Is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
21. Norbert Hinske, "Kants Leben als gelebtes Bürgertum," in *Kant als Herausforderung an die Gegenwart* (Freiburg: Alber, 1980), 17.
22. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Bii; Hinske, "Kants Leben," 19-20.
23. Gerhard Lehmann, "Kants Lebenskrise," in *Beiträge zur Geschichte und Interpretation der Philosophie Kants* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969), 412.
24. Hinske, "Kants Leben," 28.
25. Lehmann, "Kants Lebenskrise," 417-18.
26. Giorgio Tonelli, "The 'Weakness' of Reason in the Age of Enlightenment," *Diderot Studies* 14 (1971): 241.
27. Lewis White Beck, *Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors* (1969; Bristol: Thoemmes, 1996), 426. Beck contrasted a Kant who was a "typical Enlightenment writer" with the Kant whose rigorous argumentation makes him still philosophically challenging. Beck wanted to focus on the latter Kant; here I propose to bring the first under much closer scrutiny.
28. Rolf George recognizes the centrality of this question, in "The Lives of Kant," 495.
29. Dieter Henrich, "Kants Denken 1762/3," in *Studien zu Kants philosophischer Entwicklung* (Hildesheim: Olms, 1967), 9-38.
30. Reinhard Brandt, "Kants pragmatische Anthropologie: Die Vorlesung," *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 19 (1994): 42.
31. Helmut Pfotenhauer, "Anthropologie, Transzendentalphilosophie, Klassizismus," in *Anthropologie und Literatur um 1800*, ed. Barkhoff and Sagarra, 74.
32. Haym, *Herder*, passim.
33. Isaiah Berlin, "The Counter-Enlightenment," and "Hume and the Sources of German Anti-Rationalism," in *Against the Current* (Middlesex: Penguin, 1979), 1-25, 162-87.
34. Frederick Beiser, *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 44.
35. See *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate*, ed. Michael Kelly (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994).
36. See my essay, "Herder, Kant, Spinoza, und die Ursprünge des deutschen Idealismus," in *Herder und die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, ed. Marion Heinz (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997), 107-44.

37. Schings, "Vorbemerkung der Herausgebers," in *Der ganze Mensch*, 5.
38. Werner Schneiders, "Der Philosophiebegriff des philosophischen Zeitalters," in *Wissenschaft im Zeitalter der Aufklärung*, 58-92; Schneiders, "Akademische Weltweisheit," in *Aufklärungen. Frankreich und Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert*, vol. 1, ed. Gerhard Sauder and Jochem Schlobach (Heidelberg: Winter, 1986), 25-44; Schneiders, "Zwischen Welt und Weisheit," *Studia Leibnitiana* 15:1 (1983): 2-18; Schneiders, "Vernünftiger Zweifel und wahre Eklektik," *Studia Leibnitiana* 17:2 (1985): 143-61; Walther Zimmerli, "Arbeitsteilige Philosophie? Gedanken zur Teil-Rehabilitierung der Populärphilosophie," in *Wozu Philosophie? Stellungnahmen eines Arbeitskreises*, ed. Hermann Lübke (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1978), 181-212; Zimmerli, "'Schulfuchsische' und 'handgreifliche' Rationalität," in *Wandel des Vernunftbegriffs*, ed. Hans Poser (Freiburg: Alber, 1981), 137-76; Zimmerli, "'Schwere Rüstung' des Dogmatismus und 'anwendbare Eklektik,'" *Studia Leibnitiana* 15:1 (1983): 58-71; Helmut Holzhey, "Der Philosoph für die Welt—eine Chimäre der deutschen Aufklärung?" in *Esoterik und Exoterik der Philosophie*, ed. Helmut Holzhey and Walther Zimmerli (Basel: Schwabe, 1977), 117-38; Holzhey, "Philosophie als Eklektik," *Studia Leibnitiana* 15:1 (1983): 19-29; Hans Erich Bödeker, "Von der 'Magd der Theologie' zur 'Leitwissenschaft,'" *Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert* 14:1 (1990): 19-57; Gunter Grimm, "Vom Schulfuchs zum Menschheitslehrer," in *Über den Prozeß der Aufklärung in Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert*, ed. Hans Erich Bödeker and Ulrich Herrmann (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987), 14-38; Gerd Ueding, "Populärphilosophie," in *Deutsche Aufklärung bis zur Französischen Revolution, 1680-1789*, ed. Rolf Grimmer (Munich: Hanser, 1980), 605-34; Doris Bachmann-Medick, *Die ästhetische Ordnung des Handelns* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1989). An English language contribution to this question is Johan van der Zande, "In the Image of Cicero: German Philosophy between Wolff and Kant," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 56 (1995): 419-42; see also Johan van der Zande and Richard Popkin, eds., *The Skeptical Tradition around 1800: Skepticism in Philosophy, Science, and Society* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998), 69-115. An earlier discussion of some of these issues is F. M. Barnard, "Self-Direction: Thomasius, Kant, and Herder," *Political Theory* 11 (1983): 343-68.
39. Kant, *Prolegomena*, AA:4:373-80; tr. 112-19; Klaus Petrus, "'Beschriebene Dunkelheit' und 'Seichtigkeit,'" *Kant-Studien* 85 (1994): 280-302.
40. Beck, *Early German Philosophy*, 307.
41. Kant, "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?" AA:8:35; tr. in "An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?" in Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 41.
42. Christian Thomasius, *Einleitung zu der Vernunft-Lehre* (1691); cited in Holzhey, "Der Philosoph für die Welt," 122.
43. Bödeker, "Von der 'Magd,'" 24.
44. Schneiders, "Akademische Weltweisheit," 35; Grimm, "Vom Schulfuchs," 31.

45. Beck, *Early German Philosophy*, 297.

46. Notker Hammerstein, "Die deutschen Universitäten im Zeitalter der Aufklärung," *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung* 10 (1983): 75-77; Thomasius created a movement that carried on after his death. "Four men stand out in a direct line of succession from Thomasius: [Johann Franz] Budde [1667-1729], [Andreas] Rüdiger [1673-1731], [Adolf Friedrich] Hoffmann [1707-1741], and [Christian August] Crusius. Budde was a colleague of Thomasius, Rüdiger a student, Hoffmann was Rüdiger's student, and Crusius was Hoffmann's" (Beck, *Early German Philosophy*, 297).

47. Already Budde reverted to the type of the *Polyhistor*, generating yet another "'school philosophy' with many scholastic trimmings," in the words of Beck (*Early German Philosophy*, 298). See Johann Franz Budde, *Philosophischer Diskurs von dem Unterschied der Welt- und Schul-Gelahrtheit* (1709). On Budde's Thomasian eclecticism, see Schneiders, "Vernünftiger Zweifel," 154-55.

48. Tonelli, "Der Streit über die mathematische Methode in der Philosophie," *Archiv für Philosophie* 9 (1959): 37-66.

49. "The popular philosophy of Germany in the second half of the eighteenth century emerged directly out of the decline of Wolffianism and the influx of English and French philosophy made easier [by that decline]" (Schneiders, "Zwischen Welt und Weisheit," 15).

50. Schneiders, "Vernünftiger Zweifel," 156; Holzhey, "Philosophie als Eklektik," 23. Even Kant saw himself as an "eclectic" in that moment, Holzhey suggests, referring to Kant's claim in the *Logic* that an eclectic was an "independent thinker [*Selbstdenker*] who acknowledged no allegiance to any school" (AA:9:31). One is reminded that Tonelli, in seeking to characterize the precritical Kant, could find no better description than "anti-Wolffian eclectic" ("Conditions in Königsberg and the Making of Kant's Philosophy," in *Bewußt sein: Gerhard Funke zu eigen*, ed. Alexius Bücher, Herman Drüe, and Thomas Seeböhm [Bonn: Bouvier, 1975], 139). That translates, contextually, into "popular philosopher." But in *Reflexion* 1636 Kant's reservations come to the fore: "The philosophers [*Weltweisen*] who philosophized free from the yoke of the schools created the eclectic approach. Until in the end beyond the schools and scholarly societies [*ausser Schulen und gelehrten Gesellschaften*] the publicum sets the tone, when a general shallowness gains the upper hand" (AA:16:61).

51. W. Martens, *Botschaft der Tugend. Die Aufklärung im Spiegel der deutschen Moralischen Wochenschriften* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1968); Pamela Currie, "Moral Weeklies and the Reading Public in Germany, 1711-1750," *Oxford German Studies* 3 (1968): 69-86. Holzhey observes that "world" really meant the bourgeois reading public created and cultivated by the moral weeklies ("Der Philosoph für die Welt," 123).

52. Hans Erich Bödeker, "Journals and Public Opinion," in *The Transformation of Political Culture: England and Germany in the Late Eighteenth Century*, ed. Eckhart Hellmuth (London: German Historical Institute London;

Oxford University Press, 1990), 434; Horst Möller, *Aufklärung in Preussen: Der Verleger, Publizist und Geschichtsschreiber Friedrich Nicolai* (Berlin: Colloquium, 1974); Paul Raabe, "Die Zeitschriften als Medium der Aufklärung," in *Wolfenbütteler Studien zur Aufklärung* 1 (1974), 99ff; Hans Erich Bödeker, "Aufklärung als Kommunikationsprozeß," *Aufklärung* 2 (1988): 89–111. For more skeptical views, see Christa Bürger, Peter Bürger, and Joachim Schulte-Sasse, eds., *Aufklärung und literarische Öffentlichkeit* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1980); Reinhart Meyer, "Limitierte Aufklärung," in *Über den Prozeß der Aufklärung in Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert*, ed. Bödeker and Herrmann, 139–200; Dominik von König, "Lesesucht und Lesewut," in *Buch und Leser*, ed. Herbert Göpfert (Hamburg: Hauswedell, 1977), 89–112; Erich Schön, *Der Verlust der Sinnlichkeit oder Die Verwandlung des Lesers* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987).

53. Rudolf Vierhaus, "Die aufgeklärten Schriftsteller: Zur sozialen Charakteristik einer selbsternannten Elite," in *Über den Prozeß der Aufklärung in Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert*, ed. Bödeker and Herrmann, 53–65; Möller, *Aufklärung in Preussen*.

54. H. B. Nisbet, "Herders anthropologischer Anschauungen in den 'Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit,'" in *Anthropologie und Literatur um 1800*, ed. Barkhoff and Sagarra, 21.

55. See my essay, "'Method' versus 'Manner'?" (Professor Nisbet, in fact, refereed this essay).

56. This is not just the claim of an older generation of Kant scholarship, which read him as "metaphysical," and even that generation—especially Heinz Heimsoeth—made a potent case (see Heimsoeth, "Metaphysische Motive in der Ausbildung der kritischen Idealismus," *Kant Studien* 29 [1924]: 121–59). It has also been a major feature of the work of Karl Ameriks to illuminate the persistence of traditional metaphysics in Kant's critical project. See Ameriks, *Kant's Theory of Mind*. 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000); and Ameriks, "The Critique of Metaphysics: Kant and Traditional Ontology," in *Cambridge Companion to Kant*, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 249–79.

57. Reflecting on the long hegemony of the positivist reception of Kant's philosophy of science and its historical limitations, Yehuda Elkana observed some time ago: "The renaissance which rescued Newton's philosophy from the strait-jacket of positivism has not yet reached Euler and Kant" ("Euler and Kant," in *Methodological and Historical Essays in the Natural and Social Sciences*, ed. Robert Cohen and Marx Wartofsky [Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974], 293). That renaissance has now swept up Kant and the epoch that followed. See, e.g., *Ferment of Knowledge: Studies in the Historiography of Eighteenth-Century Science*, ed. G. S. Rousseau and Roy Porter (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

58. For currents of eighteenth-century science that Nisbet seems to pass over too lightly, see the many essays of Peter Hanns Reill: "Science and the Science of History in the Spätaufklärung," in *Aufklärung und Geschichte*, ed. H. E. Bödeker et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986); "Bildung,

Urtyp, and Polarity: Goethe and Eighteenth-Century Physiology," *Goethe Yearbook* 3 (1986): 139–48; "Anti-Mechanism, Vitalism and Their Political Implications in Late Enlightened Scientific Thought," *Francia* 16:2 (1989): 195–212; "Buffon and Historical Thought in Germany and Great Britain," in *Buffon 88: Actes du Colloque international pour le bicentenaire de la mort de Buffon*, ed. Jean Gayon et al. (Paris: Vrin, 1992), 667–79; "Between Mechanism and Hermeticism: Nature and Science in the Late Enlightenment," in *Frühe Neuzeit—Frühe Moderne?* ed. Rudolf Vierhaus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992), 393–421; "Die Historisierung von Natur und Mensch. Der Zusammenhang von Naturwissenschaften und historischem Denken im Entstehungsprozeß der modernen Naturwissenschaften," in *Geschichtsdiskurs: Bd. 2: Anfänge modernen historischen Denkens* (Hamburg: Fischer, 1994), 48–61; "Science and the Construction of the Cultural Sciences in Late Enlightenment Germany," *History and Theory* 33:3 (1994): 345–66; "Anthropology, Nature, and History in the Late Enlightenment," in *Schiller als Historiker*, ed. Otto Dann, Norbert Oellers, and Ernst Osterkamp (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1995), 243–65; "Analogy, Comparison, and Active Living Forces," in *The Skeptical Tradition around 1800*, ed. Zande and Popkin, 203–11.

59. See the extensive discussions in *Philosophy in History*, ed. Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner.

60. Alasdair MacIntyre has polarized these positions into a deliberately drastic dilemma:

*Either we read the philosophers of the past so as to make them relevant to our contemporary problems and enterprises, transmuting them as far as possible into what they would have been if they were part of present-day philosophy, and minimizing or ignoring or even on occasion misrepresenting that which refuses such transmutation because it is inextricably bound up with that in the past which makes it radically different from present-day philosophy; or instead we take great care to read them in their own terms, carefully preserving their idiosyncratic and specific character, so that they cannot emerge into the present except as a set of museum pieces. ("The Relevance of Philosophy's Past," in *Philosophy in History*, ed. Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner, 31)*

From this it is only too clear how the debate has often descended to reciprocal charges of "anachronism" and "antiquarianism." For recent runs of the debate, see J. Rée, "Philosophy, History, and Interpretation," in *Doing Philosophy Historically*, ed. P. Hare (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1988), 44–61; J. Bennett, "Response to Garber and Rée," in *Doing Philosophy Historically*, ed. P. Hare, 62–69; and M. Wilson, "History of Philosophy in Philosophy Today; and the Case of Sensible Qualities," *Philosophical Review* 101 (1992): 191–243.

61. See, e.g., Philip Kitcher, "The Naturalists Return," *Philosophical Review* 101 (1992): 53–114.

62. For one account of the fate of transcendental semantics after Kant, see J. Alberto Ciffa, *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

63. And not just in the traditional *Geisteswissenschaften*. There is now a considerable body of literature that suggests that hermeneutics and historicism have a substantial place in understanding the *Naturwissenschaften*.

CHAPTER ONE

1. That simple aspiration is not so simply achieved; contextualization is a methodological conundrum. It remains, I would nonetheless contend, well worth the certainty of incompleteness and the risk of significant distortion. To link immanent with "externalist" or contextual approaches is an undertaking that has traditionally been uncomfortable for the history of philosophy, but it is nevertheless both possible and rewarding.

2. Hans Erich Bödeker, "Prozesse und Strukturen politischer Bewusstseinsbildung der deutschen Aufklärung," in *Aufklärung als Politisierung—Politisierung der Aufklärung*, ed. Hans Erich Bödeker and Ulrich Herrmann (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), 10-31.

3. Bödeker, "Die 'gebildeten Stände' im späten 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert," in *Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert. Teil IV*, ed. Jürgen Kocka (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992), 22.

4. Franklin Kopitzsch, "Die Aufklärung in Deutschland: Zu ihren Leistungen, Grenzen und Wirkungen," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 23 (1983): 3-4.

5. Rudolf Vierhaus, "Bildung," in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1997), 509-51.

6. For this concept of *Hochaufklärung*, see Rolf Grimminger, "Aufklärung, Absolutismus und bürgerliche Individuen," in *Deutsche Aufklärung bis zur Französischen Revolution, 1680-1789*, ed. Grimminger (Munich: Hanser, 1980), 15-99.

7. Lewis White Beck dates the prominence of the term *Aufklärung* to 1750 (*Early German Philosophy*, 322).

8. German collections on this theme date back a while (e.g., Norbert Hinske, ed., *Was ist Aufklärung? Beiträge aus der Berlinischen Monatsschrift* [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1981]), but for the English reader a new and already indispensable resource is James Schmidt, ed., *What Is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). See as well H. B. Nisbet, "'Was ist Aufklärung?': The Concept of Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century Germany," *Journal of European Studies* 12 (1982): 77-95; Thomas P. Saine, "Was ist Aufklärung?" in *Aufklärung, Absolutismus, Bürgertum*, ed. Manfred Baum (Berlin: Aufbau, 1976), 319-44; Joachim Whaley, "The Protestant Enlightenment in Germany," in *The Enlightenment in National Context*, ed. Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 106-17, 238-40; and especially Kopitsch, "Die Aufklärung in Deutschland."

9. See the volume, *Wissenschaft im Zeitalter der Aufklärung*, ed. Rudolf Vierhaus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985).

10. Johan van der Zande, "In the Image of Cicero: German Philosophy between Wolff and Kant," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 56 (1995): 419-42; see the penetrating analysis of Werner Schneiders, "Der Philosophiebegriff des philosophischen Zeitalters," in *Wissenschaft im Zeitalter der Aufklärung*, 58-92.

11. An earlier English language contribution to this question is F. M. Barnard, "Self-Direction: Thomasius, Kant, and Herder," *Political Theory* 11 (1983): 343-68.

12. See the four-volume study, one of the hallmarks of modern German social history, *Das Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert*, ed. Jürgen Kocka.

13. Jürgen Habermas's thesis about the rise of liberalism in the context of new forms of bourgeois association has been revived and forms one of the most important nodes of conceptualization of the nature of eighteenth-century German political culture (Habermas, *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* [Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991]). See also Reinhard Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988).

14. Bödeker, "Die 'gebildeten Stände,'" 21-23 and passim.

15. Helmut Holzhey, "Der Philosoph für die Welt—eine Chimäre der deutschen Aufklärung?" in *Esoterik und Exoterik der Philosophie: Beiträge zu Geschichte und Sinn philosophischer Selbstbestimmung*, ed. Holzhey and Zimmerli (Basel: Schwabe, 1977), 117-38.

16. Notker Hammerstein cites Ernst Wangermann's summary judgment (in *Aufklärung und staatsbürgerliche Erziehung* [Munich, 1978]) about the attitude of the *Aufklärung* in Catholic Austria—"The good of society demands that the knowledge of the people (*Volk*) not go beyond its occupations;"—and adds: "The theoreticians of enlightenment in the Protestant *Reich*, too, shared this view for the most part" ("Universitäten und gelehrte Institutionen von der Aufklärung zum Neuhumanismus und Idealismus," in *Samuel Soemmering und die Gelehrten der Goethezeit*, ed. Gunter Mann and Franz Dumont [Stuttgart: G. Fischer, 1985], 320).

17. Schneiders, "Zwischen Welt und Weisheit," *Studia Leibnitiana* 15:1 (1983): 2-18, esp. 8ff.

18. Notker Hammerstein, "Zur Geschichte der deutschen Universitäten im Zeitalter der Aufklärung," in *Universität und Gelehrtenstand 1400-1800*, ed. Hellmut Rössler and Günther Franz (Limburg: Starke, 1970), 145-82, esp. 146.

19. Joachim Whaley, "The Protestant Enlightenment in Germany" (106-17, 238-41) and T. C. W. Blanning, "The Enlightenment in Catholic Germany" (118-26, 241-44) in *The Enlightenment in National Context*, ed. Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and on the crucial role of Protestant theologians in the Berlin *Aufklärung*, see Günter Birtsch, "The Christian as Subject," in *Transformation of Political Culture*, 309-26.

20. Norbert Hinske, "Wolffs Stellung in der deutschen Aufklärung," in *Christian Wolff 1679-1754*, ed. Schneiders (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), 306-20;

H. de Vleschauwer, "La genèse de la méthode mathématique de Wolff," *Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire* 11 (1932): 651-77; Eduard Zeller, "Wolffs Vertreibung aus Halle," *Preussische Jahrbücher*, no. 2 (1862): 47-71; Norbert Hinske, ed., *Zentren der Aufklärung*, vol. 1, *Halle: Aufklärung und Pietismus* (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1989).

21. Raffaele Cifardone, "Über das Primat der praktischen Vernunft vor der theoretischen bei Thomasius und Crusius mit Beziehung auf Kant," *Studia Leibnitiana* 14 (1982): 127-35.

22. Schneiders, "Philosophiebegriff," 69. Holzhey notes: "the concept of history encompassed . . . in addition to literary experience secondhand also actual empiricism, sensual experience [*die eigentliche Empirie, die sinnliche Erfahrung*]" ("Philosophie als Eklektik," *Studia Leibnitiana* 15 [1983]: 28).

23. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Bxxxvi; Michael Albrecht, "Kants Kritik der historischen Erkenntnis—ein Bekenntnis zu Wolff?" *Studia Leibnitiana* 14 (1982): 1-24.

24. Schneiders, "Philosophiebegriff"; Norbert Hinske, "Wolffs Stellung in der deutschen Aufklärung," in *Christian Wolff 1679-1754*, ed. Schneiders (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), 306-20.

25. Bödeker, "Von der 'Magd,'" 32.

26. Kant, *Streit der Fakultäten*, AA:7:1-116. See esp. Günther Bien, "Kants Theorie der Universität und ihr geschichtlichen Ort," *Historische Zeitschrift* 219 (1974): 551-77, esp. 556. Kant believed "the model of modern analytical natural sciences . . . directed all the modern disciplines, even those of practical philosophy," as evinced in the second *Critique*, AA:5:161-63.

27. Schneiders, "Vernünftiger Zweifel und wahre Eklektik: Zur Entstehung des modernen Kritikbegriffs," *Studia Leibnitiana* 17:2 (1985): 143-61; Holzhey, "Philosophie als Eklektik."

28. Gunter Grimm, "Vom Schulfuchs zum Menschheitslehrer: Zum Wandel des Gelehrtentums zwischen Barock und Aufklärung," in *Über den Prozeß der Aufklärung*, ed. Bödeker and Herrmann, 30.

29. George Iggers put it mercilessly: "the university as constituted was incapable of reforming itself" ("The University of Göttingen 1760-1800 and the Transformation of Historical Scholarship," *Historische Historiographie* 2 [1982]: 15).

30. Hammerstein, "Die deutschen Universitäten im Zeitalter der Aufklärung," 77.

31. Hammerstein, "Christian Thomasius und die Rechtsgelehrsamkeit," *Studia Leibnitiana* 11 (1979): 22ff; Hammerstein, *Jus und Historie* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972).

32. Hammerstein, "Christian Wolff und die Universitäten," in *Christian Wolff 1679-1754*, ed. Schnieders, 268.

33. Bödeker, "Von der 'Magd,'" 26.

34. "Wolff's method now appeared clumsy and pedantic; his concepts did not appear to have enough experiential content (*zureichenden Erfahrungsgehalt*)" (Schneiders, "Akademische Weltweisheit: Die deutsche Philosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung," in *Aufklärungen. Frankreich und Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert*, vol. 1, ed. Gerhard Sauder and Jochem Schlobach [Heidelberg: Winter, 1986], 35). Bödeker notes: "even in Wolff's lifetime step by step a new spiritual climate was emerging" ("Von der 'Magd,'" 26). Reimarus, a late and innovative Wolffian, felt this "vanishing reputation of Wolffian philosophy" already in 1754, the year of Wolff's death, according to Holzhey, "Der Philosoph für die Welt," 122. This was not entirely fair, for Wolffianism continued to grow and change. See the discussion by Günter Mühlpfordt, "Radikaler Wolffianismus: Zur Differenzierung und Wirkung der Wolffschen-Schule ab 1735," in *Christian Wolff 1679–1754*, ed. Schneiders, 237–53. Reimarus himself deserves recognition as one of these creative Wolffians. See Norbert Hinske, "Reimarus zwischen Wolff und Kant," in *Logik im Zeitalter der Aufklärung: Studien zur 'Vernunftlehre' von Hermann Samuel Reimarus*, ed. Wolfgang Walter and Ludwig Borinski (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 9–32.

35. "Wolff's new concept of science caused a shift in the traditional canon of instruction . . . the elimination of the humanistic disciplines. . . . The system of the liberal arts had no claim with him." As a result, the traditional humanities suffered at Halle (Grimm, "Vom Schulfuchs," 30, 33).

36. Raffaele Ciafardone, "Von der Kritik an Wolff zum vorkritischen Kant: Wolff-Kritik bei Rüdiger und Crusius," in *Christian Wolff 1679–1754*, ed. Schneiders, 289–306.

37. R. Steven Turner, "Historicism, *Kritik*, and the Prussian Professoriate, 1790–1840," in *Philologie und Hermeneutik im 19. Jahrhundert II: Philologie et herméneutique au 19^{ème} siècle II*, ed. Bollack, Wismann, and Lindken (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983), 455. Also: "one major theme of German social history in the eighteenth century was to be the precipitous dissolution of the *Allgemeine Gelehrtentum*" (453).

38. Schneiders, "Zwischen Welt und Weisheit," *Studia Leibnitiana* 15 (1983): 2–18, esp. 5.

39. "Small wonder that Thomasius swiftly managed in this manner to create bitter enemies in the academic world" (Martens, "Gelehrtsensaire," 10).

40. Turner, "University Reformers," 501.

41. R. Steven Turner, "The *Bildungsbürgertum* and the Learned Professions in Prussia, 1770–1830: The Origins of a Class," *Histoire Sociale/Social History* 13 (May 1980): 111; Martens, "Gelehrtsensaire," passim.

42. Martens, "Gelehrtsensaire," 11.

43. Nipperdey, "Verein als Sozialstruktur in Deutschland im späten 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert," in *Gesellschaft, Kultur, Theorie* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976), 181.

44. "In the second half of the eighteenth century the intellectual culture which sustained the old learned estate underwent a catalysmic dissolution before the forces of the Enlightenment" (Turner, "*Bildungsbürgertum* and the Learned Professions," 110). "By 1790 the *Allgemeine Gelehrtentum* had become a *Stand* which had lost, not its function, but its exclusiveness and with it all social definition" ("Prussian Professoriate," 459).

45. Schneiders, "Zwischen Welt und Weisheit," 13.

46. Bödeker, "Von der 'Magd,'" 27.

47. Holzhey, "Philosoph für die Welt," 123.

48. That is the thrust of Bödeker's title: "Von der 'Magd der Theologie' zur 'Leitwissenschaft.'" "

49. J. D. Michaelis, *Raisonnement über die protestantischen Universitäten Deutschlands* (Frankfurt: n.p., 1768).

50. Friedrich Paulsen, *The German Universities and University Study* (New York: Scribner's, 1906); Peter Moraw, "Aspekte und Dimensionen älterer deutscher Universitätsgeschichte," in *Academia Gissensis: Beiträge zur älteren Gießener Universitätsgeschichte* (Marburg: Elwert, 1982), 1-43.

51. Gunter Grimm, "Vom Schulfuchs," 14; and see Grimm, *Literatur und Gelehrtentum*.

52. Wolfgang Hardtwig, "Krise der Universität, studentische Reformbewegung (1750-1819)," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 11 (1985): 159.

53. The source on university attendance data is Franz Eulenburg, but his results have been challenged of late by Wilhelm Frijhoff. See Frijhoff, "Grandeur des nombres et misère des réalités," in *Les universités européennes du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle*, ed. Dominique Julie, Jacques Revel, and Roger Chartier (Paris: Editions de l'Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, 1986), 23ff; Frijhoff, "Surplus ou deficit?" *Francia* 7 (1979): 173-218.

54. Bödeker, "Von der 'Magd,'" 29.

55. Iggers, "University of Göttingen," 15.

56. Notker Hammerstein, "Die Deutschen Universitäten im Zeitalter der Aufklärung," *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung* 10 (1983): 74.

57. Hammerstein, "Universitäten und gelehrte Institutionen," 311.

58. J. D. Michaelis, *Raisonnement über die protestantischen Universitäten Deutschlands*, vol. 1, 112; cited in Hammerstein, "Universitäten und gelehrte Institutionen," 311.

59. Hardtwig, "Krise der Universität," 157.

60. R. Steven Turner, "University Reformers and Professional Scholarship in Germany, 1760-1806," in *University in Society*, vol. 2, ed. Lawrence Stone (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), 495-531, esp. 501-2.

61. Most notably, Campe in *Allgemeine Revision* (1792); see the discussion of the debate his arguments stirred in the Berlin *Mittwochsgesellschaft* in 1795: Adolf Stözel, "Die Berliner Mittwochsgesellschaft über Aufhebung oder

Reform der Universitäten (1795)," *Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte* 2 (1859): 201-22.

62. Hammerstein states it starkly: "Basically the philosophical faculty reacted to demands placed upon it. It was by no means decisive or proactive in its own right. . . . The arts faculty unquestioningly served to prepare for legal studies as earlier it served to prepare for theology. In that measure it remained then as always the lowest level, it was the last of the faculties, it did not yet belong in the canon of the higher sciences" ("Deutsche Universitäten," 76).

63. Though, to be sure, a small percentage of students chose to major in the lower faculty, even in this period.

64. At the founding of the University of Halle (1694), the salaries established for the faculties were as follows: 500 florins for the Ordinary Professor of Theology (and, exceptionally, for the very distinguished Christian Thomasius in the faculty of jurisprudence), compared with 100 to 150 florins for the arts faculty. For the University of Jena in 1704, comparable annual salary levels were 366 florins for theology; between 200 and 300 for jurisprudence, and between 130 and 210 florins for the arts faculty. These, Hammerstein notes, were "typical for the time" ("Die Universitätsgründungen im Zeichen der Aufklärung," in *Beiträge zu Problemen deutscher Universitätsgründungen der frühen Neuzeit*, ed. Peter Baumgart and Notker Hammerstein [Nendeln: KTO, 1978], 267, 267 n). Elsewhere he argues that it is difficult to generalize about salary levels for the eighteenth century, but he notes that one could establish extremes. The highest salary went to jurisprudence, 1,500 taler, and the lowest to the arts faculty, between 150 and 300 taler. Hammerstein adds: "in this period one would estimate the minimum for existence around 4-500 taler" ("Universitäten und gelehrte Institutionen," 317 n). Turner notes that around midcentury the Prussian University of Frankfurt am Oder had a salary scale as follows: theologians, 338-557 taler; jurists, 200-500 taler; physicians, 100-300 taler; and philosophy faculty, 100-175 taler ("University Reformers," 499).

65. Turner notes that the jurisprudence faculty at the University of Königsberg automatically became magistrates of the city government upon appointment to the university ("University Reformers," 506).

66. Hammerstein, "Universitäten und gelehrte Institutionen," 317.

67. Turner, "University Reformers," 507.

68. Hammerstein notes that the founding salaries at Göttingen in 1734-1737 were substantially better, especially at the level of the philosophy faculty. Also, here the preponderance of the faculty of jurisprudence over that of theology made itself felt: salaries in jurisprudence ranged from 300 to 1,000 taler; in theology from 300 to 600, in medicine from 300 to 500, and in the philosophy faculty from 300 to 400 ("Universitätsgründungen," 276).

69. Michaelis, *Raisonnement über die protestantischen Universitäten Deutschlands*, vol. 1 (Frankfurt, 1768), 209; see Turner, "University Reformers," 499.

70. Michaelis, *Raisonnement*, vol. 2, 225; see Turner, "University Reformers," 518.

71. Jürgen Voss, "Die Akademien als Organisationsträger der Wissenschaften im 18. Jahrhundert," *Historische Zeitschrift* 231 (1980): 43-74; Ludwig Hammermeyer, "Akademiebewegung und Wissenschaftsorganisation," in *Wissenschaftspolitik in Mittel- und Osteuropa*, ed. H. Ischreyt (Berlin: Ulrich Kamen, 1976), 1-84; Andreas Kraus, *Vernunft und Geschichte* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1963).

72. Voss, "Akademien als Organisationsträger," 45. Yet Wolff chose to return to Halle rather than to join the Berlin Academy.

73. Hans Aarsleff, "The Berlin Academy under Frederick the Great," *History of the Human Sciences* 2 (1989): 193-206.

74. Turner, "University Reformers," 527.

75. Beck, *Early German Philosophy*, 315.

76. Harcourt Brown, "Mauvertuis philosophe: Enlightenment and the Berlin Academy," *Studies on Voltaire and the 18th Century* 24 (1963): 255-69; Ronald Calinger, "Frederick the Great and the Berlin Academy of Sciences (1740-1766)," *Annals of Science* 24 (1968): 239-49; Eberhard Knobloch, "Die Akademie der Wissenschaft zu Berlin," in *Philosophie und Wissenschaft in Preußen*, ed. Fridrich Rapp and Hans-Werner Schütt (Berlin: Universitätsbibliothek der Technische Universität Berlin, 1982), 115-43; Cornelia Buschmann, "Philosophische Preisfragen und Preisschriften der Berliner Akademie 1747-1768," *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 29 (1987): 779-89; Aarsleff, "The Berlin Academy under Frederick the Great"; Mary Terrall, "The Culture of Science in Frederick the Great's Berlin," *History of Science* 28 (1990): 333-64; John Christian Laursen, "The Berlin Academy," *Columbia History of Western Philosophy*, ed. Richard Popkin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 490-94.

77. Robert Hering, "Johann Georg Sulzer," *Jahrbuch der Freien Deutschen Hochstifts* (1928): 265-325; Johan van der Zande, "Orpheus in Berlin," *Central European History* 28 (1995): 175-208; Helmut Holzhey, "Die Berliner Popularphilosophie," in *Schweizer im Berlin des 18. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Martin Fontius and Helmut Holzhey (Berlin: Akademie, 1996), 201-16; Hans Erich Bödeker, "Konzept und Klassifikation der Wissenschaften bei Johann Georg Sulzer (1720-1779)," in *Schweizer im Berlin*, ed. M. Fontius and H. Holzhey, 325-40.

78. Zedlitz to Kant, AA:10:236; cited in Günther Bien, "Kants Theorie der Universität und ihr geschichtlicher Ort," *Historische Zeitschrift* 219 (1974): 551-52.

79. Ulrich Herrmann, "Die Pädagogik der Philanthropen," in *Von Erasmus bis Herbert Spencer*, ed. Hans Scheuerl (Munich: F. Meiner, 1979), 135-58; Herrmann, "Erziehung und Unterricht als Politicum," in *Aufklärung als Politisierung*, 53-71; Herrmann, "Aufklärung als pädagogischer Prozeß," in *Aufklärung als Prozeß*, ed. R. Vierhaus (Hamburg: Meiner, 1988): 35-56.

80. See a key ideological formulation of the dispute: Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, *Der Streit des Philanthropinismus und Humanismus in der Theorie der Erziehungs-Unterrichts unserer Zeit* (Jena, 1808).

81. Hardtwig, "Krise der Universität," 161. See R. Steven Turner, "Of Social Control and Cultural Experience," *Central European History* 21 (1988): 300-308.

82. The text was termed *Methodologische Anweisungen für die Studierenden in allen vier Fakultäten* and probably composed by or at the direction of von Zedlitz. See Werner Stark, "Kant als akademischer Lehrer," in *Königsberg und Riga*, ed. H. Ischreyt (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1995), 51-68, esp. 55ff.

83. Turner, "Bildungsbürgertum and the Learned Professions," 108-35.

84. Hammerstein, "Universitätsgründungen," 278.

85. Hammerstein, "Deutschen Universitäten," 79.

86. Turner, "University Reformers," 520.

87. See, e.g., Iggers, "The University of Göttingen"; H. G. Herrlitz and H. Kern, eds., *Anfänge Göttinger Sozialwissenschaft* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987); N. Hammerstein, *Ius und Historie*.

88. Hammerstein, "Universitätsgründungen," 279.

89. Hardtwig, "Krise der Universität," 160; See also Hardtwig, "Auf dem Weg zum Bildungsbürgertum," in *Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert*, vol. 3, ed. Reiner Lepsius (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992), 8-41; and Hardtwig, "Studentenschaft und Aufklärung," in *Sociabilité et société bourgeois en France, en Allemagne, et en Suisse, 1750-1850*, ed. Etienne François (Paris: Editions Recherches sur les Civilisations, 1986), 239-59. Also, Rainer Müller, "Sozialstatus und Studienchancen im Zeitalter der Aufklärung," *Historischen Jahrbuch* 95 (1975): 120ff.

90. Hammerstein, "Universitäten und gelehrte Institutionen," 317.

91. Hammerstein, "Christian Wolff und die Universitäten," 269; Zimmerli, "Schwere Rüstung," 58.

92. Schneiders notes that Göttingen from the beginning pursued "a sort of new eclecticism" ("Philosophiebegriff," 73). Beck notes that "the atmosphere of the university . . . concentrated on the *realia*, especially history, philology, pedagogy, science, and law" and hence, in his view, made no contribution to disciplinary philosophy (*Early German Philosophy*, 307). Bödeker stresses the segmentation of disciplines within the philosophy faculty at Göttingen: "Characteristic of the development in Göttingen was the early and epochal differentiation of the traditional faculty of arts into individual sciences" ("Von der 'Magd,'" 42).

93. Iggers, "The University of Göttingen"; Peter Reill, "Die Geschichtswissenschaft um die Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts," in *Wissenschaft im Zeitalter der Aufklärung*, 164-93; and more extensively, Reill, *German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Ulrich Muhlack, "Klassische Philologie zwischen Humanismus und Neuhumanismus," in *Wissenschaft im Zeitalter der Aufklärung*, 93-119; Timothy Lenoir, "The Göttingen School and the Development of Transcendental Naturphilosophie in the Romantic Era," *Studies in History of Biology* 5 (1981): 111-205; Frank Dougherty, "Nervenzmorphologie und -physiologie in den 80er

Jahren des 18. Jahrhunderts," in *Gehirn—Nerven—Seele*, ed. F. Dumont and G. Mann (Stuttgart: G. Fischer, 1988), 55-91.

94. Michael Maurer, *Aufklärung und Anglophilie in Deutschland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987); Manfred Kuehn, *Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768-1800* (Kingston, Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987); Fania Oz-Salzberger, *Translating the Enlightenment* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995).

95. See *From Natural History to the History of Nature*, ed. and tr. John Lyons and Phillip Sloan (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).

96. The phrase "down to earth"—or more commonly, "bringing matters back down to earth"—is one of the most frequent and indicative tropes of cultural reorientation in this period. Schneiders notes it in "Zwischen Welt und Weisheit," 6. We will have occasion to consider it in both Kant and Herder.

97. Müller, "Sozialstatus und Studienchancen," 120ff. See Otto Hintze, "Der preussische Militär- und Beamtenstaat im 18. Jahrhundert," in *Abso-lutismus*, ed. W. Hubatsch (Darmstadt: Wege der Forschung, 1973), 45-56; Horst Möller, "Wie aufgeklärt war Preußen?" in *Preußen im Rückblick*, ed. Hans-Jürgen Puhle and Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 176-201.

98. Turner, "Bildungsbürgertum," 120ff.

99. Anthony La Vopa, *Grace, Talent, and Merit* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

100. To be sure, there were elements of ideological distortion there, but there was also an essential utopian dimension that proved instrumental in progressive change, even if it had an elitist element that would become increasingly problematic.

101. Mack Walker, *German Hometowns* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971).

102. Otto Brunner, "Das 'ganze Haus' und die alteuropäische Ökonomik," in *Neue Wege der Verfassungs- und Sozialgeschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968).

103. The idea is more clearly developed with reference to the English eighteenth century, but it can be extended, with allowances, to Germany. See the rich comparisons in *The Transformation of Political Culture: England and Germany in the Late Eighteenth Century*, ed. Eckhard Hollmuth.

104. Hans Gerth, *Bürgerliche Intelligenz um 1800* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976).

105. Walker, *German Hometowns*.

106. Rudolf Vierhaus, *Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987).

107. Bödeker, "Die 'gebildeten Stände,'" in *Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert*, and Turner, "Bildungsbürgertum and the Learned Professions."

108. Reiner Wild, "Stadtkultur, Bildungswesen und Aufklärungsgesellschaften," in *Deutsche Aufklärung bis zur Französischen Revolution, 1689-1789*, ed. Rolf Grimminger (Munich: Hanser, 1980), 103-32.
109. Turner, "Bildungsbürgertum and the Learned Professions," 124.
110. Thomas Nipperdey, "Verein als soziale Struktur," 180.
111. Talcott Parsons, *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954).
112. Dominik von König, "Lesesucht und Lesewut," in *Buch und Leser*, ed. Herbert Göpfert (Hamburg: Hauswedell, 1977), 89-112; Erich Schön, *Der Verlust der Sinnlichkeit oder Die Verwandlung des Lesers: Mentalitätswandel um 1800* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987).
113. "Reading [was a] medium of self-discovery and self-comprehension of the educated," but also "they wished to learn how to understand and interpret their world" (Bödeker, "Die 'gebildeten Stände,'" 37). See Otto Dann, "Die Leseesellschaften des 18. Jahrhunderts und der gesellschaftliche Aufbruch des deutschen Bürgertums," in *Buch und Leser*, ed. Göpfert, 160-93.
114. Hans Erich Bödeker, "Journals and Public Opinion," in *Transformation of Political Culture*, ed. Eckhart Hellmuth, 434; Möller, *Aufklärung in Preussen*; Raabe, "Die Zeitschriften als Medium der Aufklärung"; Bödeker, "Aufklärung als Kommunikationsprozeß." For more skeptical views, see Christa Bürger, Peter Bürger, and Joachim Schulte-Sasse, eds., *Aufklärung und literarische Öffentlichkeit* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1980); Reinhart Meyer, "Limitierte Aufklärung," in *Über den Prozeß der Aufklärung*, ed. Bödeker and Herrmann, 139-200.
115. Eric Blackall, *The Emergence of German as a Literary Language* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978).
116. Rolf Engelsing, *Der Bürger als Leser: Lesergeschichte in Deutschland 1500-1800* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1974); but see René König, "Geschichte und Sozialstruktur," *Internationales Archiv für Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur* 2 (1977): 134-43.
117. Paul Raabe, "Die Zeitschriften als Medium der Aufklärung."
118. W. Martens, *Botschaft der Tugend*.
119. Wolfram Mauser, "Geselligkeit: Zu Chance und Scheitern einer sozialetischen Utopie um 1750," in *Entwicklungsschwellen im 18. Jahrhundert*, ed. Karl Eibl (Hamburg: Meiner, 1989), 5-36.
120. But "waserley Geschlecht"? Was *Selbstdenken* taken seriously as a possibility for women in the second half of the eighteenth century as it was, remarkably, by Christian Thomasius at its outset?
121. These are hardly coincidentally Kantian categories. See Norbert Hinske, ed., *Ekλεκtik, Selbstdenken, Mündigkeit* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986); Hinske, "Die tragende Grundideen der deutschen Aufklärung," in *Die Philosophie der deutschen Aufklärung*, ed. Raffaele Ciardone (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1990), 407-58; Hinske, *Zwischen Aufklärung und Vernunftkritik* (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1998), 17-90.

122. Sergio Moravia, *Beobachtende Vernunft: Philosophie und Anthropologie in der Aufklärung* (Munich: Hanser, 1973).

123. Marlies Präsenner, *Lesegesellschaften im achtzehnten Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt: Buchhändler-Verbändigung, 1972).

124. Jürgen Habermas, *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*; Thomas Nipperdey, "Verein als soziale Struktur"; Fritz Valjavec, *Die Entstehung der politischen Strömungen in Deutschland* (Kronberg, Ts.: Athenäum Verlag, 1978); Helmut Reinalter, ed., *Aufklärungsgesellschaften* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1993).

125. Hans Erich Bödeker, "Prozesse und Strukturen politischer Bewußtseinsbildung der deutschen Aufklärung," in *Aufklärung als Politisierung—Politisierung der Aufklärung*, ed. Hans Erich Bödeker and Ulrich Herrmann (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), 10-31.

126. Bödeker, "Aufklärung als Kommunikationsprozeß."

127. Bödeker, "Journals and Public Opinion," 434.

128. "The constitution of associations was at one and the same time the highpoint of the emancipation of the 'educated estates' from the estate tradition and also its self-constitution as a separate segment of society" (Bödeker, "Die 'gebildeten Stände,'" 41). And see Bödeker, "Die 'gebildeten Stände,'" 43, on the modeling of democratic practices such association made possible.

129. Bödeker, "Prozesse und Strukturen politischer Bewußtseinsbildung," 13-17; Otto Dann, "Die Anfänge politischer Vereinsbildung in Deutschland," in *Soziale Bewegung und politische Verfassung*, ed. Ulrich Engelhardt, Volker Sellin, and Horst Stuke (Stuttgart: Klett, 1976), 197-232; Thomas Nipperdey, "Verein als soziale Struktur in Deutschland im späten 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert."

130. Rudolf Vierhaus, "'Patriotismus'—Begriff und Realität einer moralisch-politischen Haltung," in *Deutsche patriotische und gemeinnützige Gesellschaften*, ed. Vierhaus (Munich: Kraus, 1980), 9-29.

131. Ibid.

132. Mendelssohn, letter 138, *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend* (1761), 214; cited by Ulrich Im Hof, "German Associations and Politics in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century," in *The Transformation of Political Culture*, ed. Hellmuth, 208, 208 n. And see Daniel Brühlmeier, "Isaak Iselin and the Call for Civic Virtue: a Model of Swiss Republicanism," in *Revolution and Enlightenment in Europe*, ed. Timothy O'Hagen (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1991), 69-79.

133. Kim Vivian, "Herder, Rousseau, and Fuseli," *German Life and Letters* 33 (1980): 263-68.

134. See Ulrich Im Hof, "Die Helvetische Gesellschaft 1761-1768," in *Deutsche patriotische und gemeinnützige Gesellschaften*, ed. Vierhaus, 223-40; Im Hof, "German Associations and Politics," esp. 207-8.

135. Helen Liebel, "Der aufgeklärte Absolutismus und die Gesellschaftskrise in Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert," in *Absolutismus*, ed. Walther

Hubatsch [Darmstadt: Wege der Forschung, 1973], 488-544; Volker Sellin, "Friedrich der Große und der aufgeklärte Absolutismus," in *Soziale Bewegung und politische Verfassung*, ed. Ulrich Engelhardt, Volker Sellin, and Horst Stuke (Stuttgart: Klett, 1976), 83-112; Gerraint Perry, "Enlightened Government and Its Critics in Eighteenth-Century Germany," *Historical Journal* 6 (1963): 178-92.

136. See Helmut Reinalter, ed., *Aufklärung und Geheimgesellschaften: Zur politischen Funktion und Sozialstruktur der Freimaurerlogen im 18. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989); *Aufklärung und Geheimgesellschaften: Freimaurer, Illuminaten und Rosenkreuzer: Ideologie, Struktur und Wirkungen*, ed. Helmut Reinalter (Bayreuth: Quatuor Coronati Loge, 1992).

137. Kopitzsch, "Die Aufklärung in Deutschland," 10.

138. For an alternative view on the masonic lodges, see Margaret Jacob, *Living the Enlightenment: Freemasonry and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

139. Eberhard Weis, "Der Illuminatenorden (1776-1786)," in *Aufklärung und Geheimgesellschaften*, ed. Reinalter (1989), 87-108.

140. Lessing, *Lessings Sämtliche Schriften*, vol. 17, 29; cited in Thomas Saine, "Was ist Aufklärung?" 334.

141. Franz Robling writes: "The urge of the middle class for independence expressed itself initially in the effort to make the exercise of power and the organization of national life the business of each and every responsible citizen by means of public discussion. An important instance of this was the struggle for freedom of the press, which was directed against the privy politics of the ruler and his Cabinet" ("Political Rhetoric in the German Enlightenment," in *Transformation of Political Culture*, 410).

142. Bödeker, "Die 'gebildeten Stände,'" 47.

143. Cited by Bödeker, "Journals and Public Opinion," 432.

144. Beck, *Early German Philosophy*, 320.

145. M. Welke, "Die Legende vom 'unpolitischen Deutschen,'" *Jahrbuch der Wittheit zu Bremen* 25 (1981): 161ff. And see Rudolf Vierhaus, "The Revolutionizing of Consciousness: A German Utopia?" in *Transformation of Political Culture*, 561-77. Indeed, one of the penchants especially of Western historiography of Germany has been to castigate the German middle class for its failure to generate a politically revolutionary force. Nothing short of this has seemed sufficiently "political" to either Marxist or liberal historians. Wolfgang Martens, the authority on the "moral weeklies," himself found fault with them on this score:

For all the engagement of the moral weeklies for the common good, for all the initiatives here discernible for fostering public social life, it is nevertheless necessary to observe one thing: the German weeklies did not lead their readers into the field of the political in the sense that the bourgeois [*Bürger*: in this context contrasted explicitly with the citizen] who becomes involved for his community is also responsible for the

structure of this community and should participate in determining its fate at the level of the state. The "patriotism" to which the bourgeois was called was essentially an unpolitical sense of community [*ein unpolitischer Gemeinsinn*]. The potentially democratic elements that are inherent in a bourgeois engagement for the community—which emerged in the New World in the initiatives of a Benjamin Franklin—did not appear in the German sphere. From the bourgeois concerned for the common interest no citizen emerged. (*Botschaft der Tugend*, 325)

This castigation of the German eighteenth century remained prominent into the late 1970s, but one can see a vivid shift in interpretation if one considers in chronological sequence the crucial publications from about 1976 onward. Picking up on the older work of Fritz Valjavec, historians like Thomas Nipperdey, Rudolf Vierhaus, Richard van Dülmen, and Otto Dann began to revise this image [Richard van Dülmen, "Die Aufklärungsgesellschaften in Deutschland als Forschungsproblem," *Francia* 5 (1977): 251–75]. The triumph of this revisionism can be dated from two collections edited by Ulrich Herrmann and Hans Erich Bödeker, *Aufklärung als Politisierung* (1987) and *Über den Prozeß der deutschen Aufklärung* (1987), which confirmed the connection of shifts in personal consciousness and social interaction with political culture in the German eighteenth century.

146. Vierhaus, "'Patriotismus'—Begriff und Realität," 10. Such a conception of political enculturation and political process is decisive for the new approach to the political history of *Aufklärung*.

147. Ernesti's text, in Latin with a French translation, is reproduced in Roland Mortier, "Diderot, Ernesti, et la 'Philosophie Populaire,'" in *Essays on Diderot and the Enlightenment in Honor of Otis Fellows*, ed. John Pappas (Geneva: Droz, 1974), 207–30.

148. Diderot, cited by Mortier, "Diderot, Ernesti, et la 'Philosophie Populaire,'" 209.

149. Holzhey, "Der Philosoph für die Welt," 127.

150. Mortier, "Diderot, Ernesti," 228–29.

151. Lessing, review of Mendelssohn's *Philosophische Gespräche* (*Berlinische Privilegierte Zeitung*, 1755), in Lessing, *Sämtliche Schriften*, vol. 7, 13–14.

152. Beck, *Early German Philosophy*, 306–60; Horst Möller, *Aufklärung in Preussen*; Alexander Altmann, *Moses Mendelssohn* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973); and Altmann, *Die trostvolle Aufklärung* (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1982).

153. Werner Strube, "Die Geschichte des Begriffs 'schöne Wissenschaften,'" *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 33 (1990): 181.

154. P. O. Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanistic Strains* (New York: Harper, 1961).

155. Thomasius, *Discours, Welcher Gestalt man denen Frantzosen in gemeinem Leben und Wandel nachahmen solle!* (1687, published 1721);

discussed in Strube, "Die Geschichte des Begriffs 'schöne Wissenschaften,'" 142 ff.

156. This is one of the central arguments in Strube, "Die Geschichte des Begriffs 'schöne Wissenschaften,'" *passim*.

157. See Walch, *Philosophisches Lexicon* (1726); discussed in Strube, "Die Geschichte des Begriffs 'schöne Wissenschaften,'" 145.

158. Bertram, *Summarische Einleitung in die so genannte Schöne Wissenschaften Oder litteras humaniores* (1725); discussed in Strube, "Die Geschichte des Begriffs 'schöne Wissenschaften,'" 147-52.

159. See Charles Bambach, *Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995).

160. Gottsched, "Vorrede" to *Neue Büchersaal der schönen Wissenschaften und freien Künste* 1 (1745): 7; cited in Strube, "Die Geschichte des Begriffs 'schöne Wissenschaften,'" 156.

161. Nicolai, "Vorrede" to *Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste* 1 (1757), 4; cited in Strube, "Die Geschichte des Begriffs 'schöne Wissenschaften,'" 185.

162. Paul Kristeller, "The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics, II," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 13 (1952): 17-48.

163. Wolff, *Discursus praeliminaris*, §72; discussed in Strube, "Die Geschichte des Begriffs 'schöne Wissenschaften,'" 168.

164. Max Dessoir in 1902 put it crisply: the point is "after all to think about the beautiful, not to think beautifully!" (*Geschichte der neueren deutschen Psychologie*, 2d ed. [Berlin, 1902], 559; cited in Strube, "Die Geschichte des Begriffs 'schöne Wissenschaften,'" 161). We will have occasion to return to this distinction in Kant and in Herder.

165. "Wolff disliked the French lack of *Gründlichkeit*; the *philosophes* loathed his excess of it" (Vidal, "Psychology in the Eighteenth Century," 102). Though Vidal shows how heavily represented Wolff's psychology was in the *Encyclopédie*, he also documents the resistance it provoked, perhaps even from Diderot himself: "I hate Wolff's method . . . it assumes a deep obscurity and a disgusting dryness. By introducing it in Germany, this famous man extinguished good taste, and lost the best minds" [Anonymous, "Renvoi" [in *Encyclopédie* 14: 123]; cited in Vidal, "Psychology in the Eighteenth Century," 102]. On the whole question, see Strube, "Die Geschichte des Begriffs 'schöne Wissenschaften,'" 193ff; Harold Mah, "Epistemology of the Sentence," *Representations* 47 (1994): 64-84; Antony La Vopa, "Herder's Publikum," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 29 (1995): 5-24.

166. Mary Gregor, "Baumgarten's *Aesthetica*," *Review of Metaphysics* 37 (1987): 357-85; Michael Jäger, *Die Ästhetik als Antwort auf das kopernikanische Weltbild* (Hildesheim: Olms, 1989).

167. Robert Sommer, *Grundzüge einer Geschichte der deutschen Psychologie und Ästhetik von Wolff-Baumgarten bis Kant-Schiller* (Würzburg: Stahel, 1892).

168. Mendelssohn, *Hauptgrundsätzen der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften* (1757); discussed in Strube, "Die Geschichte des Begriffs 'schöne Wissenschaften,'" 170.

169. Johann Feder, *Grundriß der philosophischen Wissenschaften nebst der noethigen Geschichte zum Gebrauch seiner Zuhörer* (Coburg: Findeisen, 1767), 50.

170. J. D. Michaelis, *Raisonnement*, vol. 1, 112; see Hammerstein, "Universitäten und gelehrte Institutionen," 311. Schneiders confirms Michaelis's judgment: "The German Enlightenment [figures] belonged generally neither to the grand bourgeoisie nor to the literary aristocracy [French categories]; they were small bureaucrats, preachers and teachers, above all university professors" ("Akademische Weltweisheit," 40).

171. Gerd Ueding, "Popularphilosophie," in *Deutsche Aufklärung bis zur Französischen Revolution, 1680-1789*, ed. Rolf Grimminger (Munich: Hanser, 1980), 609.

172. Sulzer, *Kurzer Begriff der Wissenschaften*, 2d ed. (1759); cited in Holzhey, "Philosoph für die Welt," 133.

173. Holzhey, "Philosoph für die Welt," 121.

174. Turner, "Discussion of 'Prussian Professoriate,'" 483.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Kant to Moses Mendelssohn, April 8, 1766, AA:10:71-72.

2. Kant, *Inaugural Dissertation, in Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770*, 373-416.

3. The classic sources were Leibniz's "Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason" (1714) and "Monadology" (1714) in the first instance, and his "Meditation on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas" (1684) in the second. See Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, ed. and tr. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 206-13, 213-25, and 23-28 respectively.

4. Metaphysical monists, whether idealist or materialist, were faced with having to address the claims of this position to establish the alternative (Sylvana Tomaselli, "The First Person: Descartes, Locke, and Mind-Body Dualism," *History of Science* 22 [1984]: 190). As Tomaselli summarizes, "in the middle of the eighteenth century, the 'two substance' view was presented as a new philosophical position and, although possibly a contentious one, one which could not but frame all metaphysical discussions" (192).

5. Giorgio Tonelli, "Die Anfänge von Kants Kritik der Kausalbeziehungen und ihre Voraussetzungen im 18. Jahrhundert," *Kant-Studien* 57 (1966): 417-60.

6. This particular illustration enjoyed a remarkable persistence in the literature. Hume used it; so did Kant.

7. John Yolton, "The Three Hypotheses" in *Locke and French Materialism* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), 10-37.

8. It would appear that it was Leibniz who created the classification (Eileen O'Neill, "Influxus physicus," in *Causation in Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. Steven Nadler [University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993], 25). But if Leibniz called them "systems," Wolff popularized the typology as "hypotheses," with all the epistemological and methodological scruples that—at least since Newton—accrued to that term.

9. O'Neill has made the case that the traditional theory of *influxus physicus* requires more historical investigation. She credits the coining of the term to Suarez, but she maintains that "his use of the term 'inflow' is just a figure of speech" (*ibid.*, 39).

10. It is important to note that "physical influx" is not just about material interaction. As Eric Watkins puts it, "the term 'physical' in physical influx should be taken not literally (as corporeal), but rather as natural (as opposed to hyperphysical or supernatural)" ("Development of Physical Influx," *Review of Metaphysics* 49 [1995]: 296 n).

11. Eric Watkins formulates Leibniz's objections into two main categories. First, Leibniz believed that it was "incomprehensible how one substance could act on another substance," and second, in the transfer of such "influxes" he believed there would be a violation of the "law of conservation of motion" ("Development of Physical Influx," 297).

12. In this, Newton was at one with Descartes. See the classic account: Eduard Dijksterhuis, *The Mechanization of the World Picture* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961).

13. *The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence*, ed. H. G. Alexander (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956).

14. "Only the new conceptualization of substance on the foundation of a concept of force understood in terms of entelechy by Leibniz opened new possibilities for explanation" (Mareta Linden, *Untersuchungen zum Anthropologiebegriffs des 18. Jahrhundert* [Bern: Lang, 1976], 22 n). On Leibniz's dynamic notion of matter, see, e.g., Jill Vance Buroker, "Kant, the Dynamical Tradition, and the Role of Matter in Explanation," in *PSA 1972*, ed., Kenneth Schaffner and Robert S. Cohen (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974), 153-64.

15. Roger Joseph Boscovich, "Space, Time, and Measurement, [Excerpt] from *A Theory of Natural Philosophy*," in *The Changeless Order: The Physics of Space, Time, and Motion*, ed. Arnold Koslow (New York: Braziller, 1967), 104-14; Lancelot Law Whyte, "Boscovich's Atomism," in *Roger Joseph Boscovich, S.J., F.R.S., 1711-1787*, ed. L. Whyte (London: Allen & Unwin, 1961), 102-26.

16. "The body-soul problem was more or less suspended by Wolff" (Soo Bae Kim, *Die Entstehung der Kantischen Anthropologie und ihre Beziehung zur empirischen Psychologie der Wolffschen Schule* [Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1994], 42 n).

17. Charles Corr, "Christian Wolff and Leibniz," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 36 (1975): 241-62; Jean École, "Cosmologie Wolffienne et dynamique

Leibnizienne: Essai sur les rapports de Wolff avec Leibniz," *Les études philosophiques* 19 (1964): 3-9.

18. Stefan Lorenz, *De Mundo Optimo: Studien zu Leibniz' Theodizee und ihrer Rezeption in Deutschland (1710-1791)* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1997).

19. W. H. Barber, *Leibniz in France from Arnauld to Voltaire* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1955); John Yolton, "The Three Hypotheses," in *Locke and French Materialism*, 10-37.

20. Yolton, "Three Hypotheses," 18.

21. Those who sought a new conception of physical influx were concerned "to replace the purely mechanical picture of natural change with a model of vital matter, that is, matter infused with spirit" (O'Neill, "Influxus physicus," 33).

22. "A relatively sophisticated version of Physical Influx emerges from 1732 to 1745" (Watkins, "The Development of Physical Influx," 300).

23. *Ibid.*, 311.

24. Eric Watkins, "Kant's Theory of Physical Influx," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 77 (1995): 286.

25. John Yolton, "Ideas in Logic and Psychology," in Yolton, *Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 105. In the most penetrating study of this development, James Buickerood explains that until that point in the history of logic "the field was understood predominantly as the study of terms and propositions, and of the formal properties of arguments, which were for the most part restricted to syllogisms" ("The Natural History of the Understanding," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 6 [1985]: 159). As Buickerood characterizes the upshot of this innovation, "Whether investigation into the nature of the faculties was considered a foundational ingredient of logical theory or else as a distinct enterprise buttressing logic itself, an understanding of man's cognitive capacities was taken to be fundamental to the development of those elements of logical theory which were retained from tradition" (163).

26. Hinske, "Zwischen Aufklärung und Vernunftkritik," 60-61. And see Tonelli, "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason within the Tradition of Modern Logic," 186.

27. Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, *Logic, or the Art of Thinking* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Yolton, "Ideas in Logic," 112, 115; Buickerood, "Natural History," 161.

28. According to Buickerood, "Locke's notion of a faculty was as a power, a capacity to perform discriminable kinds of acts," but "capacities are imperceptible. No cognitive acts occur without content" ("Natural History," 167, 167 n).

29. Kim, *Entstehung der Kantischen Anthropologie*, 46-47.

30. Jean École, "Des rapports de l'expérience et de la raison dans l'analyse de l'âme, ou la *Psychologia empirica* de Christian Wolff," *Giornale di Metafisica* 21 (1966): 592-93; Charles Corr, "Wolff's Distinction between Empirical

and Rational Psychology," *Akten des II. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses*, vol. 3, 195–215, esp. 196. Wolff's role in the constitution of an eighteenth-century concept of psychology for European discourse in general is now becoming more widely recognized. See, e.g., Marcel Thomann, "Influence du philosophe allemand Christian Wolff (1679–1754)," *Archives de Philosophie du Droit* 13 (1968): 233–48; Sonia Carboncini, "L'Encyclopédie et Christian Wolff," *Les études philosophiques* 4 (1987): 491–504.

31. J. École, "De la nature de l'âme," *Giornale di Metafisica* 24 (1969): 501–2 n. As Corr elaborates, "Wolff's intention is to place empirical psychology on a par with its rational counterpart. To this end he explicitly defines empirical psychology as a philosophical science and locates it as a part of metaphysics" ("Wolff's Distinction," 200). École settles for the view that one can only discriminate the role of reason in Wolff's two psychologies by assigning it a subordinate role in the empirical psychology and a determining role in the rational psychology. That works as a description of what Wolff is up to but not as its legitimation.

32. However, as Kim writes, "The suspicion comes readily that Wolff's proof structure in the rational psychology is not infrequently circular" (*Entstehung der Kantischen Anthropologie*, 36 n).

33. Christian Wolff, *Ausführliche Nachricht von seinen eigenen Schriften, die er in deutscher Sprache von den verschiedenen Theilen der Welt-Weisheit ans Licht gestellt* (1726), §79; cited in Corr, "Wolff's Distinction," 205.

34. Christian Wolff, *Deutsche Metaphysik* §191, as cited in Corr, "Wolff's Distinction," 210 n. 16.

35. Christian Wolff, *Discursus praeliminaris* §54, as cited in Corr, "Wolff's Distinction," 205.

36. Christian Wolff, *Discursus praeliminaris*; this distinction is, as we have seen, central to the debates of the mid-eighteenth century. See Jean École, "La conception wolffienne de la philosophie d'après le 'Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere,'" *Filosofia oggi* 1 (1978): 403–28; and Arno Seifert, "Nuda facta notitia," in *Cognitio Historica: Die Geschichte als Namensgeberin der frühneuzeitlichen Empirie* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1976), 163–78.

37. In Charles Corr's cautious language, Wolff's "emphasis on the role of historical and experiential forms of knowledge . . . produced certain tensions when juxtaposed with the demand for certitude" ("Wolff's Distinction," 197).

38. *Ibid.*; the citation from Wolff is taken from *Discursus praeliminaris* §34.

39. Christian Wolff, *Psychologia empirica*, §496, 497, as cited in Jean École, "De la nature de l'âme," 501 n.

40. Thus, this empirical commitment generated "the most precarious element in Wolff's epistemological reflections," (Kim, *Die Entstehung der Kantischen Anthropologie*, 25).

41. Corr, "Wolff's Distinction," 204.

42. Kim, *Entstehung der Kantischen Anthropologie*, 50. Of Kant, Kim writes: "true scientificity according to Kant can only be a matter of the rational knowledge of a science . . . only that about which certainty is apodictic." Kim notes that this view of science "remained unaltered from the beginning of his academic teaching to its end" (80).

43. That is to say, Kant's views on empirical psychology did not change substantially over the course of his career.

44. Karen Gloy, "Die Differenz von Begriff und Anschauung bei Kant und ihre Begründung," *Kant-Studien* 75 (1984): 1-37.

45. Ernest Hilgard, "The Trilogy of Mind: Cognition, Affection, and Conation," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 16 (1980): 107-17.

46. Tonelli, "Conditions in Königsberg and the Making of Kant's Philosophy," in *Bewußt sein: Gerhard Funke zu eigen*, ed. A. Bucher, H. Drüe, and T. Seeborn (Bonn: Bouvier, 1975), 126-44, esp. 137-39.

47. There is some dispute over which faculty Kant enrolled in, but it seems fairly plausible, in light of Schulz, that Kant started out in the theology faculty, even if he turned away from it (see *ibid.*, 137).

48. "The term *Privatdozent* was not yet in use at the time. Kant called himself a *magister legens*" (Gause, *Kant und Königsberg* [Leer, Ostfriesland: Rautenberg, 1974], 21).

49. Borowski, *Darstellung des Lebens und Charakters Immanuel Kants*, in *Immanuel Kant: Sein Leben in Darstellungen von Zeitgenossen*, ed. Felix Groß (Berlin: Deutsche Bibliothek, 1912), 17.

50. Giorgio Tonelli, "Conditions in Königsberg," esp. 141.

51. Borowski, *Darstellung*, 17.

52. Kant, *Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte und Beurteilung der Verweise, deren sich Herr von Leibnitz und andre Mathematiker in dieser Streitsache bedienen haben . . .* (1746), AA:1:1-182.

53. Kant to Euler, August 23, 1749; Hermann Fischer, "Eine Antwort auf Kants Brief vom 23. August 1749," *Kant-Studien* 76 (1985): 79-89; Fischer, "Kant und Euler," *Kant-Studien* 76 (1985): 211-19.

54. Fischer, "Eine Antwort."

55. Review of Kant's first book in *Göttingische Anzeigen*, no. 37 (April 13, 1750); cited in Ritzel, *Immanuel Kant: Eine Biographie*, 13.

56. Lessing, *Werke*, vol. 1, 41.

57. Kant, *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte*, AA:1:215-368.

58. Borowski, *Darstellung*, 25.

59. Kant, *The One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God*, AA:2:68.

60. Ritzel, *Immanuel Kant: Zur Person* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1975), 25-26. Gause resists this insinuation: "this slowing of [Kant's] academic career should not be ascribed to any failure to recognize Kant's importance or obstruction of

his progress due to collegial envy" (*Kant und Königsberg*, 23). But this is too blanket an assurance.

61. Karl Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant: Der Mann und der Werk*, 2d ed. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), 85.

62. Cassirer, *Kant's Life and Thought*, 42.

63. Ritzel, *Immanuel Kant: Eine Biographie* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1985), 17. Gause does suggest that the *Wöchentliche Königsbergisch Frag- und Anzeigungsnachrichten* should be considered an official venue in which "university professors would publish scientific works" (*Kant und Königsberg*, 37). Again, this seems to miss the point.

64. "Even to our best friend we must not reveal ourselves in our natural state as we know it in ourselves. To do so would be loathsome" (Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, 206-7).

65. Kant to Lindner, October 28, 1759, AA:10:17-18; tr. in Cassirer, *Kant's Life and Thought*, 42.

66. Goetschel, *Constituting Critique* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994), 3.

67. Herman Schmalenbach, *Kant's Religion* (Berlin: Junker & Dünhaupt, 1929), 41.

68. Ibid. Goetschel suggests that "the travelogue can . . . be seen as representing, in literary form, epistemological theory's search for a standpoint" (*Constituting Critique*, 58).

69. Stuckenberg, *The Life of Immanuel Kant* (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1990), 4.

70. On the conflicted status of this ideal in later German culture, one should juxtapose Nietzsche's affirmations of good European cosmopolitanism in, e.g., *Twilight of the Idols*, with Friedrich Meinecke's classic and conflicted, if not downright antipathetic account in *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*.

71. Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 4 n.

72. H. Böhme and G. Böhme, *Das Andere der Vernunft* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983), 463-66.

73. Kant, "Entwurf und Ankündigung eines Collegii der physischen Geographie," (1757), AA:2:3.

74. Adickes, *Untersuchungen zu Kants physischer Geographie* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1911).

75. There was a notorious squabble among great Kantians at the end of the nineteenth century on this question, having to do with the relation—if any—between the course in physical geography and the new course in anthropology that Kant instituted in 1772-1773. Benno Erdmann saw such a connection; Emil Arnoldt disputed it. Erick Adickes applied himself to a rigorous reconstruction of the actual physical geography course Kant developed

and whether and how it changed over the forty years Kant taught it. See my discussion in chapter 7.

76. Kant, "Entwurf und Ankündigung eines Collegii der physischen Geographie" (1757), AA:2:3.

77. G. Tonelli, "Der Streit über die mathematische Methode," *Archiv für Philosophie* 9 (1959): 66 (for *Gewährsmänner*). See, too, Tonelli, "Königsberg," passim, and on Maupertuis esp. 144, where Tonelli argues that he "exerted a strong influence on Kant at a time. . . ."

78. Mary Terrall, "The Culture of Science," 335–39.

79. Tonelli, "Conditions in Königsberg," 143–44.

80. Irving Polonoff presents a table correlating Kant's writings with various academy prize contests (*Force, Cosmos, Monads and Other Themes of Kant's Early Thought* [Bonn: Bouvier, 1973], 123 n).

81. Tonelli, "Conditions in Königsberg," 143–44.

82. That Pope was just a stalking horse for Leibniz has been carefully set forth in Beck, *Early German Philosophy*, 316.

83. Beck, *Early German Philosophy*, 317–19.

84. Lessing and Mendelssohn, "Pope ein Metaphysiker!" in Lessing, *Sämtliche Schriften*, vol. 6 (Stuttgart: Göschen, 1886), 409–55.

85. Rita Goldberg, "Voltaire, Rousseau, and the Lisbon Earthquake," *Eighteenth-Century Life* 13 (1989): 1–20.

86. Indeed, Voltaire's *Candide* has almost as much to do with military as with religious folly.

87. See "The Lisbon Earthquake: Rousseau versus Voltaire," a collection of documents from Voltaire, Rousseau, and others concerning the Lisbon disaster, in *Candide and Related Texts*, by Voltaire, ed. and tr. David Wootton (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000): 95–122.

88. Kant wrote several technical essays on the geology of earthquakes for the Königsberg press in the late 1750s, materials that helped constitute his new and famous course in "Physical Geography." See Kant, "Von den Ursachen der Erderschütterungen bei Gelegenheit des Unglücks, welches die westliche Länder von Europa gegen das Ende des vorigen Jahres betroffen hat" (1756), AA:1:417–28; "Geschichte und Naturbeschreibung der merkwürdigsten Vorfälle des Erdbebens, welche an dem Ende des 1755ten Jahres einen großen Theil der Erde erschüttert hat" (1756), AA:1:428–62; "Fortgesetzte Betrachtung der seit einiger Zeit wahrgenommenen Erderschütterungen" (1756), AA:1:463–72; and his Physical Geography course, AA:9:151–436. About Kant's Physical Geography course, see Adickes, *Untersuchungen zu Kants physischer Geographie*; G. Gerland, "Immanuel Kant: seine geographische und anthropologische Arbeiten," *Kant-Studien* 10 (1905): 1–43, 417–547.

89. For the Voltaire-Rousseau exchange, see the documents gathered in "The Lisbon Earthquake: Rousseau versus Voltaire," in *Candide and Related Texts*, by Voltaire (95–122). Kant's distinction between natural and moral

calamities is carried forward into his *One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God* of 1762:

There are many forces in nature that have the ability to destroy individual men, states, or the entire human race: earthquakes, gales, rough seas, comets, and so on. That some of these should happen from time to time is also sufficiently grounded in the constitution of nature according to natural law. . . . When such a case occurs, one still attributes it to natural causes and means that it is a misfortune, not a punishment, because the moral behavior of man can be no reason for earthquakes, which occur according to natural law. (*One Possible Basis*, 121)

90. Kant, "Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus" (1759), AA:2:27-36. See Tonelli, "Conditions in Königsberg," 138, identifying the target of Kant's essay.

91. Tonelli, "Conditions in Königsberg," 138; see also the translator's introduction to Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770*, lvi.

92. Borowski, *Darstellung*, 29 n.

93. Franz Gabriel Nauen, "Kant as an Inadvertent Precursor of Eighteenth-Century Neospinozism: On Optimism (1759)," *Kant-Studien* 83 (1992): 268-79.

94. Tonelli describes the case of C. Fischer and goes on, "The charge of Spinozism was probably not unjustified in this case, although it was the standard accusation of the Pietists against the Wolffians. Königsberg seems to have been a center of Spinozism: in 1729 a senior government official of the town, Th. L. Lau, was compelled to recant his spinozistic views" ("Conditions in Königsberg," 132).

95. Stavenhagen, *Kant und Königsberg*, 19.

96. Arsenji Gulyga, *Immanuel Kant: His Life and Thought* (Boston: Birkhäuser, 1987), 34-35.

97. Kant to Johann Gotthelf Lindner, October 28, 1759, AA:10:19.

98. Dennis Showalter, *The Wars of Frederick the Great* (London: Longman, 1996).

99. N. Weiß, *Königsberg*, 24.

100. W. O. Henderson, "The Berlin Commercial Crisis of 1763," *European Economic Review* 15 (1962/63): 89-102; Helen Liebel, "Laissez-faire versus Mercantilism," *Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 52 (1965): 207-38.

101. Stavenhagen, *Kant und Königsberg*, 19.

102. Borowski, *Darstellung*, 65; Ritzel, *Immanuel Kant: Eine Biographie*, 52.

103. Cited in the Erläuterungen to the Akademie-Ausgabe, Studien-Ausgabe, 494.

104. D. Henrich, "Kants Denken 1762/3," in *Studien zu Kants philosophischer Entwicklung* (Hildesheim: Olms, 1967), 9-38.

105. "[T]he confrontation of Kant with Leibniz's natural theology had to result as well in a critical perspective on the practical philosophy of Wolff and the Wolff school" (Henrich, "Über Kants früheste Ethik," *Kant-Studien* 54 [1963]: 413).

106. Prussian Ministry of Culture, "Anweisung für ankommende Studierende auf die Universität Halle" (1770)—extended to Königsberg in 1771; cited in Werner Stark, "Kant als akademischer Lehrer," in Ischreyt, ed., *Königsberg und Riga*, 16.

107. This was the first of Kant's texts published by Johann Kanter, who was Herder's protector in these first few months in Königsberg. Spending a great deal of his time in Kanter's shop, Herder, it is said, developed a taste for reading texts in the proof and print stages of publication.

108. Kant, "Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren," AA:2:56.

109. Kant, "The History of Pure Reason," *Critique of Pure Reason*. (Kant's argument also has some features that anticipate Thomas Kuhn.)

110. Kant, "Prize Essay," AA:2:276; tr. 6.

111. Ibid., AA:2:280; tr. 11. Kant here already shows interest in the feelings of the sublime and the beautiful. He also adds the disgusting, which brings to mind Derrida's "Economimesis."

112. Tonelli, "Der Streit über die mathematische Methode."

113. Kant, "Prize Essay," AA:2:295; tr. 28.

114. Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 24–29, AA:4:413–20.

115. Kant, "Prize Essay," AA:2:299; tr. 32.

116. Henrich, "Hutcheson und Kant," *Kant-Studien* 49 (1957/58): 64.

117. Josef Schmucker, *Die Ursprünge der Ethik Kants in seinen vorkritischen Schriften und Reflektionen* (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1961), 58–62.

118. Kant, *Reflexion* 6798, AA:19:164.

119. Henrich, "Hutcheson und Kant," 56.

120. Cassirer, *Kant's Life and Thought*, 55.

121. Kant, *One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God*, 55.

122. Ibid., 91. Kant explicitly disowns a Spinozist notion as "a blind necessary ground . . . distinguished not at all from the eternal fate of some of the ancients" (91).

123. "The collective perfection of the universe can be achieved in accordance with divine will by the laws of nature alone without many [sic] supernatural influences" (ibid., 129).

124. Ibid. That all this was set out by Kant in this text of 1762, which we know Herder read closely, suggests that these ideas were not lost on his student.

125. Kant, *Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen*, AA:2:177-78.

126. Gulyga, *Immanuel Kant*, 48.

127. First published by Hans Dietrich Irmscher in the *Beihefte of Kant-Studien* in 1960, a complete version has appeared in the Akademie Ausgabe, vols. 27 and 28.

128. Kant, *Metaphysik Herder*, AA:28:6.

129. Gunter Schulz, "Christian Garve und Immanuel Kant," *Jahrbuch der Schlesischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Breslau* 5 (1960): 123-88; Klaus Petrus, "'Beschriebene Dunkelheit' und 'Seichtigkeit'"; Wolfgang Kersting, "Kann die Kritik der praktischen Vernunft populär sein?" *Studia Leibnitiana* 15:1 (1983): 82-93.

130. Zammito, *Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment*, 35-44.

131. Kant, *Metaphysik Herder*, AA:28:1:7.

132. J. Stuckenberg, *Life of Immanuel Kant*, 75.

133. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §40, AA:5:294; tr. 160.

134. Borowski, *Darstellung*, 93ff.

135. Herder, *Briefe zu Beförderung der Humanität* (final version), Suphan:17:404.

136. Kant, *Announcement of His Winter Courses for 1765-66*, AA:2:306.

137. Kant, "Was heißt sich im Denken orientieren?" AA:7:136 n.

138. Norbert Hinske, "Die tragenden Grundideen der deutschen Aufklärung," esp. 419-24.

139. Hume, *Enquiry* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977), 1-9; Röd, "Humes Skeptizismus als Entwurf," *Grazer philosophischen Studien* 44 (1993): 211-32.

140. This is especially the case with the volume entitled *Four Philosophers*, translated into French by Mérian and then into German by Resewitz.

141. This is one of the most important revisions of our understanding of the *Hochaufklärung*. See Manfred Kuehn, "Kant's Conception of 'Hume's Problem,'" *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 21 (1983): 175-93.

142. See below, chapter 5.

143. *Metaphysik Herder*, AA:28:1:43.

144. *Ibid.*, AA:28:1:19.

145. Watkins, "Kant's Theory of Physical Influx," 295.

146. Kant, *Metaphysik Herder*, AA:28:1:51-53. "Unlike both Knutzen and Crusius, Kant explicitly argues that God is necessary for substances to stand in real connection" (Watkins, "Kant's Theory of Physical Influx," 298). Kant had developed this idea about God as the necessary presence for the coordination of substances in an interactive community in his *Nova dilucidatio* and in his *Physical Monadology*.

147. Watkins, "Kant's Theory of Physical Influx," 299.

148. "Is a soul a material or immaterial monad?" (Kant, *Metaphysik Herder*, AA:28:1:47).

149. Ernst Cassirer, *Kant's Life and Thought*, 77.

150. M. Mendelssohn, *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend*, 280 (April 26, 1764), in *Gesammelte Schriften: Jubiläumsausgabe*, vol. 5, pt. 1, 604.

151. Mendelssohn and Lessing had been prominent in the reception of the early Rousseau in Germany, and Kant was one of the most enthusiastic readers of Rousseau, as we will have occasion to explore in detail below.

152. Mendelssohn, *Briefe*, 660.

153. Mendelssohn's first letter to Kant, mentioned in Kant's reply, February 7, 1766, AA:10:67.

154. Paul Guyer has offered us a careful juxtaposition of the respective philosophical positions, elaborating from that basis upon Kant's subsequent evolution ("Mendelssohn and Kant: One Source of the Critical Philosophy," *Philosophical Topics* 19 [1991]: 119–52).

155. Henrich, "Kants Denken, 1762/3," 14.

156. Kant, "Prize Essay," vol. 1, §3; cited in Henrich, "Kants Denken, 1762/3," 15 n.

157. Henrich, "Kants Denken, 1762/3," 15.

158. Kant, *Reflexion* 3755, AA:17:283–84. Herder *Metaphysics*—Notes re: Baumgarten, §14 (cited in Henrich, "Kants Denken, 1762/3," 33).

159. Henrich, "Kants Denken 1762/3," 35.

160. *Ibid.*, 36.

CHAPTER THREE

1. Kant to Formey, June 28, 1763, AA:10:41.

2. Formey to Kant, July 5, 1763, AA:10:42.

3. Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 158.

4. Henrich, "Kants Denken, 1762/3," 11.

5. Cassirer, *Kant's Life and Thought*, 77.

6. Emil Arnoldt, "Kants Jugend und die fünf ersten Jahre seiner Privatdozentur im Umriss dargestellt," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 3 (Berlin: Cassirer, 1908), 205.

7. Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 117.

8. Gulyga, *Immanuel Kant*, 40–41.

9. Rolf George, "The Lives of Kant," 496.

10. Richard Velkley, *Freedom and the End of Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 11; Frederick Beiser, "Kant's Intellectual Development," in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, ed. P. Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 47.

11. That text, of course, is *Observations*, and it is striking how little has been written about it, especially in light of its contemporary importance. Another Erlangen connection to be pursued in chapter 7 is Johann Feder's review of Kant's *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer for the Erlangen Gelehrten Zeitung*. It was Feder's teacher, Suckow, who conducted the university's effort to hire Kant.

12. Lewis Feuer observes: "Kant began to have visual disorders in his fortieth year, the same year in which his interest in mental illness became so great. . . . Kant was going through a difficult intellectual and emotional transformation" ("Lawless Sensations," in *Psychoanalysis and Philosophy*, ed. C. Hanly and M. Laerowitz [New York: International University Press, 1970], 81).

13. "Around forty is when character first really establishes itself" (Kant, *Reflexion* 1497, AA:15:769). "After one's fortieth year one learns nothing new" (Kant, *Reflexion* 373, AA:15:148). Understanding in the sense of judgment is only achieved at forty (Kant, *Reflexion* 404, AA:15:163). And see *Reflexionen* 1496 and 414 (AA:15:712, 167), where Kant speaks of judgment coming "not until after some years." See Ritzel, *Immanuel Kant: Eine Biographie* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1985), 125.

14. The best source for this element in Kant is Marie Rischmüller's introduction and commentary to Kant's *Bemerkungen*. As Goetschel aptly observes:

Thanks to Rischmüller's commentary, Kant's intricate dialogue with literary fiction can be grasped in its full implications. . . . [T]he authorial 'I' becomes entangled in the search for the self. . . . literature and fiction serve to compensate for the lack of empiricism and experience. . . . [Works of fiction serve as] building blocks for an ongoing project of self-reflection. The fact that this search for self takes its point of origin in literature is as little a coincidence as the choice of its object for reflection. (*Constituting Critique*, 71)

Indeed, Goetschel wishes to make an even more radical claim: "Kant's attitude toward everything novelistic, which bordered on aversion, stems from this close affinity of philosophical knowledge with it. It is Kant who first separates them; the separation repressed the losses on both sides, in order not to awake suspicion" (33). This has implications for Kant's "critical" turn against empirical psychology and anthropology.

15. Kant's relationship with Rousseau will be central for this chapter, but the other two relationships will intrude both here and later as seminal for the intellectual and psychological transformations of our subject.

16. Gulyga, *Immanuel Kant*, 51-52.

17. Thus, in one of the most important characterizations of melancholy for the epoch, Diderot's entry for the *Encyclopédie*, he states: "Melancholy is by no means the enemy of sensuality [*volupté*], it lends itself to the illusions of love and opens itself to the savoring of delicate pleasures of the soul and of the senses. Love [*l'amitié*] is a necessity for it" (cited in Schings, *Melancholie und Aufklärung* [Stuttgart: Metzler, 1977], 7).

18. Kant on phlegmatic temperament: AA:28:2:859; on melancholy: AA:28:2:878.

19. Whether Kant identified fully with the phlegmatic temperament later in his life, or simply considered it the closest "natural" approximation to the willed "character" of the disciplined scholar is something we will need to consider carefully below.

20. Josef Heller, *Kants Persönlichkeit und Leben: Versuch einer Charakteristik* (Berlin: Heise, 1924), 9.

21. Ibid. That is, Kant needs to be understood psychologically. Lewis Feuer even tries to understand him psychoanalytically. He notes that Kant frequently indicated "inner strife" in his experience ("Lawless Sensations," 76). At one point Kant even wrote of "a natural disposition towards hypochondriasis, which in my earlier years, rendered me even disgusted with life" ("Von der Macht des Gemüths" [1797], AA:7:104). "Underlying Kant's epistemological concern for preserving 'the unity of self-consciousness' was a psychological concern, an anxiety lest the lawless data and emotions rend that stability which he maintained with such difficulty" (Feuer, "Lawless Sensations," 87). Without going all that way, we can certainly agree with Feuer that Kant shows a consistent "denigration of the status of sensation," that he was "at odds with his own sensuality or sexuality," indeed, felt a "distaste for physical sexuality" (77, 78, 94). One might even find plausible Feuer's generalization: "All of Kant's personal eccentricities derived from an 'overdetermined' pre-occupation to exclude 'bestial' elements from his experience, that is, whatever was suggestive of sexuality" (88). On the other hand, the same distaste for physical sexuality seems to have characterized Adam Smith, without necessarily occasioning the same personal eccentricities. On Smith, see Robert Wokler, who writes that Smith "claims that it is distasteful to express in any strong degree those passions which arise from certain dispositions of the body. About sex . . . any striking display of it is indecent—even between husband and wife. . . . [Thus, Smith avowed] 'aversion to all the appetites which take their origin from the body'" ("Anthropology and Conjectural History in the Enlightenment," in *Inventing Human Science*, ed. C. Fox, R. Porter, and R. Wokler [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995], 39).

22. "All his life Kant struggled to master his melancholy and gloom" (Feuer, "Lawless Sensations," 84).

23. Heller, *Kants Persönlichkeit*, 28. "A sensory demand was for Kant a threat to the rational will" (Feuer, "Lawless Sensations," 82).

24. Heller, *Kants Persönlichkeit*, 17.

25. Jean Starobinski, *Rousseau: Transparency and the Obstacle* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).]

26. Heller, *Kants Persönlichkeit*, 51.

27. Ibid., 49; Heller is referring to Kant's letter to Herz, August 20, 1777, AA:10:211.

28. Kant, AA:7:294; cited in Heller, *Kants Persönlichkeit*, 61-62. See Ritzel, *Immanuel Kant: Eine Biographie*, 125.

29. Heller, *Kants Persönlichkeit*, 62.

30. Lehmann, "Kants Lebenskrise," 414, 417. Hinske, "Kant's Leben als gelebtes Bürgertum," 24.

31. Kings sign more documents than they care to read. That's why they have ministers.

32. H. Fischer, Erlangen, reported the fifteen reviews (Marie Rischmüller, ed., *Bemerkungen in den "Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen,"* xvi). Information about the many reprints of this work is to be found in the editorial annotations to the Academy Edition.

33. Prussian Ministry of Culture, Directive, August 5, 1765; cited in AA:13:24.

34. Braxein to Prussian Ministry, October 19, 1765; cited in AA:13:24.

35. Ritzel explains Kant's attitude aptly: "Kant knew well that he was not the man to provide ceremonial verse in German and Latin at University occasions or jubilees of the ruling house" (*Immanuel Kant: Eine Biographie*, 51).

36. Braxein to Prussian Ministry, October 19, 1765; cited in AA:13:24. Braxein was speculating that the health of the Ordinary Professor for Logic and Metaphysics might be failing. The awareness of that person's delicate health is a background factor in Kant's behavior over the balance of the 1760s.

37. Prussian Ministry, in the name of the King, October 24, 1765; cited in AA:13:25. We have good reason to believe that Kant was active in putting Lindner's candidacy forward. Hamann writes constantly to Lindner over this period as the negotiations get finalized.

38. Prussian Ministry, in the name of the King, October 28, 1765; cited in AA:13:25.

39. Kant enclosed a copy of this notification in his application letter for the library position, and it is reprinted in his correspondence as an enclosure to that letter, AA:10:49.

40. See AA:13:41.

41. Heller, *Kants Persönlichkeit*, 28. It is noteworthy that Kant later conceived economic independence as the indispensable requirement for eligibility for citizenship and political participation. It could be argued that Kant went so far as to consider dependence—broadly construed as *unmündigkeit*—as a bar to full ethical personhood.

42. Kant, *Beobachtungen*; tr. 54.

43. Carl Joseph Maria Dénina, *La Prusse littéraire sous Frédéric II*, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1790), 305–8.

44. Kant to Lagarde, March 25, 1790, AA:11:146.

45. Heller, *Kants Persönlichkeit*, 45.

46. Stuckenberg, *Life of Immanuel Kant*, 67.

47. Reinhold Jachmann, *Immanuel Kant*, 126.

48. Gulyga, *Immanuel Kant*, 24.

49. Jachmann, *Immanuel Kant*, 134.

50. Ritzel, *Immanuel Kant: Eine Biographie*, 15.

51. Arnoldt, "Kants Jugend," 188–90.

52. Gulyga, *Immanuel Kant*, 24.

53. Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 2, 8; Kant to Borowski, March 6, 1761, AA:10:34.

54. In 1772, for example, after he had already become an Ordinarius, Kant gave private lectures, in the latter's castle, to Duke Holstein-Beck. In token of the occasion, Kant obtained a student transcript of his Physical Geography lectures, personally annotated them, and presented them to the Duke (Schöndörffer, "Elegante Magister," 73). The volume has been preserved and will appear in the Academy edition of the Physical Geography lectures, which is currently under production. One can only presume that the gratuity in the other direction was magnanimous.

55. Kant to Frederick II, October 24, 1765, AA:10:48–49; Kant to Freiherr von Furst und Kupferberg, October 29, 1765, AA:10:50.

56. Kant to Frederick II, October 24, 1765, AA:10:49.

57. Kant to Freiherr von Furst und Kupferberg, October 29, 1765, AA:10:50.

58. "His first appointment to a position with a salary was in 1766, when he became second librarian in the Royal Library. The Government in Berlin, in the letter appointing him, designated him as 'the able Kant, made famous by his books.' His salary was 62 thalers a year" (Stuckenberg, *Life of Immanuel Kant*, 83).

59. *Ibid.*, 88.

60. G. A. Kelley, "Rousseau, Kant, and History," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 29 (1968): 347–64.

61. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 38.

62. *Metaphysik Herder* AA:28:892.

63. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 30.

64. J.-J. Rousseau, *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*.

65. "[N]ot one commentator has been encountered in over 200 works of the period who accepted the discourse paradoxes as Rousseau's sincere belief" (S. S. B. Taylor, "Rousseau's Contemporary Reputation in France," *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 27 [1963]: 1549). Claus Süßenburger has confirmed the same for the German reception (*Rousseau im Urteil der deutschen Publizistik bis zum Ende der Französischen Revolution* [Bern: Lang, 1974], 85ff).

66. Voltaire to Rousseau, August 30, 1755. The contents of the letter were immediately and widely publicized. The most vivid reflection came in Charles Pellissot's satire, *Les Philosophes*, which premiered in Paris in 1760. In one

scene, a philosopher literally crawled around the stage on all fours, to a wildly enthusiastic reception (Süßenberger, *Rousseau im Urteil*, 95).

67. On German appreciation of things Swiss in this historical moment, see Eduard Ziehen, *Die deutsche Schweizerbegeisterung in den Jahren 1750-1815* (Frankfurt: Diesterweg, 1922). On Rousseau specifically, see 33ff.

68. The German reception registered Rousseau ubiquitously as "paradoxical." Kant himself would criticize him for this in the *Bemerkungen*.

69. My assessment of Kant's reception of Rousseau tallies with that developed by Willi Goetschel, *Constituting Critique*, esp. 61 and 201 n. 13.

70. Josef Schmucker, *Die Ursprünge der Ethik Kants in seinen vorkritischen Schriften und Reflektionen* (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1961).

71. Hamann to Kant, three letters (December) 1759, AA:10:20-23, 26-31.

72. Kant, "Spitzfindigkeit," AA:2:57. Goetschel makes the same argument (*Constituting Critique*, 44): "the first marks of Rousseau already appear in the *False Subtlety*. Its title attacks scholastic philosophy just as sharply as Rousseau's own antitheses do, although Rousseau does so more completely and with more virtuosity. Kant echoes Rousseau's acrid sarcasm, which is so often hostile to science." And see Goetschel, *Constituting Critique*, 201 n. 13.

73. Herder called Kant "the great Rousseau student" in his letter to Hamann, April 1768 (Hamann, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 2, 409). It is one of the drawbacks of Schmucker's pathbreaking work on the influence of Rousseau on Kant in the 1760s that he did not have access to and therefore took no account of the evidence on this relationship offered by the Herder Lecture Notes. Hans Dietrich Irmscher published a version of these notes just shortly thereafter, and Dieter Henrich saw the powerful convergence of evidence these two contributions made to the grasp of Kant's "Entwicklungsgeschichte."

74. While there are no direct references to Rousseau's *Letter to D'Alembert* in Kant, there are indications that he was aware of material peripherally connected with the text, and Warda found that Kant owned the German translation of Rousseau's text, which was published in the early 1760s.

75. Not only does Kant refer to the novel in his *Bemerkungen* but there are references to the novel also in the Herder Lecture Notes. That Kant read novels, and that they played a significant role in his identity construction is something that deserves to be underscored, as Marie Rischmüller has done in her annotations to the *Bemerkungen*, esp. 146-48. In this, Kant was a person of his epoch. Lynn Hunt argues that novel-reading was crucial, in the period just after the middle of the eighteenth century, in creating ideologies of "human rights" grounded in a sense of individual identity (lecture delivered at Rice University, 1998). All this bears directly on Kant's reception of Rousseau and also on his involvement more generally in the Enlightenment and in "bourgeois emancipation" in Germany.

76. The legend of Kant so embroiled in reading *Emile* that he missed his walk, and thus deprived the housewives of Königsberg of an essential time-check—propounded originally by Borowski (*Darstellung*, 79)—needs to be

taken with a grain of salt, since it imputes to the Kant of the early 1760s the methodical ways of the older Kant. Borowski cannot count as a firsthand witness, since he had already left Königsberg by 1762. In fact, he was writing this at a distance of many decades from the event. Yet there is no question that, as Josef Schmucker has written, no book ever made more of an impact on Kant than *Emile* (*Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 174).

77. Anna Attridge, "The Reception of *La Nouvelle Héloïse*," *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 120 (1974): 227-67.

78. Raymond Trousson, "Jean Jacques Rousseau dans la presse périodique allemande de 1750 à 1800 (II)," *Dix-huitième siècle* 2 (1970): 233.

79. K. Guthke, "Zur Frühgeschichte des Rousseauismus," 385.

80. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 28.

81. *Ibid.*, 37-38. Contrast this with the two philosophers whom ostensibly he most admired in Germany, Mendelssohn and Lambert, who both took distinctly reserved stances toward Rousseau.

82. *Ibid.*, 38. The note begins to offer a third thought, but breaks off—leaving us to wonder what this "hard to come by and rare" insight into Rousseau might have been. The entire *Bemerkungen* represent Kant's effort to "work through" that third stage.

83. Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 142.

84. As Goetschel has noted, "In his encounter with Rousseau, Kant formulated his concept of himself as a writer" (*Constituting Critique*, 72).

85. Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 141; Kant's *Remarks in the "Observations"* document the "overwhelming impact [*übermächtiger Wirkung*]" of Rousseau on Kant's philosophical development (Henrich, "Über Kants Entwicklungsgeschichte," 257).

86. *Metaphysik Herder*, AA:28:2:871.

87. Schmucker (*Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*) tends to trace all of Kant's disaffection from *Gelehrsamkeit* to Rousseau, but our overview of the *Hochaufklärung* in Germany has demonstrated that this was a pervasive motif tracing back at least as far as to Christian Thomasius.

88. *Metaphysik Herder*, AA:28:2:871.

89. *Praktische Philosophie Herder* AA:27:1:63. This suggestion that science undermines the sexual drive may well account for an otherwise unexplained juxtaposition, in *Bemerkungen*, 76: "On the sexual inclination. On science."

90. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 34.

91. *Praktische Philosophie Herder* AA:27:1:63.

92. *Metaphysik Herder*, AA:28:2:893.

93. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 33-34.

94. *Metaphysik Herder*, AA:28:2:895.

95. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 37.

96. *Metaphysik Herder*, AA:28:2:895.
97. Wilhelm Jaitner, *Thomasius, Rüdiger, Hoffmann und Crusius* (Bleichenrode: Nieft, 1939).
98. For a good consideration of this weakness see Manfred Kuehn, "Kant's Conception of Hume's Problem."
99. See below, chapter 5.
100. Kant's earliest reference to Hume concerns Hume's essay "Of National Character."
101. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977), 3-4.
102. Ibid. Susan Shell writes: "Kant is always far more confident than Rousseau of the potential benefits of science" (*Rights of Reason*, 22).
103. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 35.
104. Ibid., 37. And see also 80.
105. Hume, *Enquiry*, 6.
106. Richard Velkley, *Freedom and the End of Reason*, 4-6.
107. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 10.
108. Gause writes (*Kant und Königsberg*, 52) that the Russians did not leave Königsberg until March 1763, and he is the major historian of the city.
109. Kurt Stavenhagen, *Kant und Königsberg* (Göttingen: Deuerlich, 1949), 21-24.
110. Joseph Kohnen, ed., *Königsberg* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1994); Heinz Ischreyt, ed., *Königsberg und Riga* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1995).
111. Joseph Kohnen, "Druckerei-, Verlags- und Zeitungswesen in Königsberg zur Zeit Kants und Hamanns," in *Königsberg*, ed. Kohnen, 2. And see Heinz Ischreyt, "Die Königsberger Freimaurerloge und die Anfänge des modernen Verlagswesens in Rußland (1760-1763)," in *Rußland und Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Kieler Historische Studien, 1974); and Ischreyt, "Streiflichter über die Freimaurerei in Kurland," in *Beförderer der Aufklärung in Mittel- und Osteuropa*, ed. E. Balazs et al. (Berlin: Camen, 1979).
112. Gause, *Kant und Königsberg*, 123.
113. Kohnen, "Kanter," 8.
114. Angelo Pupi, "Die Anfänge der Königsbergischen Gelehrten und Politischen Zeitungen (Februar-Mai 1764)," in *Königsberg*, ed. Kohnen, 21-54.
115. Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 118.
116. Hamann to Lindner, February 1, 1764 (*Hamann, Briefwechsel*, vol. 2, 234).
117. Gulyga, *Immanuel Kant*, 51-52.
118. Kant, AA:27:422ff.
119. Wolfgang Ritzel, *Immanuel Kant: Eine Biographie*, 75; citing Kant, *Praktische Philosophie Herder*, AA:27:1:81.

120. "Thus it was not only the witty Hamann who mocked with regularity the petty rivalries and chicaneries as well as the arrogance of the Königsberg professorial circles, but there are also numerous statements in Kant's own writings regarding the presumptions of the scholars and their pedantry which can only be explained in terms of personal experience" (Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 85).

121. Stavenhagen, *Kant und Königsberg*, 48.

122. Norbert Weis, *Königsberg: Immanuel Kant und seine Stadt* (Braunschweig: Westermann, 1993), 59-60.

123. Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 138.

124. Gulyga, *Immanuel Kant*, 48.

125. Karl August Böttiger, *Literarische Zustände und Zeigenossen*, vol. 1, ed. K. W. Böttiger (Leipzig, 1834), 133; cited in Norbert Hinske, "Kants Idee der Anthropologie," in *Die Frage nach dem Menschen*, ed. Heinrich Rombach (Munich: Alber, 1966), 423 n.

126. Otto Schöndörffer, "Der elegante Magister," *Reichs Philosophische Almanach auf das Jahr 1924. Immanuel Kant zum Gedächtnis* (Darmstadt: Reichl, 1924), 65-86.

127. Gulyga, *Immanuel Kant*, 42; Kant was only 5 feet 2½ inches tall [55].

128. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 7. The editor of Kant's text, Marie Rischmüller, explains the origins and significance of the term in her annotations, 137.

129. Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 120.

130. Stavenhagen, *Kant und Königsberg*, 58.

131. Schöndörffer, "Der elegante Magister," 70.

132. G. Gawlick and L. Kreimendahl, *Hume in der deutschen Aufklärung* (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1987), 171.

133. Hippel, *Der Mann nach der Uhr*.

134. Jachmann, *Immanuel Kant*, 153.

135. "Particularly important [in connection with Königsberg] is the close connection with England and the reception of the modern ideas of English philosophy (empiricism, sensualism, skepticism) as well as literature which it mediated, not to be forgotten the more liberal civic and economic ideas" (Margot Westlinning, "Der junge Herder in Königsberg," in *Königsberg und Riga*, ed. Ischreyt, 73).

136. Cited in Stavenhagen, *Kant und Königsberg*, 46.

137. Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 182.

138. Weis, *Königsberg*, 80.

139. Gulyga, *Immanuel Kant*, 55.

140. Cassirer, "Kant and Rousseau," in *Rousseau, Kant, Goethe*, 6.

141. Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 158.

142. Stuckenberg, *Life of Immanuel Kant*, 220.

143. Indeed, Kant's charisma as a teacher is attested far more widely than in the famous epigraph from Herder (Herder, *Briefe zu Beförderung der Humanität* [final version], Suphan:17:404). Werner Stark proposes quantitative analysis of this question, which would be nice, but the anecdotal evidence is already significant. Stark's own essays on Kant as teacher remain thus far thinner than one expects of his work ("Kant als akademischer Lehrer," in *Königsberg und Riga*, ed. H. Ischreyt, 51–68; "Die Formen von Kants akademischer Lehre," *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 40 [1992]: 543–62).

144. Goetschel, *Constituting Critique*, 25.

145. On the context, see Arno Seifert, *Cognitio Historica*.

146. Moses Mendelssohn, *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend*, March 1762 (*Jubiläumsausgabe* 5:1:506). Goetschel cites this text, 77.

147. Mendelssohn, "Über die Mischung der Schönheiten," (1758) in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1, 254; Herder to Kant, November 1768, AA:10:76.

148. Borowski, *Darstellung*, 32.

149. Pupi, "Anfänge," 27.

150. Hamann, review of *Beobachtungen*, in *Königsbergische Gelehrte und Politische Zeitungen*, April 30, 1764, in Hamann, *Kleine Schriften 1750–1788*, ed. Josef Nadler (Vienna: Herder, 1952), 289.

151. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:420.

152. Review of *Beobachtungen* in *Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek* 5:2 (1767), 273.

153. Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 161.

154. Kant began the essay on Negative Magnitudes immediately upon submitting the Prize Essay at the end of 1762, and he completed it in the spring of 1763. He commenced *Observations* that summer.

155. Kant, Prize Essay, AA:2:299; tr. 33.

156. *Metaphysik Herder*, AA:28:2:883.

157. Hence the aptness of the German title of the monograph by Sergio Moravia: *Beobachtende Vernunft*.

158. I will take up this theme in chapter 7.

159. *Praktische Philosophie Herder*, AA:27:1:62; tr. 28.

160. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 42.

161. Kant, *Nachricht seiner Vorlesungen für das Wintersemester 1765–1766*, AA:2:311; tr. 298.

162. Hamann, it will be remembered, knew of Kant's plans to compose such a work already in the spring of 1764; see his letter to Lindner, February 1, 1764 (Hamann, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 2, 234).

163. Hamann to Herder, January 16, 1767 (Hamann, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 2, 285).

164. Kant, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, 45.

165. Ibid., 46. On intellectual pleasure, see Frederic Will, *Intelligible Beauty in Aesthetic Thought from Winckelmann to Victor Cousin* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1958).

166. *The Sublime: A Reader in British Eighteenth-Century Aesthetic Theory*, ed. Andrew Ashfield and Peter de Bolla (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Paul Crowther, *The Kantian Sublime* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989).

167. Mendelssohn, "Über die Mischung"; Gracyks, "Kant's Shifting Debt to British Aesthetics," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 26 (1986): 205–17.

168. This controversy originated with Menzer and Schilpp.

169. Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 102, 104.

170. Schiller launched such criticism in a letter to Goethe, February 19, 1795: "The exposition is merely anthropological, and one learns nothing from it about the ultimate principles of the beautiful" (*Briefwechsel Schiller-Goethe* [Frankfurt: Insel, 1966], 87).

171. Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 153.

172. Schilpp, *Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics*, 45–62; Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 102.

173. See *Metaphysik Herder*, AA:28:2:883.

174. Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 112.

175. "[Natural impulses] are beautiful and charming, [genuine virtue] alone is sublime and venerable" (Kant, *Observations*, 61).

176. Ibid., 60. The idea of "grafting" is crucial. On this see Felicitas Munkel, "Epilogue: Character as a Grafted Entity," in *Kant's Conception of Moral Character* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 335–45.

177. Kant, *Observations*, 58.

178. Ibid., 62 and passim.

179. Feuer writes: "all his life Kant struggled to master his melancholy and gloom" ("Lawless Sensations," 84); Heller, *Kants Persönlichkeit*, 34; Hans Vaihinger, "Kant als Melancholiker," *Kant-Studien* 1 (1898).

180. Kant, *Observations*, 63.

181. Roy Porter, "Medical Science and Human Science in the Enlightenment," in *Inventing Human Science*, 66. See also O. Doughty, "The English Malady of the Eighteenth Century," *Review of English Studies* 2 (1926): 257–69.

182. Kant, *Observations*, 49.

183. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discourse on Inequality*, 66 n.

184. Kant, *Observations*, 62, 64, 70.

185. Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).

186. Bernard de Mandeville, *Fable of the Bees*; Montesquieu, *Spirit of the Laws*; Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*—all these texts are discussed in Hirschman.

187. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 48. Goetschel (*Constituting Critique*, 66) suggests that in this light, the entire conclusion should be read as irony. That there is irony is certainly undeniable, but that there is not also a measure of resignation to facticity, and hence more precisely a *cynicism* here, perhaps only pretended, seems to me to suggest the problem is more difficult than Goetschel makes it out to be.

188. Identifying no fewer than three distinct positions on crucial issues in moral philosophy from 1762 to 1765, Henrich observes that "Kant's thinking precisely in interludes of silence showed rapid, intensive movement and constant change" ("Über Kants Entwicklungsgeschichte," 263). "We know that just a short time had passed before Kant gave up his proposal of 1762. He then grasped the original, inner basis of the faculty of desire more concretely as freedom and defined the feeling that lies at the basis of all approbation more closely as the feeling of the inner universality, sociability and greatest extension of freedom in itself" (Henrich, "Über Kants früheste Ethik," 420).

189. Cassirer, "Rousseau and Kant," in *Rousseau, Kant, Goethe*; Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*; Klaus Richter, *Kant und Rousseau*; Jean Ferrari, *Les sources françaises de la philosophie de Kant* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1979).

190. Kant, *Observations*, 102 n.

191. Schilpp, *Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics*; Paul Menzer, "Der Entwicklungsgang der Kantischen Ethik in den Jahren 1760 bis 1785," *Kant-Studien* 2 (1898): 290-322; 3 (1899): 41-104.

192. Kant, *Observations*, 102.

193. Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 139-40.

194. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 28.

195. Here I agree entirely with Goetschel's criticism of Schmucker (Goetschel, *Constituting Critique*, 201 n. 13). Goetschel offers a perceptive characterization of the matter: "Intensive rereading must have made the philosophical content clearer. But this immersion must also have enabled Rousseau's literary power, against which Kant sought to defend himself, to express its great force subliminally, against Kant's will" (61).

196. On Herder's reception of Rousseau via Kant, see chapter 4.

197. See Marie Rischmüller's Introduction to the *Bemerkungen* for a rich discussion of the uniqueness and character of the text, xi-xv.

198. Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 177.

199. Henrich credits Schmucker with demonstrating that "Kant had in an altogether illuminating manner introduced Rousseau's historical anthropology into the ethic of moral sense" ("Über Kants Entwicklungsgeschichte," 263).

200. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 12.

201. Pierre Burgelin, "Kant, Lecteur de Rousseau."

202. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 16.

203. Kant was critical of Rousseau for this projective (dogmatic) notion of natural man (*Bemerkungen*, 41).

204. *Ibid.*, 17; see Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 231.

205. Jean Ferrari, *Les sources françaises de la philosophie de Kant*, 193.

206. Shell, *Embodiment of Reason*, 87–90.

207. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 51. Susan Shell argues that Kant dissolves Rousseau's distinction between *amour de soi* and *amour propre* (*Embodiment of Reason*, 86–87), but I do not think that is quite right.

208. Kant develops the idea of "asocial sociability" in "Idea for a Universal History in a Cosmopolitan Perspective" (1784), but the origins of that notion are clearly discernible here. On "luxury" as the character of the civilized estate, see Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 14, 16, 33–34, and so forth.

209. Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 220.

210. *Ibid.*, 221; Kant, AA:20:98.

211. As Schmucker puts it: "in the civilized estate, above all when it comes to fulfilling the more difficult duties, which require great sacrifice, the internal resources of morality are insufficient" (*Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 227).

212. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 15. This view persisted into the critical period, so that in the Third *Critique* Kant would argue that the possibility of a moral atheist—Spinoza—was psychologically indefensible.

213. Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 227–33.

214. *Ibid.*, 239–40, 256. This is the most famous claim of Schmucker's monograph, and one we will wish to consider in another context.

215. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 48. Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 206–7.

216. On the "palpable" experience of freedom, see Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Experience of Freedom*.

217. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discourse on Inequality*, 54.

218. Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 166, 168.

219. Kant, *Träume eines Geistersehers*, AA:2:335.

220. Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 169.

221. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 26–27.

222. *Ibid.*, 134; Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 157–58.

223. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 35.

224. *Ibid.*, 24; Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 188.

225. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 55.

226. Michel Foucault found Kant particularly interesting in this light; hence his dissertation on the *Anthropology*. The connection between Foucault's notion of the "care of self" and Kantian ethics deserves more consideration (Foucault, *The Care of the Self: History of Sexuality*, vol 3). The whole

problem of Kant's relation to the sources that Foucault himself considered—the ancients of all the various schools—has become increasingly prominent in recent treatments of Kantian ethics, e.g., Nancy Sherman, *Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting, eds., *Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Felicitas Munzel, *Kant on Character* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). On "philosophy as a way of life" as a new model of discourse for contemporary philosophy, with strong connections to classical ethical thought, see Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995); Alexander Nehamas, *The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Martha Nussbaum, *Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).

227. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 60.

228. *Ibid.*, 72, 55. See Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 221-22.

229. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 10, 14, 89, 111, 115, 119.

230. *Ibid.*, 107, 123, 104, 102. Schmucker notes that this was the decisive innovation in Kant, which had no analog in Rousseau: "the pleasure in the application of one's own force or the activation of one's own freedom" (*Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 197).

231. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 26-27, 15.

232. *Ibid.*, 40, 113. See Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 157, 202.

233. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 68.

234. "Men become sweet towards women as women become more manlike" (*ibid.*, 11). See Isabel Hull, *Sexuality, State, and Civil Society in Germany, 1700-1815*, 231.

235. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 44.

236. Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 118.

237. There is some delicacy in introducing the question of Kant's relation with women, not only because we have so little information to work with, but because it invites the charge of "voyeurism" to impute importance to it. Thus, Marie Rischmüller, in her introduction to Kant's *Bemerkungen*, warns against the "voyeuristischen Blick" (xiii).

238. Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 124.

239. Cited in Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 194.

240. Jachmann insists that Kant had love affairs as a young man, but he offers no supporting evidence (*Immanuel Kant*, 160). Norbert Weis has written, "the traces of Kant's love life are rare—probably because there was hardly anything that could have left a trace" (*Königsberg*, 102). Fritz Gause explained it as follows: "Kant's relation with women conformed to his personality. Certainly he did not seek from them what is today so highly touted as 'sex,' but

just as little did he fall into a superficial gallantry, though he was a master of the game of social etiquette in this epoch of rococo" ("Kant und die Frauen," *Ostdeutsche Monatshefte* 28 [1962]: 42). Weis goes further: "the all-too-close proximity of a woman would have disturbed his rhythm of living, his sense of purpose" (Königsberg, 103). Kuno Fischer believed that Kant remained a bachelor because "marriage did not fit into his living arrangements; in his exclusive devotion to independence lay the occasion for celibacy" (Fischer, *Kant*; cited in Heller, *Kants Persönlichkeit*, 53). Yet Kant did enter into "close proximity" with women, and it did change him. Here Ritzel's observation is convincing: "Probability counts, however, especially in a case like this. And it is just thoroughly improbable that Kant was a blank page in matters of love" (*Immanuel Kant: Eine Biographie*, 117).

241. "We must never forget that his material and social situation did not allow him even to think about sharing his life with a woman who would have been a proper match for him in education and cultivation [*ihrer Erziehung und Bildung nach, ihm ebenbürtig*]" (Heller, *Kants Persönlichkeit*, 55; see, too, 53).

242. Kant's earliest biographer, Borowski, insisted, referring to the 1760s, "I am aware of two quite worthy ladies (to whom can their names be of importance?), who one after the other captured his heart and his interest. But, of course, he was no longer a youngster, where one is quick to decide and quick to choose. He carried on so deliberately, delayed so long with his offer—which would certainly not have been refused—that one of them moved far away and the other accepted a respectable man who was faster than Kant" (*Darstellung*, 68).

243. Stuckenberg, *The Life of Immanuel Kant*, 190. Stuckenberg gets his evidence on the first two from a report from Kant's schoolmate and friend, Heilsberg. See Reicke, *Kantiana: Beiträge zu Immanuel Kants Leben* (1861), reprinted in *Immanuel Kant im Rede und Gespräche*, ed. Malter (Hamburg: Meiner, 1990), 50–51. The third may well have been Luisa Rebekka Fritz, who in her old age claimed that Kant had once been in love with her (Gulyga, *Immanuel Kant*, 54). Christian Kraus, one of Kant's most intimate friends of later life, probably had her in mind in the following passage: "I know of only one person whom he wanted to marry, based on what my friend Philippi told me around 1772; she was, as far as I know, however, a Königsberger. I can still see the house where she lived. Kant once let fall, as we passed by, that upon closer observation the aura quite disappeared, that is, that Kant did not find in her a woman's soul worthy of his attention" (Kraus, first in Reicke, *Kantiana*, reprinted in *Immanuel Kant im Rede und Gespräche*, ed. Malter, 117). Theodor von Hippel made sarcastic observations about her morals during the Russian occupation (Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 131). Of course, Hippel made sarcastic observations about lots of young women's morals in those days in Königsberg, since that was part of his novelist trade. Beyond that, things had gotten pretty risqué just then (Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 129–30; and see Stavenhagen, *Kant und Königsberg*, 23).

244. Cited in Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 192.

245. Schöndörffer, "Der elegante Magister," 83. Vorländer gets the age difference wrong by a decade (*Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 197).

246. Arnoldt, "Kant's Jugend," 174-75.

247. Some biographers maintained that Kant served as *Hofmeister* for the family in the years just before he returned to Königsberg to obtain his *Magister* (Stuckenberg takes this view, *Life of Immanuel Kant*, 57-58). Kraus, Kant's friend and protégé, secured a position in 1777 as *Hofmeister* in the Keyserling household on Kant's recommendation, and he swore that Kant himself had never served in such a position.

248. E. Fromm, "Das Kantbild der Gräfin Karoline Charlotte Amalie von Keyserling," *Kant-Studien* 2 (1898): 145-60.

249. Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 125. Ritzel (*Immanuel Kant: Eine Biographie*) barely mentions her.

250. Gulyga, *Immanuel Kant*, 14.

251. In 1761, the talented and ambitious Hippel fell in love with a young aristocratic woman, who shared his feelings. His effort to marry her was dismissed out of hand by her father, to the young couple's dismay. Hippel never married, though he had a lot to say about marriage and about the emancipation of women. (He also used his influence later to get an aristocratic "von" attached to his name, in part perhaps because of this snub.)

252. Schöndörffer, "Der elegante Magister," 86.

253. A late participant in that social scene, Elisa von der Recke, reminisced about this after Kant's death (1804):

Kant was a friend of the house for some thirty years and loved to socialize with the late countess [d. 1791]. I often saw him there, so charmingly entertaining that no one would suspect him to be such a deeply abstract thinker. In social conversation he knew how to dress up even the most abstract idea at times in a charming garb. He had at his disposal the most gracious wit, and his conversation was at times spiced with mild satire, always presented with the driest countenance, giving nothing away. (cited in Gause, *Kant und Königsberg*, 67)

This characterization of Kant's social skill is very significant, since it is based on Kant's conduct at a considerably more advanced age, when Kant and the Countess were both in their sixties. Their liveliness could hardly have been inferior some thirty years before.

254. Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 132.

255. "Maria Charlotta Jacobi was then [in 1762] 23 years old, and had been unhappily married for ten of them" (George, "Lives of Kant," 491).

256. Frau Jacobi to Kant, June 12, 1762, AA:10:39.

257. This is Vorländer's view (*Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 133). But, as Rolf George notes, "Ritzel suggests, without much reservation, that Kant had an affair with Mme. Jacobi" ("Lives of Kant," 492 n).

258. Gulyga and Ritzel make this effort (Gulyga, *Immanuel Kant*, 55; Ritzel, *Immanuel Kant: Eine Biographie*, 116). It has been fairly thoroughly debunked by Marie Rischmüller, ed., *Bemerkungen*, Annotations, 272.

259. Frau Jacobi to Kant, January 18, 1766, AA:10:57–8.

260. Jachmann, *Immanuel Kant*, 159.

261. Kant to C. A. von Knobloch, August 10, 1763, AA:10:43ff.

262. This resulted in the discovery of an important biographical detail. The historian of philosophy Kuno Fischer, in order to resolve the question of the dating of the letter, contacted the family of the lady and established that she had married a Captain von Klingspor on July 22, 1764. This is confirmed by a second document in Kant's correspondence, a letter she sent him in 1772, claiming to be eight years married and seeking his assistance in finding a tutor for her son (Frau von Klingspor [née von Knobloch] to Kant, 1772, AA:10:127ff). Because in his letter on Swedenborg Kant wrote to her under her maiden name, that set the terminal date by which the letter could have been sent, and scholars have assigned it to August 1763.

263. E. Benz, in his book *Swedenborg in Deutschland*, spends a great deal of time asking why Borowski would have deliberately changed the dating of the letter to 1758. He ends up deciding that it was an honest mistake, since in his view the only benefit in changing the dating would have been to establish, as some Swedenborg partisans had tried to do, that it was composed after *Träume eines Geistersehers*, and thus represented a recantation of Kant's hostile appraisal of the Swedish mystic. That prospect was foreclosed by Kuno Fischer's establishment of the lady's marriage date, and, for Benz, Borowski's misdating no longer made much difference.

264. "In March 1758 he recommended to the father of [Charlotte], General Gottfried von Knobloch, Lord of Schulkeim, his student Borowski as tutor" (Malter, ed., *Immanuel Kant im Rede und Gespräche*, 45 n).

265. Kant to Borowski, June 6, 1760, AA:10:32. The text is, presumably, Kant's letter of consolation to Mme. Funk upon the death of her son (Kant to Frau Agnes Elisabeth von Funk, June 6, 1760, AA:10:31–32). We also have a note Borowski wrote urgently one morning in the spring of 1762, to ask for a private appointment with Kant later in the day: "It would be a pleasure for me to speak to you, and in particular concerning one point, on which I am commanded by my gracious patroness to consult with you. In these circumstances, please allow my pupil to leave at four o'clock. The content of my main topic of conversation requires that he not be present. Please do not let anything on to him and please do me the kindness of destroying this note after you have read it" (Borowski to Kant, Spring 1762, AA:10:39). The commentators on Kant's correspondence suggest, in connection with this note, whose dating appeared uncertain to them, that Borowski wished to discuss with Kant some alleged offense to him personally by his pupil. They express uncertainty about the note's dating, suggesting it could have been from as early as 1760, and they cite a letter to Borowski dated 1760 from Diakonus Trescho—best known as Herder's taskmaster in Mohrungen—who apparently had served as *Hauslehrer*

for the von Knobloch family before Borowski, commiserating with him for some such offense [AA:13:18]. Perhaps it has other implications, but we will never know.

266. Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 126.

267. Heller, *Kants Persönlichkeit*, 50.

268. Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, AA:7:262.

269. Kant did not like women who wanted to talk to him about ideas. He came closest to rudeness when he was approached in such a manner (Ritzel, *Immanuel Kant: Eine Biographie*, 125). Yet the two women of whom he used the undoubtedly complimentary phrase "ornament of her sex" both evidently engaged Kant in intellectual matters without alienating him.

270. See Ritzel, *Immanuel Kant: Eine Biographie*, 105.

271. One might compare this with a much more egregious philosophical commentator on women, Friedrich Nietzsche. See Kelly Oliver and Marilyn Pearsall, eds., *Feminist Interpretations of Friedrich Nietzsche* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998).

272. Ritzel, *Immanuel Kant: Eine Biographie*, 117.

273. Lehmann, "Kants Lebenskrise," 417.

274. Ferrari, *Sources françaises*, 203 n.

275. Ursula Pia Jauch, *Immanuel Kant zur Geschlechterdifferenz: Aufklärerische Vorurteilkritik und bürgerliche Geschlechtsvormundschaft* (Vienna: Passagen, 1988), 59. And see Isabel Hull, *Sexuality, State, and Civil Society in Germany, 1700-1815* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), esp. 301-14.

276. Susan Okin, *Women in Western Political Thought* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979); Joan Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); Julia Simons-Ingram, "Expanding the Social Contract: Rousseau, Gender and the Problem of Judgment," *Comparative Literature* 43 (1991): 134-49; Mary Trouille, "The Failings of Rousseau's Ideal of Domesticity and Sensibility," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 24 (1981): 451-83; Trouille, *Sexual Politics in the Enlightenment* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997).

277. Jauch, *Geschlechterdifferenz*, 17, 60.

278. On Rousseau: Okin, *Women in Western Political Thought*, 99-193; Colette Piau-Gillot, "La Discours de Jean Jacques Rousseau sur les femmes et sa reception critique," *Dix-huitième siècle* 13 (1981): 317-33. On Kant: Susan Mendes, "Kant: 'An Honest but Narrow-Minded Bourgeois!'" in *Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy*, ed. Howard Williams (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 166-90; Kristin Waters, "Women in Kantian Ethics: A Failure of Universality," in *Modern Engendering*, ed. Bat-Ami Bar On (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 117-25; Barbara Hermann, "Could It Be Worth Thinking about Kant on Sex and Marriage?" in *A Mind of Our Own*, ed. Louise Antony and Charlotte Witt (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997), 49-68; Robin Schott, ed.,

Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).

279. Liselotte Steinbrugge, *The Moral Sex: Woman's Nature in the French Enlightenment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

280. Samia Spencer, ed., *French Women and the Age of Enlightenment* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984); Dorinda Outram, "Enlightenment Thinking about Gender," in *The Enlightenment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 80-95.

281. Genevieve Lloyd, *The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

282. Seyla Benhabib, *Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

283. It is fairly clear that Kant submitted his gender considerations to virtually no revision over the course of the critical period. What appears in the published version of the *Anthropology* in 1798 is not very distant from what seems the staple offering of his *Anthropology Lectures* from the 1770s forward, and these not distant at all from the crystallization of these ideas in the *Beobachtungen* and *Bemerkungen* of the early 1760s. Kant settled this question to his satisfaction by 1765, and this is noteworthy because Kant did not believe in settled questions in any other significant sphere of his intellectual life. He constantly resubmitted his thought to critical examination. But not here.

284. This is what Jean Ferrari (*Sources françaises*, 203 n), for example, thinks.

285. Erich Schön, *Der Verlust der Sinnlichkeit oder Die Verwandlung des Lesers: Mentalitätswandel um 1800* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987).

286. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 74.

287. Feuer, "Lawless Sensations," 78, 94; Kant's fear of sexual intercourse is well-discussed in Shell, *Embodiment of Reason*, 290; and noted in Hull, *Sexuality, State, and Civil Society*, 306; and Jauch, *Geschlechterdifferenz*, 78.

288. Hull, *Sexuality*, 308.

289. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 23.

290. Much later in his life, the critical Kant acknowledged to one of his most talented disciples, Friedrich Schiller, that his personal asceticism had inadvertently and inappropriately colored the rigorism to which his ethical principle entitled him.

291. Kant, *Observations*, 78.

292. There is one important exception in Kant's *Reflexionen*, which should for just this reason be cited: *Reflexion* 1281, AA:15:2:364.

293. Hannelore Schröder, "Kant's Patriarchal Order," in *Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant*, ed. Schott (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 275-96.

294. Ursula Jauch makes this argument: *Immanuel Kant zur Geschlechterdifferenz*, 55.

295. Kant, *Observations*, 79.

296. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 87.

297. Kant, *Reflexion* 1176, AA:15:520.

298. Kant, *Reflexion* 1269, AA:15:560.

299. Kant, *Reflexion* 1194, AA:15:527.

300. Kant, *Reflexion* 1206, AA:15:530.

301. Kant, *Reflexion* 1263, AA:15:558.

302. Kant, *Observations*, 88.

303. Kant, *Anthropology*, AA:7:304-5; tr. 217-18. He elaborates: "Whenever the refinement of luxury has reached a high point, the woman shows herself well-behaved only by compulsion, and makes no secret in wishing that she might rather be a man, so that she could give larger and freer latitude to her inclinations; no man, however, would want to be a woman" (307; tr. 221).

304. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 91.

305. "The free enjoyment of lustful inclination and the unreserved recognition of its object dissolves all idealization that can be applied to that inclination [hence] it is so hard to keep up for long the idealistic pleasure in marriage" (*ibid.*, 96).

306. Kant, *Anthropology*, AA:7:292; tr. 203. Not coincidentally, this distinction lies at the heart of Kant's discrimination of his own "pragmatic" anthropology from the "physiological" anthropology of his rivals. See chapter 7.

307. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 50.

308. Kant, *Anthropology*, 290; tr. 201.

309. Kant, *Reflexion* 1111, AA:15:494.

310. Kant, *Reflexion* 1113, AA:15:496.

311. Kant, *Reflexion* 1118, AA:15:499.

312. Kant, *Reflexion* 1125, AA:15:502. The best treatment of this entire issue is Felicitas Munzel, *Kant on Moral Character*.

313. Kant, *Anthropology*, 293; tr. 204.

314. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 60.

315. Kant, *Reflexion* 1153, AA:15:510.

316. Kant, *Reflexion* 1166, AA:15:516.

317. Heller, *Kants Persönlichkeit*, 64.

318. Kant, *Reflexion* 1155, AA:15:511.

319. Kant, *Reflexion* 1162, AA:15:514.

320. Kant, *Reflexion* 1164, AA:15:514. This observation is quite illuminating for Kant's later moral theory, as well as for his theory of judgment in general.

321. Kant, *Reflexion* 1166, AA:15:516.

322. Kant, *Reflexion* 1169, AA:15:517.

323. Kant to Suckow, December 15, 1769, AA:10:83.

324. Kant to Herz, early April 1778, AA:10:231.

325. "The value of life for us, if it is estimated by that *which we enjoy* (by the natural purpose of the sum of all inclinations, i.e., happiness) is easy to decide. It sinks below zero, for who would be willing to enter upon life under the same conditions?" (Kant, *Critique of Judgment* §83 n; tr. 284 n).

326. Kant, *Reflexion* 1286, AA:15:568.

327. Kant to Herder, May 9, 1768, AA:10:73–74.

328. I cannot agree with Beiser's reading, which sees mainly a continuity between the *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* and the *Inaugural Dissertation*. See Beiser, "Kant's Intellectual Development, 1747–1770," in *Cambridge Companion to Kant*, 49–52.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. Beiser (*Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992]) sees Herder as far closer to Kant and the *Aufklärung* than the traditional interpretation classically stated by Rudolf Unger in *Hamann und die Aufklärung* (Jena: Diederichs, 1911). For a more balanced assessment, see Ulrich Gaier, "Gegenaufklärung im Namen des Logos: Hamann und Herder," in *Aufklärung und Gegenaufklärung in der europäischen Literatur* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek, 1989), 261–76; and Jürgen Brummack, "Herders Polemik gegen die 'Aufklärung,'" in *Aufklärung und Gegenaufklärung in der europäischen Literatur*, 277–93.

2. On Herder and Hamann, see Günter Arnold, "'Eitelkeit der Eitelkeiten!' Aufklärungskritik im Briefwechsel zwischen Herder und Hamann," in *Johann Georg Hamann und die Krise der Aufklärung*, ed. B. Gajek and A. Meier (Frankfurt: Lang, 1990), 189–212.

3. On Herder's indebtedness to Home, see Leroy Shaw, "Henry Home of Kames: Precursor of Herder," *Germanic Review* 35 (1960): 16–27. A review of the German translation of volume 2 of Kames's *Elements of Criticism* appeared in the Königsberg newspaper on March 5, 1764. The author could have been either Kant or Herder. See William Lehmann, *Henry Home, Lord Kames, and the Scottish Enlightenment* (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 230.

4. Herder to Scheffner, September 24/October 4, 1766: "I, who was introduced simultaneously into *Rousseauiana* and *Humiana* by Kant, who read both men every day . . ." (*Lebensbild*, vol. 1, 193). On Herder and Rousseau, see Hans M. Wolff, "Der junge Herder und die Entwicklungsidee Rousseaus," *PMLA* 57 (1942): 753–819; Karl Guthke, "Zur Frühgeschichte des Rousseauismus in Deutschland," *Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie* 77 (1958): 384–96; Guthke, "A Note on Herder and Rousseau," *MLQ* 19 (1958): 303–6; Kim Vivian, "Herder, Rousseau, and Fuseli," *German Life and Letters* 33 (1980): 263–68; F. M. Barnard, "National Culture and Political Legitimacy: Herder

and Rousseau," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 44 (1983): 231-53; Barnard, "Geschichtsbewußtsein and Public Thinking: Rousseau and Herder," *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 66 (1992): 31-47. There is, alas, no comparable literature on Herder and Hume; for a beginning, see John Christian Vivian, *Der Einfluß David Humes auf den jungen Herder von 1762 bis 1769* (Dissertation, University of Jena, 1993). I would like to thank Mr. Vivian for making this dissertation and supporting material available to me.

5. Herder wrote of these philosophers as his inspiration in his correspondence with Friedrich Jacobi in the early 1780s, and then again in the preface to his *Gott: einige Gespräche* (1787). There is indisputable evidence of his preoccupation with Shaftesbury by the mid-1760s and with Leibniz and with Spinoza by the late 1760s.

6. Haym, *Herder*; Suphan, "Herder als Schüler Kants"; Dobbek, *Herders Jugendzeit in Mohrunen und Königsberg*.

7. Westlinning, "Der junge Herder," 71; Dobbek, *Herders Jugendzeit*, 76-77.

8. Dobbek, *Herders Jugendzeit*, 37-38.

9. *Ibid.*, 64; Westlinning, "Der junge Herder," 72.

10. "The Ode to Cyrus is said to be by a certain Hermes who lives in Mohrunen" (Hamann to Lindner, April 16, 1762; Hamann, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 2, 147). That turns out to be the debut of one of the most important figures in Hamann's voluminous correspondence.

11. Dobbek, *Herders Jugendzeit*, 83.

12. The medical profession was notoriously a nest of "free-thinkers."

13. Westlinning, "Der junge Herder," 71 n.

14. *Ibid.*, 72; Haym, *Herder*, 35-36.

15. Seligo to Puttlich, August 8, 1805, in *Immanuel Kant in Rede und Gespräch*, ed. Malter, 61.

16. Haym, *Herder*, 35.

17. Dobbek, *Herders Jugendzeit*, 86.

18. *Ibid.*, 97.

19. Herder, *Kalligone* (1800; Suphan:18:12-13).

20. Bock, "Was mir von dem Anfange der literarischen Laufbahn des verewigten Herder bekannt ist," in *Herders Lebensbild*, vol. 1, 133-36.

21. Haym, *Herder*, 48.

22. Bock, "Was mir," in *Herders Lebensbild*, vol. 1, 135.

23. Kant to Herder, May 9, 1768, AA:10:73-74.

24. Herder, *Briefe zu Beförderung der Humanität* (final version) Suphan:17:404.

25. Haym, *Herder*, 52.

26. Dobbek, *Herders Jugendzeit*, 97.

27. Ibid., 108; drawing upon Caroline Herder's *Erinnerungen* (vol. 1, 62).
28. Dobbek, *Herders Jugendzeit*, 101.
29. Böttiger, cited by Norbert Hinske in "Kants Idee der Anthropologie," 423 n. (See n. 125 in chapter 3.)
30. Herder to Lavater, October 30, 1772. In this letter Herder writes of Kant "who is my friend and teacher" (italics added). The present tense in 1772 is important.
31. Herder to Hamann [1766?] (Hamann, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 2, 301).
32. Cited in Gulyga, *Immanuel Kant*, 50–51.
33. Dobbek, *Herders Jugendzeit*, 112.
34. Haym, *Herder*, 66.
35. Dobbek, *Herders Jugendzeit*, 111.
36. Herder, *Kalligone* (Suphan:18:12–13). For their own reasons—perhaps simply because the sources say so—Haym and Dobbek, and Vorländer as well, lend credence to these claims even as they recognize the projections and self-deceptions involved (on both sides). Westlinning is better at just brushing this obfuscation aside.
37. Margot Westlinning, "Der junge Herder in Königsberg," in *Königsberg und Riga*, ed. Ischreyt, 79.
38. Caroline Herder, *Erinnerungen*; cited in Malter, *Immanuel Kant in Rede und Gespräch*, 6; Herder, *Kalligone* (Suphan:18:12–13); Henrich, "Kants Denken 1762/63," 11.
39. Haym, *Herder*, 52.
40. Herder, *Briefe*, Suphan:18:324.
41. Heller, *Kants Persönlichkeit*, 17.
42. Kant to Herder, May 1768, AA:10:73–74; Herder to Kant, November 1768, AA:10:75–79.
43. Herder, *Briefe*, Suphan:18:324.
44. Schöndörffer, "Der elegante Magister," 71.
45. Herder, *Briefe*, Suphan:18:324–25.
46. Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 204; tr. in introduction to Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy*, lx.
47. Kant to Lindner, October 28, 1759, AA:10:18–19.
48. Herder, *Briefe*, Suphan:18:325.
49. Herder, *Briefe* (final version), Suphan:17:404.
50. Herder, *Briefe* (final version), Suphan:17:404; *Briefe*, Suphan:18:325.
51. Herder, *Briefe*, Suphan:18:325.
52. Herder, *Briefe* (final version), Suphan:17:404.
53. Herder, *Briefe*, Suphan:18:325. This is an allusion to the conversation Böttiger mentions in the passage cited in chapter 3 (see n. 125).

54. Herder to Scheffner, September 24/October 4, 1766: "I, who was introduced simultaneously into *Rousseauiana* and *Humiana* by Kant, who read both men every day . . ." (*Herders Lebensbild*, vol. 1, 193).

55. Ibid.; Dobbek, *Herders Jugendzeit*, 95. Of course, Herder indicates also reading *Hume* every day, and of this more will need to be said.

56. Herder to Scheffner, October 31, 1767: "My philosophical didactic poem for Kant was the outcome of a stomach overfull of Rousseau's writings; however, I would like to have it back; if you could accomplish that for me, I would be very obliged to you" (*Lebensbild*, vol. 1, 299).

57. Clark claims that the decisive aspect of Herder's revisions of his *Fragmente* I and II in 1767 was the "suppression of Rousseauism" in response to the criticisms by Christian Garve of the penchant to "philosophical romance" that it had inspired in Herder (*Herder*, 74).

58. "Besides Kant and more than Kant, longer lasting, deeper, more personal than the latter—more than any other human being was the influence of Hamann on Herder" (Haym, *Herder*, 68).

59. Unger, *Hamann und die Aufklärung*.

60. Emil Adler, *Herder und die deutsche Aufklärung* (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1968).

61. Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, ed., *Herder Today* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1987); Gerhard Sauder, ed., *Johann Gottfried Herder 1744-1803* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987); Wolf Koepke, ed., *Johann Gottfried Herder: Language. History, and the Enlightenment* (Columbia, S.C.: Camden House, 1990); Martin Bollacher, ed., *Johann Gottfried Herder: Geschichte und Kultur* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1994); Regine Otto, ed., *Nationen und Kulturen* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1996); Wolf Koepke, ed., *Johann Gottfried Herder: Academic Disciplines and the Pursuit of Knowledge* (Columbia, S.C.: Camden House, 1996).

62. See H. B. Nisbet, "Zur Revision des Herder-Bildes im Lichte der neueren Forschung," in *Bückerburger Gespräche* (1971): 101-17; and the bibliography of recent literature: Tino Markworth, *Johann Gottfried Herder: A Bibliographical Study, 1977-1987* (Hürth-Efferen: Gabel, 1990).

63. Herder, "Essay on a History of Lyrical Poetry," in *Selected Early Works, 1764-1767*, ed. and tr. Ernest Menze and Karl Menges (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 80. (Interestingly, Herder embroiders upon this thought with reference to Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*, evidence that this text was already centrally in play in the thought of the Königsberg *Aufklärung*.)

64. Frederick Beiser, *Enlightenment, Idealism, Romanticism*, 195.

65. See Herder's great manifesto (together with Goethe), *Von deutscher Art und Kunst* (1773). On *Sturm und Drang* see the older work by Roy Pascal, *The German Sturm und Drang* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1953), and the more recent survey of the scholarship, W. Hinke, ed. *Sturm und Drang: ein literaturwissenschaftliches Studienbuch* (Kronberg: Athenäum, 1979).

66. Haym, *Herder*, 77.

67. On the influence of *Tristram Shandy* in Kant's and Herder's circle, see Michael Maurer, *Aufklärung und Anglophilie*, 336; Hamilton Beck, "Tristram Shandy and Hippel's *Lebensläufe nach aufsteigender Linie*," *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture* 10 (1980): 261–78.

68. Carl Wilpert, Mayor of Riga; cited in *Immanuel Kant im Rede und Gespräche*, ed. Malter, 65.

69. Horst Steinmetz, ed., *Lessing, ein unpoetischer Dichter* (Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1969).

70. As Herder deepened his historical understanding of language and literature, he even grew suspicious of efforts to make prose beautiful. See Robert Norton, *Herder's Aesthetic*, 102–3 n.

71. Dobbek, *Herders Jugendzeit*, 87.

72. Felicitas Munzel, "Menschenfreundschaft: Friendship and Pedagogy in Kant," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 32 (1998/99): 247–60.

73. Haym, *Herder*, 55.

74. Here I agree entirely with Hans Adler's statement: "That Herder did not follow Kant into the latter's version of the critical philosophy—this observation by itself—is not a sufficient reason to fail to examine the validity and consistency of Herder's own [philosophical] position" (*Prägnanz des Dunklen*, 50).

75. Hans Adler is merely reporting conventional wisdom when he observes, "But as appears to be the rule with Herder's working style, in the lecture notes as well we have no purely reproductive [enterprise]; rather, what is going on is 'revisions [*Umarbeitungen*]' in which the reproduction of what was heard, commentary, annotation, and personal reflections of Herder as listener all get mixed together" (*Prägnanz des Dunklen*, 52). It can hardly have been otherwise; and yet, I think, Adler here follows the penchant of most Herder scholars in being interested in distinguishing Herder's own voice as soon as possible in his writings.

76. See, e.g., Dieter Henrich, "Kants Entwicklungsgeschichte," 261. Beatke Dreike even believes that the lecture notes are signs of Herder's negligence and disinterest in Kant's presentations!

77. Current Kant scholarship has accepted the lecture notes as authentic materials for the understanding of Kant when their contents are juxtaposed with other lecture notes, and all these together are compared with the ensemble of Kant's corpus. The problematic nature of lecture notes as sources for an accurate assessment of Kant's philosophy has long been an issue in Kant scholarship. It led Adickes to delay inclusion of the lecture notes in the academy edition, despite Dilthey's plans to do so. It was only after the Second World War, under the lead-editorship of Lehmann, that this project got underway, and it is still not complete. The philological and philosophical issues have been discussed with great acuity by Lehmann, Hinske, and Brandt, among recent scholars (Gerhard Lehmann, "Kants Entwicklung im Spiegel der Vorlesungen,"

in *Studien zu Kants philosophischer Entwicklung* [Hildesheim: Olms, 1967], 144-58). In my view, the wisest grasp of these matters is Hinske's. His proposal that Kant scholarship work within the framework of a "corpus" of mutually nuancing materials—published writings, lecture notes, and unpublished reflections—seems to me the basis for all future work in the field (Hinske, "Zwischen Aufklärung und Vernunftkritik," 58-59). The Cambridge edition of translations of Kant's works, which includes substantial segments of the lecture notes, also takes note of the philological issues and their philosophical implications. See, e.g., Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon, introduction to Kant, *Lectures on Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), xiii-xliii.

78. I agree with Marion Heinz that "here the young Herder attempts to establish his own philosophical profile by critically coming to terms—for the most part on the basis of Kantian ideas—with Kant's newly published *One Possible Basis of Proof for the Demonstration of the Existence of God*" (*Sensualistischer Idealismus*, 1).

79. How can we assess the matter? First, I believe, we must do what Hans Adler claims neither of the recent editors of Herder's text, Gaier or Proß, did, namely, compare Herder's text, in which he explicitly tried to distinguish his own views from those of his mentor, with the notes Herder took in the Kant lectures (Adler, *Prägnanz des Dunklen*, 50); Gaier's edition of the text has become standard and I will use it here.

80. On the basis of a letter from Herder to Hamann (August 1764), Ulrich Gaier suggests that Herder may have submitted the work to Kant ("Commentary," DKV:1:844-45).

81. Herder, *Versuch über das Sein*, in *Johann Gottfried Herder: Frühe Schriften 1764-1772*, 9-21.

82. Herder to Hamann, August 1764; cited in Gaier, "Commentary," DKV:1:844-45.

83. Kant, *Einzig mögliche Beweisgrund*, AA:2:163-64; English: *The One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979).

84. See Manfred Baum, "Herder's Essay on Being," in *Herder Today* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1987), 126-37.

85. Manfred Baum and Marion Heinz both stress the prominence of Hume's *Enquiry* in Herder's "Essay on Being." "It is certain that Herder already knew Hume's *Enquiry* by the time he composed his 'Essay on Being,'" Heinz writes (Marion Heinz, *Sensualistischer Idealismus*, 2 n). She elaborates: "Not only Hume's naturalism or anthropology but also his skeptical determination of the limits of human cognitive possibilities make their presence felt in Herder's first effort in philosophy. . . . Already [Herder's] program for a subjective philosophy points toward Hume's conception of a philosophy of mind [*Geist*—but Hume would never use "spirit"] which in analogy to Newton's physics takes as its task the unprejudiced description and analysis of the

nature of the human mind, its powers and the laws of its operation" (*Sensualistischer Idealismus*, 23). J. C. Vivian has shown how extensively Herder studied Hume's *Enquiry* in the German translation edited and annotated by Johann Sulzer, and how important his personal notes both from Hume and from Sulzer proved for his argument in "Essay on Being" (Vivian, *Der Einfluß David Humes*, chapter 3).

86. One should be suspicious, I think, especially on the grounds of Hume's radical skepticism, which as Heinz notes elsewhere, Herder glosses over (Heinz, *Sensualistischer Idealismus*, 14).

87. Wolfgang Röd, "Kant und Hume: Die Transzendentalphilosophie als Alternative zum Naturalismus," *Dialectica* 49 (1995): 317–34.; Röd, "Humes Skeptizismus als Entwurf eines neuen philosophischen Paradigmas," *Grazer philosophischen Studien* 44 (1993): 211–32.

88. Haym, *Herder*, 52. Frederick Beiser sees Kant's *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte* as a very important source for Herder's naturalism: "Herder approved of Kant's radical naturalism and only wanted to extend it. Kant's suggestion in his treatise that humans too are subject to a natural history and explicable in naturalistic terms proved to be especially fruitful for the young Herder" (*Enlightenment, Revolution, Romanticism* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992], 194). The argument for Kant's strong empiricism in this decade was started in the chapter 3 and will be continued in chapter 5.

89. B. Erdmann's "Kant und Hume in 1762" needs substantial updating. See J. C. Vivian, *Der Einfluß David Humes*, and chapter 5 below.

90. Baum, Heinz, and Gaier all stress Herder's derivation of arguments from Kant and from Crusius throughout the "Essay on Being."

91. Gaier, commentary on "Versuch über das Sein," 854.

92. *Metaphysik Herder*, AA:28:1:6.

93. Mark Kulstad, *Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness and Reflection* (Munich: Philosophie Verlag, 1991).

94. Herder, "Versuch über das Sein," 10.

95. The best treatment of this part of Herder's essay is Manfred Baum, "Herder's Essay on Being," in *Herder Today*, 126–37.

96. Herder, "Versuch über das Sein," 20–21.

97. Mendelssohn, *Philosophical Conversations*. This treatment drew heavily upon the major commentary on Spinoza by Wolff himself, in *Theologia rationalis*. This essay appeared in translation as an appendix to the crucial German translation of Spinoza's *Ethics*, and proved vital for the "Spinoza Renaissance" of the second half of the eighteenth century in Germany. See Jean L'École, "La Critique Wolffienne du Spinozisme," *Archives de Philosophie* 46 (1983): 553–567; Cornelia Buschmann, "Wolff's 'Widerlegung' der 'Ethik' Spinozas," in *Spinoza in der europäischen Geistesgeschichte*, 126–41; Ursula Goldenbaum, "Die erste deutsche Übersetzung der Spinozaschen 'Ethik,'" in *Spinoza in der europäischen Geistesgeschichte*, 107–25.

98. Baum, "Herder's Essay on Being," 106–7.

99. Heinz, *Sensualistischer Idealismus*, 17.

100. Hans Adler's study is indispensable on this connection.

101. Herder, "Versuch über das Sein," 5.

102. Hans Adler summarizes his analysis of Herder's "Versuch über das Sein" with the following observations: "unprovable certainty of being is the ontological starting point for Herder. Sensibility [*Empfindung*] as the instance which makes for [*verschaffe*] this primordial certainty is Herder's primary gnoseological option. The first [position] he shares with Kant; the second divides Herder from Kant" (*Prägnanz des Dunklen*, 57). That is exactly right.

103. One need only think of Heidegger in recent philosophy to register the enormity of the issues, here.

104. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 130.

105. Herder, *Versuch über das Sein*, 12. See Irmischer, "Grundzüge der Hermeneutik Herders," 33, and Hans Adler, *Prägnanz des Dunklen*, 77 n.

106. And still less "God," as Adler tolerantly allows him to synonymize (*Prägnanz des Dunklen*, 59).

107. Hans Dietrich Irmischer writes: "Herder . . . sets in the place of thought (what his time understood by *cogitare*) the experience of one's own embodiment [*die Erfahrung der eigenen Leiblichkeit*] as the only allowable source of knowledge of self or world" ("Grundzüge der Hermeneutik Herders," 33). Adler quarrels with this claim, holding that embodiment is only relevant in the context of external senses, but that the inner sense is more primordial, and that one should not confuse the presence of being with the experience of embodiment. I think, though, that Irmischer is correct philologically in taking embodiment as the central touchstone of knowledge for Herder, and I think that philosophically it is extremely difficult, and in any event, profoundly incongruous with Herder's project, to conceive of an inner sense apart from external sense or embodiment. Adler himself recognizes that, for Herder, embodiment is an inescapable constraint of humanity (*Prägnanz des Dunklen*, 100).

108. I take this useful term from Marion Heinz, *Sensualistischer Idealismus*.

109. On this issue in the Herder lectures, see *Metaphysik Herder*, AA:28:1:11-12, 18-24; AA:28:2:845. It is also central to Kant's publications of 1762-1764; see Henrich, "Kants Denken 1762/63," *passim*.

110. "It is utterly necessary that one convince oneself of the existence of God; it is not, however, at all so necessary that one demonstrate it," AA:2:205.

111. Herder, "Versuch über das Sein," 19.

112. Heinz and Baum hold that Herder did not really grasp the argument Kant was making; Gaier sees Herder's criticism as consistent with the general stance of the ultimate critical philosophy. Schmucker holds that much in the *Only Possible Basis* is retained in the *First Critique*. As with so much else in the technical exegesis of Kant's arguments, there is nothing quite approaching consensus about what he was saying.

113. Herder, "Versuch über das Sein," 19.

114. Heinz comments: "To be sure we are present to ourselves in inner sense, but as empty consciousness that knows only that it exists, so that no knowledge about any other existence is involved." Thus, "for the explication of its obscure concept of Being the soul requires the senses, but these sensible forms of presentation are themselves nothing but modifications of the soul" (*Sensualistischer Idealismus*, xix). She draws the vital historical conclusion: "This distinction between ideal being and existential being demonstrates best the empirical impulse in Herder's 'Essay on Being'" (12 n).

115. Heinz, *Sensualistischer Idealismus*, 9.

116. Gaier, "Commentary," 848. "Herder feels entitled to this generalization of the superfluosity of philosophy (as an independent science) because, as he insists with ever greater frequency, Being, which can never be proven, is 'the node [*Mittelpunkt*] of all certainty'" (867).

117. Herder, introduction to *Fragments: First Collection*, in *Selected Early Works*, 1764-1767, 94.

118. That raises all sorts of questions about Herder and German nationalism. See George Iggers, *The German Conception of History* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1983); Otto Dann, "Herder und die Deutsche Bewegung," in *Johann Gottfried Herder, 1744-1803* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), 308-40; and so forth. But the proper context seems to me to be captured by Ulrich Geier: "In Herder's early period, national pride and patriotism, powerfully advocated by Swiss authors like Johann Georg Zimmermann and Isaak Iselin and applied to the German situation by their German followers like Friedrich Karl von Moser, Jakob Wegelin and—especially important for Herder—Thomas Abbt, absorbed the contexts of human flourishing and perfection" ("Vom rationalen Klassik zur Humanität: Konzepte der Vollendung bei Herder," in *Nationen und Kulturen*, ed. Otto, 54).

119. Herder, introduction to *Fragments: First Collection*, in *Selected Early Works*, 1764-1767, 94.

120. Herder, "Über Thomas Abbt's Schriften—Der Torso von einem Denkmal, an seinem Grabe errichtet," DKV:2:594.

121. Menze and Menges, commentary, *Selected Early Works*, 1764-1767, by Herder, 270.

122. "Not poeticizing, but aesthetics should be the field of the Germans, who are capable at best of being originals in didactic poetry" (Herder, *Fragments: First Collection*, in *Selected Early Works*, 1764-1767, 107).

123. Herder, introduction to *Fragments: First Collection*, in *Selected Early Works*, 1764-1767, 95.

124. Herder became interested in the concept *schöne Wissenschaft* in the mid 1760s, amassing a considerable bibliography, as reflected in his *Nachlaß* 24:4. He was sensitive to the sweeping nature of its concerns.

125. Herder, "On Diligence in the Study of Several Learned Languages," in *Selected Early Works*, 1764-1767, 32.

126. Herder, *Fragments: First Collection*, in *Selected Early Works*, 1764-1767, 102.

127. In *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend*, 4:366-89.

128. Herder, "Fragments of a Treatise on the Ode," in *Selected Early Works*, 1764-1767, 46.

129. Ernest Menze and Karl Menges, introduction to *Johann Gottfried Herder: Selected Early Works, 1764-1767* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 5.

130. Herder, "Do We Still Have the Public . . . ?" in *Selected Early Works*, 1764-1767, 66.

131. Herder, "Essay on a History of Lyric Poetry," in *Selected Early Works*, 1764-1767, 69.

132. Thus, Herder begins his "Fragments of a Treatise on the Ode" with: "The more the teachings of all philosophy approach experience and the subjective categories of being, the more certain they indeed become, but also the more inexplicable; and the irreducibility of aesthetic principles appears to increase to the degree that they descend to the sensations of the beautiful" (*Selected Early Works*, 1764-1767, 35). This is virtually a precis of his "Versuch über das Sein."

133. Herder, "Fragments of a Treatise on the Ode," in *Selected Early Works*, 1764-1767, 50.

134. Gaier, "Commentary," 1233.

135. Herder, "Bruchstück von Baumgartens Denkmal," DKV:1:684-85.

136. *Metaphysik Herder*, AA:28:2:883.

137. Mendelssohn, cited in Herder, "Bruchstücke von Baumgartens Denkmal," DKV:1:687.

138. Herder, "Plan zu einer Ästhetik," DKV:1:668-69.

139. Gaier, "Commentary," 1256.

140. Ibid., 1256. "True aesthetics is the feeling—not the concept, even less the judgment—of taste, and least of all its rules" (Herder, "Plan zu einer Ästhetik," DKV:1:676). Gaier comments: "Herder's project with aesthetics, which he understands as an anthropological discipline built upon the depths of the soul which are inexpressible in school philosophy, aims to create an alternative to that philosophy" ("Commentary," 1256).

141. Gaier, "Commentary," 1234.

142. Herder, "Fragments of a Treatise on the Ode," in *Selected Early Works*, 1764-1767, 25. Compare this with Kant's famous line from *Observations* in which it is a category error to dispute the reasons for a subject making an aesthetic judgment.

143. Herder, "Plan zu einer Ästhetik," DKV:1:674.

144. Gaier, "Commentary," 1234.

145. Herder, "Essay on a History of Lyric Poetry," in *Selected Early Works*, 1764-1767, 70.

146. Herder, "Von Baumgartens Denkart," DKV:1:655.
147. Herder, "Essay on a History of Lyric Poetry," in *Selected Early Works*, 1764–1767, 82.
148. Garve, "[Review of] Johann Gottfried Herder: Über die neuere deutsche Literatur," *Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste* 4 (1767), 40–78; 5 (1767), 241–91.
149. Herder, *Fragments: First Collection*, in *Selected Early Works*, 1764–1767, 104.
150. Of course, Herder still realized that his own age was an age of prose. See Hans Dietrich Irmscher, "Herders Dithyrambische Rhapsodie," in *Aufklärung als Problem und Aufgabe. Festschrift für Sven-Aage Jørgensen* (Copenhagen: Fink, 1994), 144–52, esp. 147.
151. Herder, *Fragments: First Collection*, 107.
152. Herder, "Essay on a History of Lyric Poetry," in *Selected Early Works*, 1764–1767, 81.
153. Herder, *Fragments: First Collection*, in *Selected Early Works*, 1764–1767, 100.
154. Herder, "Wie die Philosophie," in DKV:1:134.
155. Herder, "Über Christian Wolfs Schriften," Suphan:32:158.
156. Menze and Menges, commentary, *Selected Early Works*, 1764–1767, by Herder, 269.
157. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:305.
158. "What Herder criticizes in Riedel here he celebrates in panegyric tones later in Young; for Young 'rules' are just 'crutches'" (Gunter Grimm, commentary on *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:990).
159. Hans Adler, "Ästhetische und anästhetische Wissenschaft," *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 68 (1994): 66–76.
160. Harold Mah, "The Epistemology of the Sentence," *Representations* 47 (1994): 64–84; Anthony La Vopa, "Herder's Publikum," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 29 (1995).
161. In his early "Plan zu einer Ästhetik," Herder recognized the ambiguity in Baumgarten's practice and expressed his preference for rigor as against thinking beautifully (DKV:1:659). Kant would wax vitriolic over this conceptual slippage in his *Critique of Judgment*, claiming it confused "manner" for "method," and taking Herder up as particularly guilty of this mischief.
162. Kant, *Beobachtungen*, 78; *Praktische Philosophie Herder*, AA:27:1:14–15. See Ursula Jauch, *Immanuel Kant zur Geschlechterdifferenz*, 74–75.
163. Mendelssohn recognized as "the 'beautiful philosophical writers' those, 'who have noted that the systematic lecture is not always the best introduction'" to philosophy (Reiner Wisbert, commentary on Herder, "Vom Begriff

der schönen Wissenschaften, besonders für die Jugend [1782]," DKV:9:1214; citing Mendelssohn, *Jubiläumsausgabe*, vol. 1, 524].

164. *Metaphysik Herder*, AA:28:1:6.

165. On the usage "schönen Wissenschaften" in this period, see Strube, "Die Geschichte des Begriffs 'schöne Wissenschaften.'"

166. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:261.

167. Herder, "Bruchstück von Baumgartens Denkmal," DKV:1:694.

168. Dobbek writes aptly that Herder was "inwardly a weak, easily provoked, sensitive man of feeling" (*Herders Jugendzeit*, 69). His own self-characterization in *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769* is mercilessly lucid about his own "shudder" in the face of any external contretemps (Herder, *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, 11, 104).

169. Reiner Wisbert, commentary on *Journal meiner Reise*, DKV:9:865.

170. Herder to Scheffner (undated, 1768?), *Lebensbild*, vol. 1, 355.

171. Herder to Nicolai, February 19, 1767, *Lebensbild*, vol. 1, 232.

172. Clark claims bluntly: "The Torso contains less Abbt than Herder" (Herder, 78).

173. On Abbt, see Hans Erich Bödeker, "Thomas Abbt: Patriot, Bürger und bürgerliches Bewußtsein," in *Bürger und Bürgerlichkeit im Zeitalter der Aufklärung*, ed. Rudolf Vierhaus (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1981), 221-54.

174. Herder observed this in "Über Thomas Abbt's Schriften."

175. Herder, *Fragments: First Collection*, in *Selected Early Works*, 1764-1767, 153.

176. Haym, *Herder*, vol. 1, 65.

177. Clark, *Herder*, 78.

178. Herder, "Über Thomas Abbt's Schriften: Der Torso von einem Denkmal, an seinem Grabe errichtet," DKV:2:581.

179. *Ibid.*, citing Abbt, *Vom Verdienste*. Herder reviewed this work in 1765 for the Königsberg newspaper.

180. Herder, *Fragments: First Collection*, in *Selected Early Works*, 1764-1767, 153.

181. Horst Stephan, "Einleitung," in *Spaldings Bestimmung des Menschen (1748) und Wert der Andacht (1755)* (Gießen: Töpelmann, 1908), 11.

182. A. Altmann, "Die Entstehung von Moses Mendelssohns *Phädon*," in *Die trostvolle Aufklärung* (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1982), 100.

183. On the context of the Spalding text's reception, see Hans Adler, "Die Bestimmung des Menschen: Spaldings Schrift als Ausgangspunkt einer offenen Anthropologie," *Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert* 18:2 (1994): 125-37.

184. Johann Spalding, *Betrachtung über die Bestimmung des Menschen*, 15.

185. Søren Kierkegaard, *Either/Or* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971).

186. Spalding breaks this up into two arguments, the first having to do with crude sensual pleasures, and the second with pleasures of the mind. It is this latter segment on which he elaborated most extensively in the next several editions of the text, in response to criticism that he had not done full justice to a sophisticated Epicurean position. But resistance to his dismissal of the sensual life persisted, and one of the most interesting resisters, as we will see, was Herder.

187. Johann Spalding, *Betrachtung über die Bestimmung des Menschen*, 20.

188. Altmann, "Entstehung," 99.

189. Kant, *Vienna Logic*, in *Lectures on Logic*, 268.

190. Spalding, *Bestimmung*, 29.

191. Resewitz, review of *Bestimmung*; cited in Adler, "Bestimmung," 131 n.

192. Hans Adler, "Die Bestimmung des Menschen," 125-37; Giuseppe D'Alessandro, "Die Wiederkehr eines Leitwortes," *Aufklärung* 11 (1999): 21-47.

193. Altmann, "Entstehung," passim.

194. On the Boscovich connection, see Altmann, "Entstehung," 94; for the phrase "Achilles of rational arguments," see Kant, *First Critique*, A351.

195. Abbt to Mendelssohn, November 10, 1762; as cited in Stephen Lorenz, "Skeptizismus und natürliche Religion," in *Moses Mendelssohn und die Kreise seiner Wirksamkeit*, ed. M. Albrecht, E. Engel, and N. Hinske (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1994), 120.

196. Thomas Abbt, "Zweifel über die Bestimmung des Menschen," (*Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend*, 1764), reprinted in *Der Aufstieg zur Klassik in der Kritik der Zeit*, vol. 3 of *Ein Jahrhundert deutscher Literaturkritik*, ed. Oscar Fambach (Berlin: Akademie, 1959), 121-30.

197. Henry Vyverberg, *Historical Pessimism in the French Enlightenment* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).

198. Lorenz, "Skeptizismus," 128.

199. Abbt, "Zweifel," 127.

200. Moses Mendelssohn, "Orakel, die Bestimmung des Menschen betreffend," in *Der Aufstieg zur Klassik*, ed. Fambach, 130-35.

201. See the documentation in Mendelssohn, "Orakel," 136-61; and the commentary in Lorenz, "Skeptizismus," 130ff; Altmann, "Entstehung," 105ff.

202. Marion Heinz, "Die Bestimmung des Menschen: Herder contra Mendelssohn," in *Philosophie der Endlichkeit*, ed. Beate Niemeyer and Dirk Schütze (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1992), 272.

203. Herder to Hamann, November 1768 [Hamann, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 2, 424].

204. Herder to Nicolai, November 1768 (Herder, *Briefe: Gesamtausgabe*, 127). See Heinz, "Bestimmung des Menschen," 271.

205. Herder, "Über Spaldings 'Betrachtung über die Bestimmung des Menschen,'" Suphan:32:160.

206. "The 'Destiny of Man' is here not conceived as the perfection of rationality but rather as the sensual registry of beauty" (Gaier, "Commentary," 1249).

207. Herder, "Über Spaldings 'Betrachtung,'" Suphan:32:161.

208. Herder to Mendelssohn, April 1769, *Briefe: Gesamtausgabe*, 137-43.

209. Mendelssohn to Herder, May 2, 1769, Mendelssohn, *Jubiläumsausgabe* 12:1:182.

210. Herder, *Fragments. First Collection*, in *Selected Early Works, 1764-1767*, 117.

211. Herder-Scheffner correspondence, *Herders Lebensbild*, vol. 1, 193, 224, 240.

212. Scheffner to Herder, January 7, 1767, *ibid.*, 224.

213. Hamann to Lindner, May 16, 1764 (Hamann, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 2, 256).

214. Herder to Scheffner, July 22, 1767, *Lebensbild*, vol. 1, 240.

215. Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 172; Heinz, *Sensualistischer Idealismus*, 27-42.

216. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen* (1769), in DKV:2:420.

217. Kant and Herder exchanged letters in 1768; Herder's observations were composed in 1769.

218. Issues that arise in the essay include the question of education for women, the problem of a universal history of humankind, and, as we shall note, political democratization: unfinished projects of Enlightenment, indeed!

219. The Bern prize topic was announced in *Briefe, die neueste Litteratur betreffend* in 1763 (Gaier, "Commentary," 974).

220. Herder, "Wie die Philosophie," 110.

221. See J. C. Vivian, *Der Einfluß David Humes*.

222. Turner, "University Reformers," 500-501.

223. Herder, "Wie die Philosophie," 108, 121.

224. See, especially, Bödeker, "Thomas Abbt."

225. Herder, "Wie die Philosophie," 130.

226. Gaier, "Commentary," 988.

227. Judith Shklar, *Men and Citizens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Carol Blum, *Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986).

228. See, e.g., Patrick Riley, *Kant's Political Philosophy* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Little, 1983).

229. Herder, "Wie die Philosophie," 106.

230. *Ibid.*, 115; Rousseau's famous apostrophe comes at the end of the First *Discourse*: "Virtue! sublime science of simple minds, . . . Are not your principles graven on every heart? Need we do more, to learn your laws, than examine ourselves and listen to the voice of conscience, when the passions are silent?" [*A Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*, in *The Social Contract and Discourses* [New York: Dutton, 1973], 26].

231. Herder, "Wie die Philosophie," 116.

232. Herder specifically invokes Rousseau as a great philosopher for having made this criticism, *ibid.*, 114.

233. Velkley, *Freedom and the End of Reason*, 32–43, 61–88. Haym got this, too, exactly right: "the Rousseauian standpoint mutates into—more precisely, it is expanded by—the Kantian: the whole essay climaxes in the thought that philosophy should not simply be thrown overboard but serve itself as the antidote for all the evil which it has caused" (*Herder*, vol. 1, 64).

234. Herder, "Wie die Philosophie," 121.

235. Herder, *Briefe*, Suphan:18:324–25; in his "Commentary," Gaier recognizes that Kant is on Herder's mind in these passages (992).

236. On Herder as "Kantian of the year 1765," see Haym, *Herder*, vol. 1 (Berlin: Akademie, 1954), 55.

237. Gaier, "Commentary," 994.

238. Herder, "Wie die Philosophie," 134. Paul Menzer has offered us a possible source for Herder's choice of the term *anthropology*: In Kant's lectures Herder heard Kant characterize the introductory treatment of empirical psychology as "anthropology" (Menzer, *Kants Lehre von der Entwicklung* [Berlin: Reimer, 1911], 149). And Kant himself appears to have taken the term from Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* §747: *anthropologia philosophica* (R. Brandt, "Ausgewählte Probleme der Kantischen Anthropologie," in *Der ganze Mensch*, ed. Schings, 82).

239. Herder, "Wie die Philosophie," 132.

240. Gaier, "Commentary," 994.

241. Herder, "Wie die Philosophie," 103.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. Richard Velkley, *Freedom and the End of Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 11.

2. *Ibid.*, 11. In Velkley's terms, "Rousseau proposes to Kant a way of thinking about the *justification* [*Rechtfertigung*] of reason, as a whole. This issue of justification is inseparable from the issue of the end, *Zweck*, or telos of reason" ("Freedom, Teleology, and Justification of Reason," in *Rousseau in Deutschland: Neue Beiträge zur Erforschung seiner Rezeption* [Berlin: de Gruyter, 1995], 183).

3. Frederick Beiser, "Kant's Intellectual Development: 1746-1781," in *Cambridge Companion to Kant*, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 47; citing Kant, *Bemerkungen*, AA:20:181.
4. Beiser, "Kant's Intellectual Development," 47.
5. Josef Schmucker, *Die Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 201.
6. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 36.
7. Ibid., 39. One can compare this directly to the opening of Kant's 1798 publication of the *Anthropology*: "pragmatic knowledge of man aims at what man makes, can, or should make of himself as a freely acting being" (*Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* [Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978], 3).
8. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 13.
9. Dieter Henrich, "Über Kants früheste Ethik: Versuch einer Rekonstruktion," *Kant-Studien* 54 (1963): 404-31; Henrich, "Hutcheson und Kant," *Kant-Studien* 49 (1957/58): 49-69; Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*.
10. As Werner Busch queries, "What meaning does this self-parody of Kant have for [the idea of] Right?" For Busch, it put off Kant's writing and even Kant's teaching on questions of political justice (*Die Entstehung der kritischen Rechtsphilosophie Kants 1762-1780* [Berlin: de Gruyter, 1979], 37).
11. Kant, "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?" AA:8:36-40; tr. in "An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?" in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 42-44.
12. By "public" here, I mean in publication, not in the classroom, along the lines of Kant's own distinction of the public versus private employment of reason: "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?" There is a considerable literature on Kant and publicity, e.g., John Christian Laursen, "Scepticism and Intellectual Freedom," *History of Political Thought* 10 (1989): 439-55.
13. The most careful and fruitful exploration of the "internal/external" conundrum for intellectual history is Steven Shapin, "Discipline and Bounding: The History and Sociology of Science as Seen Through the Externalism-Internalism Debate," *History of Science* 30 (1992): 333-69.
14. Velkley, *Freedom and the End of Reason*, 5; citing Kant, *Reflexion* 6612, AA:19:110.
15. Kant to Mendelssohn, April 8, 1766, AA:10:66.
16. Kant to Lambert, December 31, 1765, AA:10:56-57.
17. Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 155.
18. Beiser, "Kant's Intellectual Development," 45.
19. Susan Shell is quite right to observe: "In writing it Kant was of two (or more) minds, at once in earnest and in jest" (*Embodiment of Reason*, 130; I will maintain that Kant's being of several minds is not restricted to this one moment). Julius Ebbinghaus made the same point: "The question of what Kant really intended with his publication against Swedenborg is hardly to be settled in a word [or two]" ("Kant und Swedenborg," in *Gesammelte Aufsätze*

Vorträge und Reden [Hildesheim: Olms, 1968], 59]. Two reviewers made the point in the immediate reception of the text. One was Mendelssohn, whom we will consider in detail below. The other was the very young Johann Feder, whose review will concern us later in a different context. Here I would note simply his observation that the author of this—for him still anonymous—text “is just as much a discerning philosopher as a witty mocker. We . . . are left in doubt whether he writes in earnest or in jest; at least he seems to have both almost always in play” (J. G. H. Feder, review of *Träume eines Geistersehers*, in *Erlangen Gelehrten Zeitung*, September 23, 1766; reprinted in Immanuel Kant, *Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik*, ed. Rudolf Malter [Stuttgart: Reclam, 1976], 125).

20. Cassirer, *Kant's Life and Thought* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981), 78–79.

21. Laywine, *Kant's Early Metaphysics*, 14.

22. Eckard Förster, “Kant's Notion of Philosophy.”

23. Kant, “Announcement of the Programme of his Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765–1766,” AA:2:308; tr. in Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 294.

24. Ibid., 295; see Gerhard Lehmann, “Kants Vorlesungen,” 150–51. The Herder lecture notes reflect that before 1765 Kant taught his Baumgarten textbook straight, in the “synthetic” manner in which it was published.

25. Charles Corr, “Wolff's Distinction between Empirical and Rational Psychology,” *Akten des II. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses*, vol. 3, 195–215; Jean École, “Des rapports de l'expérience et de la raison dans l'analyse de l'âme,” *Giornale di Metafisica* 21 (1966): 589–617; Jean École, “De la nature de l'âme, de la déduction de ses facultés, de ses rapports avec le corps,” *Giornale di Metafisica* 24 (1969): 499–531.

26. Kreimendahl comes to somewhat similar conclusions (*Kant: Der Durchbruch von 1769* [Cologne: Dinter, 1990], 117), but he then has recourse to Kant's *Reflexionen* of the period to insist that Kant still believed in the possibility of a rational metaphysics (118).

27. Kant, “Announcement,” 295.

28. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A848/B876.

29. Tonelli, “Die Umwälzung von 1769 bei Kant,” *Kant-Studien* 54 (1963): 370.

30. We need to see, as Kreimendahl puts it, that “metaphysics is thus no longer a ‘science of the limits of human reason,’ as it was still defined in *Dreams*, but rather one concerning the limits of human experience and capacity for experience” (*Durchbruch*, 134).

31. “A rule for testing oneself and one's science concerning any cognition is this: if I understand and have insight into a thing perfectly, then I must be able to communicate and represent it so clearly to another man that he will have insight into it just as perfectly as I, if only he has a healthy understanding. If I cannot do this, however, it is a certain sign that I do not yet understand

it rightly myself" (Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, 74). This rule would have a strong bearing on the question of the "popularity" of a philosophical text.

32. See W. H. Walsh, "Kant and Empiricism," in *200 Jahre Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Hildesheim: Gerstenberg, 1981), 385-415, for a thoughtful discussion.

33. Johan van der Zande, "In the Image of Cicero."

34. Walther Zimmerli, "'Schwere Rüstung' des Dogmatismus und 'anwendbare Eklektik': J. G. H. Feder und die Göttinger Philosophie im ausgehenden 18. Jahrhundert," *Studia Leibnitiana* 15:1 (1983): 58-71.

35. Tonelli, "Umwälzung," 370-71.

36. Sulzer, "Vorrede zu Hume, *Vermischte Schriften*, II (1755), unpaginated. "Philosophy is a science for every man and must be presented in a manner that is clear and pleasant to every reader." Hume's style "appears to me the best standard by which one can direct oneself" in satisfying this principle. "He leads his reader even into the most hidden and darkest depths of philosophy on a path that is easy, pleasant and strewn with roses. The most difficult and abstract investigations which otherwise endow this part of philosophy with a dark and off-putting appearance are here presented in such a way in which profundity and pleasure are always neck to neck, derived truths through the pen of this outstanding author become as pleasant as the most informative stories in the formulations of poets."

37. See Shirley Letwin, "Hume: Inventor of a New Task for Philosophy," *Political Theory* 3 (1975): 134-58; Wolfgang Röd, "Humes Skeptizismus als Entwurf eines neuen philosophischen Paradigmas," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 44 (1993): 211-32; Röd, "Kant und Hume: Die Transzendentalphilosophie als Alternative zum Naturalismus," *Dialectica* 49 (1995): 317-51.

38. Kant, *Prolegomena*, AA:4:260-61.

39. Whether *Erinnerung* signified a recollection Kant had of something he once read in Hume or rather a reminder that Hume gave Kant—even that utterly linguistic issue has occasioned no little consternation among interpreters. Kreimendahl sides with Vaihinger in claiming that a native speaker's sense of the German phrasing should clearly affirm the second rendering. It took a nonnative even of the stature of Lewis White Beck the better part of his career to come around to that view, and even some natives seem to have registered it in the former manner, including the young Erich Adickes! The whole phrase is still far from clear, no matter which of these two renderings one chooses. For Beck's about-face, see his important essay, "A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant," in *Essays on Kant and Hume*, 118 n. On Vaihinger and Adickes, see Kreimendahl, *Durchbruch*, 18.

40. "It seems hardly possible to formulate an account of Kant's gradually increasing knowledge of Hume which fits *all* the apparent facts" (Beck, *Essays on Kant and Hume*, 113 n).

41. Manfred Kuehn, "Kant's Conception of 'Hume's Problem,'" *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 21 (1983): 175-93.

42. Lorne Falkenstein, "The Great Light of 1769—A Humeian Awakening?" *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 77 (1995): 75.

43. Lewis White Beck, "A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant," 111–12. On the issue of Kant, Hume, and Naturalism, see Wolfgang Röd, "Kant und Hume: Die Transzendentalphilosophie als Alternative zum Naturalismus," *Dialectica* 49 (1995): 317–34; Henry Allison, "On Naturalizing Kant's Transcendental Psychology," *Dialectica* 49 (1995): 335–51; Graham Bird, "Kant and Naturalism," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 3 (1995): 399–408; Patricia Kitcher, "Changing the Name of the Game: Kant's Cognitivism Versus Hume's Psychologism," *Philosophical Topics* 19 (1991): 201–36.

44. Kuehn, "Kant's Conception," 176.

45. Rudolf Lütke, "Misunderstanding Hume," in *Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. V. Hope (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1984), 105–15, esp. 109–11.

46. Beck, "Kant's Strategy," in *Essays on Kant and Hume*, 3–19.

47. Kuehn, "Kant's Conception," 191.

48. Kant, *Prolegomena*. AA:4:360; tr. 100.

49. Kuehn, "Kant's Conception," 191.

50. See Gawlick and Kreimendahl, *Hume in der deutschen Aufklärung*; Brandt and Klemme, *David Hume in Deutschland*; J. C. Vivian, *Der Einfluß David Humes*.

51. The Thoemmes Press is publishing a substantial collection of works from the early reception of Hume in Germany.

52. Kuehn conceives the reception of Hume in Germany in four phases. The first of his phases spans the period from the publication of Hume's *Treatise* to the early 1770s, a second phase extends to the aftermath of the dispute over the Garve-Feder review set off by Kant's *Prolegomena*, about 1783, then a third period until the appearance of Aenesidemus, 1792–1793, with a denouement of fading interest to 1807 and the Hegelian hegemony ("Kant's Conception," 178 n).

53. Ibid. On this Francophone reception in the Berlin Academy, see especially John Christian Laursen and Richard Popkin, "Hume in the Prussian Academy," *Hume Studies* 23 (1997): 153–62. Particularly noteworthy is Laursen and Popkin's situation of the Hume reception in the context of the wider dread of Pyrrhonic scepticism in the Enlightenment from Crousaz through Formey and Haller (154).

54. Kuehn, "David Hume and Moses Mendelssohn," *Hume Studies* 21 (1995): 197–220.

55. Kuehn, "Kant's Conception," 178 n. See Kreimendahl's less than gracious comments on Kuehn, in *Durchbruch*, 79–80 n.

56. Tonelli, "Die Anfänge von Kants Kritik der Kausalbeziehungen," 451–54; Erdmann, "Kant und Hume um 1762," *passim*.

57. Kuehn, "Hume in the *Göttingische Anzeigen*," *Hume Studies* 13 (1987): 56.

58. Gawlick and Kreimendahl, *Hume in der deutschen Aufklärung*.
59. Kuehn, "Hume in the *Göttingische Anzeigen*," 57.
60. Sulzer, "Vorrede" to Hume, *Vermischte Schriften* II (1755), unpaginated.
61. Kuehn, "Kant's Conception," 180.
62. Lütke, "Misunderstanding Hume," 112.
63. Herder, "Wie die Philosophie," DKV:1:134.
64. J. C. Vivian, *Der Einfluß David Humes*.
65. *Ibid.*, chapter 3.
66. Gawlick and Kreimendahl, *Hume in der deutschen Aufklärung*, 7; "Hume understood himself throughout as a skeptic; his empiricism stood in service to his doubt" (Gawlick, "Über einige Charakteristika der britischen Philosophie," 31). Walsh, too, is of this view: "For [Kant] Hume was not so much an Empiricist or a scientist of human nature as a sceptic, a thinker whose destructive argument deserved the closest attention, but whose constructive thoughts could be passed over more lightly" ("Kant and Empiricism," 419). I think Walsh is clearly influenced by postures of the critical Kant and misperceives an earlier responsiveness. Gawlick and Kreimendahl, however, are arguing this even for the earlier period and for the whole reception, not just Kant's. Here I simply have to hold that they are wrong.
67. Wolfgang Carl, review of *Hume in der deutschen Aufklärung*, by Gawlick and Kreimendahl, *Philosophische Rundschau* 35 (1988): 210.
68. Kuehn, "Kant's Conception," 181.
69. *Ibid.* This allows Kuehn to reach a very important conclusion: "It appears, therefore, that Kant knew Hume's philosophy very well from 1755 onwards and that any similarity between Kant and Hume is indeed the result of influence" (180). Here Kuehn treads upon the thinnest ice in intellectual history [see Quentin Skinner's classic essay on the perils of influence ascription] and yet over against the adamant and partial efforts of earlier generations of scholars to deny *any* influence, I believe, we must go some way toward Kuehn's position.
70. "It is extremely probable that Kant was aware already by the end of the 50s of Hume's *Essays*, to be sure, but his appreciation of the philosopher even in the 60s had to do with the *moral essayist*, not the *metaphysical skeptic* and not the philosopher of religion" (Erdmann, "Kant und Hume um 1762," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 1 [1888]: 77).
71. Reinhard Brandt, introduction to *David Hume in Deutschland*, by R. Brandt and H. Klemme (Marburg: Universitätsbibliothek Marburg, 1989), 7. Brandt notes that Kant systematically suppressed all these references in his published version of the *Anthropology*.
72. Heiner Klemme, "David Hume in Deutschland," in *David Hume in Deutschland*, 54; citing *Reflexion* 1355, AA:15:592, which Adickes dates to the early 1770s.

73. "Nowhere does Kant stand closer to the ruling eighteenth-century ideal of 'philosophy,' to the ideal of 'popular philosophy,' than at this point [i.e., the 1760s]" (Cassirer, *Kant's Life and Thought*, 58).

74. Benno Erdmann took very seriously Herder's testimony about the relationship between Kant and Hume in the 1760s (see Erdmann, "Kant und Hume um 1762," 69–70).

75. Erdmann opened his 1888 essay with the terse acknowledgment, "Concerning Kant's dependency on Hume, strife prevails" (*ibid.*, 62).

76. Together, Kuehn and Kreimendahl have advanced the most interesting new version of Kant's awakening, connected with Johann Hamann's translation of the concluding chapter of book 1 of Hume's *Treatise* for the *Königsberg Gelehrten Zeitung*, published in 1771.

77. This is the most important innovation in Kuehn's essay and Kreimendahl's monograph.

78. For English readers, Robert P. Wolff made this prominent with his essay, "Kant's Debt to Hume via Beattie," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 17 (1960): 117–23.

79. Reinhard Brandt, review of *Kant—Der Durchbruch von 1769*, by Lothar Kreimendahl, *Kant-Studien* 83 (1992): 105 n.

80. Even Kuehn writes: "There need not have been one decisive and exactly datable moment at which Kant realized that he had discovered Hume's problem." Instead, "the change may have been a gradual readjustment of philosophical doctrines" ("Kant's Conception," 185, 184).

81. To be sure, reading the obvious parallelisms between Hume and the Kant of *Dreams* is to run the risks of "influence" interpretation noted earlier. Beck reiterates what already Erdmann insisted in 1888 and Tonelli in 1966: "there is no decisive reason to ascribe this essay to Hume's influence on Kant" ("A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant," 115). Maupertuis or Crusius might well have sufficed (see Erdmann, "Kant und Hume um 1762"; Tonelli, "Die Anfänge von Kants Kritik der Kausalbeziehungen," 417–60). Still, I think the contextual web we have woven and the new historiography of Hume-reception in Germany allow us a probability that is considerably higher than Beck or Erdmann or Tonelli could perceive.

82. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 112.

83. The one interpreter who has not been misled by Kant's own explanation of his motives is C. D. Broad: "Obviously these cannot have been Kant's main motives" ("Immanuel Kant and Psychical Research," in *Religion, Philosophy, and Psychical Research* [New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953], 126). Broad sensibly dismisses Kant's ostensible reasons for writing the text, and leaves the reader with a strong sense of the mystery of its motivation.

84. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 39.

85. Kant, "Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes," AA:2:257–72.

86. For this distinction among friends, see the epigraph to the chapter.

87. Hamann to Mendelssohn, November 1764 [Hamann, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 2, 272].

88. Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 172.

89. Kant to Fräulein von Knobloch, August 10, 1763, AA:10:43. The contrast in tone between the letter and the book are at the core of the mysteriousness of Kant's motivation. There is, however, one error that should not have been perpetuated in the Cambridge Critical Edition of Kant's works. There the editors claim, "The lost letter from Fräulein von Knobloch may be regarded as the original stimulus to the composition of *Dreams*, for the extensive inquiries in which Kant engaged in order to satisfy the curiosity of his correspondent intrigued and puzzled his friends" (introduction to *Theoretical Philosophy*, lxvii). That is altogether unlikely. Kant had been fascinated with Swedenborg for reasons of his own and had pursued an extensive inquiry into the Swede before the Fräulein wrote to him. Indeed, that was why Borowski suggested to her that she write to him. It is striking how credulous the scholarship has been with regard to Kant's postures in this affair.

90. *Metaphysik Herder*. AA:28:2:861ff, 895ff, 897–98, 906; see also AA:28:2, 298, 393, 689.

91. Dobbek, *Herders Jugendzeit*, 99.

92. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 101.

93. In all this, I find Broad ("Immanuel Kant," 125–26) my only predecessor.

94. Kant to Mendelssohn, April 8, 1766, AA:10:69.

95. Kant to Fr. C. von Knobloch, August 10, 1763, AA:10:43ff.

96. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 91. Much has been made of the potential ridicule Kant's interest in Swedenborg might have faced in high-Enlightenment Prussia. Thus Broad: "in 'enlightened' circles in East Prussia in the middle of the eighteenth century, a reputation for having carefully read Swedenborg's writings and having paid serious attention to the evidence for his alleged feats of clairvoyance, would be enough to condemn a *privat dozent* to remain in that position for the rest of his life" (127). The Böhmes put this in even harsher light: "Kant must have noticed that in his own fantastical excursions in the universe and his speculations on the inhabitants of other worlds and their spiritual abilities as they appear in *Theory of the Heavens*, he was not unlike Swedenborg. This began to appear sinister to him" (Helmut Böhme and Gernot Böhme, "The Battle of Reason with Imagination," in *What Is Enlightenment?* ed. Schmidt, 438. This is a translation of chapter 4 of their book, *Das Andere der Vernunft*).

97. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 38.

98. Feder, in his review, argued that the most fruitful lesson to take from Kant's text was in fact to have followed the urgings of utility and forsaken such pursuits (review of *Träume eines Geistersehers*, 126).

99. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 130; *Announcements*, 293.

100. See, for instance, Alan Kors, ed., *Anticipations of the Enlightenment in England, France, and Germany* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987).

101. Keith Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic*.

102. Andrew Fix, "Angels, Devils, and Evil Spirits in Seventeenth-Century Thought," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 50 (1989): 527-47.

103. F. H. Heinemann, "John Toland and the Age of Enlightenment," *Review of English Studies* 78 (1944); F. Biddle, "Locke's Critique of Innate Principles and Toland's Deism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 37 (1976): 411-22.

104. Kant refers to Bekker in *Metaphysik Herder*, AA:28:2:903. Swedenborg is discussed in connection with "pneumatology" at AA:28:2:897-98, AA:28:2:298, AA:28:2:393, and AA:28:2:689. And see Oskar Diethelm, "The Medical Teaching of Demonology in the 17th and 18th Centuries," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 6 (1970): 3-15.

105. Norbert Hinske, ed., *Die Aufklärung und die Schwärmer* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1988).

106. *Ibid.*

107. Schneiders, *Die Wahre Aufklärung* (Freiburg: Alber, 1974); Hinske, "Die tragende Grundideen."

108. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, AA:5:294; tr. 161.

109. Böhme and Böhme, "The Battle of Reason and Imagination," 441.

110. Kant, "Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes," AA:2:259.

111. Of Swedenborg: *Metaphysik Herder*, AA:28:2:206; of Rousseau: *Praktische Philosophie Herder*, AA:27:1:40.

112. Kant, "Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes," AA:2:267.

113. Kant, *Praktische Philosophie Herder*, AA:27:1:21-22; AA:27:1:40.

114. Kant, "Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes," AA:2:269.

115. Susan Shell, *The Embodiment of Reason*, 264-305.

116. This was an ironic turning of the tables on the "philosophical physicians."

117. Kant, *The Conflict of the Faculties*, part 3, 175-204.

118. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 37.

119. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, 87.

120. Wayne Booth, *The Rhetoric of Irony* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974); and Harold Bloom et al., *Deconstruction and Criticism* (1979; New York: Continuum, 1992).

121. "Kant writes the doubled language of irony. His text is always starting over, getting lost, breaking off. . . ." Part of the problem can be phrased in psychoanalytic terms: the unconscious in dreams has no recourse but to resort to the repertory of consciousness, above all its imagery of sensibility.

"The technique of the dream, in which the unconscious can only indicate [zeigen] what it means by what is visible and conscious. Spirit must necessarily let itself be described with and as a part of the material [world]" (Liliane Weissberg, "*Catarticon und der schöne Wahn: Kants Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik*," *Poetica* 18 [1986]: 109). One might well bring into this context Kant's longstanding and explicit suspicion of "symbolic hypotyposis" all the way through the third *Critique*, his disdain for any imaginative *ideal* in relation to ideas of reason, which was quite explicitly antiliterary, antipoetic. For a book-length poststructuralist go at the Kant-Swedenborg problem, see Monique David-Ménard, *La Folie dans la Raison pure: Kant lecteur de Swedenborg* (Paris: Vrin, 1990).

122. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 39.

123. Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Basic, 1959).

124. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 39.

125. The image from Baudelaire is talismanic for modern intellectual acedia.

126. Friedrich Schlegel, *Philosophical Fragments* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991); Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German Romanticism* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997).

127. This is particularly prominent in the highly charged question of "Spinozism" in Germany in the first half of the eighteenth century; see Winfried Schröder, *Spinoza in der deutschen Frühaufklärung* (Würzburg: Königshaus & Neumann, 1987).

128. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 98.

129. "Kant's anger with the inflated pretensions of metaphysics extends beyond himself to the profession of philosophers" (Shell, *Embodiment of Reason*, 131). Indeed!

130. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 100.

131. Ibid. "Kant's position behind the sarcastic presentation of the stories about Swedenborg is unclear. Disturbingly, he does not stay in place. . . . Emanuel Swedenborg emerges as a *Doppelgänger* of Immanuel Kant" (Weissberg, "*Catarticon*," 107-12).

132. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 112-13.

133. Ebbinghaus describes the distance of Kant's feelings toward Swedenborg in his book from that in his letter to Fräulein Charlotte as similar to "the judgment of a lover about a beloved of whom he is surfeit, compared to the representations he made of her when he was courting. . . . What had taken place, to have caused him to have cooled off?" ("Kant und Swedenborg," 69). The analogy has powerful resonances with Kant's larger life situation, given all we have considered. John Manolesco wants to read the metaphor literally: "Would it be far-fetched to assume that Kant's sudden hatred for speculative metaphysics, as described in his letter to Mendelssohn[,], was the sequel to

a deep psychological change due to unrequited love, not by metaphysics but by Swedenborg himself? The disappointment at not receiving a reply to his letter" [Manolesco, introduction to *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer by Immanuel Kant and Other Related Writings* [New York: Vantage Press, 1969], 14]. It would indeed be far-fetched; first, because the hatred for metaphysics was not sudden but cumulative, whereas Swedenborg was a momentary, though traumatic, *symbol* for Kant of his own disorder. The erotic-psychotic focus is metaphysics, just as Kant stated. Indeed, one could go even further in that direction: "Kant's love [for metaphysics] verges on castration anxiety; it occasions doubt of his power." Thus, Kant describes metaphysics as a "deceiving seductress" [Weissberg, "*Cataracticon*," 100, 103]. Without having to go to extremes, the metaphorical texture of Kant's own wording should at the very least open our eyes to contextual and psychological possibilities that other evidence may independently substantiate.

134. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 113.

135. J. G. H. Feder, review of *Träume eines Geistersehers*, in *Erlangen Gelehrten Zeitung*, September 23, 1766; reprinted in Immanuel Kant, *Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik*, ed. Rudolf Malter (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1976), 125–27.

136. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 114.

137. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

138. The veil of Isis is *the* metaphor for this entire problem, and it permeates the writings of late-eighteenth-century Germany.

139. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 116. On the dynamics and erotics of reason in Kant, see Yovel, *Kant's Philosophy of History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980).

140. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 117.

141. *Ibid.*, 121. Compare, First *Critique*, Bxxx–xxxii.

142. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 119.

143. Schmucker, "Kants kritischer Standpunkt zur Zeit der Träume eines Geistersehers, im Verhältnis zu den der Kritik der reinen Vernunft," in *Beiträge zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft 1781–1981*, 1–36.

144. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 119.

145. *Ibid.*, 37; see, e.g., *Prize Essay*, AA:2:286–90.

146. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 44 n.

147. Kant, "Amphibolies of Reflection," *Critique of Pure Reason*, A260/B316–A292/B349.

148. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 56.

149. A. Vartanian, "Trembley's Polyp, La Mettrie, and Eighteenth-Century French Materialism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 11 (1950): 259–86.

150. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 58.

151. Broad, however, finds the entire discussion of ethical obligation misguided, so he is content to see the egregious speculation begin there ("Immanuel Kant and Psychical Research"). I think Schmucker has the better argument.

152. There is a precedent for Kant's shift from theoretical to practical keys in the same philosophical exposition. He did this in the essay on "Negative Magnitudes," for example.

153. These rubrics are taken from Kant's letter to Lambert, December 1765.

154. Schmucker, *Ursprünge der Ethik Kants*, 156.

155. Yet he had not yet established for himself the Rousseauian transformation from a "metaphysical commerce" to a "moral commerce," in the language of Susan Shell ("Kant's Moral Cosmology," chapter 4 in *The Embodiment of Reason*, 81-105).

156. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 63.

157. Shell writes that *Dreams* is "not only (or particularly successful) art. *Dreams* is instead a sort of hybrid" (*Embodiment of Reason*, 131).

158. Lambert to Kant, November 18, 1765, AA:10:52. See Wilhelm Peters, "I. Kants Verhältnis zu J. H. Lambert," *Kant-Studien* 59 (1968): 448-53.

159. Kant to Lambert, December 31, 1765, AA:10:56-57.

160. Lambert to Kant, November 18, 1765, AA:10:52.

161. Scheffner, for one, had this opinion of Lambert. In a letter to Herder (October 10/21, 1767), Scheffner wrote: "Lambert is to my mind too mathematical, perhaps too dry; it is a pity that he holds distinctness and beauty too much for incidentals [*Nebendinge*]" (*Lebensbild*, vol. 1, 280). And Herder seems to have affirmed this view in his reply: "I have long wished for a philosophical style of speech for our own language, but I have found very little material to that purpose. *Lambert* I have paged through, and perhaps sometime I will publish an appraisal [of his work] and supplement it" (Herder to Scheffner, October 31, 1767, *Lebensbild*, vol. 1, 286).

162. Kant to Lambert, December 31, 1765, AA:10:56-57.

163. Laywine, *Kant's Early Metaphysics*, 78.

164. *Ibid.*, 86, 92. As it happens, a host of German commentators in the late nineteenth century were of a very different opinion. Karl Kehrbach in his introduction to a critical edition of *Träume* from 1880 wrote: "The elegant and fashionable essay style, so masterfully displayed here by Kant, has never re-occurred in any of his later writings" (Kehrbach, "Preface" to *Träume*, 1880, reprinted in Manolesco, tr. *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 169). While Kehrbach was certainly correct about the absence in the later writings, we are a bit amazed to note his claim that "this was *feuilleton* style in the best tradition" (169). But he can maintain this on the confident authority that Kuno Fischer had given an extensive affirmation of the stylistic brilliance of Kant's work and that Karl Rosenkranz had made just this assertion in his authoritative *Geschichte der Kant'schen Philosophie* (Leipzig, 1840): "Kant here carried the elegant and

pikant style to its height. With the most comic arrogance and cocky witticisms, he gave up the worn out form of scholarship and treated the *häcklichsten* points of psychology and metaphysics with a virtually epideictic virtuosity" (cited in Malter, afterword to *Träume eines Geistersehers*, 93). Even more recent German commentators seem to hold this view. Ebbinghaus, for example, writes: "in fact, this highly original little piece of writing is not only composed with overwhelmingly good humor but also written in a style which makes it a pearl of the very rare comic-satirical genre in Germany" ("Kant und Swedenborg," 60). One can only feel sorrow for the German genre of satire! (Or, more justly, suggest that philosophical commentators may not be the best judges and turn to literary historians for a better sense of eighteenth-century German satire: Gunter Grimm, ed., *Satire der Aufklärung* [Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1975]; Helmut Arntzen, "Die Satiretheorie der Aufklärung," in *Europäische Aufklärung*, vol. 1, ed. Walter Hinck [Frankfurt am Main: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft Athenaion, 1974], 57–74).

165. Kant, *Bemerkungen*, 81.

166. Laywine, *Kant's Early Metaphysics*, 87.

167. Mendelssohn, "[Review of] Kant's *Träume eines Geistersehers*, erläutert durch *Träume der Metaphysik*," *Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek* 4:2 (1767): 281; reprinted in Mendelssohn, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 4, 529.

168. Kant to Mendelssohn, February 7, 1766, AA:10:68.

169. Kant to Mendelssohn, April 8, 1766, AA:10:70. There is a persistent error in the scholarship (e.g., Gordon Treash, "Reason, Kant's *Dreams*, and Critique," in *Akten des Siebenten International Kant-Kongresses*, vol. 2, ed. G. Funke [Bonn: Bouvier, 1991], 43 n), which takes this letter to be a response to Mendelssohn's review of *Träume*. But that cannot be, since the review did not appear until 1767. Mendelssohn's letter is lost; one could well wish it were not.

170. Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, 31.

171. Kant to Mendelssohn, April 8, 1766, AA:10:70.

172. Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 172.

173. Herder, review of *Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik*, in *Königsbergischen Gelehrten und Politischen Zeitungen*, May 3, 1766. Gottlieb Florschütz gets the dating of this review entirely wrong, even though he cites from Malter's reprint, where the correct dating is clearly given (Florschütz, *Swedenborgs verborgene Wirkung auf Kant* [Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1992], 98).

174. In this, Herder may have been reading Kant in just the way Kant would soon regret. Liliane Weissberg puts the question well: "Can Kant's treatise on spirit not be read as well as a justification of aesthetics as science, that deceiver via pleasant appearance?" ("*Cataracticon*," 109–10). Weissberg suggests that Kant felt the strong seductive pull of literature in this text, but that he feared for his moral integrity: "Kant is fascinated by literature, but that dress hides a dubious interior. It poses a moral question for philosophy [to pursue

it]" (110). Weissberg here picks up on Kant's expressed concern for his "character of uprightness," which he feared Mendelssohn might question in the light of *Dreams* (Kant to Mendelssohn, AA:10:70).

175. Herder, review of *Träume*, 126.

176. "What is strange about [Herder's] Review [of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*] is that it seems to express a contradiction between Kant and Herder that did not yet exist at the time" (Heinz, *Sensualistischer Idealismus*, 42).

177. R. Haym, *Herder*, vol. 1, 55.

178. Heinz, *Sensualistischer Idealismus*, 42.

179. Ernest Menze and Karl Menges, introduction to *Selected Early Works, 1764-1767*, by Herder, 1-25; Menze, "Königsberg and Riga: The Genesis and Significance of Herder's Historical Thought," in *Herder Today*, ed. Kurt Mueller-Vollmer (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1987), 97-107.

180. Kant to Herder, May 9, 1768, AA:10:74. The admonitions had to do with the danger he saw of Herder becoming yet another "*Schöndenker*."

181. Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, 147.

182. Herder to Kant, November 1768, AA:10:78.

183. Herder, "Wie die Philosophie," 134.

184. Schmucker, "Kants kritischen Standpunkt," 19, 26.

185. Kreimendahl, *Durchbruch*, 122 n.

186. "The necessity of metaphysics was throughout beyond question for Kant" (ibid., 122 n). "For Kant early and late is convinced of the necessity of metaphysics" (126). Yes, of course, if what that means is that Kant felt that questions of the existence of God or the possibility of morality through freedom and immortality of the soul were indispensable for human meaning. But it in no wise follows that Kant believed that a "scientific" metaphysics based on rational principles alone was throughout a live possibility. In 1762 he believed. In 1766 he disbelieved. In 1770 he believed. But what about the critical Kant? In the phase of *Kritizismus*, Kant used his enormous philosophical acumen to ring round these articles of faith with a buttress of *theoretical possibility* in order to defend their *practical necessity*. If that is metaphysics, it is, as Kant himself would have said, an entirely new sort.

187. Kant to Lambert, December 31, 1765, AA:10:55; tr. in Kant, *Correspondence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 81.

188. "For perhaps a year now, I believe I have arrived at a position that, I flatter myself, I shall never have to change, even though extensions will be needed, a position from which all sorts of metaphysical questions can be examined according to wholly certain and easy criteria, and the extent to which these questions can or cannot be resolved will be decidable with certainty" (Kant to Lambert, September 1, 1770, AA:10:97; tr. in Kant, *Correspondence*, 107). Kant had left Lambert waiting five years for an answer: "I could not persuade myself to send you anything less than a clear summary of how I view this science [of metaphysics] and a definite idea of the proper method for it.

The carrying out of this intention entangled me in investigations that were new to me and, what with my exhausting academic work, necessitated one postponement after another" (107).

189. Kant to Marcus Herz, February 1772, AA:10:129–35.

190. Kant to Lambert, December 31, 1765, AA:10:55; tr. in Kant, *Correspondence*, 82.

191. Kant to Mendelssohn, April 8, 1766, AA:10:69–72.

192. Ibid.

193. As Kreimendahl has observed, "the continuity of the reflection process [concerning metaphysics] should not be confused with constancy in results" (*Durchbruch*, 103). He elaborates later, in explicit criticism of Schmucker, "actually Kant says nothing constructive about the concrete contents of metaphysics—neither in his works of the period in question nor in his letters or reflections. . . . That behind [his letter to Mendelssohn], as Schmucker would have it, 'profound and revolutionary [insights] . . . into the essence and the method of metaphysics in general and the mentioned three disciplines of special metaphysics [i.e., God, freedom, immortality] lay hidden' is an assumption for which there is not a single concrete indicator of confirmation" (129).

194. Even Kreimendahl observes, "one cannot help but hear the tone of resignation" (ibid., 135).

195. Sala, "Bausteine zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Kritik der reinen Vernunft," *Kant-Studien* 78 (1987): 156.

196. "Just the relevant '*conceptus terminator*' as the highest concept of reason is, although it is only through it that the possibility of conceiving the series of things is given from the outset, itself no longer capable of rational conception, but only problematic. Therewith, the impossibility of a dogmatic metaphysics is recognized" (Kreimendahl, *Durchbruch*, 118).

197. Kreimendahl spells out the problem

With the insight achieved into the problematic character of the "*conceptus terminator*" and now as well the openly expressed conviction that "there can be no rational insight into the possibility of a real connection in primitive grounds [*realverknüpfung in primitiven Gründen*]" a position is reached which could be counted as belonging to the doctrine of transcendental philosophy. From the vantage of developmental history however, it betokens the irretrievable end of the phase in his thought in which he ". . . believed still that he could find the method to elaborate dogmatic knowledge through pure reason." (*Durchbruch*, 118)

The first passage cited from Kant is *Reflexion* 3755 (AA:17:284), dated by Adickes to around 1766, and the second is from *Reflexion* 5116 (AA:18:96), from the late 1770s. Kreimendahl contends in a note to this passage that the doctrine parallels the first *Critique*, B584.

198. Benno Erdmann, "Entwicklungsperiode von Kants theoretischer Philosophie," in *Reflexionen Kants zur kritischen Philosophie*, vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1884), xiii–lx.

199. Sala, "Entstehungsgeschichte," 155.

200. For a clear sense of this hardening into an "ism," see especially Kant's letter to Marcus Herz, 1781, AA:10:269–70. The question of the new terminology associated with *Kritizismus* is one that Norbert Hinske has documented altogether persuasively in the context of his monumental *Kant Index*. He also makes it clear that this turn to a new language was a product of the period after 1772, Schmucker notwithstanding (see the debate about dating Kant's *Reflexion* 3716, referred to in chapter 7, n. 40 below). In this he follows the lead of Giorgio Tonelli ("Das Wiederaufleben der deutsch-aristotelischen Terminologie bei Kant während der Entstehung der 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft,'" *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 9 [1964]: 233–42). See Hinske, "In Memoriam, Giorgio Tonelli," *Kant-Studien* 69 (1978): 247–51. Lehmann has drawn upon Kant's lecture material to illuminate this point: "coming to terms with contemporaries and indeed consideration of contemporary literature is stronger in the earlier lecture notes than in the later ones. . . . paradoxically, in his 'critical' epoch Kant was more dogmatic than in his 'dogmatic' one" ("Kants Entwicklung im Spiegel der Vorlesungen," 141).

201. See, especially, Alois Riehl, *Der philosophische Kritizismus* (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1908).

202. Manfred Kuehn, "Kant's Conception of 'Hume's Problem,'" 192.

203. Günter Schulz, "Christian Garve und Immanuel Kant: Gelehrten-Tugenden im 18. Jahrhundert," *Jahrbuch der Schlesischen Friedrich-Willelms-Universität zu Breslau* 5 (1960): 123–88; Wolfgang Kersting, "Kann die Kritik der praktischen Vernunft populär sein?" *Studia Leibnitiana* 15:1 (1983): 82–93.

204. On this see Lorne Falkenstein, "Kant, Mendelssohn, Lambert, and the Subjectivity of Time," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 29 (1991): 227–51.

205. Marcus Herz to Immanuel Kant, July 9, 1771, AA:10:124–25; tr. in *Identity or History? Marcus Herz and the End of the Enlightenment*, by Martin Davies (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1995), 32–33.

206. Though much of his account leaves me skeptical, Davies (*Identity or History?* 38–71) does at the very least raise questions about the grasp Herz may have had on Kant's philosophical project even in the early 1770s. Kant certainly felt some reservations, as he made clear in his letter to Fr. Nicolai, October 25, 1773 (AA:10:142).

CHAPTER SIX

1. Cabanis, *Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme* (1796), discussed in Friedrich Vollhardt, "Zwischen pragmatischer Alltagsethik und ästhetischer Erziehung," in *Der ganze Mensch*, ed. Schings, 116–17. See also Sergio Moravia, "'Moral'—'Physique': Genesis and Evolution of a 'Rapport,'"

in *Enlightenment Studies in Honour of Lester Crocker*, ed. A. Bingham and V. Topazio (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1979), 163–74. There is a distinct impetus toward revision of Cabanis's sense of priority, however. Vollhardt indicates it by stressing the importance, until very recently overlooked, of Pufendorf (Vollhardt, "Alltagsethik und ästhetischer Erziehung," 119–20). See also Robert Wokler for some important discussion of Rousseau's debt to Pufendorf (Wokler, "Anthropology and Conjectural History in the Enlightenment," in *Inventing the Human Sciences*, 36–38).

2. Blankaert, "Buffon and the Natural History of Man," 42.

3. Odo Marquard, "Der angeklagte und der entlastete Mensch in der Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts," in *Die Neubestimmung des Menschen*, ed. Bernhard Fabian, 193–209, esp. 194–95. Bodeker suggests a similar configuration: eighteenth-century anthropology, he writes, had three dimensions: *physical* anthropology, *philosophical* anthropology, and *ethnography*. All, he insisted, were grounded in an "empirical-inductive method" ("Anthropology," in *Lexikon der Aufklärung*, ed. Werner Schneiders [Munich: Beck, 1995], 38).

4. See Loren Graham, Wolf Lepenies, and Peter Weingart, eds., *Functions and Uses of Disciplinary Histories* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983).

5. "The study of *la pensée sauvage*, in its various articulations, was judged to be a central part, but only a part, of a general theory of human nature which had to embrace the history of civilization and a grasp of man's place among the animals as well" (Wokler, "From *l'homme physique* to *l'homme moral*," 122).

6. See Kurt Danziger, "Generative Metaphor and the History of Psychological Discourse," in *Metaphor in the History of Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 331–56. Danziger claims that metaphors create "a basic common framework within which communication is possible, while at the same time providing scope for differences of emphasis" (332). Thus, "underlying metaphorical systems have *generative* properties," they "make it possible for people to exchange information about what they feel to be the same subject matter" (333). Danziger is building upon a radical revision in the interpretation of metaphor in science which began with Max Black. It was elaborated crucially by Richard Boyd in relation to the history of science and by George Lakoff in terms of ordinary language theory in *Metaphor and Thought*. 2d ed., ed. Anthony Ortony. I have sought to bring this background to bear upon the dispute between Kant and Herder on science in my essay, "Epigenesis: Concept and Metaphor in Herder's *Ideen*," forthcoming in the proceedings of the International Herder Society Conference on *Ideas for a Philosophy of History of Mankind*, Weimar, 2000.

7. Hans-Jürgen Schings, "Vorbemerkung des Herausgebers," in *Der ganze Mensch*, ed. Schings, 2–4.

8. Richard Toellner, "Zur Einführung," in *Die Neubestimmung des Menschen*, ed. Fabian, i.

9. The term *anthropology* seems to have arisen in the Renaissance as a vehicle to express the problem of unity versus division in human nature. In

that context, the discrimination was typically between the spiritual and the animal, and anthropology was frequently used to signify attention in particular to the animal side of that duality. The ambiguity of human nature was true equally for the term *anthropology* itself: it signified either the duality or the animality. While this etymological background is interesting, the emergence of an anthropological discourse in the eighteenth century cannot be grasped simply by following the vagaries of the term *anthropology* or even of the constellation of terms from *anima* to animal. (For this early background, see Margaret Hodgen, *Early Anthropology in the 16th and 17th Centuries* [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964]; Dilthey, *Die Funktion der Anthropologie*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2 [Leipzig: Teubner, 1923], 416ff.)

10. Sergio Moravia, "The Enlightenment and the Sciences of Man," *History of Science* 18 (1980): 248ff. See also Vollhardt, "Alltagsethik und ästhetischer Erziehung," 114.

11. Odo Marquard made this "turn to the life world" the key to his historical account of the rise of anthropology, especially as the background to Kant's embroilment in these concerns ("Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Begriffs 'Anthropologie' seit dem Ende des 18 Jahrhunderts," in *Schwierigkeiten mit der Geschichtsphilosophie: Aufsätze* [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982], 122–44). Andreas Käuser elaborates: "Marquard's formulation of an epistemological 'turn to the life world' to which anthropology in Kant owed its development, signifies thus that the object of anthropology in the eighteenth century is the empirical observation of man" ("Anthropologie und Ästhetik im 18. Jahrhundert," *Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert* 14 [1990]: 200). See also Odo Marquard, "Kant und die Wende zur Ästhetik," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 16 (1962): 231–43, 362–74.

12. Vollhardt, "Alltagsethik und ästhetischer Erziehung," 114.

13. G. A. J. Rogers, "Locke, Anthropology and Models of the Mind," *History of the Human Sciences* 6 (1993): 76.

14. Roger Smith, "The Language of Human Nature," in *Inventing Human Science*, 95. As Julian Martin has formulated it, "By the term 'Histories,' Bacon was referring to the collection of a mass of careful observations of things, both as they are, and through active experimentation upon them" ("Sauvages's Nosology," in *The Medical Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Andrew Cunningham and Roger French [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990], 116).

15. Arno Seifert, *Cognitio historica: Die Geschichte als Namengeberin der frühneuzeitlichen Empirie* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1976).

16. As two instances of direct importance to my own large argument, here, I would point to Herbert Dieckmann's essay on the influence of Bacon on Diderot, and H. B. Nisbet's essay on the influence of Bacon on Herder. Both Dieckmann and Nisbet adopt strong postures of contempt for Baconian empiricism and extend that to Diderot and Herder as enthusiasts for that legacy. I want to argue for the centrality of the line from Bacon through Diderot to

Herder as a *progressive* impulse for eighteenth-century science. To do so, we must throw off philosophical biases that have blinded us to historical possibilities of the eighteenth century. See chapter 8.

17. Blumenbach, certainly not the least rigorous natural scientist of the German eighteenth century, "with Bacon . . . considered [natural history] as the first subject of philosophy" (K. F. H. Marx, "Life of Blumenbach," in *Anthropological Treatises*, by Johann Blumenbach [London: Longman, 1865], 10).

18. On the Scottish Enlightenment, see Gladys Bryson, *Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth Century* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1945); and major recent works in this field with relevant material: *Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); *Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. V. Hope (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1984); Ronald Hamowy, *The Scottish Enlightenment and the Theory of Spontaneous Order* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987); *Philosophy and Science in the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. Peter Jones (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1988); *Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. M. A. Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); *The 'Science of Man' in the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. Peter Jones (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1989); Alexander Broadie, *The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1990); George Davie, *The Scottish Enlightenment and Other Essays* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1991).

19. P. B. Wood, "The Natural History of Man in the Scottish Enlightenment," *History of Science* 27 (1989): 90.

20. Christopher Fox, "Introduction: How to Prepare a Noble Savage," 2.

21. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739; Oxford: Clarendon, 1888), xx.

22. That there was ferment on this whole question of what empirical inquiry signified has been noted by Christopher Fox in rather firm tones: "It has been convincingly shown that, in Hume's age at least, the status of 'empirical science' was not all that clear" ("Defining Eighteenth-Century Psychology," in *Psychology and Literature in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Christopher Fox [New York: AMS Press, 1987], 16). His reference for this claim is the major study of Hume by John P. Wright, *The Sceptical Realism of David Hume* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985).

23. Voltaire, *Philosophical Letters*, 53-54 (cited by Rogers, "Locke, Anthropology," 79).

24. Rogers, "Locke, Anthropology," 80. "It is this Baconian programme which infects much of the writing on nature and much on man through the 17th century," Rogers observes (74), and "Bacon [himself] saw these histories of man as including all of those aspects which we classify as psychological as well as physiological" (74). The pervasiveness of this "Baconian programme" can be illustrated as well in Edinburgh, in Alexander Gerard's *Plan of Educa-*

tion (1755). See P. Wood, "Natural History and The Scottish Enlightenment," 94–95.

25. James Buickerood, "The Natural History of the Understanding: Locke and the Rise of Facultative Logic in the Eighteenth Century," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 6 (1985): 157, 157 n. "Echoing the Baconian conviction in the efficacy of compiling 'natural histories' of phenomena, the *Essay's* 'Historical, plain Method' was intended to result in an 'Account of the Ways'—i.e., the operations—"whereby our Understanding comes to attain those' ideas which they in fact possess" (165). See, further, Neal Wood, "The Baconian Character of Locke's 'Essay,'" *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science* 6 (1975): 43–84. P. B. Wood offers a similar characterization of Locke's contribution to the natural history of human understanding. In Locke's "historical plain method," Wood observes, there was a "systematic appeal to comparative evidence" as a "means of transcending the limitations of the introspective method." Thus, Locke "compared the operations of the human mind with those of the higher animals," he "considered the mental states of idiots and madmen," and he invoked the evidence of the 'whole course of Men in their several Ages, Countries, and Education'" (Wood, "The Natural History of Man in the Scottish Enlightenment," *History of Science* 27 [1989]: 96). Thus, Locke, in Wood's view, "opened up new perspectives on the relevance of history, anthropology, and the comparative study of languages" (96).

26. This crucial phrase is stressed by Wolfgang Proß, "Herder und die Anthropologie seiner Zeit," 1183–84. It obviously picks up on Voltaire's characterization of Locke, and befits the endeavors above all of Condillac in the early eighteenth century. Herder referred to the Marquis d'Argens's French text, *Histoire de l'esprit humain* (1765–1768) in his third *Kritisches Wäldchen* in German as "Geschichte des menschlichen Verstandes" (Herder, *Kritische Wälder, Erstes bis Drittes Wäldchen; Viertes Wäldchen; Paralipomena*, ed. Regine Otto [Berlin: Aufbau, 1990], 428). Georges Gusdorf has termed this "genetic epistemology" and situated it at the core of (empirical) psychology as it emerged in the eighteenth century (*L'avènement des sciences humaines au siècle des lumières* [Paris: Payot, 1973], 32).

27. "From Bacon to Locke through Descartes and the Port Royal 'Logic,' a new conception emerged according to which logic ought to be based on the empirical study of the understanding" (Vidal, "Psychology in the Eighteenth Century," 93). This formulation is even more pregnant with the emergence of eighteenth-century anthropology than the path-breaking treatment of James Buickerood, "The Natural History of the Understanding," which I discussed in chapter 2. See also Lothar Müller, "Mikroskopie der Seele—Zur Entstehung der Psychologie aus dem Geist der Beobachtungskunst im 18. Jahrhundert," in *Die Geschichtlichkeit des Seelischen*, ed. Gerd Jüttemann (Weinheim: Psychologie Verlags-Union Beltz, 1986), 185–208.

28. Peter Gay, ed., *The Enlightenment: A Comprehensive Anthology* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1973), 521; cited in Francisco Vidal, "Psychology in the Eighteenth Century," 89–90.

29. P. B. Wood, "The Natural History of Man in the Scottish Enlightenment," 96. The last citation is from Locke himself, *Essay*, i.61.181–82.

30. Wood, "The Natural History of Man in the Scottish Enlightenment," 96.

31. Moravia, "The Enlightenment and the Sciences of Man," 248. It is striking that these are central features of Herder's new, hermeneutical method, and the very sorts of things that Kant found unsatisfactory in mere empiricism.

32. Cited in Lester Crocker, *Nature and Culture: Ethical Thought in the French Enlightenment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963), 480.

33. Moravia, "The Enlightenment and the Sciences of Man," 250. The centrality of that term is accentuated in *Der ganze Mensch*, ed. Schings, the most important collection of essays to date on the rise of German anthropological discourse in the eighteenth century.

34. Moravia, "The Enlightenment and the Sciences of Man," 252.

35. Ibid. As Gary Hatfield puts it, "Ontological questions were bracketed in order to concentrate on the study of mental faculties through their empirical manifestations in mental phenomena and external behavior" ("Remaking the Science of Mind: Psychology as Natural Science," in *Inventing Human Science*, 188).

36. "The controversy over Lavater in Germany is centrally a controversy over the concept of symbolism in physiognomy and the question regarding bodily expression," i.e., it raises central questions about a hermeneutic of "nonverbal-corporeal communication" (Andreas Käuser, "Anthropologie und Ästhetik im 18. Jahrhundert," *Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert* 14 [1990]: 205–6).

37. Hans-Jürgen Schings, "Der philosophische Arzt. Anthropologie, Melancholie und Literatur im 18. Jahrhundert," in *Melancholie und Aufklärung* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1977), 13; Wolfgang Riedel, "Influxus physicus und Seelstärke," in *Anthropologie und Literatur um 1800*, ed. Jürgen Barkhoff and Eda Sagarra (Munich: Iudicium Verlag, 1992), 25. Significantly, the German title of Moravia's monograph on the emergence of anthropological discourse in France is *Beobachtende Vernunft*—observing reason. For other signs of recognition of this ubiquitous pairing and its significance, see Christopher Fox, "Introduction: How to Prepare a Nobel Savage," 13; Roy Porter, "Medical Science and Human Science in the Enlightenment," in *Inventing Human Science*, 57.

38. Wolfgang Proß argues convincingly that Locke's suspicion (by the absolutist measure) of the adequacy of empirical science weighed heavily on eighteenth-century thought ("Herder und die Anthropologie seiner Zeit," 1136).

39. The historical novelty of this notion of empirical law can only be grasped in the context of the persistence of an absolutist notion: these issues were central to the critical Kant, and played out especially in the First Critique and in his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*.

40. Ian Hacking, "Statistical Language, Statistical Truth, and Statistical Reason," in *The Social Dimensions of Science*, ed. Ernan McMullin (Notre

Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 130-57; Hacking, "Style for Historians and Philosophers," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 23 (1992): 1-20.

41. See Robert Butts, ed., *Kant's Philosophy of Physical Science: Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft 1786-1986* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986); Michael Friedman, *Kant and the Exact Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); and Hoke Robinson, ed., *Spindel Conference, 1991: System and Teleology in Kant's Critique of Judgment*, supplement to *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 30 (1991).

42. Robert Cohen and Marx Wartofsky, eds., *Hegel and the Sciences* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1984).

43. Kathleen Okruhlik and James Brown, eds., *The Natural Philosophy of Leibniz* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985).

44. That is, I take Hume to be a naturalist.

45. Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, xxi.

46. Wolfgang Proß, "Herder und die Anthropologie seiner Zeit," 1152.

47. Phillip Sloan, "From Logical Universals to Historical Individuals: Buffon's Idea of Biological Species," in *Histoires du Concept d'Espèce dans la science de la vie*, ed. Jean-Louis Fischer and Jacques Roger (Paris: Singer-Polignac, 1985), 101-40.

48. As Phillip Sloan puts it, "Mathematical truth, at least in the sense of the reasoning of geometry is only 'abstract' and concerns only the relation of ideas. Such abstractions have no immediate contact with reality. Reality is reached by what Buffon terms 'physical' truth" ("The Gaze of Natural History," in *Inventing Human Science*, ed. Fox, Porter, and Wokler, 129). The parallels with Kant raise important questions even of "influence." See Sloan, "Buffon, German Biology, and the Historical Interpretation of Biological Species," *British Journal for the History of Science* 12 (1979): 109-53.

49. Cited in Sloan, "The Gaze of Natural History," 129.

50. For a German recognition of these concerns, see Moses Mendelssohn, "Über die Wahrscheinlichkeit," (1755); tr. in Moses Mendelssohn, *Philosophical Writings*, 235-50.

51. Phillip Sloan, "From Logical Universals," 114.

52. Cited in Sloan, "The Gaze of Natural History," 120.

53. Moravia, "'Moral'—'Physique.'"

54. Claude Blanckaert, "L'Histoire naturelle de la civilisation: L'esprit des mœurs et l'idée de nature humaine au siècle des Lumières," in *Buffon 88*, ed. Jean Gayon (Paris: Vrin, 1992), 7.

55. Wokler, "From *l'homme physique* to *l'homme moral* and back," 124; Wokler takes the phrase "temporalization of the 'chain of being'" explicitly from Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, chapter 11.

56. Wokler, "From *l'homme physique*," 131.

57. Lepenies, "Naturgeschichte und Anthropologie im 18. Jahrhundert," in *Die Neubestimmung des Menschen*, 221.

58. Wolfgang Proß, "Herder und die Anthropologie seiner Zeit," 1173.

59. "The category 'human nature' remained largely unquestioned and provided the ahistorical language in terms of which historical change was intelligible" (Smith, "The Language of Human Nature," 105).

60. Two of the greatest thinkers in this vein made this point explicitly. Adam Ferguson insisted that in emphasizing human artifice it should never be forgotten that in humans, art is nature. And Johann Blumenbach similarly insisted that the history of man was a natural history.

61. Moravia places special emphasis, in this connection, on Adam Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (Moravia, "Enlightenment," 256).

62. Wokler, "Anthropology and Conjectural History," 32. See, too, Roger Smith, "The Language of Human Nature," 88-105.

63. "Anthropology sprang from a great thought of Buffon. Up to his time, man had never been studied, except as an individual; Buffon was the first who, in man, studied the species" (M. Flourens, "Memoir of Blumenbach," in *Anthropological Treatises*, by Blumenbach, 55).

64. Moravia developed this idea in a third, crucial essay: "From *homme machine* to *homme sensible*: Changing Eighteenth-Century Models of Man's Image," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 39 (1978): 45-60.

65. See Suzanne Pucci, *Diderot and a Poetics of Science* (New York: Peter Lang, 1986).

66. The charge that Diderot's empiricism, like Bacon's (and Herder's) amounted to "mere groping" is made by Herbert Dieckmann ("Influence of Francis Bacon on Diderot," 43-45) and echoed by H. B. Nisbet, "Herder and Francis Bacon." See chapter 8.

67. Dieckmann, "Influence of Francis Bacon," 45.

68. Moravia, "The Enlightenment and the Sciences of Man," 247.

69. Dieckmann, "Influence of Francis Bacon," 51.

70. Wolfgang Proß, "Herder und die Anthropologie seiner Zeit," 1130-31. See Roger Smith, "The Background of Physiological Psychology in Natural Philosophy," *History of Science* 11 (1973): 75-123, esp. 75-77.

71. The exhaustion of the mechanist paradigm manifested itself in efforts to revise the idea of the inertness of matter: "the definition of matter, which changes dramatically in the eighteenth century, radically alters the definition of mind" (Fox, "Defining Eighteenth-Century Psychology," 4). Revision of the inertness of matter had immediate and essential reverberations in the theory of mind: the metaphysics of the Three Hypotheses necessitated the connection. It is not as if the metaphysical problem of the Three Hypotheses could be *solved*, but what proved novel in the eighteenth century was the endeavor to construct an empirical-scientific *alternative* (not solution).

72. Sergio Moravia has documented the shift in medical thought from the "iatromechanical" to the "vitalist" orientation in the school of Montpellier and in the thought of men like Maupertuis, Buffon, Bordeu, and Diderot ("From *Homme Machine* to *Homme Sensible*," 45-60).

73. Aram Vartanian has conceptualized the impetus of these crucial years in terms of the transformation in Denis Diderot ("From Deist to Atheist," *Diderot Studies* 1 (1958): 46-63). "The Materialists set out with the optimistic attitude that a physiological consideration of man would bring light into the darkness of epistemological and moral-legal issues. Man considered as a machine gave ground for the hope that one could unlock the mystery of the wholeness of man via insight into his physical organization" (Gerald Harung, "Über den Selbstmord: Eine Grenzbestimmung des anthropologischen Diskurses im 18. Jahrhundert," in *Der ganze Mensch*, ed. Schings, 41).

74. Maupertuis, *The Earthly Venus* (1746; New York: Johnson Reprint, 1966).

75. Sloan mentions the Maupertuis connection but does not elaborate on it.

76. On the centrality of Maupertuis's debate with D'Alembert, see Mary Terrall, "The Culture of Science in Frederick the Great's Berlin." On the debate with Diderot, see Gossmann, "Berkeley, Hume, and Maupertuis," *French Studies* 14 (1960). In Germany both Mendelssohn and Kant were thoroughly embroiled with Maupertuis's thought, as we have had occasion to note, and their attention was not lost on Herder (see Tonelli, "Die Anfänge von Kants Kritik der Kausalbeziehungen," 439, 449; Tonelli, "Der Streit über die mathematische Methode," 59).

77. "The concept of the animal soul did not give rise to any serious problems until the seventeenth century, when Cartesian dualism brought out distinctions which had been latent in the dominant Aristotelian tradition. Aristotle had postulated graduations from inert, inanimate matter to plants, which had the additional functions of nourishment and reproduction, to animals, which were also endowed with sensation, motion, and all degrees of mental functions except reason: he reserved reason for man" (Robert M. Young, "Animal Soul," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 1, 122).

78. François Duchesneau writes of the epoch's "trend towards radical antireductionism" and illustrates the simultaneous resistance to materialism and to animism in a key figure in France, England and Germany from the late eighteenth century ("Vitalism in late Eighteenth-Century Physiology," in *William Hunter and the Eighteenth-Century Medical World*, ed W. F. Bynum and Roy Porter [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985], 259-95, esp. 259).

79. John Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 4:3:6; see John Yolton, *Thinking Matter* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 14-17.

80. John Yolton, *Thinking Matter*; Yolton, *Locke and French Materialism* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991).

81. Nicholas Jolley, *Leibniz and Locke* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984).

82. On the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, see, most recently, Ezio Vailati, *Leibniz and Clarke: A Study of Their Correspondence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

83. Konrad Cramer, Wilhelm Jacobs, and Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, eds., *Spinozas Ethik und ihre frühe Wirkung* (Wolfenbüttel: Herzog August Bibliothek, 1981); Karlfried Gründer and Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, eds., *Spinoza in der Frühzeit seiner religiösen Wirkung* (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1984); Rüdiger Otto, *Studien zur Spinozarezeption in Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1994); P. Cristofolini, J.-T. Desanti, R. Pomeau, and P. Vernière, eds., *Spinoza au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris: Méridiens Kilncksieck, 1990); Hanna Delf, Julius Schoeps, and Manfred Walther, eds., *Spinoza in der europäischen Geistesgeschichte* (Berlin: Hentrich, 1994); David Bell, *Spinoza in Germany from 1670 to the Age of Goethe* (London: Institute of Germanic Studies, University of London, 1984).

84. Diderot proved a remarkable figure, for he seemed at once at home with the utter mechanists and yet attuned to aspects that one would normally associate with the more *vitalist* currents of the age. See L. Crocker, "Diderot and Eighteenth-Century French Transformationism," in *Forerunners of Darwin: 1745-1859*, by B. Glass et al. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959), 114-43. As Roger Smith puts it, "Far from implying materialism in the simple sense of reducing reality to dead matter, Diderot in fact explored physiology for ideas on how to revivify nature" ("The Language of Human Nature," 102).

85. See H. Dieckmann, "Théophile Bordeu und Diderots *Rêve de D'Alembert*," *Romanische Forschungen* 52 (1938): 55-122.

86. Diderot, *Pensées sur l'Interprétation de la Nature*.

87. Shirley Roe, "Rationalism and Embryology," *Journal of the History of Biology* 12 (1979): 1. Roe distinguishes between opposition to preformationism and advocacy of epigenesis: "Buffon, Maupertuis, Needham, and the materialists LaMettrie and Diderot" all opposed preformationism; "not all of these can be classified as true epigenesists, however" (3 n). That, of course, depends on how one characterizes "true epigenesis."

88. Helmut Müller-Sievers writes,

One can only grasp in what an enormous configuration of history of science and philosophy this epigenesis model is situated, when one has reconstructed the main arguments of the fiercely conducted debate over the phenomenon of generation after the middle of the eighteenth century. What emerges is that answers to this question of how one should think about the biological origin of humans are not just some scientific paradigms among many but without question comprehend, in their speculative disclosure of abysses [*Abgründlichkeit*], the discourses of the theoretical and even practical philosophy. (*Epigenesis: Naturphilosophie im Sprachdenken Wilhelm von Humboldts* [Paderborn: Schöningh, 1993], 29)

89. William F. Bynum, "The Anatomical Method, Natural Theology, and the Functions of the Brain," *Isis* 64 (1973): 445-68.

90. Manfred Riedel, "Influxus physicus," 29.

91. Cited in Phillip Sloan, "The Gaze of Natural History," 112.

92. A. O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*; Giorgio Tonelli, "The Law of Continuity in the Eighteenth Century," *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 27 (1963): 1619-38.

93. As Manfred Wenzel puts it, what Herder found unbearable in pre-formationism was that it removed all "spontaneity of nature, which was not allowed any further creative development or generation of new things" ("Die Anthropologie Johann Gottfried Herders und das klassische Humanitätsideal," in *Die Natur des Menschen*, ed. Gunter Mann and Franz Dumont [Stuttgart: G. Fischer, 1990], 144 n). This same response is true for his great rival: "Kant's arguments for epigenesis . . . ha[ve] the advantage of being better founded in facts and of granting nature a maximum of creative power" (Owsei Temkin, "German Concepts of Ontogeny and History around 1800," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 24 [1950]: 230 n).

94. Peter Hanns Reill, "Between Mechanism and Hermeticism," 409.

95. Here I part company sharply from Wim Klever, "Hermann Boerhaave (1668-1738) oder Spinozismus als rein mechanische Wissenschaft des Menschen," in *Spinoza in der europäischen Geistesgeschichte*, 75-93. Klever is correct in his description of Boerhaave's mechanism but fundamentally misguided about the persistence of this mechanism in the later eighteenth century. Holbach is, in this light, retrograde, not exemplary relative to the developments in natural philosophy. La Mettrie, by contrast, is far more in step with these developments.

96. Aram Vartanian, *La Mettrie's L'homme Machine: A Study in the Origins of an Idea* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960).

97. "LaMettrie represented human nature as the organizing power of living matter, deliberately earning himself a shocking reputation as a materialist" (Smith, "The Language of Human Nature," 99).

98. I have noted in chapter 4 how central the provocation of La Mettrie's book proved in the conception and the reception of Spalding's *Betrachtung über die Bestimmung des Menschen*, a decisive text for German anthropological discourse in the second half of the eighteenth century.

99. Raymond de Saussure, "Haller and La Mettrie," *Journal of the History of Medicine* (Autumn 1949): 431-49.

100. It makes matters entirely worse when one does not even discern a difference between the vitalism that was coming into prominence in the mid-eighteenth century and the very idea of two-substance theory it was aiming to displace, which seems to be what Christa Kersting does in *Die Genese der Pädagogik im 18. Jahrhundert: Campes 'Allgemeine Revision' im Kontext der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft* (Weinheim: Deutsche Studien Verlag, 1992), 122, where she identifies Haller as the "essential representative" of vitalism

as a two-substance view. Indeed, he was a representative of the two-substance view, but just this vitiated his vitalism for those who wished to develop the new science on the basis of a monistic, vitalist materialism.

101. Claude Blanckaert has developed a strong case that Buffon's main philosophical commitments were uncongenial to the "research programme" for anthropology that emerged in his name at the end of the century, and so these parts of his thought were simply suppressed ("Buffon and the Natural History of Man," 20, 26, 40). It is hard to reconcile Buffon's extensive, published formulation of the immateriality of the soul with Jacques Roger's claim that Buffon was a closet atheist-materialist (Roger, "Diderot et Buffon en 1749," and "Buffon et l'Anthropologie").

102. Ingensiep, "Der Mensch im Spiegel der Tier- und Pflanzenseele: Zur Anthropomorphie der Naturwahrnehmung im 18. Jahrhundert," in *Der ganze Mensch*, ed. Schings, 61.

103. Robert Wokler has elaborated this point to set off Rousseau's "transformationism" from the dualistic postures even of such advanced scientific thinkers as Buffon. See Wokler, "Anthropology and Conjectural History in the Enlightenment," 42.

104. And that explains the centrality of the controversy over the origins of language, from Condillac to Herder.

105. Kenneth Dewhurst and Nigel Reeves, *Friedrich Schiller: Medicine, Psychology, and Literature* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), esp. 98, where they stress "a significant difference between Hallerian vitalism and Stahlian animism."

106. Karl Figlio, "Theories of Perception," 177.

107. Especially Bonnet, *Essai de psychologie ou Considérations sur les Opérations de l'âme, sur l'Habitude et sur l'Education* (London, 1755); C. Kersting, *Die Genese der Pädagogik*, 117.

108. Gary Hatfield, "Remaking the Science of Mind: Psychology as Natural Science," in *Inventing Human Science*, ed. C. Fox, R. Porter, and R. Wokler, 206.

109. Indeed, Bonnet is a regular target of Kantian disparagement. See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A668/B696; "Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Prinzipien in der Philosophie," AA:8:179-80; [Anthropologie-] *Vorlesungen des Wintersemesters 1772/73* (Collins), AA:25:1:9.

110. Richard Toellner, "Haller's Abwehr von Animismus und Materialismus," *Sudhoffs Archiv* 51 (1967): 130-44.

111. G. Rudolph, "Haller's Lehre von der Irritabilität und Sensibilität," in *Von Boerhaave bis Berger*, ed. K. E. Rothschuh (Stuttgart: G. Fischer, 1964); Shirley Roc, *Matter, Life, and Generation: Eighteenth-Century Embryology and the Haller-Wolff Debate* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); A. Vartanian, "Trembley's Polyp, La Mettrie, and Eighteenth-Century French Materialism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 11 (1950): 259-86; T. S. Hall,

Ideas of Life and Matter: Studies in the History of General Physiology 600 BC-1900 AD (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), vol. 1, 351-407; vol. 2, *Mechanism and Vitalism*, passim; Hall, "On Biological Analogs of Newtonian Paradigms," *Philosophy of Science* 35 (1968): 6-27; J. Schiller, "Queries, Answers, and Unsolved Problems in Eighteenth-Century Biology," *History of Science* 12 (1974): 184-99; P. Ritterbush, *Overtures to Biology: The Speculations of Eighteenth-Century Naturalists* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964).

112. The struggle with Haller's positions is salient in the writings of all the key figures of the new science (and the new Spinozism) of the later eighteenth century. This is particularly the case with Herder; see Simon Richter, "Medizinischer und ästhetischer Diskurs im 18. Jahrhundert: Herder und Haller über Reiz," *Lessing Yearbook* 25 (1993): 83-95. See also John Neubauer, "The Freedom of the Machine: On Mechanism, Materialism, and the Young Schiller," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 15 (1981/82): 275-90.

113. *Ketzer* was Kant's word for this aspect of Haller, *Logik Philippi*, AA:24:328.

114. Robert Wokler, "Tyson, Buffon, and the Orangutan," *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 155 (1976): 2301-19.

115. Phillip Sloan, "The Gaze of Natural History," 121.

116. On Linnaeus and the indistinguishability of man from animals, see Heinz Stolpe, who cites a reference in Blumenbach's dissertation to Linnaeus's preface to his *Swedish Fauna* as follows: "that it had been impossible to discern a single mark by which one could distinguish between man and the apes [*Affen*]" ("Herder und die Ansätze einer naturgeschichtlichen Entwicklungslehre im 18. Jahrhundert," in *Neue Beiträge zur Literatur der Aufklärung* [Berlin: Rütten & Loening, 1964], 293). See also Lepenies, "Naturgeschichte und Anthropologie," 217.

117. On Buffon's observations in this light, see Lepenies, "Naturgeschichte und Anthropologie," 223.

118. Hans-Werner Ingensiep, "Der Mensch im Spiegel der Tier- und Pflanzenseele," 57.

119. Wolf Lepenies, "Naturgeschichte und Anthropologie," 211-26. See also Sergio Moravia, "From *Homme Machine* to *Homme Sensible*," 45-60.

120. "Could the properties of matter themselves be responsible for the activities of the living creature? If so, what would this imply for the existence of a soul in man, and a Creator in the universe?" (Shirley Roe, "Rationalism and Embryology: Caspar Friedrich Wolff's Theory of Epigenesis," *Journal of the History of Biology* 12 [1979]: 1).

121. Sloan, "The Gaze of Natural History," 126.

122. Sloan, "From Logical Universals," 123.

123. "[N]ot until the past 200 years has it come to be widely supposed that the study of human nature in general, and empirical investigations of primitive peoples in particular, form precisely the same field" (Wokler, "From

l'homme physique to l'homme moral and Back: Towards a History of Enlightenment Anthropology," *History of the Human Sciences* 6 [1993]: 121).

124. Roger Smith, "The Language of Human Nature," 103.

125. Karl Fink, "Rhetoric of the Review," in *Eighteenth-Century German Book Review*, ed. Karl Fink and Herbert Rowland (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1995), 58; Fink, "Storm and Stress Anthropology," 53.

126. "Eighteenth-century Europeans believed that traveling in space also meant traveling in time, the Others they encountered were earlier versions of themselves" (Fox, "How to Prepare a Noble Savage," 16). Robert Wokler observes that this was a relatively recent development: "Not until the late seventeenth century was it widely perceived that the behavior of primitive peoples might shed light upon the early history of civilization; not until the eighteenth century did it come to be accepted that the study of human nature in general, and empirical investigations of savage societies in particular, form precisely the same field" (Wokler, "Anthropology and Conjectural History in the Enlightenment," in *Inventing Human Science*, 31). Thus, "comparative and historical methods became inextricable, together contributing to a properly social social science" (Smith, "The Language of Human Nature," 103). See Ronald Meeks, *Social Science and the Ignoble Savage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Anthony Pagden, *The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

127. Ronald Meeks, "Smith, Turgot, and the 'Four Stages' Theory," in *Smith, Marx, and After* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1977), 18–32.

128. N. Phillipson, "The Scottish Enlightenment," 20–21.

129. P. B. Wood, "The Natural History of Man in the Scottish Enlightenment," 100.

130. Ibid., 102. "Kames's *Sketches of the history of man* grew out his desire in the 1740s to write 'a natural history of man' in which he apparently hoped to chart the 'History of the Species, in its progress from the savage state to its highest civilization and improvement'" (102).

131. Robert Wokler, "Apes and Races in the Scottish Enlightenment: Monboddo and Kames on the Nature of Man," in *Philosophy and Science in the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. Peter Jones, 145–68.

132. See, especially, Peter Jones, ed., *The 'Science of Man' in the Scottish Enlightenment*.

133. Johan van der Zande, "Popular Philosophy and the History of Mankind," 38–39.

134. Fink, "Rhetoric of the Review"; Leventhal, "Progression and Particularity," in *Johann Gottfried Herder: Language, History, and the Enlightenment*, 25–46.

135. Georg Gustav Fülleborn, "Abriß einer Geschichte und Literatur der Physiognomik," in *Beyträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. 8, ed. Füllerborn (Zurich, 1797), 156; cited in Zande, "The Moderate Skepticism of

German Popular Philosophy," in *The Skeptical Tradition around 1800*, ed. Zande and Popkin, 75.

136. Reinhard Brandt, "Die englische Philosophie als Ferment der kontinentalen Aufklärung," in *Europäische Aufklärung(en): Einheit und nationale Vielheit*, ed. Siegfried Jütter and Johann Schlobach (Hamburg: Meiner, 1992), 66-79.

137. Günter Gawlick, "Über einige Charakteristika der britischen Philosophie des 18. Jahrhundert," *Studia Leibnitiana* 15 (1983): 32-33.

138. P. B. Wood, "The Natural History of Man in the Scottish Enlightenment," 103.

139. Gawlick notes: "No less a figure than Hume, in the Preface to *Treatise of Human Nature*, linked the achievements of a Locke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Mandeville and Butler to those of Bacon" ("Über einige Charakteristika," 35). This sense of a coherent British tradition aimed at pragmatic empiricism with utilitarian outcomes is the essential idea that the German eighteenth century took up from the British.

140. "English philosophy after and in some part even with Locke, with his partially empirical theory of knowledge, abandons two of the three old *metaphysicae speciales* as independent domains in its epistemologically grounded philosophy: cosmology and theology. . . . [These] quietly become epiphenomena of human consciousness" (Brandt, "Die englische Philosophie," 67).

141. See Maurer, *Aufklärung und Anglophilie in Deutschland*, and Olszberger, *Translating the Enlightenment*.

142. Brandt, "Die englische Philosophie als Ferment der kontinentalen Aufklärung," 70.

143. Addison, *The Spectator*, March 12, 1711.

144. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*, vol. 2, 4-5; cited in Brandt, "Die englische Philosophie," 78.

145. Carl Friedrich Flögel, *Geschichte des menschlichen Verstandes* (1765; 2d, rev. ed., Breslau: Meyer, 1773). Riedel characterizes it as "a survey of the literature of already furiously ongoing debates abroad in Western Europe concerning the origins of the properties of the soul and of the spirit and the positions of the major protagonists [in the debate] from Huarte to Helvétius, from Dubos to Lord Kames, from La Rochefoucauld to LaMettrie, but also of the German reception in Krüger, Platner or Unzer" ("Influxus physicus," 27 n). Similarly, Hans-Jürgen Schings recognizes that it "allows us to recognize well the interests of contemporary anthropology" ("Der anthropologische Roman," in *Die Neubestimmung des Menschen*, ed. Fabian, 256). Herder reviewed this book for the *Königsberger Anzeigen* on October 11, 1765, which tells us a great deal about his familiarity with the state of the argument at that moment (Herder, review of Flögel, Suphan:1:87-89).

146. Flögel, *Geschichte des menschlichen Verstandes*, 5.

147. That, it is worth noting, is the Baconian agenda of "natural history."

148. Flögel, *Geschichte des menschlichen Verstandes*, 56.

149. Herman Wolf, *Versuch einer Geschichte des Geniebegriffs in der deutschen Ästhetik des 18. Jahrhunderts*, vol. 1, *Von Gottsched bis auf Lessing* (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1923), 115.

150. Mendelssohn reviewed each of these works in his *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend*, in letters 92-93.

151. For a mercifully brief summary of their views see E. Cassirer, *Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), 331ff.

152. Porter, "Medical Science and Human Science," 72.

153. H. Thüme, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Geniebegriffs in England* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1927): 68ff; Herman Wolf, *Versuch einer Geschichte des Geniebegriffs*, 16ff.

154. See H. Thüme, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Geniebegriffs in England*; Herman Wolf, *Versuch einer Geschichte des Geniebegriffs*; and J. Engell, *The Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).

155. Addison, "Genius," *Spectator* 160 (September 1711); reprinted in *Eighteenth-Century Critical Essays*, vol. 1, ed. Elledge (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press), 27-30; see Thüme, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Geniebegriffs*, 78ff; H. Wolf, *Versuch einer Geschichte des Geniebegriffs*, 26ff; J. Engell, *Creative Imagination*, 37.

156. Edward Young, *Conjectures on Original Composition*, in *Edward Young's Conjectures on Original Composition in England and Germany*, by M. Steinke (New York: Stechert, 1917), 45. It made a big impression in Germany when it was translated, less than a year later. A similar line would be taken up by Klopstock in Germany, defended by such critics as Resewitz and Hamann, and feed into the *Sturm und Drang*.

157. J. Benziger, "Organic Unity: Leibniz to Coleridge," *PMLA* 66 (1951): 21-48.

158. In Edinburgh, the prize-winning aesthetic philosopher Alexander Gerard delivered an important series of lectures on genius (A. Gerard, *An Essay on Genius* [1774; Munich: Fink, 1966]). Hume's essays on taste and tragedy from the late 1750s touch on this topic. Henry Home, Lord Kames, addressed the question as well in what many take to be the culminating work of this whole period, *Elements of Criticism* (1762). They worked to develop a carefully naturalistic theory of genius based upon the premise that the imagination was limited to what the senses had provided. There could be no creation *ex nihilo*, no Divine analogy in mortal genius. Milton Nahm makes this the crux of his many disquisitions on genius. He distinguishes, along these lines, between Addison, Kames, Duff (and Herder), who succumb to the—in Nahm's view—"mystagoguery of inspiration" or the "cult of genius," and the sober and rational approach that sees the artist as a mere artisan, remaking the naturally given through his craft, which he associates with Gerard (and Kant) ("Imagination as the Productive Faculty for 'Creating Another Nature,'" in *Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress*, ed. L. W. Beck [Dordrecht: Reidel,

1972], 442-50. See also Nahm's other works: *Genius and Creativity* [New York: Harper & Row, 1965]; "Genius and the Aesthetic Relation of the Arts," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 9 [1950]: 1-12.

159. H. Wolf, *Versuch einer Geschichte des Geniebegriffs*, 30 n. The title of this collection of publications is in itself a marvellous documentation of the project of the Berlin *Aufklärung*.

160. Flögel, *Geschichte des menschlichen Verstands*, 3-4.

161. Jürgen Jahnke, "Psychologie im 18. Jahrhundert: Literaturbericht 1980 bis 1989," *Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert* 14 (1990): 253-78, with extensive bibliography. See, especially, Richard Graham, "Of What Is the History of Psychology a History?" *British Journal for the History of Science* 20 (1987): 201-11; Christopher Fox, ed., *Psychology and Literature in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: AMS, 1987); Stanley Jackson, "Melancholia and Mechanical Explanation in Eighteenth-Century Medicine," *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 38 (1983): 298-319; G. S. Rousseau, ed., *The Languages of Psyche: Mind and Body in Enlightenment Thought* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), esp. G. S. Rousseau and Roy Porter, "Introduction: Toward a Natural History of Mind and Body," 3-44; Roy Porter, "Barely Touching: A Social Perspective on Mind and Body," 45-80; and Simon Shaffer, "States of Mind: Enlightenment and Natural Philosophy," 233-90. See the two earlier surveys of the field: G. S. Rousseau, "Science and Literature: The State of the Field," *Isis* 69 (1978): 583-91; and G. S. Rousseau, "Literature and Medicine: The State of the Field," *Isis* 72 (1981): 406-24.

162. "Locke and Hume . . . failed to appreciate the special character of concepts. . . . Their aim all along was to reduce the intellectual to the sensible or introspectable, on the ground that the former is mysterious, esoteric and un-natural whilst the latter is palpably given in experience" (Walsh, "Kant and Empiricism," 409).

163. R. Bezolt, *Popularphilosophie und Erfahrungsseelenkunde* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1984).

164. Martin Davies, "Karl Philipp Moritz' *Erfahrungsseelenkunde*: Its Social and Intellectual Origins," *Oxford German Studies* 16 (1985): 13-35.

165. See Lisa Rosner, "Eighteenth-Century Medical Education and the Didactic Model of Experiment," in *The Literary Structure of Scientific Argument*, ed. Peter Dear (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), 182-94.

166. Davies, "Karl Philipp Moritz," 21.

167. Hammerstein, "Zur Geschichte der deutschen Universitäten," 147-50.

168. Erna Lesky, "Medizin im Zeitalter der Aufklärung," in *Lessing und die Zeit der Aufklärung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968), 77-99; Kenneth Dewhurst and Nigel Reeves, introduction to *Friedrich Schiller: Medicine, Psychology and Literature*, 1-141; Lester King, *Medical World in the Eighteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958); Andrew Cunningham and Roger French, *Medical Enlightenment of the Eighteenth*

Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Roger French and Andrew Weir, eds., *Medical Revolution of the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

169. Hans-Jürgen Schings, "Der philosophische Arzt," 11-40; Wolfgang Riedel, "Influxus physicus und Seelestärke," 24-52.

170. Moravia, "'Moral'—'Physique': Genesis and Evolution of a 'Rapport,'" 170. See also Moravia, "Philosophie et médecine en France à la fin du XVIIIe siècle," *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 89 (1972): 1089-151.

171. Schings, "Der philosophische Arzt," 14.

172. Gerald Hartung, "Über den Selbstmord," 41.

173. P. B. Wood, "Natural History of Man in the Scottish Enlightenment," 92.

174. P. Kondylis, *Die Aufklärung im Rahmen des neuzeitlichen Rationalismus* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), 9-41.

175. "Unzer was one of the most important physiologists of the eighteenth century. His specialty was in showing the lines of connection between medical science and philosophy" (Hartung, "Über den Selbstmord," 43).

176. Kant made fun of him in this capacity in his newspaper article "Illnesses of the Head," AA:2:270.

177. Linden, *Untersuchungen zum Anthropologiebegriff*, 36-37.

178. The mind/body problem was allowed "to recede," according to Figlio, that is, the new ideas "were not so much philosophical solutions as they were physiological doctrines which spawned experimental inquiry" ("Theories of Perception," 180).

179. J. La Mettrie, *Man a Machine*, 6.

180. Wolfgang Riedel, *Die Anthropologie des jungen Schiller: Zur Ideengeschichte der medizinischen Schriften und der 'Philosophische Briefe'* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1985), 54.

181. Zimmermann, *Von der Erfahrung in der Arzneykunst*, vol. 1, 169-70; cited in Davies, "Karl Philipp Moritz' *Erfahrungsseelenkunde*," 22.

182. Zimmermann, *Von der Erfahrung in der Arzneykunst*, vol. 1, 4; cited in Davies, "Karl Philipp Moritz' *Erfahrungsseelenkunde*," 28.

183. Davies, "Karl Philipp Moritz' *Erfahrungsseelenkunde*," 30, referring to Lambert's characterization of empiricism in the *New Organon*.

184. Zimmermann, "Untersuchung der Frage, wie ein schöner Geist sich der Zergliederungskunst widmen könne"; cited in Davies, "Karl Philipp Moritz' *Erfahrungsseelenkunde*," 31.

185. Mareta Linden, *Untersuchungen zum Anthropologiebegriff des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Bern: Lang, 1976), 27-29.

186. Krüger "wanted to show philosophers that medicine could make a contribution to philosophical knowledge of the soul, and that mathematics

could be applied to this subject matter" (Hatfield, "Remaking the Science of Mind: Psychology as Natural Science," 201). Through clinical case histories and quantitative brain physiology, Krüger hoped not only to make observations but to develop a rigorous experimental methodology. His approach to brain physiology "adopted a vibratory conception of nerve activity," and he sought to quantify this (201-3).

187. Yolton, "Three Hypotheses," 35.

188. Leonora Rosenfield, *From Beast-Machine to Man Machine* (New York: Octagon, 1968).

189. Robert Wokler, "Tyson, Buffon, and the Orangutang."

190. Ingensiep, "Der Mensch im Spiegel der Tier- und Pflanzenseele," 61. The most bizarre element in the eighteenth-century reflections on a wider notion of soul had to do with the "vegetative soul," the soul of plants, namely the eroticization of plant life. Thus, Linnaeus published *On the Wedding of Plants* (1746); the "extreme eroticism" of Bonnet's concept of plant souls was quite explicit. Johann Unzer published *Von Gefühle der Pflanze* (1766) specifically for ladies. Such a vein continued to the close of the century into the celebrated works of Erasmus Darwin.

191. Johann Süssmilch, *Versuch eines Beweises, daß die erste Sprache ihren Ursprung nicht von Menschen, sondern allein vom Schöpfer erhalten habe* (1766); see Bruce Kieffer, "Herder's Treatment of Süssmilch's Theory of the Origin of Language in the *Abhandlung über die Ursprung der Sprache*: A Reevaluation," *Germanic Review* 53 (1978): 96-105.

192. Hans Aarsleff, "The Tradition of Condillac," *Studies in the History of Linguistics*, ed. Dell Hymes (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), 93-156.

193. Hans-Jürgen Schings, "Vorbemerkung des Herausgebers," in *Der ganze Mensch*, ed. Schings, 1.

194. Hans-Jürgen Schings, "Der philosophische Arzt," in *Melancholie und Aufklärung*, 13. Christa Kersting reflects the impact of this centrality upon the emergence of pedagogy in Germany in the late eighteenth century: *Die Genese der Pädagogik*, esp. "Anthropologie als Fundament philosophischer Theoriebildung," 115ff.

195. Wolfgang Riedel, "Influxus physicus und Seelstärke," 26.

196. Plotenhauer, *Literarische Anthropologie* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1987), 4.

197. Andreas Käuser, "Anthropologie und Ästhetik im 18. Jahrhundert," esp. 197 and passim.

198. Riedel, "Influxus physicus," 24.

199. Plotenhauer, *Literarische Anthropologie*, 1.

200. Christopher Fox, "Defining Psychology," 10; see G. S. Rousseau, "Literature and Medicine: The State of the Field," 409.

201. See Bernhard Fabian, "Newtonische Anthropologie: Alexander Popes *Essay on Man*," in *Die Neubestimmung des Menschen*, 117-33, esp. 130:

"Pope's *Essay on Man*, viewed in terms of its thought-content, is one of the numerous efforts of the age to draw popular-philosophical implications from Newtonianism."

202. See Roy Porter, "Against the Spleen," and Valerie Grosvenor Myer, "Tristram and the Animal Spirits," both in *Laurence Sterne: Riddles and Mysteries*, ed. Valerie Grosvenor Myer (New York: Vision; Barnes & Noble, 1984), 84–98, 99–112. I suggest that this was a particularly important source for the emergence of the anthropological-psychological insights of both Kant and Herder.

203. Riedel, "Influxus physicus," 32; referring to Garve, "Betrachtung einiger Verschiedenheiten der älteren und neueren Schriftsteller, besonders der Dichter," in *Popularphilosophische Schriften*, vol. 1, ed. K. Wölfel (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1974), 24–104.

204. This suggests the ubiquity and potency of the notion of the "pragmatic" in this period. See Gudrun Kühne-Bertram, "Aspekte der Geschichte und der Bedeutung des Begriffs 'Pragmatisch' in den philosophischen Wissenschaften," *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 27 (1983): 158–86.

205. Riedel, "Influxus physicus," 33–35.

206. Feder's *Grundriß der philosophischen Wissenschaft* had appeared in 1767, enunciating a turn to empiricism and specifically to historical inquiry. Riedel celebrated the work in an important review in 1769. This was the moment that the "Göttingen Program" moved toward ascendancy in Germany. For Kant's adoption of this text by Feder for a new course in 1767, see chapter 7.

207. Walther Zimmerli, "'Schwere Rüstung' des Dogmatismus und 'anwendbare Eklektik,'" *Studia Leibnitiana* 15:1 (1983): 58–71.

208. Ibid., 63. See Konrad Cramer, "Die Stunde der Philosophie," in *Zur geistigen Situation der Zeit der Göttingen Universitätsgründung 1737*, ed. Jürgen von Stackelberg (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 101–43.

209. Zimmerli, "'Schwere Rüstung,'" 59.

210. Cramer, "Die Stunde der Philosophie."

211. *Johann Georg Heinrich Feders Leben*, 71.

212. Reinhard Brandt, "Feder und Kant," 250.

213. Brandt writes: "Rousseau led Kant to the critique, but Feder to the defense of contemporary society" (ibid., 251).

214. This book will concern us at length in a later context.

215. Zimmerli, "'Schwere Rüstung,'" 61.

216. *Johann Georg Heinrich Feders Leben*, 71.

217. Brandt, "Feder und Kant," 252.

218. Feder, "Vorrede" to *Logik und Metaphysik nebst der philosophischen Geschichte im Grundrisse* (Göttingen und Gotha: Dieterich, 1769), unpaginated.

219. This gives powerful evidence of the influence of Herder's early writings in the gestation of popular philosophy, but he has been systematically

excluded from the consideration of most interpreters of this movement. A case in point: Johan van der Zande.

220. Cited in Feder, *Logik und Metaphysik*, 2.

221. *Ibid.*, "Vorrede." In his earlier book, Feder explained that he wished to provide "the beginners in philosophy a foretaste, so that they would be placed in a position to learn a little bit of [that science] with a greater reward, even if they only had a preliminary notion of it, or if for some circumstances did not permit hearing lectures about all the parts of philosophical knowledge, still they would not be totally ignorant of any part of it" ("Vorrede" to *Grundriss der philosophischen Wissenschaft nebst der nöthigen Geschichte zum Gebrauch seiner Zuhörer* [Coburg, 1767], unpaginated).

222. Feder, *Logik und Metaphysik*, 12-13.

223. Feder, *Grundriss der philosophischen Wissenschaft*, 50.

224. Feder, *Logik und Metaphysik*, 12.

225. He mentions Feder by name; see chapter 7.

226. Feder, *Logik und Metaphysik*, 90.

227. Zimmerli, "Schwere Rüstung," 64; Manfred Kuehn, "The Scots in Göttingen," (chapter 4 of *Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768-1800*, 70-85, esp. 76ff). Kuehn suggests that "Feder never became a follower of the Scots" (76), but "in his conception of healthy reason or common sense which forms the basis for his theory of truth, Feder is very close to the Scottish conception of common sense" (81).

228. Feder, *Logik und Metaphysik*, 158. In his *Blomberg Logic* (1771), Kant would blast a similar subjective formulation, which he associated with Crusius, but which he may well have known Feder shared. See chapter 7.

229. Klaus Petrus, "Beschriebene Dunkelheit und Seichtigkeit," 290.

230. Michael Hißmann, *Brief über Gegenstände der Philosophie* (1778); cited in Zimmerli, "Schwere Rüstung," 60.

231. Review of Michael Hißmann, *Anleitung zur Kenntniss der ausser-lesenensten Literatur in allen Theilen der Philosophie* (Göttingen, 1778), *Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek* 38 (1779): 245 ff.

232. [Christoph Meiners], *Revision der Philosophie* (Göttingen and Gotha: Dieterich, 1772).

233. [Feder], review of *Revision der Philosophie*, *Göttingen Anzeigen von Gelehrten Sachen* 15 (1772): 113-17.

234. There is no concrete evidence that he read it, of course. But no one in his field was likely not to have.

235. Meiners, *Revision der Philosophie*, 52.

236. *Ibid.*, 54. Meiners "relies on the 'wise Locke' and the 'brave and good-natured Hume'" throughout *Revision*, according to Manfred Kuehn ("Skepticism: Philosophical Disease or Cure?" in *The Skeptical Tradition around 1800*, 92). See Meiners, *Revision*, 161, 202, 153.

237. Meiners, *Revision der Philosophie*, 53.

238. The scheme of disciplines (ibid., 184–86), the expose of sources of prejudice (187–89), the deflation of fashionable ideas of the day (189–90), practical rules of inquiry based on these results (191), on how to read (192ff), and on the “art of observation” (196).

239. Meiners developed his argument that “psychology and logic are one and the same science” in “Vorrede” to *Kurzer Abriss der Psychologie zum Gebrauche seiner Vorlesungen* (Göttingen und Gotha: Dieterich, 1773). Meiners opined in that work that “in psychology and the sciences that derive from it is contained the entire theory of man and of philosophy” (8).

240. Meiners, *Revision der Philosophie*, 202.

241. Ibid., 144. But Meiners had his reservations about the unity of the “schönen Künste und Wissenschaften” (226ff, esp. 232). Meiners develops this concern in *Kurzer Abriss der Psychologie*, 16–17, and at full length in a later work, *Grundriß der Theorie und Geshichte der schönen Wissenschaften* (Lemgo: Meyer, 1787).

242. Meiners, *Revision der Philosophie*, 214.

243. Zimmerli, “‘Schwere Rüstung,’” 69; Meiners, *Revision der Philosophie*, 82.

244. Alexander Kosenina, *Ernst Platner*, 22–23.

245. Platner, *Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise* (1772; Hildesheim: Olms, 2000), ix–x; the metaphysics of soul-body relations was an “impenetrable mystery.” Nevertheless, understanding it was indispensable for human well-being (xii).

246. Riedel, *Anthropologie des jungen Schiller*, 15.

247. Christa Kersting, *Die Genese der Pädagogik*, 122.

248. Platner, *Anthropologie*, x. See Harald Schöndorf, “Der Leib und sein Verhältnis zur Seele bei Ernst Platner,” *Vierteljahresschrift für Theologie und Philosophie* 60 (1985): 77–87; J. Lachelier, “L’Observation de Platner,” *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 11 (1903): 679–702.

249. Platner, *Anthropologie*, 90–95.

250. Ibid., 93. See Riedel, *Anthropologie des jungen Schiller*, 98.

251. Platner, *Anthropologie*, 44.

252. Ibid., 25–27. See Riedel, *Anthropologie des jungen Schiller*, 65–66.

253. Platner, *Anthropologie*, 33, 49. “Even in Platner the soul remains immaterial in the traditional sense and it remains the starting point for self-consciousness. All further insights regarding the character of the human soul, however, must be gleaned from experience” (Hartung, “Über den Selbstmord,” 45).

254. Gerald Hartung, “Über den Selbstmord,” 45.

255. Platner, *Anthropologie*, 94, 191.

256. Johann Feder, "Ernst Platner, *Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise*," *Göttingische Anzeigen*, June 4, 1772, 571-74; Christian Garve, "Dr. Ernst Platners, der Arzneykunst Professors in Leipzig, *Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise*," *Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften* 14:2 (1773): 214-47; Marcus Herz, "D. Ernst Platner, der Arzneykunst Professors in Leipzig, *Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise*," *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek* (1773): 25-51.

257. Platner, *Anthropologie*, v.

258. Meiners, *Revision der Philosophie* (Göttingen and Gotha, 1772), 164. See Feder's review of this work, *Göttingische Anzeigen*, February 3, 1772, 113-17.

259. Kosenina, *Ernst Platner*, 131.

260. Garve, review of Feder, *passim*.

261. Herz, review of Feder, 27.

262. Linden, *Untersuchungen zum Anthropologiebegriff*, 53, 82ff, and *passim*.

263. Kosenina, *Ernst Platner*, 22-23; Paul Rohr, *Platner und Kant* (Gotha: Engelhard-Reyher, 1890).

264. Dewhurst and Reeves, *Friedrich Schiller*, *passim*.

265. Riedel, *Anthropologie des jungen Schiller*, 20 n.

CHAPTER SEVEN

1. "After 1770 it is established for Kant that metaphysics treats the pure concept of the form of intuition and of understanding and consequently a discipline like empirical psychology must *necessarily* be excluded" (Brandt, "Ausgewählte Probleme der Kantischen Anthropologie," in *Der ganze Mensch*, ed. Schings, 16).

2. Herder, "Wie die Philosophie," DKV:1:134. Indeed, Karl Franz von Irwing wrote in 1772: "presently one can incorporate almost our whole philosophy, and not without profit, into the science of man" ("Vorrede" to *Erfahrungen und Untersuchungen über den Menschen* [1772]; cited in Zande, "In the Image of Cicero," 430). Michael Hißmann's review of the literature of the 1770s (*Anleitung zur Kenntnis der auserlesenen Literatur in allen Theilen der Philosophie* [Göttingen, 1778]) would confirm just this impulse, and this "indifferentism" toward metaphysics would be no small contextual provocation for Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, as we shall see.

3. Werner Schneiders, *Die wahre Aufklärung*; N. Hinske, "Aufklärung über Aufklärung: zu Werner Schneider's Buch 'Die wahre Aufklärung,'" *Studia Leibnitiana* 8 (1976): 120-27.

4. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Bxxx.

5. Yet many of those who pursued popular philosophy *shared* Kant's core spiritual value-commitments, among them Garve, Platner, and Herder.

6. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A855/B883.

7. Kant, "Appendix: On What Can Be Done to Make Metaphysics as a Science Real," *Prolegomena*, AA:4:371–80.

8. "After the appearance of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in the year 1781, Kant broke with virtually all the prominent representatives of German Enlightenment philosophy. The rift is not to be overlooked. His friendly relationship with Mendelssohn ended in a profound bitterness" (Hinske, "Kant und die Aufklärung," in *Kant als Herausforderung*, 34). "Kant's philosophy polarized late Enlightenment culture," Martin Davies writes. His dismissal of empirical research bewildered his former student, Marcus Herz, because his reformulation of epistemology "explicitly . . . censure[d] the empirical methods Herz . . . relied on." Thus, "a gulf of incomprehension opened up between the older advocates of Enlightenment in Berlin and Kant in Königsberg" (Davies, "Karl Philipp Moritz' *Erfahrungsseelenkunde*," 33). An important instance of this alienation is Selle, "Versuch eines Beweises, dass es keine reine, von der Erfahrung unabhängige Vernunftbegriffe gebe," *Berlinische Monatsschrift* 4 (1784): 565–75. Selle was one of the other prominent physicians in Berlin and an earlier admirer of Kant. The *Berlinische Monatsschrift* circle represented the most important progressive impulse for *Aufklärung* in Prussia, and it looked to Kant as a crucial ally; it was disappointed not only with Kant's first *Critique* but also with his response to the Jacobi-Mendelssohn conflict.

9. Though it took a decade, and it was never a total victory, as Frederick Beiser has documented thoroughly in *The Fate of Reason*.

10. Michel Foucault argued that empirical anthropology "confiscated a disheartened metaphysics" (*Thèse*, Sorbonne, 1961, 45; cited in the introduction, by Reinhard Brandt and Werner Stark, to *Vorlesungen zur Anthropologie*, vol. 2 of *Kants Vorlesungen* [AA:25:1:xiii, n]). But Brandt and Stark note aptly that Kant resisted this: "Kant, however, developed his philosophy after 1770 against empiricism, against the supercession of metaphysics by empirical disciplines" ("Einleitung," AA:25:1:xiii, n). Yet Kant was ambivalent. Brandt puts it quite provocatively: "Empirical, pragmatic anthropology is not a part of philosophy in a strict sense, but is rather Kant's idiosyncratic [*eigentümliche*] popular philosophy or philosophy for living" ("Ausgewählte Probleme der Kantischen Anthropologie," in *Der ganze Mensch*, ed. Schings, 17).

11. Consider the *Blomberg Logic*, delivered 1771. In the introductory discussions and later as well, Kant is clearly taking a stance *defending* the scholar against the criticism of popular philosophy.

12. Kant, *Preisschrift über Fortschritt in der Metaphysik*, AA:20:256; this "history of pure reason" is, of course, already conceptually in place in the A-version of the first *Critique*. Schmucker and Kreimendahl are effective in bringing this material to bear on the historical problem of the critical turn.

13. These are crucial terms used by Kant to describe the situation in the second epoch of philosophy.

14. Hayden White has written instructively on the tropics of historical narrative and of romance among them. See *Metahistory* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 1–42.

15. See Barry Stroud, *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984).

16. See Kant's letters to Herz, Garve, and Mendelssohn around the time of the publication of the first *Critique* (Kant to Herz, May 1, 1781, AA:10:266-67; Kant to Garve, August 7, 1783, AA:10:336-44; Kant to Mendelssohn, August 16, 1783, AA:10:344-47).

17. Kant to Tieftrunk, October 13, 1797, in *Kants Briefwechsel*, 3d, exp. ed., ed. Otto Schöndörffer and Rudolf Malter (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986), 753.

18. Lorne Falkenstein made the very apt observation that the *Inaugural Dissertation* carries an extraordinarily optimistic tone ("Great Light," 73).

19. Norbert Hinske observes: "The autobiographical reflections of Kant raise more questions than they answer" ("Prolegomena zu einer Entwicklungsgeschichte des Kantschen Denkens," in *Von Christian Wolff bis Louis Lavelle*, ed. Robert Theis and Claude Weber [Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1995], 103). Brandt observes that it is "difficult to make all of Kant's references consistent" (review of *Kant—Der Durchbruch*, by Kreimendahl, 101).

20. For two brief overviews of this history of Kant interpretation, see Lothar Kreimendahl, "Zur Forschungslage," chapter 2 of *Kant: Der Durchbruch von 1769*, 15-82; and G. Sala, "Bausteine zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Kritik der reinen Vernunft," *Kant-Studien* 78 (1987): 153-69.

21. Heimsoeth, "Metaphysische Motive in der Ausbildung des kritischen Idealismus"; Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense* (London: Routledge, 1989).

22. Perhaps the most unrestrained presentist in this vein was Jonathan Bennett. See Bennett, *Kant's Dialectic* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), and the review of that work by Allen Wood, "Kant's Dialectic," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 5 (1975): 595-614.

23. John Dewey long ago made this observation about currents in philosophy, and Richard Rorty has made this the sum and substance of the history of philosophy.

24. Kreimendahl, *Durchbruch*, 15.

25. On recent debate concerning the critical turn, see Gawlick and Kreimendahl, *Hume in der deutschen Aufklärung*; Wolfgang Carl, review of Gawlick and Kreimendahl, Brandt and Klemme, *David Hume in Deutschland*; Kreimendahl, *Durchbruch*; Brandt, review of *Kant—Der Durchbruch von 1769*, by Kreimendahl, Lorne Falkenstein, "The Great Light of 1769—A Humeian Awakening?" *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 77 (1995): 63-79; Hinske, "Prolegomena," 102-21.

26. The first metaphor is most prominent in the *Prolegomena*, where it relates to David Hume, but variants of it have been found already in the A-version of the first *Critique*, where it referred to the antinomy problem. The second metaphor is from Kant's *Reflexion* 5037.

27. Kreimendahl and Schmucker are the primary proponents of this approach.

28. On the unpublished writings, see Erich Adickes, "Einleitung in die Abtheilung des handschriftlichen Nachlasses," AA:14:xv–lxii.

29. Kant, *Reflexion* 5037, AA:18:69. Josef Schmucker, "Was entzündete das grosse Licht von 1789?" *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 58 (1976): 393–434.

30. Beck notes the complexity of Kant's Hume reception in *Essays on Kant and Hume* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978), 113 n.

31. I find Hinske more convincing on this score than his critics, Schmucker ("Was entzündete?" 394) and Kreimendahl (*Durchbruch*, 156–58).

32. Kuehn, Kreimendahl, and Schmucker all take this view. Hinske, Falkenstein, and especially Brandt demur.

33. Brandt, review of *Kant—Der Durchbruch von 1769*, by Kreimendahl, 108.

34. Kant makes it clear in the A-preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason* that he regards the transcendental deduction as the centerpiece of his endeavor.

35. On the irretrievably "unscientific" nature of empirical psychology, see Kant's introduction to *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, 3–6 (AA:4:467–70); on the problem of the Paralogisms in the genesis of the critical philosophy, see Brandt, "Rousseau und Kants 'Ich denke,'" *Kant-Forschungen* 5 (1990): 1–18.

36. For two studies of that decade, see W. Werkmeister, *Kant's Silent Decade* (Tallahassee: University Presses of Florida, 1979); and Wolfgang Carl, *Der schweigende Kant* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989).

37. Sala, "Entstehungsgeschichte," 163.

38. Kant, "Von den ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume," AA:2:375–84.

39. Kant to Suckow, October 25, 1769, AA:10:79; and December 13, 1769, AA:10:82–83. See Suckow's letters to Kant, AA:10:80–82. Also see Richard Falckenberg, "Kant's Berufung nach Erlangen," *Kant-Studien* 7 (1908): 364–65; Hans-Joachim Schoeps, "Kants Berufung nach Erlangen," *Kant-Studien* 49 (1957/58): 279–81.

40. For the controversy over dating, see Josef Schmucker, "Zur Datierung der Reflexion 3716," *Kant-Studien* 65 (1974): 68–85; Norbert Hinske, "Die Datierung der Reflexion 3716," *Kant-Studien* 68 (1977): 321–40.

41. See Hinske ("Stillschweigende Gespräch," 136, 146–47) who claims that Kant's ultimate answer to "Was ist Aufklärung?" dates back to the Abbt-Mendelssohn controversy of 1764, a "conscious confrontation with Mendelssohn (and Abbt)."

42. On Basedow, see Tonelli, "Umwälzung," 371; on Meier, see Hinske, *Zwischen Aufklärung und Vernunftkritik*, 24; Tonelli, "La question des bornes de l'entendement humaine au XVIIIe siècle et la genèse du criticisme kantien," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 64 (1959): 412.

43. Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, AA:24:300; tr. in *Lectures on Logic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 245. The same admonition, virtually word for word, was delivered by Kant a year later in the *Logik Philippi*, AA:24:495.

44. See Kant, *Reflexion* 3716, AA:17:259. In *Reflexion* 3717, Kant holds that these three concepts are responsible for “all connection (in the real sense) [alle Verbindung (im realverstande)]” (AA:17:260).

45. Cited in Adickes’s note to the highly controversial *Reflexion* 3716 (AA:17:257 n), which contains all the relevant source material and some useful reflections.

46. Schmucker is convincing on this point; see his “Datierung der Reflexion 3716,” 78.

47. Kant, *Reflexion* 3716, AA:17:255.

48. Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, AA:24:99–100; tr. 76–77; *Logik Philippi*, AA:24:456ff.

49. Kant, *Reflexion* 3716, AA:17:259.

50. Kant, *Reflexion* 3717, AA:17:260.

51. Herder, *Metacritik* (1799; Suphan:19). There is a growing body of literature on this late controversy between Herder and Kant. See Heinrich Clairmont, “‘Metaphysik ist Metaphysik,’” in *Idealismus und Aufklärung*.

52. Hinske is very persuasive about all this in “Die Datierung der Reflexion 3716.”

53. Stavenhagen, *Kant und Königsberg*, 57.

54. See my essay, “‘Manner’ versus ‘Method.’”

55. Kant to Herder, May 9, 1768, AA:10:73–74.

56. Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, AA:24:192; tr. 152.

57. Roy Pascal, *German Sturm und Drang*

58. See my *Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment*, 35–44.

59. Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, AA:24:45; tr. 31; and so forth.

60. Kant, *Logik Philippi*, AA:24:465.

61. Kant, *Reflexion* 5040, AA:18:70; dated by Adickes to 1776–1778.

62. Lehmann (“Kants Lebenskrise”) and Hinske (“Kant und die Aufklärung”) are clear about the estrangement of Kant from wider currents of the *Aufklärung* around 1781.

63. Kant, *Inaugural Dissertation*, AA:2:385–420; tr. in Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 373–416. See, especially, Josef Schmucker, “Zur entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Bedeutung der Inauguraldissertation von 1770,” in *Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*, vol. 1 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1974), 263–82.

64. Beck, *Essays on Kant and Hume*, 103.

65. Tonelli, “Die Umwälzung von 1769 bei Kant,” *Kant-Studien* 54 (1963): 375.

66. Schmucker, "Was entzündete?" *passim*; Kreimendahl, *Durchbruch*, 217; Beiser, "Kant's Intellectual Development," 47–52. Hinske formulates the case aptly: "If Kant, for example, had noticed already by 1769 something like a conflict within reason itself—an antinomy in the rigorous sense—why then is there nothing said of this in the *Dissertation*? Kreimendahl of course does everything to diminish the weight of this text in order to secure the precedence of the *K-Reflexionen*" ("Prolegomena," 111).

67. Beck, "Lambert and Hume in Kant's Development from 1769 to 1772," in *Essays on Kant and Hume*, 101–10; Hinske, "Kants Begriff der Antinomie und die Etappen seiner Ausarbeitung," *Kant-Studien* 56 (1965): 485–96; Brandt, review of *Kant—Der Durchbruch von 1769*.

68. Kant, *Reflexion* 5037, AA:18:69.

69. Hinske, "Kants Begriff der Antinomie und die Etappen seiner Ausarbeitung."

70. See the interesting work of S. Al-Azm, *The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972). The strictures of Victoria Wike ("History or Philosophy?" *Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant Kongresses*, vol. 1) on Al-Azm represent "systematic" philosophy at its most wooden. Her monograph on the antinomy problem is composed as if there had not been two centuries of Kant scholarship on these questions, as if rebutting Jonathan Bennett's *Kant's Dialectic* sufficed.

71. Beck, "Lambert and Hume," 101ff.

72. Beck, "Lambert and Hume," 103.

73. "By a clear separation of the spheres of the two cognitive faculties, therefore, he could save metaphysical dogmatism and, almost as a by-product, avoid skepticism in mathematics" (Beck, "Kant's Strategy," 14).

74. Kant to Lambert, September 2, 1770, in Kant, *Correspondence*, 108 (AA:10:98).

75. Kant, *Inaugural Dissertation*, in *Theoretical Philosophy*, 379.

76. *Ibid.*, 408. Kant generally likes to use the term *bastard* in this context.

77. *Ibid.*, 380, and so forth. The distinction of coordination from subordination is central to the logic lectures of the early 1770s as well. See *Blomberg Logic*, AA:24:108–9; tr. 84; and so forth.

78. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A408–44/B435–72; *Critique of Judgment*, AA:5:248–60; tr. 103–17.

79. The question of the scope of Kant's "determinate judgment" is controversial in Kant studies. See Gerd Buchdahl, "The Kantian 'Dynamic of Reason' with Special Reference to the Place of Causality in Kant's System," in *Kant Studies Today*, ed. Lewis Beck (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1969), 341–74; and Friedman, *Kant and the Exact Sciences*.

80. Kant, *Inaugural Dissertation*, 411.

81. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A72–74/B103–4.

82. Kant, *Inaugural Dissertation*, 412.

83. See their letters responding to Kant's *Inaugural Dissertation*: from Lambert, October 13, 1770, AA:10:103–11; from Mendelssohn, December 25, 1770, AA:10:113–16. There is also a letter from Sulzer, December 8, 1770, AA:10:111–13. Reinhard Brandt has also pointed to the importance of the review of Kant's *Dissertation* in the local Königsberg newspaper by Johann Schultz, which he has made accessible as the appendix to his important essay, "Materialien zur Entstehung der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (John Locke und Johann Schultz)."

84. David Hume, *Enquiry*, 15–25.

85. Kant, *Reflexion* 3738 (AA:17:278); dated by Adickes to 1766–1768.

86. Kant, *Reflexion* 3744 (AA:17:280); dated to same period.

87. Kant, *Reflexion* 3750 (AA:17:282); dated to same period.

88. Kant, *Reflexion* 3749 (AA:17:281); dated to same period.

89. "Die Möglichkeit einer realverknüpfung in primitiven Gründen kann nicht rational eingesehen werden" (Kant, *Reflexion* 3755, AA:17:284; dated to same period).

90. L. Falkenstein, "Hume's Answer to Kant," *Nous* 32 (1998): 331–60.

91. Leibniz, *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*.

92. Nicholas Jolley, *Leibniz and Locke*: Lüder Gäbe, "Zur Aprioritätsproblematik bei Leibniz-Locke in ihrem Verhältnis zu Descartes und Kant," in *Sinnlichkeit und Verstand*, ed. Hans Wagner (Bonn: Bouvier, 1976), 75–106.

93. G. Tonelli, "Leibniz on Innate Ideas and the Early Reactions to the Publication of the *Nouveaux Essais* (1765)," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 12 (1974): 437–54, esp. 449.

94. J. de Castillon, "Descartes et Locke conciliés," *Nouveaux Mémoires de l'Académie Royale des Sciences et Belles-Lettres*, vol. 70 (Berlin, 1772); cited in Tonelli, "Leibniz on Innate Ideas," 450–51. Tonelli adds: "In fact, Locke does not assert, like Aristotle, that all our ideas come through the senses; the ideas representing the operations of the mind do not come from outside, and, moreover, the mind forms other ideas of its own by reflection—combination, abstraction" (451). The crucial point, here, is that Locke and Leibniz both could sponsor in Kant the notion that the intellect has its own inherent principles, and that these deserve more systematic scrutiny. They made *apperception* both urgent and accessible for metaphysics.

95. See both the original and the ultimate introductions to the third *Critique*.

96. Kant to Lambert, August 7, 1783, AA:10:340; tr. in Kant, *Correspondence*, 198.

97. Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, AA:24:17; tr. 6. Kant indifferently used *Verstand* and *Vernunft* in connection with *Gesundheit*. The translators generally use *healthy reason*, so I will comply, though I prefer *understanding*.

98. Indeed, "there really and properly is no science of the beautiful [*schöne Wissenschaft*] at all; rather what we know of the beautiful is nothing but a *critica*" (*ibid.*, AA:24:25; tr. 12).

99. Ibid., AA:24:37-38; tr. 24-25; AA:24:82; tr. 62, and so forth.

100. Though Meier evolved in the direction of Lockian skepticism, as Hinske has pointed out.

101. Tonelli, "Conditions in Königsberg."

102. Tonelli, "Der Streit über die mathematische Methode," 56, 66; "Conditions in Königsberg," 142; "Analysis and Synthesis," 207-9; "Crusius, Christian August," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 1, 270.

103. Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, AA:24:37; tr. 24.

104. Karl Ameriks, "Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument," *Kant-Studien* 69 (1978): 273-87; Jaako Hintikka, "Transcendental Arguments: Genuine and Spurious," *Nous* 6 (1972): 274-81; Stephen Korner, "The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions," *Monist* 51 (1967): 317-31; Eva Schaper, "Arguing Transcendentally," *Kant-Studien* 63 (1972): 101-16; Barry Stroud, "Transcendental Arguments," in *The First Critique: Reflections on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Terence Penelhum and J. J. MacIntosh (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1969), 54-69; Dieter Henrich, "The Proof Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction," *Review of Metaphysics* 22 (1969): 640-59.

105. Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, AA:24:37; tr. 24.

106. Ibid.; in the *Logik Philippi* (AA:24:335), Kant elaborates his view.

107. Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, AA:24:37; tr. 24-25.

108. Kant, *Logik Philippi*, AA:24:452.

109. Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, AA:24:254; tr. 203. Hume is clearly meant here, but I suspect so is Kant himself in an earlier stance.

110. Kant, *Logik Philippi*, AA:24:452.

111. Klaus Fischer, "John Locke in the German Enlightenment: An Interpretation," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 36 (1975): 431-46; Alois Winter, "Selbstdenken—Antinomien—Schranken: Zum Einfluß des späten Locke auf die Philosophie Kants," *Aufklärung* 1 (1986): 27-66; Reinhard Brandt, "Locke und Kant," in *John Locke und/and Immanuel Kant*, ed. Martyn Thompson (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991), 87-108; Brandt, "Materialien zur Entstehung der Kritik der reinen Vernunft (John Locke und Johann Schultz)," in *Beiträge zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft 1781-1981*, ed. Ingeborg Heidemann and Wolfgang Ritzel (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1981), 37-68.

112. Leibniz, *New Essays*, 111. Giorgio Tonelli opines that it is "improbable" that this great dictum was "an original Leibnizian formula; Leibniz probably reproduced a current scholastic dictum" ("Leibniz on Innate Ideas," 441). But given Tonelli's extraordinary mastery of the scholastic literature, it seems to me strong support for the contrary that he can only *conjecture* that it was so widespread and not find any concrete *evidence*. Rather, I believe we should credit Leibniz with this dictum just because the German school philosophy of the eighteenth century was both acutely aware of the need for a more active construction of reason and yet groping for an adequate argumentative structure

for it. Surely, had the dictum been in wide circulation, it would not have been so striking when it did become widely known after 1765.

113. Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, AA:24:236-37; tr. 188.

114. Kant, *Philosophischen Enzyklopädie*, AA:29:1:14.

115. See Zammito, *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment*, 64, and so forth.

116. Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, AA:24:83; tr. 63.

117. Kant, *Philosophische Enzyklopädie*, AA:29:1:20-21.

118. It would appear that Kant was not consistent on this point in the early logic lectures, for he also proclaims there: "Experience simply cannot teach us with apodictic certainty that all men must die, e.g., but only that all men who have previously lived have died" (*Blomberg Logic*, AA:24:238; tr. 189).

119. Kant, *Philosophische Enzyklopädie*, AA:29:1:28.

120. Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, AA:24:159-61; tr. 125-27.

121. Kant, *Logik Philippi*, AA:24:433.

122. Gawlick and Kreimendahl, *Hume in der deutschen Aufklärung*, 120-38.

123. Manfred Kuehn, "The Early Reception of Reid, Oswald, and Beattie in Germany," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 21 (1983): 479-85; Kuehn, *Scottish Common Sense in Germany*.

124. One way out was to refuse to see the difference. That was what Friedrich Jacobi did: "Jacobi moves imperceptibly between Hume and Reid without signalling any difference between the two" (George di Giovanni, "Hume, Jacobi, and Common Sense: An Episode in the Reception of Hume in Germany at the Time of Kant," *Kant-Studien* 89 [1998]: 50).

125. Beck, indeed, sees this as a good way to describe Kant's critical problem: "How could he oppose Hume without falling in with Reid, Beattie, and Oswald. . . . How could he give up a supernatural metaphysics without making a metaphysics of naturalism?" ("Kant's Strategy," 6).

126. The text entitled *Four Philosophers* was actually a continental innovation in the packaging of Hume's writings and approach. Originally published in French in 1758 by Mérian, it was then translated into German by Resewitz and published 1768 (see Gawlick and Kreimendahl, *Hume in der deutschen Aufklärung*, 50).

127. Lambert, review of *Vier Philosophen*, by Hume, in *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek* 12, no. 2 (1770): St. 297-98; discussed in Gawlick and Kreimendahl, *Hume und die deutsche Aufklärung*, 50-51.

128. Lambert, draft for review of Hume, *Vier Philosophen*; cited in Gawlick and Kreimendahl, *Hume in der deutschen Aufklärung*, 50-51 n.

129. Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, AA:24:217; tr. 172.

130. Beck, "Kant's Strategy," 5.

131. Lütke, "Misunderstanding Hume," 110.

132. Kitcher, "Changing the Name of the Game," 202.
133. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Avii.
134. Kant to Garve, September 21, 1798, AA:12:256–58; tr. in Kant, *Correspondence*, 551–52.
135. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Aviii–ix.
136. Kant to Mendelssohn, August 16, 1783, AA:10:344–45; tr. 202.
137. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Ax.
138. Ibid., Axi. Note how the phrasing evokes the language of Kant's letter to Mendelssohn of 1766.
139. Ibid. The editor conjectures that this criticism may have been specifically in connection with Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*.
140. Ibid., A764/B792. Note the anticipation, here, of the language of the *Prolegomena* on Hume awakening Kant from dogmatic slumber.
141. Ibid., A765/B793. Yet we need not simply accept Kant's verdict. Beck felt driven to acknowledge that "Hume's implicit account of the causal principle is much more like Kant's own than Kant had any reason to suspect" ("A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant," 120). And Lorna Falkenstein has offered an extensive development of this view ("Hume's Answer to Kant," *Nous* 32 [1998]: 331–60). See also two recent essays that assess the complexity of the question without simply presuming Kant's position: Harold Langsam, "Kant, Hume, and Our Ordinary Concept of Causation," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54 (1994): 625–47; and A. T. Nuyen, "Sense, Reason, and Causality in Kant and Hume," *Kant-Studien* 81 (1990): 57–68.
142. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A761/B789.
143. Here Kant come to the rescue of *his* queen with the same gallantry that Burke evoked in his longing to have rescued Marie Antoinette (Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987], 62–67).
144. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A835/B883.
145. Lewis White Beck, "Kant's Strategy," 6.
146. Manfred Kuehn, "Dating Kant's Encyclopedia Lectures," 306 n. Kuehn argues elsewhere that this commitment to common sense was characteristic of Kant's precritical posture: "during the early states of his development, he thought just as highly of common sense as did his contemporaries. In fact, it appears that, at least for a time, he considered critique to be the business of common sense" (*Scottish Common Sense*, 194). Kuehn points to a whole series of *Reflexionen* that substantiate this claim: *Reflexionen* 1567, 1568, 1573, 1574, 1575, 1577, 1578, 1579, 1585, 1586, 1591, 1595, 1602, 1612, 1614, and 1619, all in AA:16.
147. Kant, *Nachricht*, AA:2:309–10.
148. Felicitas Munzel, *Kant's Conception of Moral Character*, 267–72.
149. See *Praktische Philosophie Herder*, AA:27:1:77–89.
150. Kant, *Nachricht*, AA:2:312.

151. See Kant's announcement of his Physical Geography Course, 1758: AA:2:1-12.
152. Kant, *Physische Geographie*, AA:9:157-58.
153. Adickes, *Untersuchungen zu Kants physischer Geographie* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1911).
154. Kant, "Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen," AA:2:443.
155. Kant, *Anthropologie*, AA:7:119-22.
156. Kant, *Logik*, AA:9:21-24; Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (A version) AA:3:542-43.
157. Kant, *Vorlesungen über Enzyklopädische Philosophie*, ed. Gerhard Lehmann (Berlin: Akademie, 1961).
158. The origin of this information is ultimately Emil Arnoldt, but it is replicated in Lehmann's introduction to the *Vorlesungen*.
159. M. Kuehn, "Dating Kant's 'Vorlesungen über Philosophische Enzyklopädie,'" *Kant-Studien* 74 (1983): 302-13.
160. G. Lehmann, "Einleitung zur Enzyklopädievorlesung," in Kant, *Vorlesungen über Enzyklopädische Philosophie*, ed. Gerhard Lehmann (Berlin: Akademie, 1961), 73 n.
161. "I sought to develop *applicable* philosophy from the most natural forms of representation, those not sensibly to be doubted, to anchor what the true and the good entailed by whatever rational grounds I could find" (Feder, *Johann Georg Heinrich Feder's Leben*, 81 n).
162. Feder, *Grundriß der philosophischen Wissenschaft* (1767) and *Logik und Metaphysik* (1769).
163. G. Lehmann, "Einleitung," AA:29:1:662; "Einleitung zur Enzyklopädievorlesung," 70.
164. Lehmann, "Einleitung zur Enzyklopädievorlesung," 73 n.
165. G. Lehmann, "Einleitung," AA:29:1:666.
166. Lehmann, "Einleitung zur Enzyklopädievorlesung," 73.
167. Lehmann, "Einleitung," AA:29:1:662.
168. Emil Arnoldt, "Allgemeiner Charakter der Kantischen Kollegien und sein metaphysisches Kolleg im besonderen," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 5, *Kritische Exkurse im Gebiete der Kantforschung*, ed. Otto Schöndörffer (Berlin: Cassirer, 1909), 5.
169. Arnoldt, "Möglichst vollständiges Verzeichnis aller von Kant gehaltenen oder auch nur angekündigten Vorlesungen nebst darauf bezüglichen Notizen und Bemerkungen," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 5, 214 ff.
170. G. Lehmann, "Einleitung," AA:29:1:662.
171. This is the title that Arnoldt cites from the official University of Königsberg records in "Möglichst vollständiges Verzeichnis."
172. Willi Goetschel, "Enzyklopädie," in *Lexikon der Aufklärung*, 101-3.

173. Diderot, "Encyclopedia," in *Rameau's Nephew and Other Works* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956); D'Alembert, *Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

174. Mortier, "Diderot, Ernesti, et la 'Philosophie Populaire.'" "

175. Lehmann, "Einleitung," AA:29:1:662.

176. Lehmann, "Einleitung," AA:29:1:663.

177. Lehmann, "Einleitung zur Enzyklopädievorlesung," 71. Feder's review appeared September 23, 1766, in the *Erlangen Gelehrten Zeitung*. Feder had completed his dissertation there a year earlier under Suckow.

178. *Johann Georg Heinrich Feders Leben*, 117.

179. Feder, review of *Träume eines Geistersehers* (September 23, 1766).

180. Kuehn, "Dating Kant's 'Vorlesungen über Philosophische Enzyklopädie,'" 306 n.

181. Kant, *Philosophische Enzyklopädie*, AA:29:1:6.

182. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Aviii.

183. Kant, *Philosophische Enzyklopädie*, AA:29:1:7.

184. On the persistence of discourse on the *Bestimmung des Menschen* in the later *Aufklärung*, see Giuseppe D'Alessandro, "Die Wiederkehr eines Leitwortes," *Aufklärung* 11 (1999), 21–47.

185. Kant, *Philosophische Enzyklopädie*, AA:29:1:8.

186. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Bxxxvi.

187. Kant, *Philosophische Enzyklopädie*, AA:29:1:13.

188. Addison, *The Spectator*.

189. Kant, *Philosophische Enzyklopädie*, AA:29:1:10.

190. Hinske, *Zwischen Aufklärung und Vernunftkritik*, 48.

191. Kant, *Philosophische Enzyklopädie*, AA:29:1:10.

192. Reinard Brandt and Werner Stark, introduction to *Vorlesungen zur Anthropologie*, AA:25:1:viii n.

193. Norbert Hinske, "Kants Idee der Anthropologie," 411 n. See Odo Marquard, "Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Begriffs 'Anthropologie.'" "

194. Benno Erdmann, *Kants Reflexionen zur Anthropologie*.

195. Emil Arnoldt, "Kant's Vorlesungen über Anthropologie," *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 4, 319–434.

196. Hinske summarizes the debate in his essay. See also Holly Wilson, "A Gap in American Kant Scholarship: Pragmatic Anthropology as the Application of Kantian Moral Philosophy," in *Akten des 7. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*, 403–19.

197. Brandt, "Ausgewählte Probleme," 14–32.

198. See Robert Louden, *Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings* (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), chapter 3.

199. Kant, *Nachricht*, AA:2:312; tr. 298-99.
200. From comments Herder interjected into his *Journal seiner Reise in 1769* (DKV:9:43), it would appear this was already the case when Herder attended the lectures.
201. Kant, *Nachricht*, AA:2:312-13.
202. *Praktische Philosophie Herder*, AA:27:1:77-89.
203. Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, part 1, 7-191 (AA:7:125-282); Kant, *Vorlesungen zur Anthropologie*, AA:25:1-2.
204. Soo Bae Kim, *Die Entstehung der Kantischen Anthropologie und ihre Beziehung zur empirischen Psychologie der Wolffschen Schule* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1994), esp. chapter 2: "Kants Auseinandersetzung mit der *Psychologia Empirica* der Wolffschen Schule." Kant was far less willing than either Wolff or Baumgarten to consider a substantial theory of the soul. Whereas Wolff identified self-consciousness with the soul, Kant kept them separate, and even self-consciousness was notoriously complicated in Kant's thought. Already in *Träume* he problematized severely the access of consciousness to any essential nature of the self. That would, of course, become a major theme in the "critical period," when Kant not only canceled "rational" psychology but disputed the possibility of a rigorous "science" of empirical psychology. Yet never, in either the critical philosophy or in the anthropology, did Kant subject the "facultative approach" to the human mind (*Gemüt*) to direct investigation: it remained a background assumption of his entire way of thinking.
205. In the published form of Kant's *Anthropology*, this preponderance is preserved: in the English translation, part 1 goes from 7-191, part 2 from 195-251.
206. Brandt and Stark develop this point fully in their introduction to the anthropology lectures.
207. Herz, review, "D. Ernst Platner . . . , *Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise*," *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek* (1773): 25-51.
208. Kant to Herz, end of 1773, AA:10:145-46.
209. Kant to Mendelssohn, April 8, 1766, AA:10:69-73.
210. And, implicitly, Herder as a "Kantian of the year 1765."
211. Brandt, "Ausgewählte Probleme," 20-21; Kim, *Die Entstehung der Kantischen Anthropologie*, 94-95.
212. Brandt, "Ausgewählte Probleme," 22.
213. *Passow Nachschrift* (1772-3); cited by Brandt and Stark, AA:25:1:1x.
214. Kant, [Anthropologie-] *Vorlesungen des Wintersemesters 1772/73* (Collins), AA:25:1:7.
215. Kant, [Anthropologie-] *Vorlesungen des Wintersemesters 1772/73* (Parow), AA:25:1:243.
216. Ibid. But Heimsoeth questions whether Kant lives up to this: "Kant's own lectures on anthropology were . . . not the expression and result of any

theoretical-scientific effort in the rigorous sense; they . . . contented themselves with [mere] concatenation of an aggregate of insights and thoughts without any really 'systematic' intent" ("Kants Erfahrungf mit den Erfahrungswissenschaften," 67; cited in Kim, *Die Entstehung der Kantischen Anthropologie*, 104 n).

217. Kant, [*Anthropologie*-] *Vorlesungen des Wintersemesters 1772/73* (Collins), AA:25:1:7.

218. Already in the lecture course for 1772–1773, Kant criticized a "physiological" approach to anthropology, targeting Charles Bonnet instead of Ernst Platner in that version (AA:25:1:9). This line of criticism, of course, goes back at least to the parody of such analysis in chapter 3 of part 1 of *Träume*. But to dismiss this line of inquiry in its entirety as "eternally vain" was not to be scientifically scrupulous, it was rather to be obstructionist. That nothing was to be done in this vein was as untrue then, however primitive the hypotheses and the empirical data, as it is today, when the "mind's new science" is the hottest academic research field there may be.

219. G. Kühne-Bertram, "Aspekte der Geschichte und der Bedeutung des Begriffs 'Pragmatisch,'" Brandt and Stark, "Einleitung," AA:25:1:xvi; Hinske, "Kants Idee der Anthropologie," 424.

220. Brandt and Stark, "Einleitung," AA:25:1:xv-xvi; see also Brandt, "Ausgewählte Probleme," 21–22; Brandt, "Beobachtungen," 87–88.

221. Brandt and Stark, "Einleitung," AA:25:1:xv-xvi.

222. Kant, *Reflexion* 3376, AA:16:804.

223. Kant, *Reflexion* 1482, AA:15:659.

224. Brandt, "Ausgewählte Probleme," 21 n.

225. *Anthropologie Philippi* (1772), 21; cited in Brandt, "Beobachtungen zur Anthropologie," 87.

226. Brandt, "Ausgewählte Probleme," 18.

227. The vexed question of Kant's notion of what constituted a "scientific" discipline, especially the question of whether empirical psychology (and hence anthropology) could qualify, has been conventionally dominated by Kant's obliterating remarks in the preface to *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, but there are good grounds for taking those statements in a very restrictive sense, i.e., as having to do with a priori knowledge, and thus keeping open the possibilities of an *empirical* science of psychology and hence of anthropology. See Monika Firla, *Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Anthropologie und Moralphilosophie bei Kant* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1981), 19–20.

228. In their different ways, both Hinske and Brandt note the unsatisfactory status of Kant's "systematic" organization of his anthropological materials.

229. This began as early as Friedrich Schleiermacher's review of the published version of the lectures. A continuous trail has followed. See Brandt and Stark, "Einleitung," AA:25:1:xviii.

230. Brandt, "Ausgewählte Probleme," 19.
231. Pfotenbauer, *Literarische Anthropologie*, 10.
232. See the conclusion of this book.
233. Kim, *Die Entstehung der Kantischen Anthropologie*, 103.
234. Ibid., 78; referring to *Reflexion* 159, AA:15:57 and to *Metaphysik Pölitz*, AA:28:1:224.
235. "The territory of psychology is forever restricted to inner sense, to which the full range of categorical principles, most notably causality, is not cognitively applicable. . . . Since we cannot gain access to another's inner sense [to which the domain of psychology is restricted], we have no way of confirming judgments pertaining to inter-subjective psychological comparisons. Furthermore, we are incapable of observing our own psychological activity without interfering with that activity. . . . Psychological phenomena lack the sort of objectivity, permanence, and regularity that are required of a genuine science" (Abhaya Nayak and Eric Sotnak, "Kant on the Impossibility of the 'Soft Sciences,'" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 55 [1995]: 149). And, "psychology could not use objective observation and experimentation with its object, inner sense. First, the inner sense is capable only of mere ideal, not experimental, analysis. Second, observation of inner sense is limited to one's own inner sense. Third, the act of introspection alters our inner state" (Charles Gouaux, "Kant's View on the Nature of Empirical Psychology," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 8 [1972]: 240).
236. This suggests serious reservations not only against the "case-study" approach of Moritz but also the experimental psychology of Krüger.
237. Kant, [Anthropologie-] *Vorlesungen des Wintersemesters 1775/76* (Friedländer), AA:25:1:469.
238. Kant to Herz, end of 1773, AA:10:145-46.
239. Kim, *Die Entstehung der Kantischen Anthropologie*, 106.
240. F. C. Starke [Adam Bergh], ed., *Immanuel Kants Menschenkunde oder philosophische Anthropologie* (Leipzig: Expedition des europäischen Aufsehers, 1831).
241. Brandt and Stark, "Einleitung," AA:25:1:xi-xii.
242. Kim observes that Kant did not problematize the category of popularity until the controversy over the Garve-Feder review (*Die Entstehung der Kantischen Anthropologie*, 133).
243. Kant, *Menschenkunde*, AA:25:2:853.
244. See his letter to Herz, for instance.
245. Kant, *Menschenkunde*, AA:25:2:856-57.
246. Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 3.
247. To this we may add that Kant himself, especially in the second part of the *Anthropology*, failed to live up to this standard in practice. Heinz Heimsoeth writes: "Kant's own lectures on anthropology were not the expression and result of a theoretical-scientific effort in the authentic sense; they . . .

satisfied themselves . . . with the presentation of insights and thought, aggregates without any truly 'systematic' intent" (*Kants Erfahrung mit den Erfahrungswissenschaften*, 67; cited in Kim, 104 n).

248. R. Brandt, "Beobachtungen," 89; Brandt and Stark, "Einleitung," AA:251:xlvii.

249. Steven Lestition, *Kant's Philosophical Anthropology*.

250. Kant, *Metaphysik Pölitz*, AA:28:533–34.

251. Monika Firla's *Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis* is the most rigorous effort to do so.

252. And not just the minor ones covered in Linden's monograph. The great German Idealists, Fichte and Hegel above all, to say nothing of Humboldt, elaborated an anthropological vision.

253. Karl Fink argues that German "physical anthropology began in 1771 with Kant's review of Pieter Moscati's . . . book" ("Storm and Stress Anthropology," 60). I think it would be wiser to say that *philosophical interest* in physical anthropology intensified at that juncture. Buffon had already made an impact on the Göttingen faculty in natural science, led by Haller, well before this point, and Pieter Camper and other scientists were already assiduously at work, in response to French and Scottish initiatives dating back at least to midcentury. It also seems inaccurate when Fink maintains: "At the time Kant wrote the review of Moscati's book, he had not yet begun his studies in anthropology" (60). That is flat out false in the general understanding of the term and even in the restrictive *physical* sense of anthropology it seems incorrect in light of the substantial body of material in his *Reflexionen*.

254. See Al-Azm, *The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies*.

255. Buroker, "Kant and the Dynamic Tradition."

256. Kant, review of Moscati, AA:2:425–27.

257. Kant, "Von den verschiedenen Racen," AA:2:427–44.

258. A. O. Lovejoy argues that "Kant derived not only most of his zoological facts, but also some of his ideas of scientific method, from Buffon" ("Kant and Evolution," in *Forerunners of Darwin: 1745–1859* by B. Glass et al. [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959], 179). See also the essay on Buffon in that volume, where Buffon's theory of species and principles of method in natural science are given a sympathetic exposition.

259. Kant, "Von den verschiedenen Racen," AA:2:434.

260. Maupertuis's suggestion for selective breeding of men to segregate virtuous and productive people from the less worthy occasioned some striking observations in Kant's essay. Kant conceded this might be possible, but it would not be wise. Nature was "wiser" in using the "mingling of the good and the bad" as the great driving force [*Triebfeder*] that "sets the sleeping powers of humanity into motion and requires it to develop all its talents and thus approach the perfection of their destiny [*Bestimmung*]" ("Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen," AA:2:431). The anticipation of his arguments in "Idea

for a Universal History" (1784) is striking. Kant's fascination with Maupertuis as a biological theorist strongly underscores Tonelli's claim ("Der Streit über die mathematische Methode," 66) that the French President of the Berlin Academy was a major guiding thinker (*Gewährsmann*) of the early Kant. We already see Kant grappling with Maupertuis and Buffon as critics of preformation in his *One Possible Basis*.

261. J. L. Larson, "Vital Forces: Regulative Principles or Constitutive Agents? A Strategy in German Physiology, 1786-1802," *Isis* 70 (1979): 235-49; T. Lenoir, "Kant, Blumenbach and Vital Materialism in Germany Biology," *Isis* 71 (1980): 77-108; Lenoir, "Teleology Without Regrets: The Transformation of Physiology in Germany," *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science* 12 (1981): 293-354.

262. Sloan, "Buffon, German Biology," 124-25.

263. Phillip Sloan, "Performing the Categories," paper delivered at the American Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies annual conference, Austin, Texas, 1996.

264. The shift in Blumenbach's interpretation of epigenesis from 1775 into the 1790s has been most forcefully demonstrated by Peter McLaughlin, "Blumenbach und der Bildungstrieb," *Medizinhistorisches Journal* 17 (1982): 357-72.

265. Wolff, *Theorie von der Generation*, 73.

266. Roe, *Matter, Life, and Generation*.

267. Helmut Müller-Sievers, *Self-Generation: Biology, Philosophy, and Literature around 1800* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997), 5. While there is much to be gleaned from his first study, *Epigenesis: Naturphilosophie im Sprachdenken Wilhelm von Humboldts* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1993), his second venture into this field seems to me quite problematic.

268. Müller-Sievers, *Self-Generation*, 5. I find that position historically false and methodologically perverse. I am not surprised to discover, however, that Müller-Sievers makes Kant the hero of his "critical historical" account and Johann Gottfried Herder the "ideological"—textualizing—villain.

269. Kant, *Von den verschiedenen Rassen des Menschen* (1774); *Über den Gebrauch von teleologischen Prinzipien in der Philosophie* (1787).

270. But should he have thought this? See Alicia Roqué, "Self-Organization: Kant's Concept of Teleology and Modern Chemistry," *Review of Metaphysics* 39 (1985): 107-35, for a juxtaposition of Kant's views with the findings of recent science.

271. "The hypothesis of organic evolution awakened in Kant a resistance which was quite out of keeping with his formal philosophy" (Feuer, "Lawless Sensations," 96). Kant expressed this fear most explicitly in his essay "Über den Gebrauch der teleologischen Prinzipien in der Philosophie." See Arthur Lovejoy, "Kant and Evolution," 185.

272. I have made this case in *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment*, 189.

273. Feuer, "Lawless Sensations," 107.

274. The conversion of Haller's disciple Johann Blumenbach to epigenesis in 1780 signaled a major turn in German natural history, the emergence of what Timothy Lenoir has called the "Göttingen school." See Timothy Lenoir, "Kant, Blumenbach, and Vital Materialism in German Biology," *Isis* 71 (1980): 77-108; Lenoir, "The Göttingen School and the Development of Transcendental Naturphilosophie in the Romantic Era," (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 111-205. On Blumenbach, see also Georgette Legée, "Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840), La Naissance de l'Anthropologie à l'Époque de la Révolution Française," in *Scientifiques et sociétés pendant la Révolution et l'Empire* (Paris: Editions du CTHS, 1990), 395-420; Peter McLaughlin, "Blumenbach und der Bildungstrieb," *Medizinhistorisches Journal* 17 (1982): 357-72; Frank Dougherty, "Johann Friedrich Blumenbach und Samuel Thomas Soemmerring" in *Samuel Thomas Soemmerring und die Gelehrten der Goethezeit*, ed. Gunter Mann and Franz Dumont (Stuttgart: G. Fischer, 1985), 35-56.

CHAPTER EIGHT

1. There is a sense in which one could almost refer the reader to Wolfgang Proß, "Herder und die Anthropologie seiner Zeit," "Nachwort" to *Herder und die Anthropologie der Aufklärung*, vol. 2 of *Werke*, by Herder (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1987), 1128-216, and be done with things. Proß offers a massive case for the centrality of anthropology in the work of Herder and implicitly of Herder in the emergence of anthropology. I am deeply in the debt of this interpretation, but I resolve to offer a variant reconstruction.

2. "Herder followed Shaftesbury, Hume and Rousseau; the genre of the essay is utilized not simply as a form of education or edification, as an emancipation from purely metaphysical discourse and useless theoretical controversy, but as a medium of a particular kind of philosophical self-reflection that has become conscious of its own rhetoricity, its own constitution within language and history" (Robert Leventhal, *The Disciplines of Interpretation* [New York: de Gruyter, 1994], 170. This cite is a rare point of agreement I can find with this drastic imposition of De Man and Derrida upon Herder).

3. "His fundamental thought . . . is: by enlightenment of all the members of a people, through the cultivation of the specific spatio-temporal possibilities and through the nationalization of civilizational reform projects to foster at one and the same time the freedom of the individual person and the culture of nations, societies and states without recourse to violence, and thus to bring about the perfection of mankind in general and of the revelation of God's providence" (Wisbert, commentary on *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, DKV:9:880).

4. Herder, *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, DKV:9:36.

5. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:304.

6. Herder, *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, DKV:9:118.

7. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:303-5.

8. Adler, *Prägnanz des Dunklen*, 68.
9. W. Proß, commentary on "Fragmente über Wolff, Baumgarten, und Leibniz," in *Werke*, by Herder, vol. 2, 847.
10. Herder, "Von Baumgartens Denkart in seiner Schriften: Zweites Fragment," DKV:1:653.
11. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:261.
12. Ibid. The juxtaposition of Baumgarten to Kames was something Herder had learned from Kant (Kant, *Logic*, AA:9:15; *Reflexion* 1588 [mid-1760s], AA:16:27; and see *Reflexionen* 622, 623, 624, and 626 [from the same period], AA:15:269–72). In Riedel's invocation of it, however, Herder saw only a vulgar oversimplification.
13. "sinnlich vollkommene Rede." See A. G. Baumgarten, *Meditationes philosophicae de Nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954).
14. Herder, "Bruchstück von Baumgartens Denkmal," DKV:1:683.
15. Ibid., 687. While Kant might well wish to dismiss it as merely subjective, this misses Herder's point; philosophy of subjectivity was a crucial issue, and Herder is self-consciously building upon the prior work of Baumgarten and Hume.
16. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:260.
17. Kant to Herder, May 9, 1768, AA:10:73.
18. Herder to Kant, November 1768, AA:10:75.
19. Herder's reception of Hume conceived him primarily as a pragmatic, moderate skeptic, more interested in an empirical science of man than in radical epistemological gambits. That changed by 1772, when he expressed disdain for Hume as a technical philosopher. See the review of Beattie (1772): Suphan:5:461.
20. Herder to Kant, November 1768, AA:10:77. Shaftesbury was of enormous importance to German thinkers of the 1760s, as he had become for French thinkers in the prior decade, starting with Diderot's *Pensées philosophiques* (1745). Herder wrote: "Shaftesbury . . . seems to be the teacher of Diderot" (*Fragments: First Collection*, in *Selected Early Works, 1764–1767*, 125). The French concern with Shaftesbury carried through into Voltaire's important reflections on the Lisbon earthquake (see Voltaire, *Candide and Related Texts* [Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000], 95 n). Kant, as Lewis White Beck has observed, was as much a "disciple of Shaftesbury" at the time he composed the Prize Essay as was Mendelssohn or any other German (*Early German Philosophy*, 332). Several efforts were underway in the 1760s to translate Shaftesbury's work into German, and these efforts involved Mendelssohn, Iselin, Herder, and others. Thus, it was not at all insignificant that Herder should have called Kant the "German Shaftesbury" in his *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*. On Shaftesbury's influence, see the classic works: Christian Friedrich Weiser, *Shaftesbury und das deutsche Geistesleben*, 2d ed. (1916; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche

Buchgesellschaft, 1969); and Irvin Hatch, *Der Einfluß Shaftesburys auf Herder* (Berlin: Duncker, 1901).

21. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:420.

22. As Hans Adler puts it, "To move *aisthesis* from the periphery of scientific involvement into its center and to its beginnings: that is Herder's intention. To 'become acquainted with' and to 'gather' the fundamental forms of sensual perception: that is his preliminary objective. Therewith, psychology and physiology receive new importance as empirical sciences" (*Prägnanz des Dunklen*, 84). One could scarcely find a better characterization of the animating impulse behind the creation of a "science of man"—of anthropology—in the second half of the eighteenth century. Or again, "Herder wrenches sensibility from the periphery of philosophical attention into its center, with the consequence that he arrives at a different conception of gnoseology and philosophy" (54).

23. Herder, "Über Thomas Abbt's Schriften," DKV:2:572.

24. Herder, "Über Christian Wolff's Schriften," Suphan:32:158.

25. For the phrase "*dieses wahre innere Afrika*," see Ludger Lütkehaus, *Einleitung to "Dieses wahre innere Afrika": Texte zur Entdeckung des Unbewußten vor Freud*, ed. Lütkehaus (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1989), 7-45.

26. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:395. The phrase "journey into the interior" is from Heller, *The Artist's Journey into the Interior*, with some interesting connections to what Herder is after here. Even in Mendelssohn, what Herder claimed to find most valuable were particular observations.

27. Herder, "Kritik der 'Aesthetica,'" DKV:1:672.

28. Herder to Soemmerring, February 28, 1785.

29. Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 6.

30. "Art and literature are from this point of view prominent objects of consideration, because they are in a particularly considerable measure the correlates in human practice of the gnoseological dispositions" (Adler, *Prägnanz des Dunklen*, 101).

31. Herder, *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, DKV:9:43. One might observe that, unless this is a totally new thought on his part, Herder's immediate link of physical geography with ethnography suggests that Kant already put the two together in his course on physical geography, Emil Arnoldt notwithstanding. The publication of Kant's geography lecture notes, including those from Herder, will shed great light on this issue.

32. Herder, *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, DKV:9:33.

33. *Ibid.*, 37. Drawing upon English and French psychology to develop a more complex analysis of human faculties, in order to enrich German school-philosophical psychology, was, as Ulrich Gaier notes, "the center of Herderian anthropology" ("Commentary," 1236-37). On Herder and nationalism, see the collection of essays *Nationen und Kulturen*, ed. Regine Otto (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1996).

34. Herder, *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, DKV:9:34.

35. These are, to restate the argument, precisely the domains whose convergence constituted the late-eighteenth-century discourse of anthropology. Again, it is not idiosyncrasy or megalomania but an acute attunement to the cultural impetus of his time and place that moved Herder to this grand endeavor.

36. Heinz, *Sensualistischer Idealismus*, xvi. See also Robert Norton, *Herder's Aesthetics and the European Enlightenment* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 45 n.

37. Herder to Scheffner, October 31, 1767, *Briefe: Gesamtausgabe*, 92.

38. Heinz (*Sensualistischer Idealismus*, xiv) strongly objects to this widespread charge against Herder, and she is right.

39. Condillac, *Traité des Systèmes*; D'Alembert, *Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Diderot*, 94-95; Cassirer, *Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, 8.

40. Herder, *Erstes Kritisches Waldchen*; cited in Proß, "Herder und die Anthropologie seiner Zeit," 1196.

41. Heinz, *Sensualistischer Idealismus*, xix. Kondylis (*Die Aufklärung*, 622) argues that Herder was never quite comfortable, for religious reasons, to abandon dualism. His endeavor was to *spiritualize* matter, but not to go all the way to a full monism. This ambivalence is important to note, and *this* might well warrant the charge that Herder was "unsystematic." However, one could mount a variant of the same charge, in the inverse direction, against Kant's posture of "rational faith" in the critical philosophy. There is a case to be made that, as a complement to "religion within the limits of pure reason," Kant was always careful to conceive "pure reason within the limits of religion."

42. Heinz, *Sensualistischer Idealismus*, xix, xxii.

43. Later, in his *Ideen*, Herder made this explicit: "Both in theory and in practice, reason is merely something *acquired* [*Vernommenes*] and learned, a proportion and direction of man's ideas and faculties [*Kräfte*] to which he was predetermined by his organisation and way of life" (vol. 1, Suphan:13:145).

44. Heinz, *Sensualistischer Idealismus*, xxi.

45. Beate Dreike, *Herders Naturauffassung in ihrer Beeinflussung durch Leibniz' Philosophie* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1973).

46. Proß, commentary on "Wolff, Baumgarten und Leibniz," in *Herder und die Anthropologie der Aufklärung*, vol. 2 of *Werke*, by Herder, 863.

47. It was in this context that Kant's *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte* exerted its maximal influence on Herder, but one should not ignore such lesser essays as Kant's "Physical Monadology." That Kant abandoned these endeavors almost at the same moment that Herder took them up is a historical irony, not a philosophical verdict.

48. Proß, commentary on "Wolf, Baumgarten und Leibniz," 851.

49. Lindner, *Das Problem des Spinozismus im Schaffen Goethes und Herders* (Weimar: Arion, 1960), 90-91.

50. Herder, *Sämtliche Werke*, Suphan:8:358.

51. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:275. This conviction was the basis of Herder's dispute with Mendelssohn in the letters concerning the *Bestimmung des Menschen*.

52. "In the second half of the eighteenth century Leibniz was readily simplified in a monistic manner—and not just by Herder—to be set against the two-substance dualism of Wolff" (Pfothner, *Literarische Anthropologie*, 13). This way of interpreting Leibnizian monadology, I have suggested, permeated the philosophical milieu of the precritical Kant. Knutzen and Crusius took this line; Kant himself worked on physical monadology for the bulk of his precritical period. It was just here, Wolfgang Ritzel suggests, that Kant—the critical Kant—and Herder parted ways. Kant gave up the "force metaphysics" and Herder did not, writes Ritzel "this is when the ways of thought of Kant and Herder part" (*Immanuel Kant: Eine Biographie*, 69).

53. Lindner, *Problem des Spinozismus*, 93.

54. Wolfgang Proß, "Herder und die Anthropologie seiner Zeit," 1142, 1153, 1183.

55. That is, Condillac's dissertation on the monad, submitted to the Berlin Academy for the contest of 1747 and published together with the winning entry for that prize contest shortly thereafter (Condillac, *Les Monades*, ed. Laurence Bongie [Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1980]); and Diderot, "Leibnizianisme," in the *Encyclopédie*. On the influence of these thinkers on Herder's Leibniz reception, see Proß, "Herder und die Anthropologie seiner Zeit," 1138-42.

56. Cited in Proß, "Herder und die Anthropologie seiner Zeit," 1162.

57. Herder, *Journal meiner Reise*, DKV:9:19.

58. This appalled Kant, as he would demonstrate in the *Critique of Judgment*.

59. Herder, "Wie die Philosophie," DKV:1:101-34.

60. Moses Mendelssohn, "[Philosophical] Dialogues," in *Philosophical Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 96-129.

61. "Herder was familiar with Mendelssohn's *Gespräche*. It is entirely possible that they served as his first exposure to Spinoza as such. But Herder at the same time took a critical view of them" (Lindner, *Problem des Spinozismus*, 29 n).

62. Willi Vollrath, *Die Auseinandersetzung Herders mit Spinoza* (Dissertation; University of Gießen, 1911); Regine Otto, "Herder auf dem Weg zu Spinoza," *Weimarer Beiträge* 10 (1978): 165-77.

63. "Spinoza believed that everything existed in God. He . . . only assumed One Center, he called it God and World. One can therefore term him with equal justice an idealist as an atheist; he never was this latter. . . . Thus God belongs to the world, as the world to God. He is the principle: Everything

is therefore contingency insofar as it has its ground in God, but also necessary in so far as it belongs necessarily to the Thought of God" (see Herder, *Sämtliche Werke*, Suphan:32:228).

64. Lessing, "Durch Spinoza ist Leibnitz nur auf die Spur der vorherbestimmten Harmonie gekommen," in *Sämtliche Schriften*, vol. 14, by Lessing, ed. Karl Lachmann and Franz Muncker (Stuttgart: Göschen, 1886ff), 294–96; Lessing, "Über die Wirklichkeit der Dinge außer Gott," *Sämtliche Schriften*, 292–93.

65. Dreike and Proß claim a key influence to have been J. B. Robinet, whose work *De la Nature* was translated into German in 1764 and read by Herder shortly thereafter. In another of his works, Robinet wrote: "All of matter is organic, living, animate. An inorganic matter, dead, inanimate, is a chimera, an impossibility" [*Considérations sur le gradation naturelle* [Paris, 1768], 8; cited in Dreike, *Herders Naturauffassung*, 50]. Dreike observes that "more than Bonnet and Buffon, for him [Robinet] the question of the relation between body and soul was in the foreground; and in contrast to Leibniz, who rejected *influxus physicus*, reciprocal influence, Robinet insisted that the soul was capable of nothing without the intermediacy of the body or the material" (*Herders Naturauffassung*, 48). H. B. Nisbet has raised serious questions about the accuracy of this claim about Robinet's influence in "Herder, Goethe, and the Natural 'Type,'" *Proceedings of the English Goethe Society*, n.s., 37 (1966/67), 83–119, esp. 90–96.

66. Proß makes the important point that Diderot's article "Spinoziste," appeared in vol. 5 of the *Encyclopédie* in 1765, so that French Neo-Spinozism was fully deployed for Herder to take up into his reception.

67. I developed this argument in a paper entitled, "The Most Hidden Conditions of Men of the First Rank'—The Pantheist Current in Eighteenth-Century Germany 'Uncovered' by the Spinoza Controversy," for the conference on *Materialist Philosophy, Religious Heresy, and Political Radicalism, 1650–1800*, sponsored by the William Andrews Clark Memorial Library and the Center for Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Studies, UCLA, April 30–May 1, 1999.

68. "There is a generalized schematic antithesis, through which the traditional conceptual dichotomies from every domain are called up, from contemporary psychology through the theology of incarnation and crucifixion all the way to presocratic oppositional metaphors. Everywhere one seeks contradictory oppositions, in order to place oneself between them" (Timm, *Spinoza-renaissance*, vol. 1 of *Gott und die Freiheit: Studien zur Religionsgeschichte der Goethezeit* [Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1974], 228).

69. Herder, *Sämtliche Werke*, Suphan:9:536–540.

70. "This is a piece of *necessary* anthropology, for it is in the *depth* of the soul that our *strength* as *humans* resides" (Herder, "Plan zu einer Ästhetik," DKV:1:665).

71. Hans Adler, "*Fundus animae*—der Grund der Seele."

72. Adler, *Prägnanz des Dunklen*, 61.

73. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:281.

74. John Locke, *Of the Conduct of the Understanding*; cited in Buickrood, "Natural History," 169.

75. Adler, *Prägnanz des Dunklen*, 75–76.

76. Herder, *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, DKV:9:48.

77. Herder, Suphan:5:459. As Hans Adler explains, "logic ought to concern itself with the functions of thinking. . . . It is no longer in a position to give directions for how to think; rather, it [should] 'gather' how thinking actually took place." He elaborates: "Logical derivation [*Schlußfolgern*] presupposes attentiveness to the particular (*attentio*) and successive analysis of the parts of the particular (*reflexio*) which are to be compared to one another in a judgment." "Psychology should not be structured according to presupposed faculties, in order to subordinate affect and sensations under them, but rather all that in actuality manifests itself in affects and sensations needs in the first place to be observed [*beobachtet*] and grasped as unique, individual. 'No speculating, only gathering' is Herder's demand for a 'human science'" (*Prägnanz des Dunklen*, 71).

78. On Kant's suggestion that the question what human morals actually were came before determining what they ought to be, see Kant, *Nachricht*, AA:2:311. On the extension of this same line of thinking to logic, see Herder, "Wie die Philosophie zum Besten," DKV:1:110–12.

79. Herder, *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, DKV:9:27.

80. Rüdiger, as cited in Proß, "Herder und die Anthropologie seiner Zeit," 1151.

81. Herder, *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, DKV:9:48–50. Herder's reference to *bon sens* is to a work by the Marquis d'Argens, in which he found much that he disliked about French superficiality but also a clear statement of commitment to practical philosophy and to vitalist materialism. The idea of a new logic of creativity was already central to Herder's thinking in the essay, "Wie die Philosophie" of 1765.

82. Herder, review of Beattie, October 20, 1772, Suphan:5:456.

83. Herder, "Erhebung und Verlangen" (1764); cited in Dobbek, *Herders Jugendzeit*, 111.

84. "Relative to the scheme of [Bacon's] major work, to present a new hierarchy of all the sciences, Herder emphasizes the formal achievement of Bacon's empirical inductive method, which enthrones experience as the foundation of science" (Gunter Grimm, commentary on "Über Thomas Abbt's Schriften," DKV:2:1241).

Herder wants to displace the systematic-ahistorical claims of science by a historical perspective which anchors scientific progress in a genetic development of scientific discoveries and in the productive reception of traditional authors. In Herder's view, the task of the new scientist must be not simply to take over the method that was inaugurated by Francis Bacon, but also to explain that method in terms of its times and then to

develop it in terms of the knowledge of more recent times. In that way the modern scientist could become a 'second Bacon.'" (1243)

85. Herbert Dieckmann, "The Influence of Francis Bacon on Diderot's *Interprétation de la Nature*," in *Studien zur europäischen Aufklärung* (Munich: Fink, 1974), 34-57.

86. Diderot, *Pensées sur l'interprétation de la nature*, II; as cited in Dieckmann, "Influence of Francis Bacon," 38. Here we have another instance of the master metaphor of the new way of thinking of the mid-eighteenth century.

87. Diderot, as cited in *ibid.*, 41.

88. Bacon, *New Organon*, as cited in *ibid.*, 43. This criticism of Baconianism, and more generally of empirical inquiry, epitomized Kant's "critical" philosophy of science, invoked quite fiercely against the new anthropology in Germany, as we have seen.

89. Nisbet, "Herder and Francis Bacon," *Modern Language Review* 62 (1967): 271-72.

90. Elie Zahar, "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Invention?" *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 34 (1983): 243-61; Clifford Hooker, "Surface Dazzle, Ghostly Depths," in *Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Explanation*, ed. Paul Churchland and Clifford Hooker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

91. Nisbet, "Herder and Francis Bacon," 270.

92. This has been the entire thrust of the "postpositivist philosophy of science." For the major literature, see *The Science Studies Reader*, ed. Mario Biagioli (New York: Routledge, 1999). For a particularly powerful rendition of the complexities of actual scientific practice that seems to allow a much more generous reception of Herder's ideas, see Andy Pickering, *The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

93. Nisbet, *Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science* (Cambridge: Modern Humanities Research Association, 1970), 20. Nisbet seems to share the view of Robert Schofield, but there has been a substantial revision of interpretation of eighteenth-century physical science, e.g., P. M. Heimann and J. E. McGuire, "Newtonian Forces and Lockian Powers: Concepts of Matter in 18th-Century Thought," *Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences* 8 (1971): 233-306. I have discussed this literature in my earlier study of Kant and again in my juxtaposition of Kant's philosophy of science with that of Herder in terms of the practice and theory of science of the close of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century.

94. Nisbet, *Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science*, 327.

95. Diderot, *Pensées sur l'interprétation de la Nature*.

96. Nisbet, *Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science*, 271.

97. Porter, "Medical Science and Human Science in the Enlightenment,"

98. Pfotenhauer, *Literarische Anthropologie*, 7.

99. Karl Figlio makes the key point succinctly: "It was a reorientation towards epistemology and methodology in place of ontology. The nature of the soul was in principle unknowable, but so was the nature of any substance or force" ("Theories of Perception and the Physiology of Mind in the late Eighteenth Century," *History of Science* 12 [1975]: 183). And see Roger Smith, "The Background of Physiological Psychology in Natural Philosophy," *History of Science* 11 (1973): 75–123, esp. 79: "functional concepts have enabled scientists to develop a discipline of physiological psychology in spite of tendencies towards a dualistic ontological framework."

100. Proß, commentary on "Fragmente über Wolff, Baumgarten und Leibniz," 852.

101. Adler, *Prägnanz des Dunklen*, 84.

102. Heinz, *Sensualistischer Idealismus*, 14.

103. Gaier, "Commentary," DKV:1:868.

104. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:257.

105. Adler, *Prägnanz des Dunklen*, 100; he elaborates: "Art and literature are prominent objects of consideration in this vantage because they are the human practices which in a unique measure bespeak the disposition to gnoseology" (101). That is, they *express* the elements of human nature that "gnoseology" seeks to disembody.

106. Herder, Suphan:4:25.

107. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, Suphan:4:97.

108. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:343.

109. Kant, [Anthropologie-] *Vorlesungen des Wintersemesters 1772/73* (Collins), AA:25:1:8.

110. Herder, *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, DKV:9:48.

111. Herder, *Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele*, Suphan:8:180. For an older survey of Herder's psychological endeavors, see Ernst Probst, *Herder als Psychologe* (Dissertation; University of Bern, 1923).

112. Proß, "Herder und die Anthropologie," 1200–1203. Mortier claims there is no evidence that Herder ever read Diderot's *Pensées sur l'Interprétation de la Nature* (Diderot en Allemagne, 352). That is simply hard to believe; in the absence of evidence to the contrary, I submit, we should presume his familiarity with that crucial text for the whole German *Aufklärung*.

113. Clark, *Herder*, 58.

114. Beate Dreike notes that Herder was assuredly aware of Bonnet's *Contemplation de la Nature* (1764), in which Bonnet fused Haller with Leibniz (Dreike, *Herders Naturauffassung*, 41–43). In one of the reviews he composed for the Königsberg newspaper in the mid-1760s, Herder "took up the question of the harmony between the external and the internal, between the state of the soul and that of the body," Dreike elaborates (16; citing Suphan:8:162). Michael Hagner has aptly observed that "Haller's physiology and its success expressed

the existing need to find a middle ground on the question of the relevance of nature for the determination of the place of man between materialism and animism of the Stahlian variety" ("Aufklärung über das Menschenhirn," in *Der ganze Mensch*, ed. Schings, 147). He goes on to claim, "Herder appears among the earliest to grasp this process of transformation . . . taking account of a metaphysical as well as a natural-historical determination of man" (148). See also Johann Marbach, "Beiträge Albrecht von Hallers zu Herders Anthropologie unter besonderer Berücksichtigung sprachlich-literarischer Aspekte," *Annali* 7 (1964): 41-60.

115. Proß, "Herder und die Anthropologie," 1200-1203.

116. Herder to Merck, September 1771: "I have thoroughly studied his [Haller's] sections on physiology [senses, powers of the soul, and economy of life]." Yet Herder went on to add that while he had the greatest respect for Haller, he could not bring himself to "enthusiasm" for the man (Nisbet, *Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science*, 263).

117. Simon Richter, "Medizinischer und ästhetischer Diskurs im 18. Jahrhundert: Herder und Haller über Reiz," *Lessing Yearbook* 25 (1993): 89.

118. "Haller had attempted to give vitalism an exact basis," Nisbet writes (*Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science*, 42), but that was a "futile quest," which, in his view, Herder nonetheless pursued.

119. Richter, "Medizinischer und ästhetischer Diskurs," 87.

120. Herder, *Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele*, Suphan:8:171.

121. Nisbet, *Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science*, 257.

122. Nisbet's predilections are apparent in his invocation of Max Dessoir, a turn-of-the-century historian of psychology, on the question of the concept "life" for science: "As Dessoir observes in his history of psychology, the conception of 'life' is merely an abstraction from observed processes such as nutrition, growth, reproduction, etc. But used in an explanatory sense . . . life takes on a reality of its own, quite apart from observed phenomena. Such vitalism simply explains *ignotum per ignotius*" (*Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science*, 196). Not to belabor an overused instance, but much the same could be said of gravity, indeed, of any theoretical concept in science, and this logical positivist scruple has been exploded in philosophy of science for a generation now.

123. "Herder's ideas . . . resemble twentieth-century theories of emergent evolutionism" (Liebel-Weckowicz, "Herder's Place in the Development of Ideas on Human Genesis and Evolution," *Eighteenth-Century Life* 9 [1984]: 76).

124. "'Reiz' is for Herder neither a physical nor a physiological phenomenon in the strict sense, it is simply an ingredient in his basically metaphysical, Leibnizian psychology, lending it outwardly a physiological and scientific colouring" (Nisbet, *Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science*, 264). Herder did not "make clear distinctions between the physiological, the

psychological, and the metaphysical aspects of consciousness" (254). Rather, he used Haller as "a means of bridging the dualistic gap between mind and body, and between emotion and reason, whereas Haller had related them to definite physiological functions of the body" (264). Indeed, all this is true. What is not so true is Nisbet's verdict that this was scientifically nefarious.

125. Richter, "Medizinischer und ästhetischer Diskurs," 83.

126. Kant would therefore seek in his *Critique of Judgment* systematically to ban *Reiz* from "pure" aesthetic judgments, which should be "disinterested." On the residual fear of feminine beauty and allure that informed this Kantian strategy in the third *Critique*, see Susan Shell, *The Embodiment of Reason*, 219-24.

127. Richter, "Medizinischer und ästhetischer Diskurs," 90.

128. Kurt Danziger, "Generative Metaphor."

129. Nisbet, *Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science*, 274, 266. See chapter 6 above for the argument for the newer approach.

130. Stanley Jackson, "Force and Kindred Notions in Eighteenth Century Neurophysiology and Medical Psychology," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 44 (1969): 397-410.

131. Elizabeth Haigh, "Vitalism, the Soul, and Sensibility: The Physiology of Théophile Bordeu," *Journal of the History of Medicine* 31 (1976): 30-41. And, monumentally, Jacques Roger, *Les sciences de la vie dans la pensée française du XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1963).

132. Heinz, *Sensualistischer Idealismus*, 8.

133. Herder, *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, DKV:9:119.

134. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:274.

135. "Thus, from the reworking of the impressions of sight arise the ideas of distance, space and substance, from the reworking of those of hearing arise the representations of succession and thus of time, and finally from the feeling of touch, the representation of unity and multiplicity and also of cause and effect" (Proß, commentary on *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, in *Herder und die Anthropologie der Aufklärung*, by Herder, 876).

136. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:325.

137. "The sense of touch is according to Herder the sense for the inner forces of the soul, through which it constructed its body, hence the sense for the force of attraction of one's own soul and the force of repulsion of the world, the consciousness of the strivings of the self and at the same time the consciousness of being limited by external forces. On the basis of the universal claim of this statement, the sense of touch is the metaphysical sense" (Wisbert, commentary on "Gesetze der Welt, Gesetze der Körper," DKV:9:1077).

138. Herder, *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, 110.

139. Wisbert, commentary on *Journal meiner Reise*, DKV:9:956.

140. Proß, "Herder und die Anthropologie seiner Zeit," 1187.

141. Condillac, *Treatise on the Sensations* (1754).

142. Herder explicitly invokes Diderot and the Molyneux problem with reference to his investigation of touch and sight in *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:294. See John Davis, "The Molyneux Problem," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 21 (1960): 392-408.

143. Berkeley, *New Theory of Vision*.

144. Diderot, *Letter Concerning the Blind*.

145. Condillac, *Treatise on the Sensations*.

146. Aarsleff ("The Tradition of Condillac") rejects this representation of Condillac and suggests that Herder in fact derived a great deal from the authentically dynamic approach of Condillac to reflection and language.

147. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:294-96, 320.

148. Raymond Immerwahr, "Diderot, Herder, and the Dichotomy of Touch and Sight," *Seminar* 14 (1978): 84-96; Jean Chabbert, "Le jeune Herder et Diderot: Une relation paradoxale?" *Beiträge zur Romanischen Philologie* 24 (1985); Lionel Gossman, "Berkeley, Hume, and Maupertuis," *French Studies* 14 (1960): 304-24.

149. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:325.

150. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen* (DKV:2:349) on Burke. Herder calls him the "British philosopher of experience . . . with whom Moses [Mendelssohn] has acquainted us" (349). On Morelly, see Ralph Häfner, "Herder und Morelly: Ein Beitrag zu Herders Psychologie um 1770," *Euphorion* 87 (1993): 329-46.

151. Herder, "Plan zu einer Ästhetik," DKV:1:668-70.

152. On this work, see, especially, Marion Heinz, *Sensualistischer Idealismus*.

153. Lepenies, "Germany: The Search for a New Ancestor," in *Anthropology: Ancestors and Heirs*, ed. Stanley Diamond (The Hague: Mouton, 1980), 407.

154. Reiner Wisbert, commentary on *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, DKV:9:877.

155. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen* DKV:2:325. Marion Heinz observes: "mankind individualizes itself in the same way that a single person does" ("Historismus oder Metaphysik? Zu Herders Bückeburger Geschichtsphilosophie," in *Johann Gottfried Herder: Geschichte und Kultur*, ed. Bollacher, 83). See also Fritz Wafelmeyer, "Herders Kulturanthropologie und die Frage nach der Geschichtlichkeit des Seelischen," in *Wegbereiter der Historischen Psychologie* (Munich: Psychologie Verlags-Union Beltz, 1988), 28-40.

156. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:281. Compare this with the language of Herder's *Ideen*, where reason is notoriously described as "ein Vernommenes," i.e., something acquired.

157. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:280-85.

158. Gaier, commentary on "Wie die Philosophie," DKV:1:849.

159. Herder, *Viertes Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:302.

160. Roy Pascal holds that it was not until 1769 that Herder "thr[ew] himself into the study of history" ("Herder and the Scottish Historical School," *Publications of the English Goethe Society*, n.s., 14 [Cambridge, 1939], 28).

161. Reiner Wisbert, commentary on *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, DKV:9:879. Roy Pascal has noted that Herder's "philosophy of nature . . . closely accompanies and supplements his historical thought" ("Herder and the Scottish Historical School," 25).

162. Herder, "Über Thomas Abbt's Schriften," DKV:2:572.

163. "Buffon's *Histoire Naturelle* influenced essentially Herder's conception of natural history and his way of thinking in general" (Wisbert, commentary on *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, DKV:9:898).

164. Herder, "Gesetze der Welt: Gesetze der Körper," DKV:9:222. See Eugen Sauter, *Herder und Buffon* (Rixheim: Sutter & Cie, 1910).

165. The Scottish Enlightenment was itself strongly influenced by Buffon's idea of "natural history." See Paul Wood, "Buffon's Reception in Scotland: The Aberdeen Connection," *Annals of Science* 44 (1987): 169-90, and P. H. Reill, "Buffon and Historical Thought in Germany and Great Britain."

166. Herder, review of Millar, *Frankfurter Zeitung*, September 25, 1772, Suphan:5:452.

167. See Adam Smith, "The Four Stages of Society," (from *Lectures in Jurisprudence*) in Alexander Broadie, ed., *The Scottish Enlightenment: An Anthology* (Edinburgh: Canongate Classics, 1997), 475-87. See also John Brewer, "Conjectural History, Sociology and Social Change in Eighteenth-Century Scotland," in *The Making of Modern Scotland*, ed. D. McCrone, S. Kendrick, and P. Straw (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1989), 13-30; H. M. Höpfl, "From Savage to Scotsman: Conjectural History in the Scottish Enlightenment," *Journal of British Studies* 17 (1978): 19-40; Roger Emerson, "American Indians, Frenchmen, and Scots Philosophers," *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture* 9 (1979): 211-36.

168. He criticized it in his *Ideen* (Suphan:13:310).

169. R. Pascal, "Herder and the Scottish Historical School," 35.

170. Herder, *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, DKV:9:29.

171. Herder, *Auch einer Philosophie der Geschichte*, Suphan:5:509.

172. "Herder is especially concerned with the world views and values of native peoples as expressed in language, mythology, folk-song, and 'national character.' . . . In contrast, he shows little interest in native institutions—in economic and social organization, trade, legal customs, and so forth" (Gerald Broce, "Herder and Ethnography," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 22 [1986]: 163). A source of considerable significance for Herder's understanding may well have been the pioneering classical philologist Christian Gottlob Heyne (1729-1812) of Göttingen, whose idea of the total *habitus* of a culture was influential also on Johann Blumenbach. Heyne in fact made a strenuous effort to bring Herder into the Göttingen faculty; it is known that he incited Herder to write his polemical review of Schlözer.

173. Pascal, "Herder and the Scottish Historical School," 33. Pascal claims that "in contrast with their [the Scottish historians'] sober, scientific conceptions, . . . Herder's are obscure and confused," but he does grant that Herder's recognition of "beliefs of a people as an historical force, actively contributing in shaping the future of that people," represented a valid counterpoint to their economic-institutional contextualism (40–41). For a more nuanced view, see Fania Oz-Salzberger, *Translating the Enlightenment: Scottish Civil Discourse in Eighteenth-Century Germany*, passim.

174. Herder, "Älteres Wäldchen," as cited in Wisbert, commentary, DKV:9:822.

175. Herder, *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte*, DKV:4:9–108. See Friedrich Meinecke's problematic but influential study, *Historism*.

176. In *Yet Another Philosophy of History* Herder termed them "Schöndenker who take the polish of our century for the *non plus ultra* of mankind" (Suphan:5:524).

177. On Iselin, see H. Adler, *Prägnanz des Dunklen*, 151–56; Reill, *German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism*, 65–69.

178. Herder extended his critique from Iselin to the whole of this proto-Whig historiography in his polemical *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1774), in which he railed against the simultaneously smug and superficial fashion of Enlightenment ideology he associated with Voltaire, Hume, Helvétius, and Bayle (Herder, *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte*, Suphan:5:524). See also Herder's review of Beattie (1772), Suphan:5:457.

179. Reill, *The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism*, 36.

180. Gatterer reviewed Abbt's contribution to universal history in *Allgemeine historische Bibliothek* 4 (1767): 229–92. Zande thinks Gatterer was "quite right that Abbt was not interested in history as a field of empirical inquiry" ("Popular Philosophy and the History of Mankind," 49).

181. Reill, *The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism*, 72.

182. "For Herder—but not only for Herder—history was a supremely philosophical discipline, and as such it was to be conducted by observing the most strict philosophical method available" (Norton, *Herder's Aesthetics and the European Enlightenment*, 53). This was the way in which Herder was both a promoter and a critic of the "*schönen Wissenschaften*." He believed they were indeed *Wissenschaften*, not just literary palaver, and in just this measure, they required rigorous method, and that was what he conceived philosophy to entail. See Strube, "Die Geschichte des Begriffs 'schöne Wissenschaften,'" 198–201.

183. It is a bit too guildlike to maintain, e.g., that "the difference between Herder and Schlözer is that between historical science sure of its facts and universalistic philosophy of history" (Steffen Dietzsch, "Ist Geschichte als Naturgeschichte möglich?" 149). But it is not altogether amiss to register a difference in sensibility and in object.

184. M. Kay Flavell, "Winckelmann and the German Enlightenment: On the Recovery and Uses of the Past," *Modern Language Review* 74 (1979): 79-96.

185. Wisbert, commentary on *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, DKV:9:226.

186. Jacques Taminiaux, *La nostalgie de la Grèce à l'aube de l'idéalisme allemand* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1967).

187. Herder, "Älteres Wäldchen," DKV:2:23-32.

188. Rudolf Stadelmann argues that this attunement to historical development was the core of Herder's historical sense: *Der historische Sinn bei Herder*, 55.

189. It is not very likely coincidental that this was also the endeavor of Gatterer in his inaugural essay, "Vom historischen Plan" (1767), which Herder considered the clearest statement of the Göttingen historical method.

190. Herder, "Early Leaves of Critical Groves," in *On World History* (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1997), 28.

191. Herder, "An den Herrn Direktor der Historischen Gesellschaft in Göttingen," (1768) in Herder, *Ausgewählte Werke in Einzelausgaben: Schriften zur Literatur*, 2/1: *Kritische Wälder*, ed. Regine Otto (Berlin, 1990), 688. See Seeba, "Geschichte als Dichtung: Herders Beitrag zur Ästhetisierung der Geschichtsschreibung," *Storia della Storiografia* 8 (1985): 50-72.

192. Herder, "An den Herrn Direktor," 688.

193. Herder, *Fragments: First Collection*, in *Selected Early Works, 1764-1767*, 127.

194. "In Germany, he wanted, as Herder wrote in December 1766, to bring Hume 'into closest proximity' with Thomas Abbt" (Wisbert, commentary on *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, DKV:9:898 [see Herder, *Briefe: Gesamtausgabe*, 68, 76]). In a letter to Scheffner, July 22, 1767, Herder wrote enthusiastically about Hume's "discourse on history," which he believed he interpreted along the same lines as Scheffner (*Lebensbild*, vol. 1, 241).

195. Abbt, in *Briefe, die neueste Litteratur betreffend*, 9:118-28; cited in Menze and Menges, commentary, *Selected Early Works, 1764-1767*, by Herder, 260-61.

196. "While advocating historical pragmatism, he could not discover meaningful causal patterns in the historical facts." He concluded, grimly, that "man's activities in history did not show a recognizable pattern at all" (Zande, "Popular Philosophy and the History of Mankind," *Storia della Storiografia* 22 [1992]: 46, 48).

197. Peter H. Reill, *The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism*, passim. See also the brief entry by M. Hahn, "Geschichte, pragmatisch," in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 3, ed. J. Ritter (Basel: Schwabe, 1974), 401-2.

198. Johann Gatterer, "Vom historischen Plan und der darauf sich gründenden Zusammenhang der Erzählungen," *Allgemeine Historische Bibliothek* I (1767), 80-81.

199. Michaelis, cited in Reill, *German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism*, 42.

200. Ibid., 42-43. Kant discussed pragmatic history in his *Blomberg Logic* lectures of 1771 or 1772: "That history which becomes useful through universal rules is called pragmatic. . . . Learned history becomes pragmatic when one considers learnedness in relation to human reason, if one looks to its growth or to the causes by which it is held back" (AA:24:297). That has a somewhat different tenor from the wider Enlightenment usage, but Reinhard Brandt argues that Gatterer and his colleagues were the direct source of Kant's idea of the pragmatic ("Ausgewählte Probleme," 21-22).

201. Reill, *German Enlightenment*, 34, 41, and passim.

202. Ibid., 59. Alfred Baumler made this point earlier: "the rise of the historical view of life in the eighteenth century is inextricably connected with the genesis of modern aesthetics" (*Das Irrationalitätsproblem* [Halle: Niemeyer, 1923], 53-54). Norton draws all these ideas together in "A Philosophical History of Aesthetics," chapter 2 of his *Herder's Aesthetics and the European Enlightenment*, 51-81, the gist of which is the important claim that Herder's "'historical sense' was in fact the result of his attempt to harness the greatest diversity of empirical data within a single theoretical model" (54).

203. Reill, *German Enlightenment*, 114; see Moravia, "The Enlightenment and the Sciences of Man."

204. Reill, *German Enlightenment*, 47.

205. Zande, "Popular Philosophy and the History of Mankind," 38-39.

206. See Herder's references to Gatterer's works, starting with *Fragments: First Collection*, DKV:1:625, which noted Gatterer's *Abriß einer Universalgeschichte*. Herder referred frequently to Gatterer as the main theorist of the "art of history" and referred frequently to the essay "Vom historischen Plan," from the *Allgemeine historische Bibliothek*. Hence he decided to send Gatterer his own methodological reflections on history, as we will note.

207. Karl Renatus Hausen (1740-1805), author of *Versuch einer pragmatischen Geschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts* (1766) and *Pragmatische Geschichte der Protestanten in Deutschland* (1767). Herder makes a glancing, sarcastic reference to these in "Über Thomas Abbt's Schriften" (573), and the reference is explained in the commentary (1239).

208. Herder, "An den Herrn Direktor," 684-91.

209. Herder, review of Schlözer, July 28, 1772, Suphan:5:436-40. See Karl Fink, "Rhetoric of the Review," and Robert Leventhal, "Progression and Particularity." Fink offers a thought-provoking characterization of the exchange; it was, he writes, "a conflict between learned, established historians of the profession and critical, philosophical writers with a literary frame of reference" ("Rhetoric of the Review," 67). "Schlözer's response to Herder's review was

primarily an appeal to the authority of the guild" (71). That made it a salient episode in the conflict of popular with academic forms of German Enlightenment.

210. Herder, "An den Herrn Direktor," 685.

211. "To attempt absolute objectivity and undertake 'pure' historical studies was to remove oneself from one's own existence and evade the purpose of the study of history, namely, coming to understand one's own" (Hassell, "Johann Gottfried Herder: A Lost Ancestor," *Dialectical Anthropology* 5 [1981]: 333).

212. Herder, *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, DKV:9:27.

213. Herder to Kant, November 1768, AA:10:76–77.

214. Herder, "Do We Still Have a Public," in *Selected Early Works, 1764–1767*, 66.

215. Herder, *Älteres Kritisches Wäldchen*, DKV:2:21; tr. "Early Leaves of Critical Groves," in *On World History*, 30–31.

216. "What 'pragmatic' writers of history presented was 'actually only their story, that is, the novel of their conjuration [*ihres Kopfes und Hirnes*], what they perceived in the matter'" (Rudolf Stadelmann, *Der historische Sinn bei Herder* [Halle: Niemeyer, 1928], 16; citing Herder, Suphan:8:167). According to Stadelmann, Hume represented a form of subjective history that Herder sought to transcend (17; citing Suphan:4:201). However, Stadelmann also recognizes that Herder tends to *overstate* his empiricism in the course of his polemics, and that his own deepest historicist insight was that the historian's subjectivity was ineluctable (20).

217. Herder to Kant, November 1768, AA:10:76–77.

218. Herder, "On Christian Wolff's Writings," Suphan:32:158.

219. On the contribution of the young Herder to historicism, see Gerhard vom Hofe, "'Weitstrahl'sinnige' Ur-kunde. Zur Eigenart und Begründung des Historismus beim jungen Herder," in *Johann Gottfried Herder, 1744–1803* (1987), 364–82; Tino Markworth, "Unterwegs zum Historismus: Der Wandel des geschichtsphilosophischen Denkens Herders von 1771 bis 1773," in *Johann Gottfried Herder: Geschichte und Kultur*, ed. Bollacher, 51–59; Michael Maurer, "Die Geschichtsphilosophie des jungen Herder in ihrem Verhältnis zur Aufklärung," in *Johann Gottfried Herder, 1744–1803*, ed. Gerhard Sauder (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), 141–55; Jürgen Jacobs, "'Universalgeschichte der Bildung der Welt.' Die Problematik des Historismus beim frühen Herder," *Johann Gottfried Herder: Geschichte und Kultur*, ed. Bollacher, 61–73; Marion Heinz, "Historismus oder Metaphysik? Zu Herders Bückeburger Geschichtsphilosophie," in *Johann Gottfried Herder: Geschichte und Kultur*, ed. Bollacher, 75–85.

220. Herder, "Über Thomas Abbt's Schriften," DKV:2:572.

221. "As a historically constituted and constituting structure of various powers itself, the subject experiences the historicity as non-identity, as becoming-other while remembering and taking up the previous forms of its

own multifarious being. The medium of this dialectic of identity and difference is language" (Leventhal, *Disciplines of Interpretation*, 182).

222. Leventhal goes too far (*Disciplines of Interpretation*, 198) in rendering history impossible for Herder. At 201 he reads Herder as De Man two hundred years early.

223. Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*.

224. Herder, "Über Thomas Abbts Schriften," DKV:2:576.

225. Herder, "Über Thomas Abbts Schriften," DKV:2:571-80; Hans-Dietrich Irmscher, "Herders Hermeneutik." See also Emil Staiger, "Der neue Geist in Herders Frühwerk," in Staiger, *Stilwandel*, 121-75.

226. Herder, "Über Thomas Abbts Schriften," DKV:2:576.

227. Herder, "Shakespeare," in *Eighteenth-Century German Criticism*, ed. Timothy Chamberlain (New York: Continuum, 1992), 143-63.

228. Hinrich Seeba, "Geschichte als Dichtung."

229. Herder, "Über Thomas Abbts Schriften," DKV:2:580.

230. Jacob, "Universalgeschichte der Bildung der Welt," 68.

231. Herder, *Viertes Kritische Wäldchen*, DKV:2:287.

232. Herder, "Shakespeare," 143.

233. Ibid., 159. This is what Gadamer means by *Wirkungsgeschichte*.

234. Kant's most hostile *Reflexionen* concerning Herder date from the aftermath of these manifestos of *Sturm und Drang*. He felt personally affronted, and he was not wrong.

235. Herder, *Ursprung der Sprache*, Suphan:5:147.

236. G. A. Wells, *Herder and After: A Study in the Development of Sociology* (The Hague: Mouton, 1959).

237. Robert Mayo, *Herder and the Beginnings of Comparative Literature* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969).

238. Helen Liebel-Weckowicz, "Herder's Place in the Development of Ideas on Human Genesis"; Paul Salmon, "Herder's Essay on the Origin of Language, and the Place of Man in the Animal Kingdom," *German Life and Letters* 22 (1968): 59-70; Reinhard Löw, "Herder und die Evolution," in *Oikeiosis. Festschrift für Robert Spaemann* (Weinheim: VCH, 1987), 131-47.

239. There is some confusion about this, based on a passage in *Ideen*, part 1, in which Herder seems to be critical of epigenesis. But I would suggest that a thoughtful reading of the passage in question points to Herder's discriminating repudiation of Kant's half-hearted epigenesis, which was at that time still almost indistinguishable from preformation, on behalf of a more thoroughgoing epigenesis of the sort Caspar Wolff had pioneered in the 1750s and Johann Blumenbach was to develop over the course of his career, ultimately forcing Kant to tailor his own account.

240. Nisbet, *Herder on the Philosophy and History of Science*, 11-12.

241. Robert Bernasconi, ed., *The Idea of Race* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000).
242. Hans-Jakob Werlen, "Semiotische Verwandtschaften—Sprache und (Wirtschafts-)Wissenschaft in Herders 'Ideen,'" paper presented at the International Herder Society Conference on *Ideen*, Weimar, Germany, August 2000.
243. Gerald Broce ("Herder and Ethnography," 164) comes to the same conclusion.
244. Luanne Frank, "Herder's *Essay on the Origin of Language*," *Forum Linguisticum* 7 (1982): 15-26; Dietrich Mühlberg, "Herders Theorie der Kulturgeschichte in ihrer Bedeutung für die Begründung der Kulturwissenschaft," *Jahrbuch für Volkskunde und Kulturgeschichte* 27 (1984): 9-26; Malve von Hassell, "Johann Gottfried Herder, A Lost Ancestor," *Dialectical Anthropology* 5 (1981): 331-39; Gerald Broce, "Herder and Ethnography."
245. Fink, "Review," 58-59; see also Fink, "Storm and Stress Anthropology."
246. Fink, "Review," 63 n.
247. Maurer, "Geschichtsphilosophie," 154.
248. Brian Whittton, "Herder's Critique of the Enlightenment: Cultural Community versus Cosmopolitan Rationalism," *History and Theory* 27 (1988): 146-68.
249. "Books Six and Eleven serve as an anthropological survey drawn from the literature of travel, which provides a useful framework for a summary of Herder's ethnography and its sources" (Broce, "Herder and Ethnography," 152).

CONCLUSION

1. The great traditional text on this is Richard Kroner, *Von Kant bis Hegel*. For a recent and problematizing consideration of this period, see Frederick Beiser, *The Fate of Reason*.
2. There is something of substance in Herder's *Metakritik* and in *Kalligone*, but candor mandates acknowledgment that there are also painful excesses throughout both works.
3. See the essays in *Herder und die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, ed. Marion Heinz.
4. Humboldt's "Plan für eine Anthropologie" of 1794, along with his whole linguistic orientation, owes a great deal to Herder. As to Hegel, in addition to the whole historicization of reason, I would point to the emphasis on *Sittlichkeit* over against *Moral* as a key instance of Herderian influence.
5. Thus, the association of the "philosophical physician" with popular philosophy; see W. Coleman, "Health and Hygiene in the *Encyclopédie*: A Medical Doctrine for the Bourgeoisie," *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 29 (1974): 399-421. In the words of Hans-Jürgen Schings, "Anthropological understanding of man aims, thus, to set in motion the moral and political improvement of mankind" ("Der philosophische Arzt," 22).

6. Monika Firla attempts to develop all that can be said toward Kant as a transcendental anthropologist in *Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Anthropologie und Moral Philosophie bei Kant*. On a more cautious line, Felicitas Munzel assembles a considerable case that Kant worked out, far more richly than we conventionally believe, how an applied moral anthropology might look, via the crucial concept of "character" (*Kant's Conception of Moral Character*).

7. Firla, who believes this is possible, explicitly challenges the whole tradition from Erdmann and Arnoldt to Hinske and Brandt (*Untersuchungen*, 80ff).

8. Brandt and Stark, "Einleitung," AA:25:1:xlvi-xlviii; Brandt, "Ausgewählte Probleme," 29; Brandt, "Kants pragmatische Anthropologie," 43.

9. Allen Wood, "Unsociable Sociability: The Anthropological Basis for Kant's Ethics," *Philosophical Topics* 19 (1991): 325-51.

10. A list of some notable recent monographs illustrates this: Hannah Ginsborg, *The Role of Taste in Kant's Theory of Cognition* (New York: Garland, 1990); Victoria Wike, *Kant on Happiness in Ethics* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994); Susan Neiman, *The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Sarah Gibbons, *Kant's Theory of Imagination: Bridging Gaps in Judgement and Experience* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994).

11. Robert Pippin, "Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 17:2 (1987): 449-76; Henry Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Karl Ameriks and Dieter Sturma, eds., *The Modern Subject: Conceptions of the Self in Classical German Philosophy* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995).

12. Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Experience of Freedom* (1993; citing from paperback: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2-3.

13. Karl Ameriks, "On Paul Guyer's *Kant and the Experience of Freedom*," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 55:2 (1995): 361.

14. Guyer, *Kant and the Experience of Freedom*, 19.

15. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, introduction, §ii, AA:5:176; tr. 15.

16. Guyer, *Kant and the Experience of Freedom*, 19.

17. Paul Crowther, "The Significance of Kant's Pure Aesthetic Judgement," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 36:2 (1996): 116.

18. Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, §59, AA:5:351ff; tr. 225ff.

19. Nancy Sherman, "Reasons and Feelings in Kantian Morality," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 55:2 (1995): 369.

20. Allen Wood, "Unsociable Sociability: The Anthropological Basis of Kantian Ethics," *Philosophical Topics* 19:1 (1991): 325-51.


21. Felicitas Munzel, "The Beautiful Is the Symbol of the Morally-Good," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 33:2 (1995): 301-30; Frederick Rauscher, "Pure Reason and the Moral Law: A Source of Kant's Critical Philosophy," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 13:2 (1996): 255-71; Holly Wilson,

"Kant's Integration of Morality and Anthropology," *Kant-Studien* 88 (1997): 87-104. Of course, substantial issues remain, some of which have been articulated by Paul Stern in "The Problem of History and Temporality in Kantian Ethics," *Review of Metaphysics* 39 (1986): 505-45.

22. Andrews Reath, "Kant's Theory of Moral Sensibility," *Kant-Studien* 80 (1989): 284-302; Steven Engstrom, "The Concept of the Highest Good in Kant's Moral Theory," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 52 (1992): 747-80; Christine Korsgaard, *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); see also Barbara Herman, *The Practice of Moral Judgment* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); and see Felicitas Munzel, *Kant's Conception of Moral Character* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).



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